Italy 1939
Vanilla 1.05c
Normal/Aggressive
In September of 1939 Italy was faced with a number of strategic issues, the resolution of which would have a great impact on the State and the success of the political leadership in maintaining their control over the State. While dissent was lower than it had been during the 1930s, the issue of maintaining the economy in circumstances of general war reared its head. The main issue being the choke-point at Suez which the British government could use to cow the Italian nation. The possibility of the political use of the canal was unacceptable to the Italian State.
While preparations were made for a general North African offensive against the British and the French, Ethiopia was secured against seige by large convoys of supplies and oil to build a stockpile incase of general war.
Basic improvements in Infantry doctrine and divisional level use of modern weapons, like mines or desert equipment were made.
Additionally concentrations were established at the French border to ward off the possibility of war, and at the Yugoslav border to take advantage of the general European crisis.
Italy was lucky in this regard for the land based invasion of Yugoslavia by a mixed mounted Infantry, motorised Infantry and armoured forces brought Yugoslavia under direct Italian rule before the end of September.
The suprise at the absence of Allied response encouraged the Italian political leadership. While they initially re-oriented themselves for simultaneous landings in Syria, Alexandria, Tunis and other sites along the North African coast it became obvious that the Greek state was too weak to defend itself. The landings which had been prepared for a general war against the Allies were replanned and eliminated the independence of the Greek state.
With these gains Italy seated itself as the master of the Adriatic and Ionian. The Mediterranian was still beyond her grasp, held at Gibralter, Malta and Alexandria. War with Britain and France was necessary for the Italian State's interest of a New Roman Empire.
The plans discarded in favour of the Greek action were revised. Motorised Infantry and Armour would lead in a land dash to Alexandria. The weak and vehicleless British forces facing this group were outnumbered 10 to 1 in men. The sea-invasion of undefended Alexandria was considered, but scratched in favour of a Syrian landing when consideration of the merchant shipping available once Ethiopia was abandoned to seige.
In Ethiopia landings were planned against British client states in the Arabian peninsular in order to seize stockpiles of semi-finished goods and raw materials.
The Syrian landings were planned for six divisions of infantry and three divisions of mounted infantry.
Landings in French North Africa were planned for six divisions at Tunis and three further West.
Finally plans for limited advances into Metropolitan France were developed, based on heavy air support and Alpine troops.
With the completion of Spring rains, and the prepositioning of fleet elements the Italians entered the war in 1940.
While their chosen dispositions in French North Africa, Egypt, Syria and Arabia were excellent, fighting bogged down in Iraq. Expensive gains were made in Southern France to encircle the French ports against the sea. Futile follow-up landings in Autumn confirmed this stalemate in the Vichy settlement.
The over confidence of the Italians lead to a number of mistakes. The greatest being the loss of reserve naval power and the stupendous waste of human life in the mountains of France and the taking of Gibralter. Additionally, fleet assets had performed excellently, but at the cost of a number of capital ships. The deployment of the submarine forces in the Mediterranian and Atlantic was magnificent, using weak forces to eliminate much military shipping capacity.
However, the follies of overextension cost the Italian state greatly, and its involvement in active theatres in late 1940 was limited to the annexation of the Belgian congo and the movement of troops and naval forces through neutral Turkey to harass the Soviet's southern front.
Italy's contributions to the Axis were limited in the period 1939 to 1940, comprising mainly spoiling actions on secondary fronts, and the contribution of 800 obsolete aircraft to Germany's needs.
Vanilla 1.05c
Normal/Aggressive
In September of 1939 Italy was faced with a number of strategic issues, the resolution of which would have a great impact on the State and the success of the political leadership in maintaining their control over the State. While dissent was lower than it had been during the 1930s, the issue of maintaining the economy in circumstances of general war reared its head. The main issue being the choke-point at Suez which the British government could use to cow the Italian nation. The possibility of the political use of the canal was unacceptable to the Italian State.
While preparations were made for a general North African offensive against the British and the French, Ethiopia was secured against seige by large convoys of supplies and oil to build a stockpile incase of general war.
Basic improvements in Infantry doctrine and divisional level use of modern weapons, like mines or desert equipment were made.
Additionally concentrations were established at the French border to ward off the possibility of war, and at the Yugoslav border to take advantage of the general European crisis.
Italy was lucky in this regard for the land based invasion of Yugoslavia by a mixed mounted Infantry, motorised Infantry and armoured forces brought Yugoslavia under direct Italian rule before the end of September.
The suprise at the absence of Allied response encouraged the Italian political leadership. While they initially re-oriented themselves for simultaneous landings in Syria, Alexandria, Tunis and other sites along the North African coast it became obvious that the Greek state was too weak to defend itself. The landings which had been prepared for a general war against the Allies were replanned and eliminated the independence of the Greek state.
With these gains Italy seated itself as the master of the Adriatic and Ionian. The Mediterranian was still beyond her grasp, held at Gibralter, Malta and Alexandria. War with Britain and France was necessary for the Italian State's interest of a New Roman Empire.
The plans discarded in favour of the Greek action were revised. Motorised Infantry and Armour would lead in a land dash to Alexandria. The weak and vehicleless British forces facing this group were outnumbered 10 to 1 in men. The sea-invasion of undefended Alexandria was considered, but scratched in favour of a Syrian landing when consideration of the merchant shipping available once Ethiopia was abandoned to seige.
In Ethiopia landings were planned against British client states in the Arabian peninsular in order to seize stockpiles of semi-finished goods and raw materials.
The Syrian landings were planned for six divisions of infantry and three divisions of mounted infantry.
Landings in French North Africa were planned for six divisions at Tunis and three further West.
Finally plans for limited advances into Metropolitan France were developed, based on heavy air support and Alpine troops.
With the completion of Spring rains, and the prepositioning of fleet elements the Italians entered the war in 1940.
While their chosen dispositions in French North Africa, Egypt, Syria and Arabia were excellent, fighting bogged down in Iraq. Expensive gains were made in Southern France to encircle the French ports against the sea. Futile follow-up landings in Autumn confirmed this stalemate in the Vichy settlement.
The over confidence of the Italians lead to a number of mistakes. The greatest being the loss of reserve naval power and the stupendous waste of human life in the mountains of France and the taking of Gibralter. Additionally, fleet assets had performed excellently, but at the cost of a number of capital ships. The deployment of the submarine forces in the Mediterranian and Atlantic was magnificent, using weak forces to eliminate much military shipping capacity.
However, the follies of overextension cost the Italian state greatly, and its involvement in active theatres in late 1940 was limited to the annexation of the Belgian congo and the movement of troops and naval forces through neutral Turkey to harass the Soviet's southern front.
Italy's contributions to the Axis were limited in the period 1939 to 1940, comprising mainly spoiling actions on secondary fronts, and the contribution of 800 obsolete aircraft to Germany's needs.