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Shame, I wanted to see this through. Still, as far as I can see, it would be borderline impossible for the remaining powers to salvage the game after last Winter's disbands and this Spring's moves, and a solo with Italy is hard to turn down, so...
I, on the behalf of the reborn Roman Empire, accept the unconditional surrender of the Russian Empire, the German Reich and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, hoping to put behind Europe's long history of warfare and usher in a new Renaissance, a golden age of prosperity under the Pax Romana.
I, on the behalf of the reborn Roman Empire, accept the unconditional surrender of the Russian Empire, the German Reich and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, hoping to put behind Europe's long history of warfare and usher in a new Renaissance, a golden age of prosperity under the Pax Romana.
I'd like to thank our GM, Panzer Commader, who has done an admirable job, as well as my two junior diplomats, madchemist and Jacksonian Missionary, for their helpful advice.
Diplomacy VIII: A Feast for Wolves
The war that has consumed Europe for the past 9 years is finally coming to an end. After nearly a decade of bitter strife, the seven powers dividing the land have been reduced to four, and forced into an uneasy peace. A new world order has been established, led by the reborn Roman Empire, the remaining "Great Powers" having been worn down by endless fighting and internal strife, forcing them to sign a not-wholly-fair peace treaty that leaves them as little better than tributaries.
And that will have been all for this game! A bit shorter than I would have hoped, perhaps. Certainly less rich in thread talk. But the intrigue and the backstabbing and the tactical guessing and outguessing were all there. Hopefully most people will remember this as a positive experience, and we will see another game of paradoxian diplomacy sometime in the near future!
Many congratulations to Reis, Madchemist and Jacksonian, who were all very active in their planning(filling up their home/order thread to a whole 11 pages!) and managed to manipulate other players to do their bidding more than once, and sabotage all attempts at opposing coalitions. Chessmasters all. The victory was most well deserved!
And finally, inspired by exe's post of a wonderful book passage a page ago, my favorite passage from a feast for crows about how ending wars is not always a bad thing, which makes it related to the game(More or less(More less than more)).
And that will have been all for this game! A bit shorter than I would have hoped, perhaps. Certainly less rich in thread talk. But the intrigue and the backstabbing and the tactical guessing and outguessing were all there. Hopefully most people will remember this as a positive experience, and we will see another game of paradoxian diplomacy sometime in the near future!
Many congratulations to Reis, Madchemist and Jacksonian, who were all very active in their planning(filling up their home/order thread to a whole 11 pages!) and managed to manipulate other players to do their bidding more than once, and sabotage all attempts at opposing coalitions. Chessmasters all. The victory was most well deserved!
And finally, inspired by exe's post of a wonderful book passage a page ago, my favorite passage from a feast for crows about how ending wars is not always a bad thing, which makes it related to the game(More or less(More less than more)).
"Ser? My lady?" said Podrick. "Is a broken man an outlaw?"
"More or less," Brienne answered.
Septon Meribald disagreed. "More less than more. There are many sorts of outlaws, just as there are many sorts of birds. A sandpiper and a sea eagle both have wings, but they are not the same. The singers love to sing of good men forced to go outside the law to fight some wicked lord, but most outlaws are more like this ravening Hound than they are the lightning lord. They are evil men, driven by greed, soured by malice, despising the gods and caring only for themselves. Broken men are more deserving of our pity, though they may be just as dangerous. Almost all are common-born, simple folk who had never been more than a mile from the house where they were born until the day some lord came round to take them off to war. Poorly shod and poorly clad, they march away beneath his banners, ofttimes with no better arms than a sickle or a sharpened hoe, or a maul they made themselves by lashing a stone to a stick with strips of hide. Brothers march with brothers, sons with fathers, friends with friends. They've heard the songs and stories, so they go off with eager hearts, dreaming of the wonders they will see, of the wealth and glory they will win. War seems a fine adventure, the greatest most of them will ever know.
"Then they get a taste of battle.
"For some, that one taste is enough to break them. Others go on for years, until they lose count of all the battles they have fought in, but even a man who has survived a hundred fights can break in his hundred-and-first. Brothers watch their brothers die, fathers lose their sons, friends see their friends trying to hold their entrails in after they've been gutted by an axe.
"They see the lord who led them there cut down, and some other lord shouts that they are his now. They take a wound, and when that's still half-healed they take another. There is never enough to eat, their shoes fall to pieces from the marching, their clothes are torn and rotting, and half of them are shitting in their breeches from drinking bad water.
"If they want new boots or a warmer cloak or maybe a rusted iron halfhelm, they need to take them from a corpse, and before long they are stealing from the living too, from the smallfolk whose lands they're fighting in, men very like the men they used to be. They slaughter their sheep and steal their chickens, and from there it's just a short step to carrying off their daughters too. And one day they look around and realize all their friends and kin are gone, that they are fighting beside strangers beneath a banner that they hardly recognize. They don't know where they are or how to get back home and the lord they're fighting for does not know their names, yet here he comes, shouting for them to form up, to make a line with their spears and scythes and sharpened hoes, to stand their ground. And the knights come down on them, faceless men clad all in steel, and the iron thunder of their charge seems to fill the world . . .
"And the man breaks.
"He turns and runs, or crawls off afterward over the corpses of the slain, or steals away in the black of night, and he finds someplace to hide. All thought of home is gone by then, and kings and lords and gods mean less to him than a haunch of spoiled meat that will let him live another day, or a skin of bad wine that might drown his fear for a few hours. The broken man lives from day to day, from meal to meal, more beast than man. Lady Brienne is not wrong. In times like these, the traveler must beware of broken men, and fear them . . . but he should pity them as well."
When Meribald was finished a profound silence fell upon their little band. Brienne could hear the wind rustling through a clump of pussywillows, and farther off the faint cry of a loon. She could hear Dog panting softly as he loped along beside the septon and his donkey, tongue lolling from his mouth. The quiet stretched and stretched, until finally she said, "How old were you when they marched you off to war?"
"Why, no older than your boy," Meribald replied. "Too young for such, in truth, but my brothers were all going, and I would not be left behind. Willam said I could be his squire, though Will was no knight, only a potboy armed with a kitchen knife he'd stolen from the inn. He died upon the Stepstones, and never struck a blow. It was fever did for him, and for my brother Robin. Owen died from a mace that split his head apart, and his friend Jon Pox was hanged for rape."
"The War of the Ninepenny Kings?" asked Hyle Hunt.
"So they called it, though I never saw a king, nor earned a penny. It was a war, though. That it was."
"More or less," Brienne answered.
Septon Meribald disagreed. "More less than more. There are many sorts of outlaws, just as there are many sorts of birds. A sandpiper and a sea eagle both have wings, but they are not the same. The singers love to sing of good men forced to go outside the law to fight some wicked lord, but most outlaws are more like this ravening Hound than they are the lightning lord. They are evil men, driven by greed, soured by malice, despising the gods and caring only for themselves. Broken men are more deserving of our pity, though they may be just as dangerous. Almost all are common-born, simple folk who had never been more than a mile from the house where they were born until the day some lord came round to take them off to war. Poorly shod and poorly clad, they march away beneath his banners, ofttimes with no better arms than a sickle or a sharpened hoe, or a maul they made themselves by lashing a stone to a stick with strips of hide. Brothers march with brothers, sons with fathers, friends with friends. They've heard the songs and stories, so they go off with eager hearts, dreaming of the wonders they will see, of the wealth and glory they will win. War seems a fine adventure, the greatest most of them will ever know.
"Then they get a taste of battle.
"For some, that one taste is enough to break them. Others go on for years, until they lose count of all the battles they have fought in, but even a man who has survived a hundred fights can break in his hundred-and-first. Brothers watch their brothers die, fathers lose their sons, friends see their friends trying to hold their entrails in after they've been gutted by an axe.
"They see the lord who led them there cut down, and some other lord shouts that they are his now. They take a wound, and when that's still half-healed they take another. There is never enough to eat, their shoes fall to pieces from the marching, their clothes are torn and rotting, and half of them are shitting in their breeches from drinking bad water.
"If they want new boots or a warmer cloak or maybe a rusted iron halfhelm, they need to take them from a corpse, and before long they are stealing from the living too, from the smallfolk whose lands they're fighting in, men very like the men they used to be. They slaughter their sheep and steal their chickens, and from there it's just a short step to carrying off their daughters too. And one day they look around and realize all their friends and kin are gone, that they are fighting beside strangers beneath a banner that they hardly recognize. They don't know where they are or how to get back home and the lord they're fighting for does not know their names, yet here he comes, shouting for them to form up, to make a line with their spears and scythes and sharpened hoes, to stand their ground. And the knights come down on them, faceless men clad all in steel, and the iron thunder of their charge seems to fill the world . . .
"And the man breaks.
"He turns and runs, or crawls off afterward over the corpses of the slain, or steals away in the black of night, and he finds someplace to hide. All thought of home is gone by then, and kings and lords and gods mean less to him than a haunch of spoiled meat that will let him live another day, or a skin of bad wine that might drown his fear for a few hours. The broken man lives from day to day, from meal to meal, more beast than man. Lady Brienne is not wrong. In times like these, the traveler must beware of broken men, and fear them . . . but he should pity them as well."
When Meribald was finished a profound silence fell upon their little band. Brienne could hear the wind rustling through a clump of pussywillows, and farther off the faint cry of a loon. She could hear Dog panting softly as he loped along beside the septon and his donkey, tongue lolling from his mouth. The quiet stretched and stretched, until finally she said, "How old were you when they marched you off to war?"
"Why, no older than your boy," Meribald replied. "Too young for such, in truth, but my brothers were all going, and I would not be left behind. Willam said I could be his squire, though Will was no knight, only a potboy armed with a kitchen knife he'd stolen from the inn. He died upon the Stepstones, and never struck a blow. It was fever did for him, and for my brother Robin. Owen died from a mace that split his head apart, and his friend Jon Pox was hanged for rape."
"The War of the Ninepenny Kings?" asked Hyle Hunt.
"So they called it, though I never saw a king, nor earned a penny. It was a war, though. That it was."
As we say in Czechia: Glory to the winners, honour to the defeated. And, of course, kudos to @Panzer Commader for GMing the game. Let's file it into the main thread 
.
Also, looking forward to the AARs!
.Also, looking forward to the AARs!
About the game, prior to it I did not rate Italy very highly, considering that, despite enjoying a somewhat safe (though with the spectre of the Trieste-Venice border) early game it usually finds it hard to grow beyond Tunis and is usually up next on the chopping block whenever one of the Western (E/F/G) or Eastern triangle (R/A/T) powers is sent to an early bath.
However, being involved in both triangles in the early game, to an extent greater than most other powers (only Russia would be comparable, but it is hamstrung by not having easily defensible borders and often forced to play more conservatively) is also an advantage since you can both shape and profit from events in both triangles, though it requires more diplomatic work.
Furthermore, it's unique position right in the center of the map allows Italy unparalleled flexibility, should it grow out of the "4-SC curse" and be able to exert control on portions of the Mediterranean. An Italy that grows into 7/8 centers is a legit contender to take the game, even if they are not frontrunners. Perhaps the greatest challenge for Italy in the late game is to be able to cross the main North-South stalemate line (from MAO to StP) because it has a harder time making gains on both sides of the stalemate line (making supported pushes to MAO, France or Munich can be hard in face of concerted opposition).
I wasn't lying when I told Britain (right in the first year or so) that their continued existence as a viable power was of extraordinary importance to Italy (and indeed, the single most important diplomatic priority for Italy early on was to ensure that Britain did not get Sea Lion'ed by France and Germany - which we managed to avoid by presenting, with some luck, France as a buildless, juicy target). Granted, we didn't start the German-British conflict (though we made the prospects of a British campaign against Italy unworthwhile) but encouraging this state of affair and getting it to turn into a fairly balanced naval race helped ensure that when Germany decided to turn on us they lacked the armies to do so effectively and in a timely manner.
Likewise, when Austria insisted that their survival was of the utmost interest to Italy early on, we felt obliged to agree, though in this case, with greater care as to not allow Austria to grow beyond our ability to control, trying to sabotage an A/T alliance by all possible means (unlike Austria-Russia alliances, the next target for Turkey in an A/T alliance is almost always Italy, because moving against Austria is generally complicated for Turkey even with Italian help and Turkey wants Mediterranean control. The trick here was in the timing of the stab on Austria, at a time where both Turkey and Russia were already diminished (thus making the Juggernaut scenario where they continue plowing after Austria into Italian lands less likely) but still able to inflict damage with our support.
As for Russia, keeping it alive was a challenge, in some part due to Russia not listening to our honest, well-meaning advice, as well as the difficulty we had in getting Germany to commit to France (they moved to Silesia fairly early). Still, the effort paid off, Russia was a continuous distraction to both the Austrians and the Turks, and the presence of Russian forces in southern Russia helped nudge Germany into "easy pickings" in Austrian-held Warsaw, a move which would significantly hasten the crumbling of Austria's defenses.
However, being involved in both triangles in the early game, to an extent greater than most other powers (only Russia would be comparable, but it is hamstrung by not having easily defensible borders and often forced to play more conservatively) is also an advantage since you can both shape and profit from events in both triangles, though it requires more diplomatic work.
Furthermore, it's unique position right in the center of the map allows Italy unparalleled flexibility, should it grow out of the "4-SC curse" and be able to exert control on portions of the Mediterranean. An Italy that grows into 7/8 centers is a legit contender to take the game, even if they are not frontrunners. Perhaps the greatest challenge for Italy in the late game is to be able to cross the main North-South stalemate line (from MAO to StP) because it has a harder time making gains on both sides of the stalemate line (making supported pushes to MAO, France or Munich can be hard in face of concerted opposition).
I wasn't lying when I told Britain (right in the first year or so) that their continued existence as a viable power was of extraordinary importance to Italy (and indeed, the single most important diplomatic priority for Italy early on was to ensure that Britain did not get Sea Lion'ed by France and Germany - which we managed to avoid by presenting, with some luck, France as a buildless, juicy target). Granted, we didn't start the German-British conflict (though we made the prospects of a British campaign against Italy unworthwhile) but encouraging this state of affair and getting it to turn into a fairly balanced naval race helped ensure that when Germany decided to turn on us they lacked the armies to do so effectively and in a timely manner.
Likewise, when Austria insisted that their survival was of the utmost interest to Italy early on, we felt obliged to agree, though in this case, with greater care as to not allow Austria to grow beyond our ability to control, trying to sabotage an A/T alliance by all possible means (unlike Austria-Russia alliances, the next target for Turkey in an A/T alliance is almost always Italy, because moving against Austria is generally complicated for Turkey even with Italian help and Turkey wants Mediterranean control. The trick here was in the timing of the stab on Austria, at a time where both Turkey and Russia were already diminished (thus making the Juggernaut scenario where they continue plowing after Austria into Italian lands less likely) but still able to inflict damage with our support.
As for Russia, keeping it alive was a challenge, in some part due to Russia not listening to our honest, well-meaning advice, as well as the difficulty we had in getting Germany to commit to France (they moved to Silesia fairly early). Still, the effort paid off, Russia was a continuous distraction to both the Austrians and the Turks, and the presence of Russian forces in southern Russia helped nudge Germany into "easy pickings" in Austrian-held Warsaw, a move which would significantly hasten the crumbling of Austria's defenses.
That two year period where Germany and Austria were lax communicating together was a key moment.
Both of us made suboptimal moves surrounding Warsaw based on a lack of trust because of our failure to build sufficient communication with our most important partner. I think we took each other for granted and paid the price.
Italy timed their stab on us to perfection. Reis had the forces in position one year at most before we were ready...and if he hadn't stabbed us...we would likely have stabbed him.
I'll do a more detailed AAR later, but wanted to piggyback on Reis' comments.
Reis did an excellent job whispering suggestions into everyone's ear that influenced the game flow. I'm still learning how to do that...
Both of us made suboptimal moves surrounding Warsaw based on a lack of trust because of our failure to build sufficient communication with our most important partner. I think we took each other for granted and paid the price.
Italy timed their stab on us to perfection. Reis had the forces in position one year at most before we were ready...and if he hadn't stabbed us...we would likely have stabbed him.
I'll do a more detailed AAR later, but wanted to piggyback on Reis' comments.
Reis did an excellent job whispering suggestions into everyone's ear that influenced the game flow. I'm still learning how to do that...
Recalling the earlier comment about everyone having made mistakes (in reply to barkardes claiming Germany made no mistakes), we have also made a few.
One of them was in not convoying an army to Greece or Bulgaria sooner. This gave Austria a decent chance despite numerical inferiority because our fleets (as well as Turkish and Russian ones) could not support inland from Rum, Bul and Greece. It took us more than 2 years to get an army convoyed to Albania.
Another one was in not committing the second support when we decided, in conjunction with Russia, to kill off the Turkish fleet in Bulgaria. It lived on and tied two of our fleets as well as Russia's, buying Austria some more time. By then, we knew Turkey wasn't entirely loyal to our cause, so the decision itself was right but the execution should have been cleaner.
The last remark, while not technically a mistake per se, was that some of our gambles paid far beyond our expectations and we found ourselves growing faster than anticipated, something which we wanted to avoid while we had not established a foothold beyond the stalemate line. Indeed it was our plan, before Germany moved against us, to stab Germany and take Munich even before Austria was fully crushed, but our growth alarmed Germany and caused them to send whatever they could spare against us. We were in no particular rush as long as the Anglo German conflict remained undecided and we wanted to kill Austria in a manner which would delay Russian builds.
One of them was in not convoying an army to Greece or Bulgaria sooner. This gave Austria a decent chance despite numerical inferiority because our fleets (as well as Turkish and Russian ones) could not support inland from Rum, Bul and Greece. It took us more than 2 years to get an army convoyed to Albania.
Another one was in not committing the second support when we decided, in conjunction with Russia, to kill off the Turkish fleet in Bulgaria. It lived on and tied two of our fleets as well as Russia's, buying Austria some more time. By then, we knew Turkey wasn't entirely loyal to our cause, so the decision itself was right but the execution should have been cleaner.
The last remark, while not technically a mistake per se, was that some of our gambles paid far beyond our expectations and we found ourselves growing faster than anticipated, something which we wanted to avoid while we had not established a foothold beyond the stalemate line. Indeed it was our plan, before Germany moved against us, to stab Germany and take Munich even before Austria was fully crushed, but our growth alarmed Germany and caused them to send whatever they could spare against us. We were in no particular rush as long as the Anglo German conflict remained undecided and we wanted to kill Austria in a manner which would delay Russian builds.
Yes, not having to defend the south was a godsend. I was able to force you to focus fully on me and was able to plausibly influence Russia and Turkey to at least friendly neutrality.
On the other hand, I can't think of a reason I would have allowed you to convoy an army to Greece or Albania at all during our alignment.
Had you tried to do so prior to the start, I would likely have stabbed you earlier. Post stab, it was imperative for me to deny you access to Albania.
On the other hand, I can't think of a reason I would have allowed you to convoy an army to Greece or Albania at all during our alignment.
Had you tried to do so prior to the start, I would likely have stabbed you earlier. Post stab, it was imperative for me to deny you access to Albania.
I would say my biggest mistake was gambling that I had another turn before Austria decided to backstab me. I knew the backstab was coming, but I really wanted to get control of the Black Sea before it hit me.
Good game. I congragulate Reis and his junior diplomats for their victory.
I want to thank our gm, Panzer Commader for his work to make this game happen.
I will write my AAR on Sunday. I have exams to study for until then.
I am not claiming that I did no mistakes, some tactical mistakes may have happened, but my strategy was shaped by the needs of Germany and I always had no other choice to act in another way. It's just that ı really had no other choice in my strategy. Maybe the only thing that could be better was supporting France against Britain without taking Paris from the start, given how it lead to a unyielding and irrational Britain against me. But I wouldn't know how Britain would behave from the start.
But I must say that I would attack you no matter what happened. Once I managed to hold Britain off, I quickly moved against you. My aim was stabilising the front between you two. I would let you two fight among yourselves when I take Britain down at that moment. Of course that would make a coalition against me formed later on, but once I saw that England wasn't going to put an end to the war, I was happy with a draw.
I was well aware of your needs. It was just that taking it was a matter of life or death for me, so I took it. Plus, I thought that you and I would lose to Italy and Britain seperately if things continued that way. If you became so desperate that England would have to step in, you could actually have a chance at succeding at surviving. It's not that my real aim was saving you at the end, but I also put that into account when moving to Warsaw. The thing that made this plan sorta backfire was British stubborness, and his eagerness to continue the war against me,which was an irrational move I couldn't even predict(I really tried to get why England acted as he did, but I really have no satisfying reply yet so I will call it irrational). Still, I would move to Warsaw even if I knew that England wouldn't back down, because it would save my ass and I had no other way to save the situtation. It was a good move, not because it considered your needs, but because it made me come out of a defeat against Britain and actually be succesfull at advancing against him.
On the other hand, your move made you gain nothing. It actually made you lose slightly in tactical terms. You lost Vienna, and gained Warsaw. This made you gain no supply bonus. Vienna was an important position for your defence and you lost it. So in the tactical part, it wasn't really a good move.
But I am not finished about it's effects. It made me have to disband Moscow, which made Russia think that he had things to gain by stabbing us(his stab was really premature and lost everyone of us the game, but he wouldn't think of betraying if I had an army in Moscow threatening him, I believe.). I am not going to say this outcome was predictable, it wasn't. But this, combined with the other tactical effects, makes your move to Warsaw a bad move.
So I agree that my move to Warsaw made you lose things, but it wasn't an act of miscommunication,distrust or disregarding the other's needs. I was aware of it's bad effects on you. But for my interests, making Italians be able to roam through Central Europe earlier than they would be able to was less important than saving myself from the British. I already counted on the British to actually save you at the end, which didn't happen.
I want to thank our gm, Panzer Commader for his work to make this game happen.
I will write my AAR on Sunday. I have exams to study for until then.
I am not claiming that I did no mistakes, some tactical mistakes may have happened, but my strategy was shaped by the needs of Germany and I always had no other choice to act in another way. It's just that ı really had no other choice in my strategy. Maybe the only thing that could be better was supporting France against Britain without taking Paris from the start, given how it lead to a unyielding and irrational Britain against me. But I wouldn't know how Britain would behave from the start.
But I must say that I would attack you no matter what happened. Once I managed to hold Britain off, I quickly moved against you. My aim was stabilising the front between you two. I would let you two fight among yourselves when I take Britain down at that moment. Of course that would make a coalition against me formed later on, but once I saw that England wasn't going to put an end to the war, I was happy with a draw.
Well, my move against you prevented my demise, plus I really expected Britain to attack Italy and let me be like a normal player trying to win the game would once Italy gained a lot of ground. My move to Warsaw made me able to turn the tide against England where I would lose the game if I didn't do.
I was well aware of your needs. It was just that taking it was a matter of life or death for me, so I took it. Plus, I thought that you and I would lose to Italy and Britain seperately if things continued that way. If you became so desperate that England would have to step in, you could actually have a chance at succeding at surviving. It's not that my real aim was saving you at the end, but I also put that into account when moving to Warsaw. The thing that made this plan sorta backfire was British stubborness, and his eagerness to continue the war against me,which was an irrational move I couldn't even predict(I really tried to get why England acted as he did, but I really have no satisfying reply yet so I will call it irrational). Still, I would move to Warsaw even if I knew that England wouldn't back down, because it would save my ass and I had no other way to save the situtation. It was a good move, not because it considered your needs, but because it made me come out of a defeat against Britain and actually be succesfull at advancing against him.
On the other hand, your move made you gain nothing. It actually made you lose slightly in tactical terms. You lost Vienna, and gained Warsaw. This made you gain no supply bonus. Vienna was an important position for your defence and you lost it. So in the tactical part, it wasn't really a good move.
But I am not finished about it's effects. It made me have to disband Moscow, which made Russia think that he had things to gain by stabbing us(his stab was really premature and lost everyone of us the game, but he wouldn't think of betraying if I had an army in Moscow threatening him, I believe.). I am not going to say this outcome was predictable, it wasn't. But this, combined with the other tactical effects, makes your move to Warsaw a bad move.
So I agree that my move to Warsaw made you lose things, but it wasn't an act of miscommunication,distrust or disregarding the other's needs. I was aware of it's bad effects on you. But for my interests, making Italians be able to roam through Central Europe earlier than they would be able to was less important than saving myself from the British. I already counted on the British to actually save you at the end, which didn't happen.
I never accepted any peace deal with you because you had basically no credibility. From Spring 1905 you were already suggesting to aim for a draw against Italy, which was absurd at the time. It was incredibly obvious that you just wanted me to turn my back so you could sink in the knife, and that colored my perception of your future efforts at ending our fight. Your (ultimately hollow) subsequent threat after Fall 1905 to throw the game to Italy if I didn't stop fighting you sealed any possibility of trusting anything you said, or any serious chance of cooperation.
Fistly, I will let this sit here:
Now I will break your message down to little parts and respond to them.
I was losing against you, of course I would be content with a draw. I try to be as realistic as possible when I am setting my expectations. And I told everyone that my aim was a draw after I realized that a win wasn't really possible. Are you sure that this is the real reason? I hope not. I hope you had reasons at least 10 times better than that, below that can't really make you justify your moves and I will feel like I lost the game for nothing like I do feel now.
And you are wrong to assume that I was thinking of a stab, it didn't even come to my mind as a possible move against you, the reason explained below. You could also see why I wouldn't betray you if you really thought about it.
And I think I have proven my goodwill 2 times during the game, when I built an army instead of a fleet in Kiel and when I fully pulled the moves of mine according to our agreement. I even told you about some things to not to have a misunderstanding .If you weren't going to accept that I wasn't going to stab you at that point, what else would be able to do that? If you are having the same scepticism in every game of diplomacy, there is no chance that you can work with somebody. I am not saying that youmust be acting like that to everybody, my point is, you developed a strange sense of scepticism against me for no reason, which your last post also shows.
That's where you are obviously wrong. Let's say I had the best outcome. I took a center and some good positions. What would be next? Wouldn't it alarm Italy Italy and make him suspend his fight against Austria and stop me with all the allies he could find? Then I would have enemies all around, ready to attack me. I would lose more than I gain. Plus, I was more interested in seeing the situtation in Central Europe stabilized. So I wouldn't really stab you until we did it, which would give you time to prepare for it. You were the one who would get the main share from the Italian centers.
To put it shortly, foreign factors protected you from any stab. That shouldn't have been a worry of yours. Even when those foreign factors disappear, you would have enough troops to defend yourself.
Even though I actually didn't have an aim to help Italy to the end, yes I exaggerated what I would do. I was under heavy pressure under you and I wanted some immediate effect. So I threatened you. I actually remember myself going to write you a mild message, and changing it to a harsh one as I write because you disregarded my reasoning a turn before by saying "Please don't insult my intelligence" while exaggerating my demands like "Withdraw my forces and throw them all into the Med" while my demand was a resonable demand, just spare some units to fight Italy while watching your back. I didn't really have positions to do serious damage and you seriously had the advantage there. Putting some of my emotions in it was wrong because it reduced the chance of a positive reply. That doesn't mean that the threat was really something you could throw any possibility of an alliance for. This is putting A LOT OF emotions to the table in a game only logic wins.
Considering your strange scepticism against me, even if I wrote to you in a calm manner, you would most probably say no or have your stab against me like what happened though. The threat most likely changed nothing. You really fought me for no reason.
I can't see why threatening seals any possibility of you trusting me? It doesn't really make sense to me. What does the threat has to do with honesty?
And I also threatened Italy in the same way. And I was serious with my threat that time. Italy understood why I did it even though he would have less damage by my threat, and you say you didn't ally with me even though the need for it was obvious because of that act. That difference between you can explain why Italy won, and you lost.
@TheExecuter : The basic idea was to set up a supposedly Lepanto-esque convoy but then send it to Greece instead of Anatolia as part of the stab.
A draw was an absurd goal to aim for at that point, since the game was still quite open, and Italy was not pulling ahead in supply centers. Since it made no sense to aim for a draw at that point, I assumed you were trying to make a token offer to have me redirect my focus and give you space to retake supply centers. And I don't believe that you weren't even thinking of taking advantage of your offer. All deals in diplomacy are made to be broken, and I expect anyone to betray another player when the circumstances are in their favor. Assuming another player won't act in their best interest by stabbing you is a good way to get wiped out.
Those were token gestures. They weren't openly hostile to me, but they were still a far cry from goodwill. Even if I had gone along with our agreement in spring of 1906, the movement of your armies in Russia gave you the opportunity to take St. Petersburg at will. With some of my fleets moving south to the Med, you could have stabbed me in the fall, taking back St. Petersburg, and I'd be down a supply center without Denmark, my forces spread thin, and I would have made Italy hostile to me. It would have been a perfect situation for Germany to make more gains against me.
Besides, those "proofs" of your goodwill came after I'd already marked you down as untrustable after the events I indicated in my prior post.
Someone having ~8-10 supply centers doesn't automatically get everyone to gang up on them. If you'd stabbed me and taken several centers, Italy might well have decided it had more to gain by continuing pressure in the balkans, or alternatively Austria and co would not have ceased fighting Italy, fearful of an Italian stab in turn. And besides, only an idiot leaves themselves open to a stab hoping that other players are willing to attack anyone who tries to take advantage of their weakness.
Two reasons. First it indicated you were intractably hostile to Britain, being willing to prioritize damaging Britain over self preservation, so of course I won't trust subsequent attempts to have me stop fighting you and sending forces to fight Italy instead. Second, because it made clear that a British victory wasn't possible, since you would try to support Italy in the event I made serious gains. Since I consider aiming for a draw to be ludicrous, this left only one reasonable aim for my war effort, to be the second place by having the most supply centers of the loser nations. Which is why I surrendered when I did, since Russia was threatening to cause me to lose too many centers.
And to address a general misconception you have, I did not have any strange skepticism about you. I had the same skepticism I have to every player in a diplomacy game. The longer the border, the less trust can be had, and our lengthy border pretty much made lengthy trust impossible. And you were scarcely the only one who I didn't trust, I explicitly rejected a Russian plan to give them back Saint Petersburg in 1905 to prevent you from capturing it, because Russian Saint Petersburg was no better than a German Saint Petersburg, since both of you were my enemies so Russian's plan just would have had me lose a supply center sooner.
The only nation I had any real workable relationship with was Italy, and that was in no small part due to the lack of major military forces in our small border area, since both of us were more concerned with fighting other enemies. I certainly didn't trust Italy, I was thoroughly unsurprised when Italy took Portugal after I left it open, but the obvious truth of our shared interests, and the general willingness from both of us to follow through on short term agreements kept us in workable terms throughout the game. The eventual British recapture of Portugal was even an Italian offer. Obviously because it was in Italy's interests to keep Britain strong enough to keep fighting Germany, but it went well enough with my interests.
Which goes a ways to explain why I never joined your plans to go after Italy. Germany was the greater threat to Britain, had shown significant hostility to Britain, and basically never made an anti-Italy move until very late in the game. Italy meanwhile was less of a threat, had a much better relationship with Britain, and was in a geographic position that made it uite awkward to commit major forces without leaving myself open. So it's hardly surprising that I didn't respond well to your hostility, threats, and demands to join the anti-Italian crusade.
Barkardes, your move to Warsaw came with zero warning. No discussion to me about how much you needed it at all. Happening the same turn as the Russian / Italian stab...it really threw my trust in you in the toilet for that crucial year. I wasn't sure that you weren't in on the stab with Italy (after all, if Russia and Turkey we're dead...it's easier to attack Germany rather than Italy...)
It was the lack of communication that doomed us. Neither of us explained that we needed Warsaw and allowed the other to plan for it's transfer.
It was the lack of communication that doomed us. Neither of us explained that we needed Warsaw and allowed the other to plan for it's transfer.
I feared that you wouldn't let me take it, since one of it's aim was making you lose to Italy faster than I lose to Britain. And I really needed to do that. I would tell you about it if I knew that you would accept it for sure. It was game over for me if you didn't let me.
But still, you didn't need Warsaw later on because you had a lot to deal with. Your needs in other places surpassed your need to have Warsaw.
I am not saying I didn't think of stabbing you, I am telling you that I dismissed the idea once I thought about it because I was more interested to see Italian expansion stopped, because once it got to that, there was hardly a way to stop it. Italy would close the straits in the west, and my troops wouldn't be able to stop him, especially when I was fighting with you in the north.
And once Italian threat was gone and I was ready to stab you, you would already have enough resources at your disposal to stop such thing, because you would get the main share from the Italian lands, and I had no access to those.
No they weren't token gestures. My build of an army in Kiel was a message. "This could be a fleet, that would be a great addition to my war against you, but I am building an army, because I believe in your ability to see reason and I am counting on it. So while this army will fight you, it is able to move against Italy if you let me be." . It was the army that took Holland back from you later on. Can you imagine what would happen if it was a fleet? Your complete destruction. I would have it as a fleet if I knew you would be that much persistent in continueing the war against me.
I gave you St. Petersburg for Denmark and your assistance against Italy. I was already able to take Denmark from you so my real intention was seeing you attack Italy. I didn't trust you enough for it so I made moves to make me able to take St. Petersburg back. If I didn't want you to take St. Petersburg, I would just stay where I was. No extra moves was needed. St. Petersburg was in itself a gesture to you. I was already able to take Denmark I didn't need your permission for it. I gave you St. Petersburg so that maybe you would focus on the real enemy.
Your reasons for marking me untrustworthy is a problem in itself. It is normal to be seeking for a draw when you are losing.
And even if my aim was really stabbing you, it shouldn't have been a reason to attack me at all costs, especially at the endgame when the expansion of Italy was becoming something to be acted upon. Even if I would stab you in the first time I wanted you to help me, I wouldn't do that later on when containing Italy is surely my first priority. In this game, people's needs shape their moves, not their emotions, or at least that's how it should be. And I surely needed to make sure Italy wasn't in a situtation to win. You also needed that.
It's not my number of supply centers, but my ability to increase them fastly that would worry everyone. Italy had 8 centers, but he had a lot of initiative against Austria so I was greatly worried. It was enough to make me worried, I am sure it would also threaten Italy enough to suspend the war in the east.
And like I said, I had things to gain by betraying you, and a lot more to lose.
Yes, I was hostile to you. I would prefer an Italian win rather than a British win, if my defeat was uninevitable. Did you really need my message to see that? It is normal that I would want to see someone who doesn't listen to reason lose rather than someone I could work with. What did you expect me to feel about it when you acted like the way you did?
But that was to be done only when my defeat was certain. And I saw you continueing your attack against me as something that would make me lose for certain. Actually my threat didn't really contain too much of a meaning, I didn't really have too much power to hurt Austria, or the will to do that. But my threat's real meaning was that if we did nothing we would lose. You would lose the game if you continued with your attack.
But that attitude of mine was only because of your inability to work with me. If you worked with me, the reason to be hostile to you would disappear.
Btw, would you believe that me hurrying to end the game was to prevent a border gore
. You would have Berlin which would look really bad on the map. Of course it had a lot to do with our inability to stop Italy at that point, but I could continue until Italy won.I am not gonna say you are completely wrong about this but sometimes you have to disregard that when you really have to attack another country because you are about to lose the game to that said country.
You had two choices: Continue like you do, and lose for sure or try to prevent the lose from happening while having some risk that may make you lose the game. The choice is obvious in my eyes.
I told you about the reason of my hostility and how you could easily remove it.
Coming to the "greater threat" thing. No Germany wasn't the greater threat. I was a greater threat when you decided to attack me, but I wasn't when Italy continued to make advances. Your attack on me rendered both of us unable to expand in other fronts, and Italy was able to advance in the other fronts. That would make both of us the losers of the game if everything went like it was going. Something had to change and you decided not to change anything. That is why we lost, and Italy won. If you were interested in at least a draw, you would let me attack Italy while you also do the same. The result of we both losing was inevitable if you changed nothing
(Actuallly I am gonna say the Italian win could be still prevented if Russia didn't do his move but you get my point)
Maybe it is because you didn't let me? Are you telling me this for real? I want to believe this is a joke.
No argument there. Like I said earlier, that whole scenario was one of my mistakes.