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I'm wondering, could the Kerensky government have survived? Because if so, maybe they wouldn't have shot their (ex-)Czar.
Yes. They made mistakes militarily and made the same mistake that ultimately doomed Nicholas - the Guards weren't in St. Petersburg.

You would think that a government that came to power during a revolution would station a top notch unit in the capital to forestall another one.
 
Yes. They made mistakes militarily and made the same mistake that ultimately doomed Nicholas - the Guards weren't in St. Petersburg.

You would think that a government that came to power during a revolution would station a top notch unit in the capital to forestall another one.

Which unit? One of those which was loyal to Kornilov or some others loyal to Lenin?

Really none of the groups of civil war tried to use the heritage/legitimacy of the Provisional Government, this just tells about the actual support they had this time.
 
Which unit? One of those which was loyal to Kornilov or some others loyal to Lenin?

Really none of the groups of civil war tried to use the heritage/legitimacy of the Provisional Government, this just tells about the actual support they had this time.
probably some of those tens of thousands of guys who were senselessly lost during the Summer Offensive.
 
Such as the Streltsy?
350px-Orenburgsky.jpg

worked out awesome before.
 
I'm wondering, could the Kerensky government have survived? Because if so, maybe they wouldn't have shot their (ex-)Czar.

Not really as real power was held by the Soviets who hobbled the Provisional Government's ability to achieve anything on the domestic front.
 
Certainly possible. What really did for the Kerensky government was not having the common sense other powers did when it came to a breakdown in morale. The French and Italians both recognized they were having a morale crisis (in Spring and Autumn 1917 respectively) and took steps to counteract it; attacks were postponed for a while until success could be guaranteed, conditions were substantially improved, and whilst ringleaders were heavily punished the overall attitude towards indiscipline was quite accommodating. Meanwhile Kerensky, partly because he was too busy pretending to be Napoleon, sent the Russian army into a series of pointless attacks that really broke its back.
That is why attacking with an inferior force can be bad.
 
Yes. They made mistakes militarily and made the same mistake that ultimately doomed Nicholas - the Guards weren't in St. Petersburg.

You would think that a government that came to power during a revolution would station a top notch unit in the capital to forestall another one.

I'm not sure there really were any at this point. One can point to the Guards, but whether the men in these units were loyal to the regime, would have remained as such if they stayed in Petrograd, and indeed, whether much of their original strength was left after many months of heavy losses, these are big questions.

Really, I'm not sure there were any reliable units that one could have stationed in Petrograd by this time, nor any that would have stayed reliable. By Summer 1917 the most reliable units in the Russian army were those not actually in Russia itself; those in Romania in particular. Really all contact with the civilian population and a greater proximity to home did was to further erode morale and invite sedition.

Similar trends occurred in Central Powers forces during the latter part of the war. German and Austrian soldiers sent home on leave or travelling back through the homeland were demoralized by the conditions they found and had an excellent opportunity to jump ship, which many took. Still more deserted from the rear areas, and from the East, again areas of higher politicization and of greater opportunity for escape.

That is why attacking with an inferior force can be bad.

The bigger issue was morale. The attack actually succeeded initially in some places, in Romania in particular the Austro-Hungarians put on their usual show of getting the living snot beaten out of them wholesale. The problem was though that as soon as it became apparent the war wasn't over in a day or two (much as with the Nivelle Offensive), the combination of expectations and existing underlying causes broke.
 
Really, I'm not sure there were any reliable units that one could have stationed in Petrograd by this time, nor any that would have stayed reliable. By Summer 1917 the most reliable units in the Russian army were those not actually in Russia itself; those in Romania in particular. Really all contact with the civilian population and a greater proximity to home did was to further erode morale and invite sedition.

If the Provisional Government would have had loyal troops around Petrograd they would have used them right at this point:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kornilov_affair

Instead they turned to the Bolsheviks to help them to get some haphazard defenses.
 
If the Provisional Government would have had loyal troops around Petrograd they would have used them right at this point:
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Kornilov_affair

Instead they turned to the Bolsheviks to help them to get some haphazard defenses.
that massively strengthened the Bolsheviks, who had fallen after a failed revolution in the summer of 1917.
 
I think it was Izvolsky, who first suggested the idea.
As a part of a broader solution to the Ottoman mess. Allegedly he didn't realize AH wanted to do it immediately, at least before Young Turks get weird ideas such as organising elections in what was de iure still part of their land. The other part being the threat to announce to the world that Russia gladly threw their Slavic buddies (both in Sarajevo and in Belgrade) under the bus for their own gains.
 
Yes but from the provisional govs point of view the choice was: fall against a white coup in september or fall against a red coup in november.
or they could have stationed army units not obviously loyal to either party in the capitol.
 
or they could have stationed army units not obviously loyal to either party in the capitol.

As I said previously, what units would these be? And indeed, how would you make sure they remained loyal?
 

Yet another case of reading something in the past and forgetting the source. However, the suggestion was that (amongst other reasons) Kerensky was trying to cement his position as Russia's leader by winning a great victory that would turn the war around, thereby proving his own worth and fixing that major problem in Russian politics. Hence the Summer 1917 offensive which truly broke the back of the Russian forces.
 
Yet another case of reading something in the past and forgetting the source. However, the suggestion was that (amongst other reasons) Kerensky was trying to cement his position as Russia's leader by winning a great victory that would turn the war around, thereby proving his own worth and fixing that major problem in Russian politics. Hence the Summer 1917 offensive which truly broke the back of the Russian forces.

The conventional explanation tends to be that he wanted to make a good show for the Entente more than anything else.
 
The conventional explanation tends to be that he wanted to make a good show for the Entente more than anything else.

I've heard both explanations, one doesn't really exclude the other.