Changing The War

[unmerged(4876)]

I don't think Italy wil last very long, after all it didn't take the Germans too long to conquer Yugoslavia and Greece, both countries with similar terrain to Italy, and a Napoleon type advance south might knock Il Duce out of the war within weeks.

Yea, the German Army lost 151 men in Yugoslavia... 9 less than it took for the 5th mountain division to take the Metaxas Line in Greece. I think there were something like 17,000 casualties in the bombing campaign in Belgrade. Of cource, the Axis would lose many more men during the occupation of Yugoslavia.

It would appear, that under these conditions, yet again, any early changes to allied performance and deployment benefits Germany. Further, where does Britain fight? They don't even have a desert war to participate in, what do all those troops do?

An early D-Day? If successful, that would not be benefitial to Germany.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by sean9898
Agelastas, no I'm not abandoning the thread, I was looking to see if I shut my big mouth for a while, whether the traffic would pick up. It's still very quiet in here

I find it very strange, that just about any alternative, or what-if based on a different German strategy will prompt dozens of posts, but no one seems the slightest bit interested in any allied what-ifs

You've done me a favor though, as I didn't notice Sole Survivor's Italian scenario, must have missed it on my last read through, so.....

Happy to be of service Sean9898. Maybe the lack of interest reflects a perception that the Allies didn't make as many mistakes, or have as many options-this is faintly absurd.

As for Italy, even after the fall of France they've still got a shorter frontier to defend than the Yugoslavs with what should be a (marginally) better and larger army. If anything, their frontier is the most defensible in Europe, given the curve of the Alps it rests on. I vaguely remember that there were some fortifications/fortified areas as well. Italy may be able to hold on for much longer than you postulate-the Greeks aren't a very good example because their deployment was predicated on an overestimation of the Yugoslav army, If they hadn't made it and chose to defend a line further south, perhaps even Thermopylae, it's possible the Germans would have had a much more difficult time there.

Italy is a good candidate for the imposition of a "Vichy style" regime though, given the concentration of industrial capacity in the regions drained by the Po in the north of the country.

Let's mention the old favourite-what if Freyberg's Crete command had had a few more radios?


Do I remember you mentioning you were a WiF fan on another thread?

 

[PDH]

A thought,
What would no real Med theater mean to Britian and the Western Allies in Europe? Certainly Sledgehammer (42 invasion) is more or less a pipe dream, but what about RoundUp (43 invasion) or even Overlord? Is the US still in the same European mode with no heroic Battle of Britian to draw US sentiment toward the Commonwealth?

Lend-Lease, at least in the form it was adopted, seems to be in part fueld by the public support for a besieged England capable of fighting off the Luftwaffe. With no fight there, and indeed postulating that Pear Harbor still takes place, there seems to be less motivation for a "Europe First" strategy on he part of the Western Allies.

Good thing you folks alread sent Monty to the Far East, because maybe America would be much more interested in warfare here than in Europe - where the public sees the Soviet-Nazi struggle with less interest than previously thought.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by PDH
Is the US still in the same European mode with no heroic Battle of Britian to draw US sentiment toward the Commonwealth?

Roosevelt.

His mind was probably made up by the end of 1939-many American commanders, in the navy particularly, were more interested in fighting Japan than Germany. Roosevelt knew where his priorities were-and given the relative industrial capacity of Germany and Japan, who can really argue with him?

So PDH, what do you think Monty would get up to in the east, since you're so glad we've sent him. (personally, I think he'd still be posted somewhere in the west, maybe even in the British Isles, but we've only got a finite number of "big names" among the generals to play with!)

 

[unmerged(592)]

Roosevelt made up his mind about Germany long before 1933... Hitler just gave him a reason to dislike Germany even more

 

[PDH]

Ahh, but given the Americna isolationism during the first 10 months of WW2, I would expect that Roosevelt would not have been able to make the Lend-Lease (as we know it) pass. Given that 1940 was an election year, the sitting president was still mindful of not upsetting the sentiments of the "no war at any cost" crowd - this with the swing in sympathies toward the English with the Battle of Britian.

I suspect that less sympathy with the cause of England combined with Pearl Harbor (remember I posited that the surprise attack still occurred) would have meant a much harder go to the 'Europe First' plans no matter who was doing the planning.

So PDH, what do you think Monty would get up to in the east, since you're so glad we've sent him. (personally, I think he'd still be posted somewhere in the west, maybe even in the British Isles, but we've only got a finite number of "big names" among the generals to play with!)

I think that ANY resolute commander in the Far East for the English and Indian troops would have made the initial expansion of Japanese power in 41-42 much harder. As it was the idiocy that allowed such things as the easy fall of Malaysia, the collapses in Burma, etc would have had a tougher time happening.

However, the situation with the ANZAC troops, and the general suspicion of British motives and worry that the Home Islands were too ready to sacrifice Australian troops, makes cooperation and better coordination tougher. Plus, the utterly stupidity of the initial days by leaders such as Douglas MacArthur would have allowed stunning advances anyway in region such as the Philippines.

Monty in the Far East would have been a better choice than Percival (sp?) or some of the others - despite his ego and grandstanding he seemed to be able to deal with situations in a rational manner and show steadfastness under troubling times.

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by Agelastus
Maybe the lack of interest reflects a perception that the Allies didn't make as many mistakes, or have as many options-this is faintly absurd.

Definately, I guess the fact that they won overrides the mistakes made by allied commanders. One variant I often wonder is whether Patton's plan to invade at Pas de Calais would have been better than Normandy. Might have been harder to get through the beaches, but the country inland might have made for a swifter breakthrough.

As for Italy, even after the fall of France they've still got a shorter frontier to defend than the Yugoslavs with what should be a (marginally) better and larger army. If anything, their frontier is the most defensible in Europe, given the curve of the Alps it rests on. I vaguely remember that there were some fortifications/fortified areas as well. Italy may be able to hold on for much longer than you postulate

Can't argue either way, just depends on how well the Italians might perform. I think looking at Italy in 1940, it's hard to look past the Italian performance in Africa and Greece. Not doubting the bravery of their troops, but they were poorly equipped and the worst led army in Europe (or was that the French )

On the other hand, it's equally hard to look past the German defense in Italy and assume anyone could conduct a swift campaign of conquest.

They had plenty of light tanks looking at the number the allies captured during the first romp across the desert.

So, we have a couple of choices,

(a) Italy holds out through 1940, does Britain send troops, I imagine yes. This also allows for SoleSurvivor's point; that Britain attempt night raids over Ploesti, a difficult target to reach given the poor navigation techniques used in 1940.

(b) Italy holds out indefinately. Least likely and means no Barbarossa. This allows for the possibility that Hitler reject's Japan's call for him to DOW on USA. Under the Axis terms Germany was not obliged to aid in an offensive war by her allies, and without the vague hope of Japanese troops to attack Russia would Hitler say nein?

(c) Italy falls quickly. Same as I outlined in the previous post.

Let's mention the old favourite-what if Freyberg's Crete command had had a few more radios?

Would that be enough to hold Crete? I thought it was a case of more allied blunders in being beaten by a small unarmoured force combined with the enormous air advantage.

Do I remember you mentioning you were a WiF fan on another thread?

The theoretical kind, as in spend 4 hours setting it up and playing a few moves before putting it away

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by PDH
Ahh, but given the Americna isolationism during the first 10 months of WW2, I would expect that Roosevelt would not have been able to make the Lend-Lease (as we know it) pass. Given that 1940 was an election year, the sitting president was still mindful of not upsetting the sentiments of the "no war at any cost" crowd - this with the swing in sympathies toward the English with the Battle of Britian.

But wouldn't Germany still try and strangle the Atlantic shipping lanes? Plenty of fortress Britain images could still be shown, as well as the destruction of France and Italy - German barbarians destroying Western European culture would have made for great propaganda.

I suspect that less sympathy with the cause of England combined with Pearl Harbor (remember I posited that the surprise attack still occurred) would have meant a much harder go to the 'Europe First' plans no matter who was doing the planning.

Not if Germany DOWs on America. Despite the Europe First attitude, it's hard to consider the US doing anything else. How could the US possibly increase their commitment to the Pacific front given the finite capacity of naval transport?

Monty in the Far East would have been a better choice than Percival (sp?) or some of the others - despite his ego and grandstanding he seemed to be able to deal with situations in a rational manner and show steadfastness under troubling times.

Montgomery was tremendous in the desert. Although he could not be described as daring, he did a good job of organizing forces, and turning the tide. Montgomery was influenced by the waste of troops in WW1 and much of his caution can be attributed to his desire not to throw lives away. He was however resolute when he needed an objective taken, Alamein was a WW1 battle fought with WW2 weapons, and when being told that his plans would incur 90% casualties on one battalion he said the job had to be done even if 100% casualties were sustained.

However, once he met Patton, Monty appears to go through a change of personality. Gone is his caution and planning, and instead he appears to try to outmatch Patton without those tactics being his strength. Monty's plan for Sicily was fairly sound provided he threw toward Messina, but that wasn't his style and resulted in allowing the German army to escape.

His ultimate madness was Arnheim, an operation so badly planned, that it relied on the enemy making uncharacteristic mistakes, and a timetable which was better suited to the pursuit across France than a breakthrough and advance.

Putting Monty in the Far East and keeping him away from Patton might leave a legacy of greatness which Monty threw away after North Africa. Perhaps we would be discussing his masterfull defense of Singapore, or other such exploits.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by sean9898
Would that be enough to hold Crete? I thought it was a case of more allied blunders in being beaten by a small unarmoured force combined with the enormous air advantage.

The main blunder on Crete was a delay launching a counterattack at one of the airfields, which was combined with a rather unfortunate withdrawal from one sector to prepare for the attack-since the abandoned hill was the single most vital point in the defense of the airfield (the westernmost one, and I can never remember which one that is-Maleme?), better communications with headquarters could have prevented it.

If Crete was held, what lessons would the Allies take from this-a good chunk of their enthusiasm for airborne ops. comes from the success of "Mercury", even though the casualties put Hitler off them. Would Monty have still seen Arnhem as a viable operation? More particularly, would Eisenhower, who signed off on it?

The theoretical kind, as in spend four hours setting it up and playing a few moves before putting it away

Ah! Well, you're discoursing with a man who managed a 1939-45 solitaire campaign in less than two weeks while on holiday from work-'course, it's strange how well the Commonwealth does in my games!

 

[grumbler]

I think Monty would have fared somewhat better than Percivel at Singapore, but would still have gone "in the bag" because the British troops there were simply not capable of fighting the sorts of actions the Japanese were forcing, and Monty was not at his best in a highly fluid situation where enemy intentions and capabilities were not known (eg the Axis retreat from El Alamein). Certainly he could have done no worse than Percival, but barring a miracle or major reinforcements Singapore was, IMO, doomed.

The better outcome of the "quick African campaign" for the British would have been the freeing up of the troops and aircraft to defend Burma. The Japanese campaign there was a nearer-run thing than Singapore, despite the speed of the Japanese advance. The lack of Allied air power there crippled the defense and this could have been overcome with no North Africa to tie down British and Commonwealth troops.

It is interesting to contemplate the choices the Germans would face if a 1943 Cross-channel invasion were even possible. They had few troops in the West in 1943, as their preparations for Zitadel (the Kursk Offensive) used up their reserves. Given that the Allies would have been building up forces for a CCI in 1943, would Zitadel have been launched? If not, would the Soviets have made far more gains in 1943 as the Germans were forced to defend France against a CCI? Would the Allies have executed Roundup in the face of strong German reserves? Would they have struck at the Pas de Calais if they had executed Roundup?

I think that, had Italy joined the Allies rather than the Axis, Germany would have lost the war much sooner. It would be difficult to attack Italy from the North, especially given British air and land support (remember, no North Africa in this case). On the other hand, Germany's defensive perimeter would be much larger with a hostile Italy on her flank. In addition, the Allied domination of the Med would go a long way towards influencing Turkey to join the Allies, which would open up even more possibilities for the Allied air offensive against Ploesti, and such an Allied combination might even make Hungary, Rumania, and Bulgaria think twice about the wisdom of joining the Axis.

There are some interesting "what ifs" in these scenarios.

 

[Dark Knight]

Even if Germany manages to conduct a successful blitzkrieg in Italy, wouldn't this tie up a significant number of German troops to garrison Italy?

Also, would Britain be able to hold on to Sicily or Sardinia?

 

[Agelastus]

Grumbler
Certainly the British Forces in Malaya were unprepared for combat in the jungle (part of the blame for which must be layed at Percival's feet) but if Monty had set up a decent defensive line or lines just north of Singapore Island, for which plenty of local labour was available, that's a slightly different story. The fall of Singapore in this scenario really depends on whether or not the Allies can force through a relief force or supplies against the might of the IJN. And that depends on whether the Japanese have settled for a siege of Singapore and pushed on to take the Dutch East Indies. Singapore has about six months' worth of supplies-can it be relieved in time?

I quite agree with you about Burma, however, as I said in earlier posts-it's Sean9898 who's got us sending Monty to Singapore!

Dark Knight
Good question-considering Crete, maybe not. On the other hand. Sardinia and Sicily have many differences to Crete. It might depend on how many Italian troops are available to defend them (the absence of the local Cretan Division was a major problem for the British at Crete.)

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by Agelastus

I quite agree with you about Burma, however, as I said in earlier posts-it's Sean9898 who's got us sending Monty to Singapore!

Ok, then I'll post him to Canada or Australia
Under the no desert war, or Italian campaign there's very little for the General to do in Europe, and before Monty rises to fortune a whole posse of Generals have to screw up first.

If Crete was held, what lessons would the Allies take from this-a good chunk of their enthusiasm for airborne ops. comes from the success of "Mercury", even though the casualties put Hitler off them. Would Monty have still seen Arnhem as a viable operation? More particularly, would Eisenhower, who signed off on it?

This is an interesting what if. Even if Crete fell, the success of airborn in Belgium might have led to some enthusiam, but perhaps not on the same scale.

As for Arnheim, the Normandy drops were pretty much a disaster but they still planned to use airborne again. I guess it all comes down to whether the allies form large numbers of airborne regiments based on their assessment of Crete. If they do form, then I don't think that Arnheim would necesarily be called off. After all, the plans called for Horrocks to be brewing tea in Germany 2-3 days after the kick off, a very different proposition to taking an island single handed.

Regarding Italy, having given it some thought I think I would come down on the side of a quick German victory. The German's were able to overcome difficult terrain in Greece, there is a tremendous account of the 2nd Panzer assault around Mount Olympus crossing seemingly impassable terrain.

What really convinces me though is that until the Russian rains, nothing stopped the early war German advances. They would still have a Luftwaffe untouched by the Battle of Britain, and I would presume British support to be minimal, so a German assault on Italian troops in 1940 would IMHO be little contest.

As for Sicily and Sardinia, difficult if not impossible for Germany to attack. However, would Britain still try to hold the islands if the Italian government surrendered and demanded a British withdrawl?

 

[unmerged(592)]

Remember who the Italian Govt is.Mussolini surrenders? so what! let the king constitute a new govt, preferably parliamental in exile or on sicily.

 

[Agelastus]

Originally posted by SoleSurvivor
Remember who the Italian Govt is.Mussolini surrenders? so what! let the king constitute a new govt, preferably parliamental in exile or on sicily.

It does depend on whether any sort of "Vichy" regime is created or not-but if enough troops were present in Sicily or Sardinia, Churchill would have tried to hold them, with or without a "De Gaulle" type Italian patriot.

Sean9898
A lot of enthusiasm among the western Allies for paratroops did come from Eben Emael etc.-but the number of such formations was dramatically increased in the planned Allied OoB after the German success at Crete. So we could see a much lower degree of paratrooper participation in landing operations such as Normandy-hence, no formations large enough for "Market Garden".

I still think Italy would have been a difficult task for the Wehrmacht-the Greek army was so far out of position that the best defensive points in Greece weren't held in anything like adequate strength, which literally couldn't be true for Italy in such a situation, given the postulated politics/events and the actual frontiers.

 

[unmerged(598)]

Originally posted by Agelastus
It does depend on whether any sort of "Vichy" regime is created or not-but if enough troops were present in Sicily or Sardinia, Churchill would have tried to hold them, with or without a "De Gaulle" type Italian patriot.

So assuming Italy falls at some point, and no need for a German intervention in Greece does Germany try to take the islands?

Sicily is the easier, Germany can probably gain air superiority over the area and keep the RN out. IRL The Germans were able to evacuate Sicily, can they do the reverse and invade?

Sardinia might take the place of Crete.

For both Sardinia and Sicily, can we assume that Britain will commit almost their entire air force to the Med? Might a Battle of Britain type encounter be fought over the Italian islands?

A lot of enthusiasm among the western Allies for paratroops did come from Eben Emael etc.-but the number of such formations was dramatically increased in the planned Allied OoB after the German success at Crete. So we could see a much lower degree of paratrooper participation in landing operations such as Normandy-hence, no formations large enough for "Market Garden".

Might this be better for the allies? While there are examples of airborne troop's heroics at Normandy, were the casualties worth the results? Market-Garden was a disaster which resulted in the destruction of British airborne. There were some successfull actions in Burma, although not really airborne troops, the method of insertion and resupply do require a commitment to airborne methods, so I guess my question is; Was airborne worth the trouble?

I still think Italy would have been a difficult task for the Wehrmacht-the Greek army was so far out of position that the best defensive points in Greece weren't held in anything like adequate strength, which literally couldn't be true for Italy in such a situation, given the postulated politics/events and the actual frontiers.

The Olympus example was against dug-in Aussies, not a strategic example, just a taste of the Werhmact's ability to improvise and capture impossible positions early in the war.

I'm not sure if the German's had any contingency plans which called for an invasion of Italy. If not, then their track record of hasty improvised plans is quite poor. If they did/or would under this scenario then I really think they can manage the conquest. 1940 was the German year when they performed the impossible - Ardennes, Belgium and Norway, I just can't see them failing in Italy.

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by sean9898
Might this be better for the allies? While there are examples of airborne troop's heroics at Normandy, were the casualties worth the results? Market-Garden was a disaster which resulted in the destruction of British airborne. There were some successfull actions in Burma, although not really airborne troops, the method of insertion and resupply do require a commitment to airborne methods, so I guess my question is; Was airborne worth the trouble?

A retired US Army general I know feels that the Allies made two great policy errors in the war: diverting too many resources into the strategic bombing campaign, and doing the same into airborne ops.

An early failure and turning away in either might have shortened the war, according to him. I always wondered why they both have received so much uncritical acclaim when both areas saw minimal results compared to the effort expended. As usual, it seems like a combination of political factors and the mistaken impression that there was a surplus of resources, so why look for waste?

 

[unmerged(598)]

Grumbler, while I might agree about airborne troops, I strongly disagree about the worth of the bombing campaign.

While the tactic is controversial, and certainly seems to taint the nobility of the allied cause the bombing campaign was IMHO worthwhile for a number of reasons.

[1] What else could the allies do in 1942 and 1943?

[2] While industrial damage may be questionable, the resources Germany diverted to deal with the bombers is almost the equivalent of a western front.

[3] For Britain it was vital for morale purposes that the country be seen attacking Germany.

 

[unmerged(2539)]

The point, as i see it, about the allied airborne evoulving out of german success that itself came from groundbreaking soviet ideas, is that the driving force for large scale implementation of the program was largely a political, rather than militry, desire. Churchil saw something that he did not fully understand, but he saw it worked, for example, so starting from scratch a whole new adjunct to the eastblished methods had to be worked into the system. It could be argued that scale was the problem, small unit ops success does not follow that larger use will produce an expodentual increase in results.

Post war cost effectivness examination, can show if the program was wasteful or effective, if you will. As you have already pointed out, different leasons were learned by different sides from the same experience(data) during the airborne ops of ww2, what does seem to be the case for the allies is that air ops are to be used in support of normal ground ops, while germany was also willing to go that a step further and attempt independant air insertion ops that once committed had no way of extraction or relief. The allies were never so bold. Someone was always coming to their relief. If you follow the post war train of thought as to air ops, now insertion and retrieval are equal, before the tech made only limited retrival possible, along with ressuply, now had the allies been daring, i mean truly daring, with the expensive grade a material they created they may have garnished greater laudits than they do already. If they had, the post war comparison would come out different.

Hannibal

 

[grumbler]

Originally posted by sean9898
Grumbler, while I might agree about airborne troops, I strongly disagree about the worth of the bombing campaign.

While the tactic is controversial, and certainly seems to taint the nobility of the allied cause the bombing campaign was IMHO worthwhile for a number of reasons.

[1] What else could the allies do in 1942 and 1943?

They could have had many more landing craft, eg (which used exactly the same materials and technology) and thus had had more success in Africa, the Med, and the Pacific.

[2] While industrial damage may be questionable, the resources Germany diverted to deal with the bombers is almost the equivalent of a western front.

Actually, this was not true until 1944, when there WAS an actual Western Front to deal with. Whether the Luftwaffe was destroyed over Germany (expensive) or over France (cheap) was just a matter of Allied priorities. Gerany committed significant resources to the Strategic Bombing Campaign only after the war was lost anyway.

[3] For Britain it was vital for morale purposes that the country be seen attacking Germany.

This is a common rationale for the SBC, but the fact was that the British had to lie to thier people about the losses involved in order to "keep morale up." I don't think that the British were more buoyed by the SBC than they were depressed by the loss of Singapore and Burma, for instance. Had the British deployed the resources they deployed in the SBC into tactical aircraft for Burma and Malaya, morale may have actually been higher.