Yes sure, but when it could actually make Germany stronger is a question though. Even if they could occupy that huge area it is a lot of time to colonize it and to make the economy work there. But as i told before i doubt the Allies had allowed Germany to do this, it would mean in a few generations time Germany will be a grave threat. Probably they had exported a lot of arms to the USSR to save them from defeat, maybe they even intervened directly eventually if things still went so horribly for the USSR.
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Yes sure, but when it could actually make Germany stronger is a question though. Even if they could occupy that huge area it is a lot of time to colonize it and to make the economy work there. But as i told before i doubt the Allies had allowed Germany to do this, it would mean in a few generations time Germany will be a grave threat. Probably they had exported a lot of arms to the USSR to save them from defeat, maybe they even intervened directly eventually if things still went so horribly for the USSR.
In a way, it did succeed in part, since it delayed the start of WW2 by one year, from 1938 to 1939, giving GB one more year to modernize its defenses.
no, the aim was to avoid a war altogether.
The british were quite explicit regarding Poland. There would not be another Munich. A new german aggression would lead to war. Munich and the continuing german aggrssion after Munich ( Memel territory and Prague) made it clear that appeasement had failed!
That year may have helped Germany more than the Allies, but it got the Allies closer to the date where their own military production levels could catch up and eventually exceed that of Germany, without having to fight Germany at a disadvantage for that additional year. The UK was definitely looking at the longer term picture.
the UK didn't know that though, chamberlain may have seemed naieve with his "peace in our time"-speech but he did start re-armament after that so I don't think even he believed that
Once the war started, the Western Allies were going to start rearming and mobilizing far more than they ever would at peace and would cut Germany off from international imports. The earlier the war starts, the less prepared everyone is, but also the faster the Allies close the military and production gap with Germany.
I know this is the officially acknowledged goal and maybe this was the best case scenario. I'm just coming from the assumption here that Albert Einstein and Eric Knight were right about their belief that the goal of the appeasement was to direct Germany's aggression towards the USSR, maybe as best case scenario or maybe as a fallback solution. Of course it's totally possible that this premise is false altogether and real goal was avoiding any wars or buying time for preparations. I don't think avoiding any wars was realistic at that historical situation so i don't care for that possible goal (even if it's the official) since i don't think in any way that could have succeeded and i dare to think Western leadres of the time weren't so stupid to think this might actually work. Buying time for preparations is another story since this might be a valid goal just like saving the West from a world war by directing Germany's aggression against the USSR, another enemy of the West.
Yes, i know that and also the fact that the Allies weren't prepared for a fast intervention.
I consider his statement as a means to have the concession accepted by the wider public, not like he actually thought it's true.
Also as far as i know Chamberlain got incorrect intelligence reports before München, suggesting much higher German mobilization status than the real one.
In general I find Chamberlains efforts underappreciated. He really did try to prevent a war but after Germany broke the München treaties he realized the situation and also prepared for war.
In hindsight you can say alot but this guy knew what was at stake.
In hindsight you can say alot but this guy knew what was at stake.
Yes, very true. He's usually presented like a fool although i think he was actually very smart.
Chamberlain is definitely a very underappreciated gentleman. It's easy to dunk on him with hindsight, not so much if you are limited to his knowledge and expectations for the time.
As for the goal of appeasement, just like many grand foreign policy models, it is not some one dimensional single-goal plan. Sure, absolutely, and without question, the desire is to prevent war. That isn't where appeasement ends. If war cannot be prevented entirely, the hope is then to limit its scope or severity and also to ensure more favorable odds. This is where you get ideas like Britain buying time to militarize or Hitler being pointed at the USSR instead of France. These are ALSO goals of appeasement - secondary or fallback goals. You can and should have contingencies as part of a large strategy.
This is where my criticism comes in. The appeasement plan hopes for no war, and either limited or fascist vs societ war if it comes. The alternative to appeasement is to suck up the criticism and the wailing of Germans and getting the war over with. If you are going to appease, IMO, you can't half ass it and then suddenly try to flop into drawing a red line after you've already appeased and ignored until then. Either stand up to Hitler in the first place or make a rational line further along, instead of conceding prague but then not Danzig and making BS offers of support to the Poles. (Never half ass two things. Whole ass one thing. - Ron Swanson)
As for the goal of appeasement, just like many grand foreign policy models, it is not some one dimensional single-goal plan. Sure, absolutely, and without question, the desire is to prevent war. That isn't where appeasement ends. If war cannot be prevented entirely, the hope is then to limit its scope or severity and also to ensure more favorable odds. This is where you get ideas like Britain buying time to militarize or Hitler being pointed at the USSR instead of France. These are ALSO goals of appeasement - secondary or fallback goals. You can and should have contingencies as part of a large strategy.
This is where my criticism comes in. The appeasement plan hopes for no war, and either limited or fascist vs societ war if it comes. The alternative to appeasement is to suck up the criticism and the wailing of Germans and getting the war over with. If you are going to appease, IMO, you can't half ass it and then suddenly try to flop into drawing a red line after you've already appeased and ignored until then. Either stand up to Hitler in the first place or make a rational line further along, instead of conceding prague but then not Danzig and making BS offers of support to the Poles. (Never half ass two things. Whole ass one thing. - Ron Swanson)
I agree with all of this 100%.
Question is why Britain has changed their attitute for Poland/Danzig. Fed up with Hitler breaking all promises and treaties? Achieved a level of mobilization considered safe? No more support to continue appeasement? Really cared for the Poles (least likely i think)? Some mixture of these?
Short answer yes they were fed up. Hitler showed that his last request led to another broken promise, and another, and another. The Allies drew a red line at Poland and believed that was enough. Hitler believed they were weak. The Allies was forced to act, as their previous policy of appeasment led to Italy and the former Little Entente falling into the orb of Germany as the Allies were no guarantist for mutual protection.
In short why should France trust UK if they didn't support Poland and vice versa? More serious implications were if Belgium and the Netherlands would support the western Allies if they caved in to Germany and didn't put any force behind their threats (you touch Poland you choose war), and perhaps other ramifications in the Far East. Basically they can't just abandon an ally and expect your other allies to remain just that. We can see that Germany picked apart the quite formidable anti-German and anti-Magyar pacts in a few years.
I believe that and frankly must give credit to Chamberlain for having tried negotiating so long. I could not do it even for a small fraction of that, just impossible to negotiate with someone who has no respect for the given word at all.
Certainly that had been the most horrible behaviour possible. If you draw a line you can't back off, even if you'll get punched in the face. I think Hitler didn't understand this mental response since he was a psychopath and had no idea why Britain won't peace out with him even when seemed defeated.
I only can think of not even drawing the line, maybe giving credit to German propaganda if Britain liked to continue appeasement.
i think our current view of 1938 is much colored by what happened in 1939 & 1941.
German appeasement was probably not going to prevent a war - after all, the allies had appeased by giving Germany Austria AND Czechoslovakia, and yet Germany went and split up Poland with the USSR, triggering the war. I don't know what else could have been done.
I guess the allies could have just looked the other way, but that was asking quite a bit domestically, which was probably outside the pale for leaders in democracies who had lost millions of young men fighting German aggression just two decades prior.
I think it's really important, and often forgotten, that by the time France and the UK declared war on Germany that Germany and the USSR were full military / political allies and had conspired to invade, split, and annex a sovereign country... and that France and the UK didn't declare war on the USSR as well. Nor did they declare war on Italy which had abetted German aggrandizement in Spain and Central Europe.
What ended up being a global conflict - which Hitler wanted, I believe - was originally intended to be a far more limited war between the Western powers and Berlin. Nobody expected France to collapse in a season in 1940. Nobody expected Hitler to conquer most of the Continent. Nobody (in the West) expected Babarossa and the near destruction of the USSR nor the apocalypse which ensued when that failed.
But seriously - what else were Paris and London more to do to appease Berlin's charybdian appetites?
German appeasement was probably not going to prevent a war - after all, the allies had appeased by giving Germany Austria AND Czechoslovakia, and yet Germany went and split up Poland with the USSR, triggering the war. I don't know what else could have been done.
I guess the allies could have just looked the other way, but that was asking quite a bit domestically, which was probably outside the pale for leaders in democracies who had lost millions of young men fighting German aggression just two decades prior.
I think it's really important, and often forgotten, that by the time France and the UK declared war on Germany that Germany and the USSR were full military / political allies and had conspired to invade, split, and annex a sovereign country... and that France and the UK didn't declare war on the USSR as well. Nor did they declare war on Italy which had abetted German aggrandizement in Spain and Central Europe.
What ended up being a global conflict - which Hitler wanted, I believe - was originally intended to be a far more limited war between the Western powers and Berlin. Nobody expected France to collapse in a season in 1940. Nobody expected Hitler to conquer most of the Continent. Nobody (in the West) expected Babarossa and the near destruction of the USSR nor the apocalypse which ensued when that failed.
But seriously - what else were Paris and London more to do to appease Berlin's charybdian appetites?
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As it turned out even stopping Germany was out of their reach so declaring on every malicious country at the same time would be a bit too ambitious maybe?
As we saw in 1940, they couldn't even stop Germany, much less its would-be allies.
And not only couldn't France and the UK stop Germany on its lonesome, they got handed the whoop stick.
False. Germany in 1938-41 had access to almost all of the international imports it would need (rubber being a notable exception) through its ally in the USSR.
Take a moment and imagine if Berlin had said, in early 1941, we've conquered the greatest prize in world history - which they had - and said that this is enough.
The rest of the 20th century takes a dramatic turn.
There was no structural reason which compelled the Soviets and the Nazis to go to war. Babarossa was entirely born in the minds of a small cabal of men in Berlin.