Now this is an interesting topic. Cause the Germans are actually renowned for meticulous planning. They're industrial economy is historically famous for top notch organization and it remains to be so today as well. They had experience of transformation to war economy under Luddendorf's leadership in WW1, and no matter what, almost single handedly fighting Russia, UK and France on 2 fronts for so many years of WW1 in the conditions of trade blockade imposed by Royal Navy proved their immense capabilities in the department of war/industrial management. Now, they do get bad rap for their planning in ww2 and rightfuly so, but let's not treat them as amateurs. They screwed up, that is clear. What I wonder is - why?
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Now this is an interesting topic. Cause the Germans are actually renowned for meticulous planning. They're industrial economy is historically famous for top notch organization and it remains to be so today as well. They had experience of transformation to war economy under Luddendorf's leadership in WW1, and no matter what, almost single handedly fighting Russia, UK and France on 2 fronts for so many years of WW1 in the conditions of trade blockade imposed by Royal Navy proved their immense capabilities in the department of war/industrial management. Now, they do get bad rap for their planning in ww2 and rightfuly so, but let's not treat them as amateurs. They screwed up, that is clear. What I wonder is - why?
In one word: resource constraints.
The "miracle of 1944" is basically based on the fact that continuing the current path will lead to defeat anyway, so there is no reason not to use now the stockpiles of resources we had. If we cannot solve the problems of 1944 then there will be no problems for 1945 anyway.
Similarly after Cobra and Bagratyion a large number of previously protected industrial workers were conscripted providing a temporarily boost for the quality of the Wehrmacht (see e.g. from Market Garden till Battle of the Bulge or battles in Hungary)... because the other alternative would be that the Allies occupy those industrial areas anyway.
But both of those actions were like cutting the one of my legs and eating it to avoid hunger. Neither sustainable and not without a high loss of capabilities.
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I think this might be a bad way to look at the decision the decision isn't a short term solution that causes long term problems it's a short term decision that can hopefully be used to solve the long term issue by providing the means to fix it. It isn't a decision made without thought or a possibility of success its one made because if it works maybe you can fix that long term issue and if it doesn't you only speed up the inevitable crisis.
That being said I'm hardly limiting this to the germans I would like some other nation's perspectives on the topic. Italy the UK the US Japan France would be quite interesting as to how many free french there were and how they went about getting more.
I think a lot of this discussion from the last few posts really shows just how bad of an alliance the axis was, however. How little they trust each other while on the other hand with how scared the west was of the soviets how willing they were to cooperate.
The Germans did not burned those supplies previously, because they knew they cannot replenish them that fast, and when it is gone it is gone. On the other hand it might not have been a stupid idea to do it in 1941/1942 when it might actually mattered (either via decisive victory or the N-square law... here losing 100 men and 10 tanks less, there causing 100 extra casualty and 10 destroyed artillery).
On the other hand Typhoon was exactly this push harder in the hope that the sacrifice tip the balance.
Interesting perspective and would explain a lot if true, but may I ask what resource stockpiles do you have in mind? Can you refer me to any information source talking about it?
Yes I understand that my point merely is if you have a bunch of bad options available and you are on track for a crisis risking the crisis happing sooner on the off chance you can prevent it or fix it down the line is a risky move but not one made no thought or long term goals in mind but like you said it would have been better to do so earlier.
Adam Tooze's Wages of Destruction is IMO the ultimate layman's reading on Nazi Germany and its economics. It conclusively debunks a bunch of myths like "unmobilized economy till 1943", "Hitler solved unemployment" or "Speer miraculously increased production via reorganization". The 1944 Speer's miracle is, of course, a big part of the book. If you are interested in the topic, give the book a read.
But in summary, the high figures of 1944 production of some armaments are a combination of running down of resource stockpiles, gutting of (the rest of) civilian economy and more than a bit of fudging the numbers. Example with tanks: Speer had a bunch parts reallocated from spare parts, where they didn't show up in stats as produced tanks, to building new tanks, where they did show up in stats as newly produced tanks. The result was some relatively impressive numbers produced and a certain lack of spare parts, which might have caused some unnecessary writeoffs of otherwise serviceable vehicles.
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One other point to consider is WHY the Germans didn't build more divisions in 1941-42, when the manpower wasn't completely exhausted. They knew before they went into the Soviet Union that they could only supply X amount of troops, and there was a shortage of raw materials already, so there was no reason to build up industry in advance beyond what was already in operation, since more troops and heavy equipment that couldn't be supplied or maintained at the front would accomplish nothing, even if the raw materials were available to produce more military goods. Most industrial development takes at least a year or two until it's constructed, organized, and working at more than a fraction of its capacity, so anything that wasn't already in operation in 1940 wasn't going to be useful until 1942, by which time Germany expected the war to have been pretty much decided, if not completely over. When it became apparent that the push in 1941 was not going to be sufficient, there really wasn't much that the Germans could do about it. There were insufficient raw materials to produce more equipment, insufficient manpower to run the existing factories if the front-line forces were to be expanded, and insufficient transport available to get it there if it were produced.
The Soviets had outside help in reorganizing its industry, most notably from Henry Ford. Germany never implemented assembly-line production on the massive scale that the Soviets and Americans managed to do.
Probably most importantly, Germany's army was fighting in practically every direction against a host of countries on land, sea, and air, while the Soviets were primarily fighting a ground war on a single front against a single badly overstretched main opponent with a few weak and under-equipped helpers who didn't want to be there in the first place and resisted Hitler's efforts to increase their commitment to the war at every opportunity. Hitler's unwillingness to provide heavy weapons to his allies of questionable loyalty is understandable, but it kept those allies from being more than marginally useful.
Granted, improved manufacturing processes and increased automation would likely have increased the amount of material which could be produced by a smaller work force, allowing some additional manpower to be recruited, but there weren't enough raw materials for any substantial increase in total production, and most of those improved automated processes required oil in quantities that Germany could not spare. Speer's "economic miracle" consisted of a combination of earlier projects coming to fruition, the exhausting of a few remaining stockpiles in a last-ditch effort to make one last push, or robbing Peter to pay Paul. Building more planes that you can't afford to fuel isn't helpful. There was no solution to Germany's problems by that point, and a lost war was only a matter of time.
The Soviets, in the mean time, were able to rely on the US and UK to provide numerous items which were then not needed to be produced by the Soviets, allowing the Soviets to concentrate on producing larger quantities of what they did build, as well as freeing up some manpower for conscription in the process. Comparing Soviet production of specific war goods to Germany's production ignores all of the items that the Soviets did not need to make, or only produced in smaller quantities, due to lend-lease.
The Soviets had outside help in reorganizing its industry, most notably from Henry Ford. Germany never implemented assembly-line production on the massive scale that the Soviets and Americans managed to do.
Probably most importantly, Germany's army was fighting in practically every direction against a host of countries on land, sea, and air, while the Soviets were primarily fighting a ground war on a single front against a single badly overstretched main opponent with a few weak and under-equipped helpers who didn't want to be there in the first place and resisted Hitler's efforts to increase their commitment to the war at every opportunity. Hitler's unwillingness to provide heavy weapons to his allies of questionable loyalty is understandable, but it kept those allies from being more than marginally useful.
Granted, improved manufacturing processes and increased automation would likely have increased the amount of material which could be produced by a smaller work force, allowing some additional manpower to be recruited, but there weren't enough raw materials for any substantial increase in total production, and most of those improved automated processes required oil in quantities that Germany could not spare. Speer's "economic miracle" consisted of a combination of earlier projects coming to fruition, the exhausting of a few remaining stockpiles in a last-ditch effort to make one last push, or robbing Peter to pay Paul. Building more planes that you can't afford to fuel isn't helpful. There was no solution to Germany's problems by that point, and a lost war was only a matter of time.
The Soviets, in the mean time, were able to rely on the US and UK to provide numerous items which were then not needed to be produced by the Soviets, allowing the Soviets to concentrate on producing larger quantities of what they did build, as well as freeing up some manpower for conscription in the process. Comparing Soviet production of specific war goods to Germany's production ignores all of the items that the Soviets did not need to make, or only produced in smaller quantities, due to lend-lease.
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Lots of good points, especially regarding Lend Lease and German logistics in the East. I'm not sure about the part regarding German allies though. The Finns had reservations as to how far they wanted to go into the SU, since for them it was about regaining territorial losses from the Winter war, but I'm sure we can agree it was not a war they did not want. The Romanians, who were anti-soviet in the interwar period (the Polish alliance) and lost Besarabia in 1940, weren't exactly opposed to it either. The Hungarians were definitely less motivated than previously mentioned Finns and Romanians, but the rivalry with Romania for German favor with regards to ownership of Transylvania was a significant factor and there many voices in Hungarian politics who supported the participation in the war. When it comes to the Italians, if I remember correctly it was entirely Mussolini's idea, nobody forced them, I think I read somewhere that Hitler did not particularily liked the idea either, just found it difficult to refuse.
The allies resisted increasing their participation later on, but that was in large part due to their inability to effectively fight, since they lacked the gear.
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I believe our military does long term strategic planning for what would be produced, against what enemies, and how long it's expected to be good for.
Did Germany have a high command apparatus that was responsible for the future planning of their armed forces needs against the threats they would face?
One thing I have heard was that the Germans were so sure about the Soviets collapse after the initial attacks colored by their experience of Russia in WW1 they didn't plan at all for even the possibility of a long war with them.
Under the Versailles Treaty the German Army was sharply limited in numbers, and with reparations and Depression they were seriously constrained in budget. A lot of armaments production stopped worldwide as, of course, WW1 was so terrible there would never be another war. I do not think anyone in the German Army in, say, 1933 thought they would have conquered France and be halfway across Russia a decade later.
Germany has a strong technocratic heritage, which was effectively harnessed during WWI. However, the Nazi party was ideologically and philosophically opposed to technocracy and expertise. They favoured ideas of 'will' and 'fanatic dedication' over technocratic solutions. The classic poster boy of Nazi work projects was Todt, who achieved impressive constructions in a short period of time. However, his methodology for completing these projects were based off massive resource allocation and extensive use forced labour, both German and foreign.
The economic wastefulness of his methods was disguised by his success and it reinforced concepts of will being superior to material factors. In addition, the Nazis consistently favoured politically reliability over competence, and this only got worse throughout the war. Speer was somewhat of an exception to this by being politically reliable and competent (although not as amazing as his self aggrandizement made out).
Overall, this led to a massive amount of waste in the overall management in the Nazi economy.
As an additional factor the Nazis were wary of the German population for much of the war. The leadership of the Nazi party remembered the hardships of 1917-18 and they were worried that a return to those conditions would result in revolution. There was a level of impoverishment that they were not prepared to subject the German population to (at least until the catastrophes of 1944).
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You keep coming back to this - and I think it is a mistaken assumption; I think the Germans actually performed pretty well, with exceptions in a couple of areas. Those being the waste of resources in the welter of cross-competing Nazi fiefdoms, and the lavish over-equipping of Luftwaffe and SS divisions.
The story goes that a group of historians were interviewing one of the last surviving Confederate soldiers.
"How did the South lose?" they asked. "Was it the blockade? Was it inflation? Was it draft-dodging, or the state governments not co-operating in the war effort?"
The old soldier thought hard for a bit, then shrugged.
"I always thought the Yankees had something to do with it," he said.
So... I think the Allies had something to do with it. You may find this helpful: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Military_production_during_World_War_II
Dunno about those fiefdoms... the rivalry between allied commanders is also legendary, and the US also produced a plethora of slighltly different stuff for the same job (B-25/B-26/A-26 to name one). The difference is that with a belt fed machine gun you do not have to be an excellent marksman to hit the target. Now with a single bullet it is a whole different story. ;-)
France and Russia are ancient enemies and the UK and USA are hostile powers to Germany. Unexpected success later in the West wouldn't have obviated the need for production planning with some foresight.
That seems to be the dominant narrative about German wartime economy management nowadays. I'm a bit suspicious of it, but it may as well be the best angle to approach things in the general discussion of ww2 management.
Things look a bit different if you consider comparison between the German and Soviet wartime management, to which I was mostly referring in my previous posts. And in that context there is an obvious problem. The Soviet mismanagement, extensive use of forced labor, resource squandering and reliance on ideological fanaticism and 'triumph of will' approach were absolutely legendary.
This is the fascinating bit. That motif is frequently brought up in literature. And that is 1 of the main reasons for my astonishment that I expressed in previous posts. I mean, by the end of 1941 the illusion of quick victory in the East and the 'collapse of the rotten SU' theory was pretty much burried. There were still some hopes expressed here and there, that maybe the campaign of 1942 will deliver the final devastating blow. But for the most part the German leadership was already readjusted to the idea of a prolonged, attritional war. In such a war the economy management is decisive. The military, which heavily stressed the northern strategy in 1941 in hopes that taking Moscow will bring enemy's collapse, did not press for that anymore. There seems to be a consensus on the German side backing the Southern offensive, dictated by economical reasons. It was also clear to both the Germans and the Soviets that this war is the ultimate showdown that will decide the fate of the nations, that it's do or die, win or loose everything. When it comes to the economical managment of the war the Soviets responded accordingly. Yet the Germans held back a bit for quite a while. That's the bit that's puzzling to me. Why didn't Germany go all in total mobilization in 1942, since the stakes could not be higher.
@bz249 - the Allies had about five times as much production capacity to play with, which allows for a lot of slippage.
@Dinglehoff - all sorts of planning can't conjure up armaments factories from nothing, or create workable budgets when you need a wheelbarrow of Marks to buy a bullet. Prominent German generals doubted they could win an invasion of Czechoslovakia, or win a war with France. I've never seen an account of a German army officer who predicted in 1933 that they'd be in Rostov and the Caucasus in 1942.
@Dinglehoff - all sorts of planning can't conjure up armaments factories from nothing, or create workable budgets when you need a wheelbarrow of Marks to buy a bullet. Prominent German generals doubted they could win an invasion of Czechoslovakia, or win a war with France. I've never seen an account of a German army officer who predicted in 1933 that they'd be in Rostov and the Caucasus in 1942.
If you're trying to remind me that the Allies might have had something to do with the Nazi Germany loosing the war, then my answer would be - Yes - and I wholeheartedly thank you for making sure I'm aware
Now when it comes to the content on previous posts, that you're referring to, the problem defined there was of comparison of German and Soviet responses to economy management requirements of the total war for survival, with the stress being put on inadequacy of the measures taken by Germany. In this context, the question I posed is more about German approach to war, their planning and mental state if you will, rather than external factors. In that sense - No - the Allies had nothing to do with it.
Exactly... there is absolutely no way to prevent infighting (top managers tend to be selfish psychopathic assholes, because those are the values preferred by in the selection process). Governing is always trying to maintain and/or slowly shift the balance between the different power centers... and while it is possible that the Nazi leadership did it somewhat worse than the Anglo-Saxon, at the end it was a droplet in the ocean.
The fact that it needed five years to defeat them indicates that mismanagement was not a very serious issue.