Chapter 19: For want of an order...
The following is an excerpt from Field Marshal Wallace Graham (ret.), A Continuation by Other Means,
his memoir of his career in politics following World War II. This excerpt is from the first chapter, in which the Field Marshal explains why he decided to enter politics in the first place.
A good man once asked me, "Wally, why did you resign in 1950? You were Chief of the Imperial General Staff and the most celebrated hero in a war full of them. Why did you decide to cast away that career in favor of running for an obscure parliamentary borough in Falkirk?"
I did not have an answer for him then, but I do now. It was the assault on St. Nazaire. Not the cost in terms of lives or treasure, because I had seen that before. No, it was the horrifying aftermath, how a damned fool gambled too much and put a much smarter man but an incredible fool in one area in his place. The world would be a different place--a better place--if not for one speech made at the wrong time to the wrong people. That man, by the way, was His Majesty, King George VI.
When I was put in charge in of planning the operations in France, I warned anybody who would listen that our window for success was very narrow. A campaign with clearly defined objectives was the key to success. That campaign I promised and, in the interest of full disclosure, fulfilled.
The situation in France, 0800, 29 September 1945
The objective was simple: to take advantage of German and Italian weaknesses and secure a more defensible line for 1946. I believed then and still believe now that had we stayed conservative, the unpleasantness that ensured in 1946 would not have been necessary. Taking St. Nazaire and Nantes, which would give us the protection of the Loire River, would effectively prevent a serious enemy assault, particularly with those bloody panzers Jerry loved so much. We accomplished those objectives rather quickly. Hungarian soldiers stationed in St. Nazaire rapidly retreated, surrendering the city 24 hours after the advance began. With St. Nazaire in our hands, I ordered the landing of Third Armored Corps, freshly returned from Denmark, in an attempt to exploit the breakout. With armored support, I ordered the attack on Nantes on 4 October.
At that moment, four American infantry divisions crossed the Loire and advanced on St. Jean de Monts. I believe in giving the maximum amount of freedom and initiative to my subordinates, and I had phrased my orders so as to permit offensive action in situations where the opportunity arose. I do not fault the Yankee advance. St. Jean de Monts was entirely undefeated and German subs had been using La Rochelle as a base for some time. If the Americans thought they could seize that objective while the enemy's attention was distracted, I had no objections. Friends in the Royal Navy, on the other hand, had informed me that major construction was underway. The keels of five new light cruisers and ten new destroyers were laid on 13 October; this new force would form the basis of a dedicated anti-submarine patrol. The Royal Navy even tasked bombers with the destruction of La Rochelle. Capturing La Rochelle was a viable objective, but it was not a crucial one. However, Lord Halifax seized the moment to insist on the value of La Rochelle to the war effort. He called it "more important to Allied victory than Rome, Paris, and Berlin combined." He further assured the people of the United Kingdom that "La Rochelle would be ours before the end of 1945."
I admit that once a soldier is given an order, it is his duty to fulfill that order to the best of his ability. I bear and have borne my just share of the responsibility for that campaign. That does not, however, excuse one of the most asinine speeches from one of the most asinine men I have ever had the displeasure to meet. La Rochelle was militarily important but placing such undue stress on capturing it so quickly was a mistake. I understand, logically, why the Prime Minister felt the need to emphasize the capture of La Rochelle. After all, German submarines had inflicted significant damage on British shipping over the course of the war. Taking away La Rochelle would have denied the enemy the ability to range west or to strike at our western shores. But he, as so many other politicians have done, underestimated the will of the enemy and their own recognition of critical targets.
Landing of the Third Armored Corps, 1 October 1945
The bombing of La Rochelle begins, 13 October 1945
Even I underestimated how rapidly Germany would transfer forces back to France. By 19 October, they had enough troops in place to push on our left flank. The Italians had done everything they could to retake Anzio but to no avail, but our attention was on Italy for a short period. Germany hit and hit hard. Falaise and Faaborg held; Argentan did not. A strike on La Ferte, roughly the center of our line, was repelled by a swift and decisive counterattack on the part of General Barnes. If we had lost La Ferte, German panzers could have encircled our entire army. This country owes Barnes a debt of gratitude it can never repay. As it was, there were more than 10,000 casualties in the battle. Thank God that most of them were German.
German counterattack, 19 October 1945
Defeat at Argentan, 20 October 1945
The decisive counterattack at La Ferte, 21 October 1945
Around this time, I was recalled to London from my headquarters in St. Malo. Lord Halifax, accompanied by the rest of Cabinet, finally informed me about the Edinburgh Project. I was ashamedly in favor of it at the time, having no idea what the destructive power of this project would unleash. If I had known then what I know now, I would have used every fiber of being, including resignation of my post, to prevent continued development. That no other power has developed this weapon is a happy accident, coupled with the official doctrine that said that the United Kingdom would use this weapon to prevent others from having it. That is, after all, why Leningrad no longer exists. However, I am getting ahead of myself.
The Prime Minister asked where this new weapon, once it was developed, could be most effectively deployed. My immediate response was somewhere on the front lines. I offered several potential targets, not understanding the danger the weapon imposed on our own men. My idea was simple: if we could completely wipe out several divisions, especially in multiple places at once, we could easily swarm through the wreckage and retake Paris. Paris was too valuable for the Axis to lose without a fight; they would surely have to pull troops from Italy in order to defend the city, at which point we would seize Rome and end the whole bloody shebang. Whatever the madman Hitler might have planned, it was Mussolini who ran the show. Capturing or even killing Mussolini would have ended the war. Halifax seemed amenable, but he wanted us to focus on the task at hand. The Edinburgh Project was not going to produce a workable device until some time in late 1945 or early 1946. In the interim, it was still my duty to take La Rochelle.
The final stages of the Edinburgh Project begin, 31 October 1945
With the Prime Minister screaming in my ear, I ordered an attack on Les Sables d'Olonne. It was weakly defended; only two enemy divisions protected it. La Rochelle itself was undefended; a single Hungarian division was moving to protect it, but with the Third Armored Corps in play, we could rapidly punch through and seize the crucial objective. With even more armor, we might have tried to affect an encirclement, but we did not have the power for that. Still, we were confident of success. The Italians made sure of it.
Before our infantry could move up, Les Sable d'Olonne was under attack by over 50,000 enemy soldiers. All of those men isolated the 101st Armored Division and drove it back. I could not risk any further advance toward La Rochelle. I ordered a retreat. Halifax was furious. He called me a coward, a traitor, and any number of hurtful names. He threatened to replace me with anybody who understood "real military strategy." I politely informed the Prime Minister that replacing me was his prerogative, but until he chose to do so, it was my job to protect my men. The Royal Navy could easily neutralize La Rochelle and, if necessary, launch an attack with Royal Marines. Halifax then openly demanded my resignation. In this ultimatum, he stretched too far. Nobody in the army would even consider passing along that demand to me (I only heard of it after the war). If the Conservatives had supported Halifax in the General Election of 1945, they would have been annihilated in the polls. They chose a "more sensible" alternative: Winston Churchill.
Initial attack on Les Sables d'Olonne, 10 November 1945
Italian and Hungarian attack on the 101st, 12 November 1945
There were many things I liked about the Churchill government. Anthony Eden, Viscount Templeton, and Lord Beaverbrook all retained their positions in Cabinet. All had done a fine job, in my estimation. The new head of SIS, Sir Hugh Sinclair, gave us vital intelligence about enemy positions on the land. Although Sir Robert Menzies had been equally capable, we no longer needed his naval expertise. An inspired selection was Hastings Ismay as Chief of the Imperial General Staff. He was a defensive strategist
par excellence and that was what we needed. Although I personally think that Sir Bernard Montgomery is an insufferable ass, nonetheless we needed somebody to head the army who had experience with armor, and excusing only myself and Sir John Gort, Montgomery was the best.
There were three individuals whom I did not think good fits, however. First Sea Lord Sir John Cunningham was a good submarine hunter but had little overall concept of how to use carrier fleets. Fortunately, he had an able assistant in my old friend Andrew Harris, who became Chief of the Naval General Staff. Sir Arthur Tedder's love for medium bombers--of which there were very few in our Air Force--was a strange pairing for an RAF that looked to rockets as the way of the future. The final individual was Winston Churchill, the new Prime Minister.
Let me be clear on this point: I personally like and admire Churchill and have for years. He is an exceptional politician and a gifted orator. His speeches helped give steel to our courage in our darkest hours. If Winston Churchill had become Prime Minister in 1946, after the war was over, I would have gladly given him my full support. As a wartime Prime Minister, though, he was a miserably terrible choice. When Churchill thought he knew better in military affairs, he never failed to override his officers. It had led to Gallipoli in the First World War. His days as a military genius were long behind him, if they were ever there to begin with. Yet all of that might have been forgiven, if the new Prime Minister had thought carefully about the Edinburgh Project. He did not, and the world has suffered.
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A bit of a wall of text, I know, but it was necessary to set up the final two chapters. In retrospect, I would have changed all three service chiefs in this game had I thought about it. Ismay was good for my overall strategy, but losing Deverell's reduction to supplies was a loss I did not appreciate until after the fact.
Although it ended up not making a difference, I did actually unlock Flying Bombs around this period. Before I realized how much range 1945/1946 planes had, I planned to use them to deliver nukes. It turns out that wasn't necessary. The AI made multiple attacks on Anzio in this update, which I've chosen to undersell. The only reason I didn't lose Anzio was a strategic attack to prevent superior forces from moving to take it. I never lost a battle at Anzio, but I might have without cutting off lots of scary tanks.
The anti-submarine thing was actually a symptom of my underestimating bomber range. I lost multiple smaller ships to air attack because I mistakenly thought that I was safe on Britain's west coast; I was not. Many of the victims were destroyers/light cruisers. This, in turn, let subs run amok while I had forces repairing out of bomber range. I lost lots of convoys; never enough to hurt seriously, because I could crank them out faster than I lost them, but I did lose supply convoys, which cost me a few battles in earlier updates. I think I would have had a much better chance in Denmark if not for those damn German subs. I wish I'd thought of bombing La Rochelle earlier and more bombing in general. I didn't, though.
As a warning in advance, the next chapter will be narrative heavy. The final story chapter should have lots of pictures to keep your interest, though. I will also give you folks a nice epilogue to provide some closure into the lives of our characters, a brief history of how I envision this world turning out, and some screenshots. I'll start working on it this weekend, but I probably won't finish writing until next week. Until then, my friends, I hope you enjoyed it!
