Ill see your Cadorna and raise you Franz Xaver Josef Conrad von Hötzendorf, the man who failed to beat Serbia, got schooled by Russia, and who as much as anyone caused WW1 to happen, destroying his own nation in the process.
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I was quite amused reading from wiki that Hötzendorf was very positively regarded in post-war Austria, as it is quite hard to find any 20th century general who failed their country harder than him.
But at least he almost beat Italy in the Trentino offensive. Good that the troops committed there were not really needed somewhere else like in Galicia.
Cadorna and Hötzendorf are both standout clowns in a circus full of them, but I think Cadorna should retain the crown.
Hötzendorf's failings seem to be an illustration of the Peter principle and Dunning Kruger narcissism. He appears as a competent enough organizer and army commander, but a disaster at grand strategy.
He conceived decent plans that his basket case of an army could never execute, and he continuously refused to accept or understand that, but was able to lead troops in battle.
To wit, when forces commanded by Hötzendorf come up against forces commanded by Cadorna, the Italians come off worse.
Cadorna on the other hand seems like he just bungled everything up and down the line.
He tried to implement terrible plans that no one would ever be able to execute on this plane of existence. To be fair to him, he was hardly unique in this prior to 1916, but his refusal to learn anything from failure or accept responsibility puts him in a special class.
Hötzendorf's failings seem to be an illustration of the Peter principle and Dunning Kruger narcissism. He appears as a competent enough organizer and army commander, but a disaster at grand strategy.
He conceived decent plans that his basket case of an army could never execute, and he continuously refused to accept or understand that, but was able to lead troops in battle.
To wit, when forces commanded by Hötzendorf come up against forces commanded by Cadorna, the Italians come off worse.
Cadorna on the other hand seems like he just bungled everything up and down the line.
He tried to implement terrible plans that no one would ever be able to execute on this plane of existence. To be fair to him, he was hardly unique in this prior to 1916, but his refusal to learn anything from failure or accept responsibility puts him in a special class.
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If only Conrad (that was his family name) could have had some hand-picked subordinates it might have lead to a different result.
On the other hand i do not agree that he is an example of the Peter principle. Since his opening moves has shown that he could not work under stress (sending Staffel B to Serbia, then back, and attack before his army assembled in the hope that the Russians are even worse shape in spite of the overall defensive strategy, good defensive terrain and home turf advantage)
He would have failed as a fireteam commander.
Did Cadorna advocate for Italian entry to war? For me the worst part of Hötzendorf's failures was that he himself had repeatedly advocated for war, and then terribly failed in executing it.
If only Conrad (that was his family name) could have had some hand-picked subordinates it might have lead to a different result.
On the other hand i do not agree that he is an example of the Peter principle. Since his opening moves has shown that he could not work under stress (sending Staffel B to Serbia, then back, and attack before his army assembled in the hope that the Russians are even worse shape in spite of the overall defensive strategy, good defensive terrain and home turf advantage)
He would have failed as a fireteam commander.
Sorry, wasn't trying to say that CvH was a *good* commander promoted beyond his ability, just that he wasn't hopelessly useless in all contexts, which is what LC seems to have been.
CvH wasn't alone in catastrophically bungling early war offensives, or even unproductively shuffling critical forces between fronts.
On the other hand we could make the case for Cardona, that the Italian Army have the freedom to choose its entry into the war more or less without any outside interference. Whereas Conrad had the responsibility to produce results in two fronts using an ad mobilized army.
Conrad pretty much shaped all the doctrines and such of his army, being chief of staff since 1906 and an influential military theorist and educator before that. Yes, he had a very limited budget to work with. However, for example the crappy mobilization and the pointlessly aggressive doctrine can be pinned on him. As can a lot of other failings of the Austro-Hungarian armed forces. A lack of airplanes and obsolescence of the available ones, the weird pre-war insistence on bronze instead of iron artillery... the list goes on. And he is behind many entries.
So, if he doesn't like what he has to work with, he has himself to blame.
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It's not like he was alone in his weird pre-war insistence. See British Army Chief of Staff French, and the back and forth about the need for cavalry and sabre charges before WW1.
The apparent disconnect between Conrad being popular in Austria and ridiculed in English speaking sources just reflects the historiography biases more than any facts. Being a relatively recent topic, people aren't exactly detached from their personal/national biases as much as if we were talking about the Romans. Anything to reinforce the 'lions led by donkeys' stereotypes (bonus points if they're foreigners!)
Austrians: Conrad was great. Stubborn, selfish Hungarians left us unprepared for the war, everything is their fault. (see the official war history)
English: Austrians are cartoonishly incompetent, especially Conrad. (see A Mad Catastrophe by Geoffrey Wawro)
French: We beat Austria-Hungary single-handed (specifically L.F d'Esperey) and they were brilliant, tough opponents, including Conrad. (see anything by Max Schiavon)
Soviets/Russians: Conrad was great (Tukhachevsky is supposed to have been a particular fan) but they were <insert Soviet slogan here about imperialists/capitalists> so they lost.
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hell, that's the weird part of hotzendorf, he advocated for war aganst italy, serbia, romania multiple times because he believed that those nations would attack A-H when it would be in a war with russia, which happened, that totally did happen (except for the serbia part, but that was only because they were already at war with them, serbia wouldn't hesitate to attack austria if it felt it had the chance)
he also asked for a increased budget for the army multiple times, which if you have you an army 10 times the size of the UK but only spend as much on it is actualy quite reasonable
Some interesting conversation.
I will only say that, had the two commanders somehow swapped roles, don't think either would have fared better.
Conrad still gets my vote because, despite the catastrophic Italian losses, there still was an Italy at the end of WW1.
I will only say that, had the two commanders somehow swapped roles, don't think either would have fared better.
Conrad still gets my vote because, despite the catastrophic Italian losses, there still was an Italy at the end of WW1.
Only because they managed to switch sides, as they often do.
As for the conversation as a whole, I've noticed Anglo sources don't like to dig too deep on any side except their own. I forget where I read it (either a book review about a Vietnam war history book or in an actual book), but the author posed an intellectual challenge:
Name any North Vietnamese military leader except Giap and for extra challenge, any National Liberation Front (aka Vietcong) leader at all.
Much the same can apply to this situation. Everyone knows Cardona but how many other Italian leaders do even most historians know or care about?
Likewise for the Austrians. I've noticed nearly every military-heavy history book about WW1 will mention the Childers reforms of 1881 in the UK, but who ever talks about the AH CoS before Conrad or what reforms he did in the 1880's? The AH military didn't start in 1906, but that's when most narratives about them do start. Many historians shockingly don't even know that there were technically 3 armies in AH (Wawro certainly doesn't and he's considered a Conrad expert).
As for the conversation as a whole, I've noticed Anglo sources don't like to dig too deep on any side except their own. I forget where I read it (either a book review about a Vietnam war history book or in an actual book), but the author posed an intellectual challenge:
Name any North Vietnamese military leader except Giap and for extra challenge, any National Liberation Front (aka Vietcong) leader at all.
Much the same can apply to this situation. Everyone knows Cardona but how many other Italian leaders do even most historians know or care about?
Likewise for the Austrians. I've noticed nearly every military-heavy history book about WW1 will mention the Childers reforms of 1881 in the UK, but who ever talks about the AH CoS before Conrad or what reforms he did in the 1880's? The AH military didn't start in 1906, but that's when most narratives about them do start. Many historians shockingly don't even know that there were technically 3 armies in AH (Wawro certainly doesn't and he's considered a Conrad expert).
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Oh yes, a bunch of armies had to go through a bunch of harsh reality checks at the beginning of WW1, the KuK Armee (with the K-K Armee and the Honved
) weren't alone, that is for sure. Conrad's position is, however, unique in the sense that he built the army he commanded, had a major hand in the training, planning, doctrines, mobilization and so on. Unlike other commanders, whose influence on their respective military estabilishment wasn't so profound and deep and who therefore "inherited" forces they had to work with. In a sense. So his share of blame for his country's blunders is therefore in my estimation larger.I always found his interwar good reputation baffling to the extreme. He had streets named after him, was widely respected in writings of his contemporaries... the Tukachevsky thing surprised me a lot when I read about it the first time. Yet he had approximately zero unqualified successes and quite a few huge failures under his belt. It's really difficult to wrap my head around, but it is what it is. And actually successful A-H commanders, like Svetozar Boroevic von Bojna, were quite forgotten.
To add something to the topic, Italy went to war to complete the Risorgimento, right? It wanted Tirol, Istria and Dalmatia from A-H. And the surest way to accomplish that goal was to actually hold that territory. Because possession is 9/10 of ownership and other platitudes. Italians were (IMO rightly, as future would show) worried, that if they didn't actually capture their goals, they would get nothing in the peace. So they committed to bashing their heads against the Isonzo. Eleven times. Which wasn't very smart.
Landing in Dalmatia has to go through Dinaric Alps, before it gets anywhere militarily significant. And that is horrible, terrible, no good terrain for advancing inland. See for yourself.
Could the forces expended by Italy on the Isonzo have been better utilized elsewhere? If we take Entente as one entity, then probably yes. But Entente wasn't really ever quite unified in the vision of post-war settlement. So an Italy, that pushes hard in Albania and Salonika and Palestine, might hasten the end of war, but still get the same scraps in the peace as they did historically.
So, my answer to the OP's question would be: Maybe, possibly, but why would it try, when the best course of action was to try what was tried historically, but with more success?
The interesting question would then be: Could an intelligent Italy have had more success on their front with Austria? Yep, with a different commander, lesser amount of better supplied efforts. But it would IMO still not be enough to actually swing the war in a big way. It is way too easy to stop an advance in the mountains there, before anything significant is reached.
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Yes, Conrad was pissed enough. He always believed that Italy was the main enemy in the war, and in a way he was right. If Italy could have been beaten then A-H could have negotiated some sort of peace. The problem was that once Italy entered the war its demands were unacceptable to A-H.
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I once read that Italy played a crucial role in the decision of Germany to surrender in late 1918. When the Italians knocked out Austria-Hungary, it naturally completely opened Germany's southern flank to them. With pretty much all of the German army tied down in France, there was nothing left to throw against the Italians. Do you concur? Sorry if this was discussed before.
Regarding to the OT, I would assume a more competent Italy could have knocked out Austria-Hungary sooner or at leat require more Central Power forces aligned against it. The consequences of this could range from "hardly matters" to "war changing", depending on how much a lack of these forces would make a difference elsewhere.
Regarding to the OT, I would assume a more competent Italy could have knocked out Austria-Hungary sooner or at leat require more Central Power forces aligned against it. The consequences of this could range from "hardly matters" to "war changing", depending on how much a lack of these forces would make a difference elsewhere.
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The Italians didnt't knock out AH. By the time the battle of Vittorio Venetto happened it was already in the process of disintegration. For Austria the collapse of the southern front earlier was the decisive moment and it already asked for an armistice on October 4th weeks before the italian offensive.
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The German surrender is mostly because they were literally starving to death due to the blockade, their morale was terrible (in large part because they were literally starving to death), and the failure of the Spring Offensive plus the increasing arrival of American troops meant there was no realistic scenario where they could win.
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From wikipedia:
An Italian author might of course be biased towards the Italian contribution. However, the logic appears sound Yes, the German spring offensive had failed and yes, the long- and even mid-term prospects were hopeless, but didn't the German army retain enough strength and cohesion to at least resist on, make the Entente bleed and try to gain better peace conditions? Or at the very least, shouldn't the German high command have believed so?Paoletti said:
Ludendorff was trying to avoid the blame for his own failures by shifting it to Austria-Hungary.
He had been responsible for German strategy since 1916, and had leveraged his military position (and the needs of the war) to make himself essentially dictator of Germany by 1917. His Spring Offensive had failed, the Allied Blockade was strangling Germany (in addition to military supplies, as noted deaths from starvation were increasingly common), unrestricted submarine warfare (which he had supported) had brought America into the conflict, the Allied Hundred Days offensive had made significant gains, and the German military that he had spent the last several years commanding was now openly mutinous.
Ludendorff then spent the aftermath of the war arguing that the disaster was the fault of everyone except the German military that he commanded. Post-war, he was one of the major proponents of the "Stab-in-the-Back" myth that claimed it was really the fault of the civilian government and the Communists that Germany lost, and not the military that he commanded and that effectively controlled the nation by 1918. There's a reason that Hitler wanted him to lead the Beer Hall Putsch, and that he joined the marchers there.
So I'm not surprised that he would also blame the Austro-Hungarians as well.
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