Belarussian and Ukrainian identity

[Gordy]

Russia is basically the old Muscovy that gobbled up neighbouring kingdoms and merged them all into a new Russian identity.

But how did separate Belarussian and Ukrainian identities survive?

I can understand a Ukrainian identity surviving to some extent as Kiev was a major centre and was even the capital of core Russia (little Russia) while the rest of Russia (great Russia) was essentially the periphery. Perhaps the question here involves a bit of why Kiev didn't unite the Russian principalities and continue as the centre of all things Russian (albeit a Ukrainian speaking Russia).

But Belarus is a mystery. I don't think there is anything particularly distinctive about it. It got bounced about between great powers Russia, Prussia, Poland, the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Did all this bouncing keep it from becoming just another Russian region?

Obviously these identities were sufficiently strong to warrant being bad into soverign republics of the USSR in 1917. Or did internal USSR politics play a role?

 

[Barsoom]

Russia is basically the old Muscovy that gobbled up neighbouring kingdoms and merged them all into a new Russian identity.

But how did separate Belarussian and Ukrainian identities survive?

I can understand a Ukrainian identity surviving to some extent as Kiev was a major centre and was even the capital of core Russia (little Russia) while the rest of Russia (great Russia) was essentially the periphery. Perhaps the question here involves a bit of why Kiev didn't unite the Russian principalities and continue as the centre of all things Russian (albeit a Ukrainian speaking Russia).

But Belarus is a mystery. I don't think there is anything particularly distinctive about it. It got bounced about between great powers Russia, Prussia, Poland, the Poland-Lithuanian Commonwealth. Did all this bouncing keep it from becoming just another Russian region?

Obviously these identities were sufficiently strong to warrant being bad into soverign republics of the USSR in 1917. Or did internal USSR politics play a role?

Yes to each of the questions. But there's a logic behind it that I think would be clearer if we made it more explicit. Warning: wall of text incoming.

At the beginning of the timeline there are no Belarusians, there are a couple of Slavic tribes in the area occupied by the modern state of Belarus. They don't all speak the same language exactly but they exist on a dialect continuum and were probably able to communicate without interpreters. This dialect continuum didn't stop at the present state's borders and neither did the sense that neighboring tribes were related in some way. If someone traveled from one tribe to the next he'd notice few changes, if he then went on to the next after that a few more, and so on. Only after several journeys he'd likely conclude these weren't near cousins anymore and start needing a translator. There's no natural cut-off point; the distinction between nationalities and national languages are introduced later and are largely the product of politics.

That process begins haphazardly, with one ruler or another gaining ascendancy over several tribes, usually through underkings (subreguli). On his death, the confederacy frequently splinters, to be replaced by another conglomeration under another strongman. These need not be the same tribes and the strongmen need not be related. There is a tendency for such conglomerations to stabilize when a dynasty of strongmen manages to stay in power for a while, gradually adding traditional legitimacy to the arsenal of instruments of power employed to keep the underkings and their tribes in line. Economic linkages based on accessible trade routes to profitable markets also add a bit of geographical stability, as does the institution of church dioceses in the area. All 3 of these processes affect the area around a political, economic and/or religious center far more than the outlying reaches, so even as centers achieve some continuity the border areas remain indistinct. They also affect the local elites far more than the common farmer or herder, whose circle of interactions doesn't usually reach further than the next village over. Dialects remain clearly distinct well into the modern era even in Western Europe where state formation took hold earlier than in Belarus.

As it happens, the early candidate for consolidation a little to the south of Belarus, Kiev, suffers complete political and almost complete economical annihilation in the 13th century at the hands of the Mongols. After 4 centuries the process of forming an identity around the Kievan state is rudely interrupted. The inheritance is divided into 3 main blocs.
1. Mongol overlordship is strong on the southern steppes, preventing a Kievan renewal. Slavic tribes in the area do retain a sense of shared identity, as much based on shared oppression as on the memory of great Kiev. Ukrainian identity gradually emerges in this area but is not accompanied by the (re-)formation of a state of their own. Although Mongol rule slowly weakens and fragments, the Ottoman sultans find it expedient to keep them around as a buffer state, thus preventing consolidation by other powers well into the 18th century.
2. Mongol rule over the Slavic tribes to the northeast is lighter and more indirect as the woodlands there are not suitable for the nomad lifestyle (and not rich enough to tempt them to settle down). Local rulers enjoy greater autonomy. For a couple of centuries they pay tribute but as the Mongol successor states keep dividing they gradually gain the upper hand. Moscow unites the other small states partly through conquest and partly through leadership in the struggle against the Tatars. It also manages to lure the head of the orthodox churches in the area. After a century or two it's strong enough to claim the mantle of successor to Kiev. The succession claim is the reason that the identity of the Slavic peoples living under Moscovian rule is named Rus or Russian.
3. In the northwest Mongol power projection is hampered by marshes. The terrain is equally handy in the struggle against another imperialist project, the northern crusaders who've established bases on the Baltic coast. That struggle actually promotes political and military conglomeration among local tribes that individually are too weak to resist - a process known in academic literature as secondary state formation. The core of the Lithuanian state is not Slavic but it gains control over the local Slavic tribes, again partly through conquest and partly through leadership in the struggle against scarier oppressors. The Lithuanian state prevents association with neighboring powers and to some extent stimulates economic ties between the local tribes, thus functioning as a kind of incubator for a common identity among the Slavic tribes, which in time becomes known as Belarusian.

This threefold division, though again indistinct at the edges, is around for a pretty long time. Moscow doesn't drive out the Lithuanians and their Polish commonwealth brethren until the 17th century, only slowly extending its power westward. It doesn't gain control of the Black Sea shores until late in the 18th century. That's 6 centuries of separate development.

Now, the 19th century is usually the decisive period for the formation of national identities as local dialects are supplanted by standard languages and regional identities by nationalism. Urbanization, mass media, conscription and universal primary education are the primary drivers of the process. But all of these are weaker in the Russian Empire so that, even as it controlled the territories of all 3 former blocs, it wasn't as effective at suppressing regional identities. It did manage to russify large swathes of steppe to the east of Ukraine and of course extend itself across Siberia, but it was less impressive in the western regions. Austria's cultivation of a Ukrainian identity in its share of the Polish partition had something to do with that but the larger factor is the weakness of the Russian state apparatus and its lack of interest in turning peasants into citizens.

As the empire falls apart in WW1, there's a brief resurgence of old states backed by the survival of strong regional sentiments. The Soviet Union claws back Ukraine (as well as Transcaucasia and Central Asia) but only half of the Belarusian region, the other half follows after WW2. Furthermore, to underscore its anti-imperialist credentials the communists drew up a constitution with broad local autonomy for non-Russians. This was propaganda and observed largely in the breach but the Soviets did create separate republics with their own administrative apparatus, which more or less accidentally became independent when the Union collapsed in 1991. By that time russification had progressed pretty far, both in spreading Russians throughout their territories and in making the lives of Russians, Belarusians and Ukrainians remarkably similar, but there was enough difference left for the new states to work with. In a bid to legitimize their independence they naturally claimed a distinct national identity.

 

[pithorr]

Belarusian case is even easier to explain: their branch of Ruthenian was the official language of Grand Duchy of Lithuania till the 18 century, only gradually being replaced by Polish by then.
So and there was the cultural background for such identity.

 

[fr-rein]

This threefold division, though again indistinct at the edges, is around for a pretty long time. Moscow doesn't drive out the Lithuanians and their Polish commonwealth brethren until the 17th century, only slowly extending its power westward. It doesn't gain control of the Black Sea shores until late in the 18th century. That's 6 centuries of separate development.

It's a bit of simplification. There are 3 other major centers which you omitted:

1. Novgorod. A city and state that was distinct because of foreign connections, own thriving trade and had a local culture and separate identity pretty much since times of Kiev's ascendancy. It fell to Muscovy and was pretty much destroyed in subjugation, old lucrative trade being cut off and other things. The identity of Russian North was more or less settled when Peter I created new capital, Saint Petersburg, which itself was a massive cultural and demographic influence, focused on itself a lot of trade routes and thus absorbed the remnants of the Novgorodian identity, as well as other natives (incluing many non-Slavic).
2. Chernigov (and at some point Ryazan) was another major area that was prominent in late Kievan Rus times. Being powerful and distinct, it was also one of the worst suffered regions to Mongols. It was later assimilated by XVIII century by two processes - one was Muscovy colonization of the southern areas (founding towns like Kursk and others only in XVI century as forposts) and... Chernigov was made Ukrainian during the Cossack civil wars, when Right-bank Ukraine's population was transferred to the Left bank, among them to relatively empty Chernigov area as well where they assimilated locals by numbers, creating such a divide there. It's also a reason of vast Ukrainian presence to the Eastern Steppes, it was a result of forced migrations in XVII-XVIII centuries to the land with low population.
3. Halych-Volhyn. It was actually a powerhouse in the immediate situation when Kiev was destroyed and until middle of XIV it was a serious pretender to the power in region. However, some losses and then unfortunate death of rulers with no succession beheaded the duchy/kingdom and it was partitioned by two strong neighbors in a long war over the succession over land which was untouched by Mongols. Lviv had even a strategic importance - in XIV-XV centuries through Dniester to Lviv and then through Krakow one of the major branches of the Silk Road went, making a reason why that land was that developed at the time, being better than Muscovy for a while. Although I want to note that Western Ukrainian identity didn't disappear at that point at all, unlike the other two. It remained.

Another thing you miss, and one which was most crucial to the separation of Belarus and Ukrainian identities, were the Cossack Wars of XVII century, which made a profound impact on culture, politics and society in Ukraine. Up to that point Belarusians and Ukrainians were, more or less, considered Ruthenians as a whole, Orthodox people of the Commonwealth. Even if nominally divided by border, it didn't matter that much. The Cossack Rebellions and wars that engulfed most of Ukraine changed it completely, creating a whole new class of people while ousting old polonized elites and imprinting themselves in culture, folklore, architecture, history. Ukranians strived for the ideals of Cossacks, and at the time it excluded most of Western Ukraine and Belarus. But the impact they had on culture and nation was important, it was something that persisted even after the ideal Cossacks were gone and landlords were again ruling over peasants. Later, under different circumstances and different interpretation, similar ideals were picked up by Western Ukraine.

In Belarus nothing like this happened. It's evident by many things in their culture, self-perception and how they nowadays idealize Polish/Lithuanian days, perceive their state as a simple continuation of that period, present a cultural alignment to Poland, Lithuania and Russia... and, well, being driven by perception of being "locals" in the first place, not someone too distinct from neighbors. As a group that is living in that land that was kinda always there, didn't assimilate with others but also didn't really mind assimilation. Hence why the national ideas of Belarus are so weak. Yet they have their own identity of sorts which prevented them from becoming full-fledged Lithuanians/Poles/Russians. Even now, with most of them speaking Russian as primary native tongue, their identity with being Belarusian, local, is strong. A lot thanks to the aforementioned split of groups and them being a distinct group in a place that wasn't easily accessible or too desirable.

It did manage to russify large swathes of steppe to the east of Ukraine and of course extend itself across Siberia

Not really, it happened much later under Soviet rule. Large swathes of Southern Russia spoke Ukrainian, there were literally German lands, relatively more minorities than there used to be. In fact, there were large swathes of land in Far East where Ukrainian was a dominant language even at a time.

Austria's cultivation of a Ukrainian identity in its share of the Polish partition had something to do with that but the larger factor is the weakness of the Russian state apparatus and its lack of interest in turning peasants into citizens.

While I do agree about the paragraph part about the weakness of state apparatus and primary education, I do have to ask... Austrian's evil plans about cultivating Ukrainian identity?

The major reason why Austrians let it grow was because they saw a rivalry between two sides, Poles and Ukrainians, as very beneficial to ruling over the Galicia. Obviously, they didn't want Ukrainians there to identify as Russians for understandable reasons and so they preferred Ukrainians. However, until WWI there was a very strong pro-Russian identification movement which mattered and wasn't even repressed (at least much more than pro-Ukrainian one)... which ended up being annihilated, ironically by Imperial Russia during occupation of the Galicia, it suspected them being "filthy Austrian spies", a lot of heavy uncalled for repressions happened... and then Russia started to lose war and had to retreat, with Austrians coming back and shooting Russophiles who were spared. It destroyed Russophile faction and politicians, making much bigger work for cultivation of Ukrainian identity than Austria in a way.

But there was another major issue why Austria played such a major role: Imperial Russia didn't let pro-Ukrainian politicians and activists be, repressing them a lot. For many Austrian-controlled Ukraine became a safe haven - because with all downsides, censorship was nowhere near as bad in Austria, it was relatively a liberal paradise compared to conservative Russian Empire. Two intellectual elites in XIX century, from Western Ukraine and rest of Ukraine, heavily intertwined in a result, united by a quest of liberation against oppressors. Western Ukraine saw rest of Ukraine as a major backup against the Poland while other part of Ukraine used liberalism in Western Ukraine under Austrian rule. For XIX century, when literature Ukrainian (adopted by both literature elites) was created and process of national identification happened, it was a major factor why Western Ukraine and rest of Ukraine united together. There wasn't even much alternative - in Russia Ukrainian was banned, identifying politically as Ukrainian politician was not possible.

The talks about "Austria cultivating" are just an excuse. It's running away from resposibility for "failure" of Russian Empire.

Obviously these identities were sufficiently strong to warrant being bad into soverign republics of the USSR in 1917. Or did internal USSR politics play a role?

Furthermore, to underscore its anti-imperialist credentials the communists drew up a constitution with broad local autonomy for non-Russians. This was propaganda and observed largely in the breach but the Soviets did create separate republics with their own administrative apparatus, which more or less accidentally became independent when the Union collapsed in 1991.

In 1920s, when they were created, there was a different logics behind it.
USSR was ravaged by years of civil war, devastated, with massive elements opposing the Soviet rule, a lot of potentially rebellious provinces and branches of socialists and such that were not too happy.

What happened is that Lenin decided to create national republics - run by more or less happy and allied to Moscow politicians. They were quite sovereign, in 1920s launched massive education campaigns in local languages and had a major cultural boost. It made pretty much all potential separatist regions from being rebellious to being loyal to Moscow, becoming from weakness a power. Furthermore, they were interested in opposing "white" elements and counterrevolution inside of them, being crucial for Soviet order and it managing to withstand in harsh conditions. It allowed to destroy counterrevolution in Russia itself and cement Soviet rule... as well for Stalin later paving a way to create a totalitarian state in a similar fashion, later hijacking the republicks and making them small minidictatorships integrated in whole totalitarian system very well. A lot of poets, writers and such in 1930s were killed or purged in Russia, Ukraine and other places. That period in Ukraine (1920s, peak of cultural revival) is called Executed Renessaince.

The total Russification started to happen only post-war, becoming total in since 1960s as it wasn't a focus before that. Russian schools were forced even in old districts (Ukrainian converted to Russian), universities were Russian-only, the public language defacto was Russian (became the only state language of USSR in 1980s).

they naturally claimed a distinct national identity.

This one is also false. There wasn't any new identity born out of thin air or claimed. National identities existed in USSR as well, although it did try to eridicate them. They were far from being gone or becoming marginal even in most optimistic cases.

Rather, the Soviet Union wanted to create a common Soviet identity which was disenfranchised from land and origin, which would absorb all. But it backfired and failed. Even Russians didn't accept it and craved for their own identity (even if ironically now they consider Soviet identity to be part of Russian identity now), hence why person like Yeltsin would appear in the first place. It also must be important that Soviet identity was spread on Azeris, Armenians, Kazakhs, Tatars and many many other very different non-Slavic nations.

Belarusian case is even easier to explain: their branch of Ruthenian was the official language of Grand Duchy of Lithuania till the 18 century, only gradually being replaced by Polish by then.
So and there was the cultural background for such identity.

No, it doesn't. What made them different from Ukraine and why it diverged as a branch? Defacto (written) Ruthenian at that point was similar/same in Ukraine and Belarus. It's only 19th century when literature language split happens.

But how did separate Belarussian and Ukrainian identities survive?

Outside of answers that were provided there is one more major answer: economics and economic make-up of regions.
Until Soviet times, Ukrainian economy wasn't really that aimed at all-Russian market. In fact, it was the producer of many resources, exported and had it's own major gateway into the Russian Empire - Odesa. The economic links kept people integrated as economics worked in a region being a major producers and sustainable in economic sense. Belarus... was relatively a rural part with not much connections instead.

Soviet times saw a much closer economic integration of all republics, aimed by state on purpose as well. It was also a period a bigger assimilation and integration of regions. However, the soviet system proved to be unsustainable so it collapsed anyway. Most of ex-USSR states drift apart economically regardless of relations because of the healthy economic interests of most countries.

 

[Barsoom]

It's a bit of simplification. There are 3 other major centers which you omitted:

1. Novgorod. A city and state that was distinct because of foreign connections, own thriving trade and had a local culture and separate identity pretty much since times of Kiev's ascendancy. It fell to Muscovy and was pretty much destroyed in subjugation, old lucrative trade being cut off and other things. The identity of Russian North was more or less settled when Peter I created new capital, Saint Petersburg, which itself was a massive cultural and demographic influence, focused on itself a lot of trade routes and thus absorbed the remnants of the Novgorodian identity, as well as other natives (incluing many non-Slavic).
2. Chernigov (and at some point Ryazan) was another major area that was prominent in late Kievan Rus times. Being powerful and distinct, it was also one of the worst suffered regions to Mongols. It was later assimilated by XVIII century by two processes - one was Muscovy colonization of the southern areas (founding towns like Kursk and others only in XVI century as forposts) and... Chernigov was made Ukrainian during the Cossack civil wars, when Right-bank Ukraine's population was transferred to the Left bank, among them to relatively empty Chernigov area as well where they assimilated locals by numbers, creating such a divide there. It's also a reason of vast Ukrainian presence to the Eastern Steppes, it was a result of forced migrations in XVII-XVIII centuries to the land with low population.
3. Halych-Volhyn. It was actually a powerhouse in the immediate situation when Kiev was destroyed and until middle of XIV it was a serious pretender to the power in region. However, some losses and then unfortunate death of rulers with no succession beheaded the duchy/kingdom and it was partitioned by two strong neighbors in a long war over the succession over land which was untouched by Mongols. Lviv had even a strategic importance - in XIV-XV centuries through Dniester to Lviv and then through Krakow one of the major branches of the Silk Road went, making a reason why that land was that developed at the time, being better than Muscovy for a while. Although I want to note that Western Ukrainian identity didn't disappear at that point at all, unlike the other two. It remained.

Another thing you miss, and one which was most crucial to the separation of Belarus and Ukrainian identities, were the Cossack Wars of XVII century, which made a profound impact on culture, politics and society in Ukraine. Up to that point Belarusians and Ukrainians were, more or less, considered Ruthenians as a whole, Orthodox people of the Commonwealth. Even if nominally divided by border, it didn't matter that much. The Cossack Rebellions and wars that engulfed most of Ukraine changed it completely, creating a whole new class of people while ousting old polonized elites and imprinting themselves in culture, folklore, architecture, history. Ukranians strived for the ideals of Cossacks, and at the time it excluded most of Western Ukraine and Belarus. But the impact they had on culture and nation was important, it was something that persisted even after the ideal Cossacks were gone and landlords were again ruling over peasants. Later, under different circumstances and different interpretation, similar ideals were picked up by Western Ukraine.

In Belarus nothing like this happened. It's evident by many things in their culture, self-perception and how they nowadays idealize Polish/Lithuanian days, perceive their state as a simple continuation of that period, present a cultural alignment to Poland, Lithuania and Russia... and, well, being driven by perception of being "locals" in the first place, not someone too distinct from neighbors. As a group that is living in that land that was kinda always there, didn't assimilate with others but also didn't really mind assimilation. Hence why the national ideas of Belarus are so weak. Yet they have their own identity of sorts which prevented them from becoming full-fledged Lithuanians/Poles/Russians. Even now, with most of them speaking Russian as primary native tongue, their identity with being Belarusian, local, is strong. A lot thanks to the aforementioned split of groups and them being a distinct group in a place that wasn't easily accessible or too desirable.



Not really, it happened much later under Soviet rule. Large swathes of Southern Russia spoke Ukrainian, there were literally German lands, relatively more minorities than there used to be. In fact, there were large swathes of land in Far East where Ukrainian was a dominant language even at a time.



While I do agree about the paragraph part about the weakness of state apparatus and primary education, I do have to ask... Austrian's evil plans about cultivating Ukrainian identity?

The major reason why Austrians let it grow was because they saw a rivalry between two sides, Poles and Ukrainians, as very beneficial to ruling over the Galicia. Obviously, they didn't want Ukrainians there to identify as Russians for understandable reasons and so they preferred Ukrainians. However, until WWI there was a very strong pro-Russian identification movement which mattered and wasn't even repressed (at least much more than pro-Ukrainian one)... which ended up being annihilated, ironically by Imperial Russia during occupation of the Galicia, it suspected them being "filthy Austrian spies", a lot of heavy uncalled for repressions happened... and then Russia started to lose war and had to retreat, with Austrians coming back and shooting Russophiles who were spared. It destroyed Russophile faction and politicians, making much bigger work for cultivation of Ukrainian identity than Austria in a way.

But there was another major issue why Austria played such a major role: Imperial Russia didn't let pro-Ukrainian politicians and activists be, repressing them a lot. For many Austrian-controlled Ukraine became a safe haven - because with all downsides, censorship was nowhere near as bad in Austria, it was relatively a liberal paradise compared to conservative Russian Empire. Two intellectual elites in XIX century, from Western Ukraine and rest of Ukraine, heavily intertwined in a result, united by a quest of liberation against oppressors. Western Ukraine saw rest of Ukraine as a major backup against the Poland while other part of Ukraine used liberalism in Western Ukraine under Austrian rule. For XIX century, when literature Ukrainian (adopted by both literature elites) was created and process of national identification happened, it was a major factor why Western Ukraine and rest of Ukraine united together. There wasn't even much alternative - in Russia Ukrainian was banned, identifying politically as Ukrainian politician was not possible.

The talks about "Austria cultivating" are just an excuse. It's running away from resposibility for "failure" of Russian Empire.




In 1920s, when they were created, there was a different logics behind it.
USSR was ravaged by years of civil war, devastated, with massive elements opposing the Soviet rule, a lot of potentially rebellious provinces and branches of socialists and such that were not too happy.

What happened is that Lenin decided to create national republics - run by more or less happy and allied to Moscow politicians. They were quite sovereign, in 1920s launched massive education campaigns in local languages and had a major cultural boost. It made pretty much all potential separatist regions from being rebellious to being loyal to Moscow, becoming from weakness a power. Furthermore, they were interested in opposing "white" elements and counterrevolution inside of them, being crucial for Soviet order and it managing to withstand in harsh conditions. It allowed to destroy counterrevolution in Russia itself and cement Soviet rule... as well for Stalin later paving a way to create a totalitarian state in a similar fashion, later hijacking the republicks and making them small minidictatorships integrated in whole totalitarian system very well. A lot of poets, writers and such in 1930s were killed or purged in Russia, Ukraine and other places. That period in Ukraine (1920s, peak of cultural revival) is called Executed Renessaince.

The total Russification started to happen only post-war, becoming total in since 1960s as it wasn't a focus before that. Russian schools were forced even in old districts (Ukrainian converted to Russian), universities were Russian-only, the public language defacto was Russian (became the only state language of USSR in 1980s).



This one is also false. There wasn't any new identity born out of thin air or claimed. National identities existed in USSR as well, although it did try to eridicate them. They were far from being gone or becoming marginal even in most optimistic cases.

Rather, the Soviet Union wanted to create a common Soviet identity which was disenfranchised from land and origin, which would absorb all. But it backfired and failed. Even Russians didn't accept it and craved for their own identity (even if ironically now they consider Soviet identity to be part of Russian identity now), hence why person like Yeltsin would appear in the first place. It also must be important that Soviet identity was spread on Azeris, Armenians, Kazakhs, Tatars and many many other very different non-Slavic nations.



No, it doesn't. What made them different from Ukraine and why it diverged as a branch? Defacto (written) Ruthenian at that point was similar/same in Ukraine and Belarus. It's only 19th century when literature language split happens.



Outside of answers that were provided there is one more major answer: economics and economic make-up of regions.
Until Soviet times, Ukrainian economy wasn't really that aimed at all-Russian market. In fact, it was the producer of many resources, exported and had it's own major gateway into the Russian Empire - Odesa. The economic links kept people integrated as economics worked in a region being a major producers and sustainable in economic sense. Belarus... was relatively a rural part with not much connections instead.

Soviet times saw a much closer economic integration of all republics, aimed by state on purpose as well. It was also a period a bigger assimilation and integration of regions. However, the soviet system proved to be unsustainable so it collapsed anyway. Most of ex-USSR states drift apart economically regardless of relations because of the healthy economic interests of most countries.

Yes, I simplified. It was already a wall of text and it's just a forum post, not a monograph on Eastern European national identities. I did wonder if I should say more about the Cossacks but decided against it. OP's question concerned the survival of Belarusian and Ukrainian so I didn't want to add too much about eastward and southeastward russification, other than to note that it was quite successful by comparison. It's the same reason I simplified the post-Kiev period in the woody northeast to "eventually Moscow emerged".

The reason I mentioned Austrian cultivation of Ukrainian identity has little to do with Austria's intention; I think it was mainly a way to contain Hungarian nationalism after 1848 by making the Hungarians just one of a large number of ethnicities represented in the empire. But even when the intent was internal, it had an external effect by creating a place where books and newspapers could be printed in Ukrainian. plays performed, hymns composed, etc. - a place where Ukrainian could be a language of a cultured urban elite. This made it harder to dismiss it as merely a peasant dialect to be replaced by "proper" Russian.

There's one misunderstanding that I'd like to clear up. When I said that states "naturally claimed a distinct national identity", I was describing something that all modern states have done. I'm not singling out Belarus and Ukraine for making stuff up, I mean they are to some extent but so are all the others. Every national identity is a social construct and in almost all cases the state took an active part in constructing it because it is a useful tool for them, giving them both internal and external legitimacy. Every state rewrites its own history with that purpose in mind. If you detected a whiff of irony, you're right, I'm very skeptical of all nationalism. But I just spent most of that long post explaining that Belarusian and Ukrainian identity are rooted in centuries of separate development, so I'm certainly not saying they were invented out of thin air.

 

[fr-rein]

Yes, I simplified. It was already a wall of text and it's just a forum post, not a monograph on Eastern European national identities.

I am sorry if I was a bit too attacking, I didn't want to write a monograph either. I only addressed critical points while I agreed in rest of that post.

I did wonder if I should say more about the Cossacks but decided against it.

It's an important bit.
Cossacks were fully annexed in middle of XVIII century when Hetmanate was disbanded, local Cossack elites becoming regular but wealthy nobles and landowners. If you look at the time... it is just 150 years in Russian Empire, and with an abysmal literacy rate which was caused by both trying to install Russian (and undermining existing education) while poorly enabling education at all, which heavily impaired assimilation of even similar nation.

It's a common misconception that Russia was always full of Russians and consisted only of them. Under many works, people barely see difference to anything past Poles, sometimes lumping even Armenians to Russians for unknown reasons.

I think it was mainly a way to contain Hungarian nationalism after 1848 by making the Hungarians just one of a large number of ethnicities represented in the empire

I wouldn't say it was aimed at Hungary. Rather, it was aimed at Poland and creating counterweights to the Polish national movement, allowing Austrians to effectively neutralize separatism by keeping both sides interesting in pleasing Vienna. It happened much earlier than 1848 too, exactly because it kept Poles not too disloyal and concerned about leadership in Galicia, which they couldn't get without being loyal. Divide and rule.

This said, Austria despite understandable issues was always much more permissable than Russian Empire. Even in worst days it didn't get as prohibitive and repressive. Of course, Finns and for some time Poles had special priviliges but only as autonomous parts (which were that and a few Central Asian khanates).

There's one misunderstanding that I'd like to clear up. When I said that states "naturally claimed a distinct national identity", I was describing something that all modern states have done. I'm not singling out Belarus and Ukraine for making stuff up, I mean they are to some extent but so are all the others. Every national identity is a social construct and in almost all cases the state took an active part in constructing it because it is a useful tool for them, giving them both internal and external legitimacy. Every state rewrites its own history with that purpose in mind. If you detected a whiff of irony, you're right, I'm very skeptical of all nationalism. But I just spent most of that long post explaining that Belarusian and Ukrainian identity are rooted in centuries of separate development, so I'm certainly not saying they were invented out of thin air.

I am sorry for getting at that point and I agree with this point.

Ultimately, there more identities than the typical 3 (Ukrainian, Russian, Belorussian), they could be divided further. But others are simply far less prominent and, given a lack of self-governance, don't have much going for them. Only 2 of them have a solid identity (Russians and Ukrainians) while Belarussians are a more troubled case as they lacked local elites, a driver to have a political identity or freedom to develop it in non-repressive society.

 

[pithorr]

No, it doesn't. What made them different from Ukraine and why it diverged as a branch? Defacto (written) Ruthenian at that point was similar/same in Ukraine and Belarus. It's only 19th century when literature language split happens.

Yes it did. In the Grand Duchy Ruthenian (OK, lets's assume it hasn't diverged yet...) was used by elites much longer than in the Crown. It caused differences in vocabulary (Ukrainian is more influenced by Polish), the grammar, especially in technical or scientifical issues. There was longer literary tradition on the common basis there while in Ukraine writings were much longer technically limited to Orthodox religious documents only. The short period of Cossacks authonomy, which is maybe romantized too much today, didn't change much, as Ukrainian lands were soon divided between Poland and Russia again, whose cultures continued to dominate among the elites.
Process of the development of a language is long, we cannot say that it happened suddenly in the 19th century, only together with national revival, which was actually pretty weak in Belarus, due to reasons described by you.

 

[fr-rein]

Yes it did. In the Grand Duchy Ruthenian (OK, lets's assume it hasn't diverged yet...) was used by elites much longer than in the Crown. It caused differences in vocabulary (Ukrainian is more influenced by Polish), the grammar, especially in technical or scientifical issues. There was longer literary tradition on the common basis there while in Ukraine writings were much longer technically limited to Orthodox religious documents only. The short period of Cossacks authonomy, which is maybe romantized too much today, didn't change much, as Ukrainian lands were soon divided between Poland and Russia again, whose cultures continued to dominate among the elites.
Process of the development of a language is long, we cannot say that it happened suddenly in the 19th century, only together with national revival, which was actually pretty weak in Belarus, due to reasons described by you.

But say it yourself - elites were heavily determining the usage of the official language.
It didn't have to do much with the official usage by state - it did matter, but the oral differences between languages are said to be pretty old ones, predating probably even Kievan Rus and being apparent since the times when East Slavs were still divided into smaller tribes.

What changed was exactly that in Ukraine political processes went altogether different.

In Belarus nearly all native Orthodox nobility assimilated and became either Poles or Lithuanians. Later, when Russians came, some associated themselves with Russians but no one really had much of a regional identity. Elites, and as a result potential writers, poets and politicians became Polish, Lithuanian and Russian ones. Which is reflected deeply in how in Belarus history they consider some of the Poles/Lithuanians of Belarus origin to be also national heroes. There weren't much others, their identity on political level was tied to Lithuania and Poland. Term "Litvin" wasn't coincidental.

In Ukraine the process was somewhat similar, with nobility gradually integrating into Polish identity and adopting Catholicism. But it was greatly sabotaged by the Cossack Rebellions and wars, with Cossacks ousting a lot of old nobility (the one which didn't join them and stood by Poles), wiping away an old unjust social order. Of course you probably know that it didn't end well - nobility and landlords returned (albeit no longer as daring or forcefully imposing foreign faith), remaining in XVIII century Cossacks either moved to Kuban or became new landlords and nobility, Russians spread their rule and new imperial order.
However. What it did is that all new nobility was tightly intertwined with Cossack former identity. It wasn't just nobility either, quite a lot regular families had ties to the Cossacks (even if their grandfather from XVIII century was a regular Cossack soldier), folklore became full of Cossack tales and stories, in general it set a perception of a distinct identity.

Notably, it was also picked up in Western Ukraine later, even if it never was an area where Cossacks were ruling or even supported that much, as a banner of separate identity... and fight against Poland. The anti-Polish antagonism did a lot to drive Western Ukraine, relatively separate from rest, closer in identification to rest. And that fed perfectly into the development of XIX century nationalism and its issues. It gave a constrasting result compared to Belarus and why its national movements were undoubtedly much weaker than Ukrainian (and other nations in Europe).

Simple politics, including the Cossack times, gave the most defining impact on the divisions between three nations. It also was a time when most borders were shaped more or less similar to modern times, again because of Cossack wars and massive migrations to Left bank and, much later, to Southern Ukraine.

 

[pithorr]

But say it yourself - elites were heavily determining the usage of the official language.
It didn't have to do much with the official usage by state - it did matter, but the oral differences between languages are said to be pretty old ones, predating probably even Kievan Rus and being apparent since the times when East Slavs were still divided into smaller tribes.

What changed was exactly that in Ukraine political processes went altogether different.

In Belarus nearly all native Orthodox nobility assimilated and became either Poles or Lithuanians. Later, when Russians came, some associated themselves with Russians but no one really had much of a regional identity. Elites, and as a result potential writers, poets and politicians became Polish, Lithuanian and Russian ones. Which is reflected deeply in how in Belarus history they consider some of the Poles/Lithuanians of Belarus origin to be also national heroes. There weren't much others, their identity on political level was tied to Lithuania and Poland. Term "Litvin" wasn't coincidental.

In Ukraine the process was somewhat similar, with nobility gradually integrating into Polish identity and adopting Catholicism. But it was greatly sabotaged by the Cossack Rebellions and wars, with Cossacks ousting a lot of old nobility (the one which didn't join them and stood by Poles), wiping away an old unjust social order. Of course you probably know that it didn't end well - nobility and landlords returned (albeit no longer as daring or forcefully imposing foreign faith), remaining in XVIII century Cossacks either moved to Kuban or became new landlords and nobility, Russians spread their rule and new imperial order.
However. What it did is that all new nobility was tightly intertwined with Cossack former identity. It wasn't just nobility either, quite a lot regular families had ties to the Cossacks (even if their grandfather from XVIII century was a regular Cossack soldier), folklore became full of Cossack tales and stories, in general it set a perception of a distinct identity.

Notably, it was also picked up in Western Ukraine later, even if it never was an area where Cossacks were ruling or even supported that much, as a banner of separate identity... and fight against Poland. The anti-Polish antagonism did a lot to drive Western Ukraine, relatively separate from rest, closer in identification to rest. And that fed perfectly into the development of XIX century nationalism and its issues. It gave a constrasting result compared to Belarus and why its national movements were undoubtedly much weaker than Ukrainian (and other nations in Europe).

Simple politics, including the Cossack times, gave the most defining impact on the divisions between three nations. It also was a time when most borders were shaped more or less similar to modern times, again because of Cossack wars and massive migrations to Left bank and, much later, to Southern Ukraine.

OK, it's all true but it is astonishing that Belarusians did manage to retain their identity against all odds. Maybe a lot on the basis of Grand Duchy tradition, but always. Lithuanian state, apart of the name, had actually more in common with Ruthenian culture...

 

[fr-rein]

It was kept by rural population mostly, which wasn't nowhere near integrated with relatively poor economics and education.
In XX century Belarus got opportunities to form their national identity, even if much later than most nations, and realize it in Belarus SSR.

Then, comes another issue. Later Belarus SSR became more Russifying and made elites built on the party loyalty. After collapse of USSR, the nomenclature in Belarus was one of 2 forces that were pretending for power. The other one was a nationalist and democratic movements, but they were outnumbered and in a society concerned by huge crisis Lukashenko and nomenclature seized Belarus, making it an authoritarian government with neo-Soviet identity: not grounded on democratic or real national issues, but putting on the facade whenever it suits the regime. It made even Belarusian language basically secondary, doing little to help it survive competition with Russian (as of now it is going the way Irish language went), all in order to promote rather neo-Soviet identity than Belarusian. The protests that are still going on and the opposition to Lukashenko are a lot about national identification as well.

And it's also not just an issue of Russian identity imposing itself on Belarus. Even among opposition aligning with Polish or Lithuanian identities is common. In worst case there is a possibilty of Belarus shattering and being simply divided if it won't have an identity to hold it together, with neighboring states claiming to save poor "brothers". And Brest is Berestya and Ukrainian but it's another story.

The question of fate of Belarus identity is still open.

 

[Kupr]

Obviously these identities were sufficiently strong to warrant being bad into soverign republics of the USSR in 1917. Or did internal USSR politics play a role?

V.I. Lenin - 1914 - The Right of Nations to Self- Determination

 

[pithorr]

You mean Brześć of course is Litewski

 

[fr-rein]

You mean Brześć of course is Litewski

The identity there was certainly quite ambiguous. An intersection of 4 cultures and nations - Polish, Lithuanian, Ukrainian (Volhynian) and Belarusia, the Polesian area traditions which weren't core to Ukraine or Belarus, strong Volhynian influence, cultural dominance of different neighbors, Soviet cultural revolution... massive German atrocities against rural population and destroying cities...

Still, they are today a part of Belarus nation and identity. Unless it perishes, they will be Belarusians. I only wish the multicultural side of history was more appreciated and not politicized in East Europe. It is tiresome to hear rants about "true Russians", "made up nations", "folklore written by Austrians", "muscovy being finno-ugric larpers", tatar-khazar-turk-sarmat stupidity, etc.

And what is tiring is how in unholy way official institutions support spread of such crap. Not necessarily via academy, but also via media and such.