As it was supposed to be the 'strategic breakout', it should have been planned and conducted by Montgomery's army group staff, and it should have had supporting attacks across the entire front, and the actual frontage needed to be wider, and a bit more of a plan than 'We'll just drive through and see how it goes after dropping a lot of bombs around the place'. I admit that the Brits were scraping the barrel for troops...but perhaps if they had sacked crappy generals they might not have lost so men to start with (notwithstanding Churchill's habit of spreading forces all over the place playing geo-politics...Australia learnt it's lesson with that mug and focussed on the Pacific after '42, thankfully for us).
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Goodwood was never to be the strategic breakout. It wasnt in montgomery's plan for it to be, though dempsey had high hopes of it... that was it. Cobra was aproved (by montgomery) first to be on 18 july... and goodwood was planned to, just like almost every brit operation since the second week of the normandy campaign, to keep the germans tied in the anglo canadian sector. The americans had to delay cobra though for 7 days, so the british then did even other operations to keep the germans tied... And they worked in that objective thoroughly, and the result was the success of cobra... in a time where all allied troops were under montgomery, and it was him coordinating with dempsey and bradley. (with eisenhower sitting on south england and doing ocasional visits to see what was going on). Monty was commanding the 21st army group... which at that time all 2, then 4, allied armies were under, until september 1.
Its funny that people try to understand the objective of goodwood by trusting the non sense bedell smith said than all the orders, messages, and etc montgomery, dempsey, and bradley were exchanging.. The only time montgomery overhyped goodwood was to get support of the bombers. Comon, this is the directive of 30 june montgomery sent.. His overall plan is as clear as it could be.
http://tothosewhoserved.org/can/army/canarmy03/appendixd.html
Its funny that people try to understand the objective of goodwood by trusting the non sense bedell smith said than all the orders, messages, and etc montgomery, dempsey, and bradley were exchanging.. The only time montgomery overhyped goodwood was to get support of the bombers. Comon, this is the directive of 30 june montgomery sent.. His overall plan is as clear as it could be.
http://tothosewhoserved.org/can/army/canarmy03/appendixd.html
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I'm trusting 500+ burning tank hulks, nothing coming out of the US.
Second British Army
8. Tasks as follows:
a. To hold the main enemy forces in the area between Caen and Villers Bocage.
b. To have no set-backs.
c. To develop operations for the capture of Caen as opportunity offers—and the sooner the better.
Losing an armoured corps is not a holding action. Nor is throwing said armoured corps straight into a daylight assault in the face of the strongest armoured force in the western hemisphere any way to 'develop operations' for capture of Caen. In fact, it's a guarantee of failing paragraph 8.b.
Montgomery was still in the process of reaching his highest level of incompetence (achieved with Market Garden); Normandy was simply a stepping stone towards that.
Where Montgomery and my minor treatise on him bears relevance to the topic is that Montgomery actually put himself on public record saying there was nothing wrong with allied armour, and it was perfectly fine. I guess he didn't realise where that oily smoke with the whiff of burnt flesh was coming from...
Second British Army
8. Tasks as follows:
a. To hold the main enemy forces in the area between Caen and Villers Bocage.
b. To have no set-backs.
c. To develop operations for the capture of Caen as opportunity offers—and the sooner the better.
Losing an armoured corps is not a holding action. Nor is throwing said armoured corps straight into a daylight assault in the face of the strongest armoured force in the western hemisphere any way to 'develop operations' for capture of Caen. In fact, it's a guarantee of failing paragraph 8.b.
Montgomery was still in the process of reaching his highest level of incompetence (achieved with Market Garden); Normandy was simply a stepping stone towards that.
Where Montgomery and my minor treatise on him bears relevance to the topic is that Montgomery actually put himself on public record saying there was nothing wrong with allied armour, and it was perfectly fine. I guess he didn't realise where that oily smoke with the whiff of burnt flesh was coming from...
And you fail to understand the point that 300-500 lost tanks were nothing compared to bigger losses in the infantry, which was what he wanted to keep low and therefore goodwood happened the way it did. Yes, the armoured divisions were used in a way they shoudnt be used... but alas.. that is what it was required of them since the infantry was holding the burden for too long.
And his plan was to keep the initiative, as explained in:
6. Our tactics must remain unchanged. Briefly, they are as follows:
a. To retain the initiative. We shall do this only by offensive action. On no account must we remain inactive. Without the initiative we cannot win.
b. To have no set-backs., This is very important on the eastern flank; the enemy has concentrated great strength here and he must not be allowed to use it successfully. Any set-back on the eastern flank might have direct repercussions on the quick development of our plans for the western flank.
So since he coudnt use the infantry once again to keep the initative and the germans locked in ther sector, he used the armoured divisions, and him attacking the heavier german opposition head on is the WHOLE POINT, to keep them busy there thinking the brits were the main threat. And indeed, the fact that the "strongest armoured force" was in his sector just proves that his plan was succesful from the beginning, operation epsom and on, making it superbly easy for the americans when their own operation happened, and as such every single british attack around caen, even goodwood, were essential for the normandy victory. And its interesting that even with that the british managed to have less tank losses than the americans, and also less casualties in the normandy campaign....
So now the main guy responsible for the victory of the normandy campaign was reaching higher levels of incompetence on it? LOL
Oh and, im not sure how well the result would have been of the tank crews hearing the main commander of the allied forces saying their tanks were crap. Probably refusing to enter a sherman or a cromwell eh? What he said in public was much different than his requests, which were basically only for more sherman fireflies.
And his plan was to keep the initiative, as explained in:
6. Our tactics must remain unchanged. Briefly, they are as follows:
a. To retain the initiative. We shall do this only by offensive action. On no account must we remain inactive. Without the initiative we cannot win.
b. To have no set-backs., This is very important on the eastern flank; the enemy has concentrated great strength here and he must not be allowed to use it successfully. Any set-back on the eastern flank might have direct repercussions on the quick development of our plans for the western flank.
So since he coudnt use the infantry once again to keep the initative and the germans locked in ther sector, he used the armoured divisions, and him attacking the heavier german opposition head on is the WHOLE POINT, to keep them busy there thinking the brits were the main threat. And indeed, the fact that the "strongest armoured force" was in his sector just proves that his plan was succesful from the beginning, operation epsom and on, making it superbly easy for the americans when their own operation happened, and as such every single british attack around caen, even goodwood, were essential for the normandy victory. And its interesting that even with that the british managed to have less tank losses than the americans, and also less casualties in the normandy campaign....
So now the main guy responsible for the victory of the normandy campaign was reaching higher levels of incompetence on it? LOL
Oh and, im not sure how well the result would have been of the tank crews hearing the main commander of the allied forces saying their tanks were crap. Probably refusing to enter a sherman or a cromwell eh? What he said in public was much different than his requests, which were basically only for more sherman fireflies.
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Ask the Canadians about 'not using the infantry'...this idea of tanks instead of infantry doesn't hold water. Mark Clark's US forces in Italy were facing infantry shortages, but they didn't resort to throwing an armoured division at the Appenine mountains, nor was an armoured division thrown at the abbey of Monte Cassino. Sure, those are extreme examples, but they highlight why interchanging armour for inf doesn't work, and never did.
You are trying to fit 'after the event' rationalisations onto the reality of poor planning. Despite giving overall direction to the US forces, Montgomery failed to enable co-ordination with them...it wasn't until the Falais Gap closure was occurring on auto-pilot that Montgomery gave clearance for artillery co-operation between the US and other forces, until then there was an embargo on it without clearance from his HQ.
Montgomery had a habit of only planning for a battle, never the follow up or extended operations, and was too interested in promoting himself. The interesting thing is that the frontages for the three offensives of Alamein, Normandy and Market-Garden shrank each time...from several corps, to one corps, to a very generous 'divisional' frontage focussed on one road and some subsidiary tracks.
I will point out that when the germans needed to transfer troops to the US sector in Normandy, they did so...the ground in the US sector was not suited to armour, whereas south of Caen was, which was why the germans had the majority of their armour there, in addition to the fact that they had shortages of infantry, and a number of those armoured formations were holding the line rather than being held in reserve. In Normandy, Montgomery forced the Brit and Canadian forces to refight WW1, with a continuing series of limited objective offensives, with no clearly outlined plan, the 'we'll probe here, we'll probe there, and eventually they'll crack' approach, which doesn't really seem appropriate if his forces were running short on troops.
You are trying to fit 'after the event' rationalisations onto the reality of poor planning. Despite giving overall direction to the US forces, Montgomery failed to enable co-ordination with them...it wasn't until the Falais Gap closure was occurring on auto-pilot that Montgomery gave clearance for artillery co-operation between the US and other forces, until then there was an embargo on it without clearance from his HQ.
Montgomery had a habit of only planning for a battle, never the follow up or extended operations, and was too interested in promoting himself. The interesting thing is that the frontages for the three offensives of Alamein, Normandy and Market-Garden shrank each time...from several corps, to one corps, to a very generous 'divisional' frontage focussed on one road and some subsidiary tracks.
I will point out that when the germans needed to transfer troops to the US sector in Normandy, they did so...the ground in the US sector was not suited to armour, whereas south of Caen was, which was why the germans had the majority of their armour there, in addition to the fact that they had shortages of infantry, and a number of those armoured formations were holding the line rather than being held in reserve. In Normandy, Montgomery forced the Brit and Canadian forces to refight WW1, with a continuing series of limited objective offensives, with no clearly outlined plan, the 'we'll probe here, we'll probe there, and eventually they'll crack' approach, which doesn't really seem appropriate if his forces were running short on troops.
So the british were refighting ww1 and had less casualties and tank losses than the americans in normandy... so what the hell were the americans refighting? The american civil war? LOL.
It isnt after the event rationalisations mate, its clear as a day, and proven by countless messages and letters BEFORE the operation, that goodwood was designed to keep the initiative but without keeping the burden of the infantry, with the brits lacking some 30.000 infantry men in replenishments.
And montgomery failed in coordinating the two/4 armies? That is the main thing he did for the 2/3 months and its why his hand is just as much as in operation cobra as in goodwood. Bradley, Dempsey, and montgomery's coordination in the battle of normandy isnt surpassed by any other western allied front, certainly not in italy with mark clark disobeying orders and alexander not managing to coordinate as he wanted, and CERTAINLY not with eisenhower from september 1, with bradley, montgomery, and devers doing what the hell they wanted (and also patton, since bradley also failed to coordinate his own army group...). But then, eisenhower stayed most of the time in versaille and spent almost a month without messaging montgomery.. .meanwhile in normandy montgomery was meeting all the time with dempsey and bradley. And one that acknowledged the anglo canadian contribution to easing the way for the americans was bradley himself.
And yeah, the german armoured formations were holding the line instead of being held in reserve.... thats the germans using the armoured divisions not in any way they were supposed to be but the necessity of the battle required them to do it, and it wasnt in any way a retarded blunder by their generals but just them doing their best to adapt to the needs of the battle and the lack of infantry... .exactly like the british in regards to the use of the armoured divisions in normandy. The difference is that the british also had the need to keep the initiative... hence... goodwood, quite simple really. And the fact that the germans had to keep all those armoured divisions in the frontline in the anglo canadian sector is just another proof that montgomery's plan was succesful, after all... all those armoured divisions werent there in reserve to keep the breakthrough part of cobra from being succesful, and those 1 and half that managed in luttich were already way overspent.
It isnt after the event rationalisations mate, its clear as a day, and proven by countless messages and letters BEFORE the operation, that goodwood was designed to keep the initiative but without keeping the burden of the infantry, with the brits lacking some 30.000 infantry men in replenishments.
And montgomery failed in coordinating the two/4 armies? That is the main thing he did for the 2/3 months and its why his hand is just as much as in operation cobra as in goodwood. Bradley, Dempsey, and montgomery's coordination in the battle of normandy isnt surpassed by any other western allied front, certainly not in italy with mark clark disobeying orders and alexander not managing to coordinate as he wanted, and CERTAINLY not with eisenhower from september 1, with bradley, montgomery, and devers doing what the hell they wanted (and also patton, since bradley also failed to coordinate his own army group...). But then, eisenhower stayed most of the time in versaille and spent almost a month without messaging montgomery.. .meanwhile in normandy montgomery was meeting all the time with dempsey and bradley. And one that acknowledged the anglo canadian contribution to easing the way for the americans was bradley himself.
And yeah, the german armoured formations were holding the line instead of being held in reserve.... thats the germans using the armoured divisions not in any way they were supposed to be but the necessity of the battle required them to do it, and it wasnt in any way a retarded blunder by their generals but just them doing their best to adapt to the needs of the battle and the lack of infantry... .exactly like the british in regards to the use of the armoured divisions in normandy. The difference is that the british also had the need to keep the initiative... hence... goodwood, quite simple really. And the fact that the germans had to keep all those armoured divisions in the frontline in the anglo canadian sector is just another proof that montgomery's plan was succesful, after all... all those armoured divisions werent there in reserve to keep the breakthrough part of cobra from being succesful, and those 1 and half that managed in luttich were already way overspent.
I suggest we move to a new and specific thread on this...I am more than happy to debate this, chaffing at the bit in fact.
The British/Canadians did not seize the initiative in Normandy, until the US had pried their way through the bocage and achieved operational manoeuvre. Simply attacking is not initiative...'having the initiative' is when the enemy must respond to your operational manoeuvre, and can't. At no point did any British offensive overwhelm the ability of the Germans facing them to use their reserves, although in several cases German use of their reserves didn't even involve more than simply repositioning them...the defensive belts had done the damage and stopped offensives cold.
The problem you are dealing with in your arguments is that the western allies, at the time, were at the bottom of the art of war...doctrinally, operationally and strategically they were at the bottom of the totem pole for the European war at the time of Normandy, the factors of 'invasion' and a combined international command notwithstanding. Certainly, they had their top tier abilities, but mastering the combined force/combined service operational art, nor higher order battle planning and execution aren't included in those.
And, let's face it, they weren't facing a top tier defensive general in Rommel...he was a reject from the meditteranean theatre at that point in time, replaced by a Luftwaffe general who taught the western allies what a real defense was (and thank god for the French, otherwise the western allies would still be sitting in front of the Gustav line).
Anyone left in the war I haven't praised or sledged? Feel free to ask for my opinion
The British/Canadians did not seize the initiative in Normandy, until the US had pried their way through the bocage and achieved operational manoeuvre. Simply attacking is not initiative...'having the initiative' is when the enemy must respond to your operational manoeuvre, and can't. At no point did any British offensive overwhelm the ability of the Germans facing them to use their reserves, although in several cases German use of their reserves didn't even involve more than simply repositioning them...the defensive belts had done the damage and stopped offensives cold.
The problem you are dealing with in your arguments is that the western allies, at the time, were at the bottom of the art of war...doctrinally, operationally and strategically they were at the bottom of the totem pole for the European war at the time of Normandy, the factors of 'invasion' and a combined international command notwithstanding. Certainly, they had their top tier abilities, but mastering the combined force/combined service operational art, nor higher order battle planning and execution aren't included in those.
And, let's face it, they weren't facing a top tier defensive general in Rommel...he was a reject from the meditteranean theatre at that point in time, replaced by a Luftwaffe general who taught the western allies what a real defense was (and thank god for the French, otherwise the western allies would still be sitting in front of the Gustav line).
Anyone left in the war I haven't praised or sledged? Feel free to ask for my opinion
Lets agree to disagree then. And yeah sorry for the thread hijack... But yes, the british had the initiative, since the beginning, with on operation epsom all the german reservers that were planned to be used on a major counterattack by rommel were sent in to plug the gap, and from then on thats all the germans could hope for to do in the grand scheme. Just the fact that the germans had to use armoured divisions in the frontline in a defensive way in the british sector proves that the brits held the initiative. Or tell me where were their major offensive operations against the british sector during the 3 months battle? They didnt do it, even though they certainly wanted, cause the british... held the initative, and were free to choose where and when to attack, and they did so countless times (and taking less casualties than the germans in the defensive, but more tank losses. While every single british attack required a localized and fast german counter attack to try to take the territory back with whatever units were around, but mostly they failed and it was usually when the british really damaged them). Quite simple really.
The western allies at the bottom of the art of war? Man liddel hart would be proud. Lets stop this discussion here.
German doctrine required rapid counter-attack at all levels...it was part and parcel of the way they operated, and, as I say, simply attacking does not mean you hold the initiative...using that rationale, the western allies in WW1 held the initiative in WW1 after the battle of the Marne onwards.
And yes, I will stand by my point on the poor quality of the western allied art of war, simply being on the victorious side does not automatically jump them up a couple of rungs. They simply weren't that good at ground war, although in fairness they did have to contend with all the problems of an international coalition, while each was looking to it's geo-political future.
And yes, I will stand by my point on the poor quality of the western allied art of war, simply being on the victorious side does not automatically jump them up a couple of rungs. They simply weren't that good at ground war, although in fairness they did have to contend with all the problems of an international coalition, while each was looking to it's geo-political future.
german doctrine required rapid counter attack at all levels yet they did not do a major offensive against the british sector (like they planned on week 2/3) once they had enough troops in the area.... i wonder why, certainly not because they had lost the initiative... according to you.
Their local counter attacks were entirely a response to the british attacks. They were meant to try and retake territories just lost the day before. If you are only responding to the actions of your opponent, you dont have the initiative. Now youve made the breakthrough study that not only montgomery was a crap general but that the british didnt have the initiative in normandy? No need to reply as im afraid we are beating a dead horse.
Their local counter attacks were entirely a response to the british attacks. They were meant to try and retake territories just lost the day before. If you are only responding to the actions of your opponent, you dont have the initiative. Now youve made the breakthrough study that not only montgomery was a crap general but that the british didnt have the initiative in normandy? No need to reply as im afraid we are beating a dead horse.
Montgomery looked good because the decent desert generals before him were either dead or POW's...
I'm afraid that your lack of reading has meant that you have missed out on the works of historians who provide very convincing evidence that Montgomery was well beyond his level of competence after Alamein. As I said, he wasn't fighting a particularly good example of German generalship in Rommel, who wasn't General Staff trained, and who utterly disobeyed his parameters of operation to the point of stretching the Axis forces facing the 8th Army to state where any competent attack, carried out for long enough, would cave them in.
As I said earlier, I am more than happy to move to a dedicated thread on this...no need to cut and run, I've got enough to carve you up like a xmas roast.
ive never read something more cringeworthy in my life LOL.
And which decent generals were either dead or pow? You do realize o'connor was a corps commander in normandy? Or the one you meant was gott? Sure....
And actually i suggest you read some john buckley, james holland, robin neillands, mark urban or etc. All of those certainly have the most convincing evidence that all the work from those post ww2 "historians" such as stephen ambrose, cornelius ryan, liddel hart and even max hastings and etc views on montgomery were pretty much wrong or biased. But then that is what happens when you write your book taking every post war account for granted and have absolutely no interest to actually check them.
Montgomery was so much beyond his level of competence after alamein that when he reached tunisia he defeated rommel easily on medenine, then in 1 month he went through mareth and reached enfidaville while leaving the american corps (under patton) with absolutely no enemy to fight as the british advanced so rapidly (taking sfax, sousse and getting to enfidaville) their front was gone in el guettar and the american corps needed to be repositioned to the coast. But yes, damn that montgomery for being terrible.
as can be easily seen here
https://historicalresources.files.wordpress.com/2008/09/tunisia-situation-22-april-1943.jpg
And now youve laid the initiative "debate" to rest... cut and run? LOL. As i said, im afraid we are beating a dead horse.
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Ironically, if Montgomery had been better at fighting a battle, his army wouldn't have had to fight the Afrika Korps in Tunis...they would have been destroyed at Alamein/Cyrenaica.
The offer is there...don't get all angsty over it, you might say something to get yourself banned.
The offer is there...don't get all angsty over it, you might say something to get yourself banned.
yep, because an army out of 100.000 managing to have 25.000 survive and escape to tunisia (and then fail again in operations against the 8th army in medenine) sure was a major blunder by montgomery.
This is a common myth. In point of fact, the French attempted multiple divisional attacks with armored formations and their doctrine absolutely did encourage the use of massed armor. And in fact the very man who chose to disperse those armored divisions in the area of Sedan was the single most experienced armored leader in the French army, a major proponent of the massed armored attack and the man who literally created the French armored forces (and had a major hand in the design of the best French tank, the Somua S35) : General Jean Flavigny. If you're looking for the French Guderian, this is the guy.
Here's why he made that call in his own words:
And part of why he made that call was a frankly embarrassing training exercise he saw a week prior:
Both are from The Breaking Point by Robert Doughty.
French pre war training was frankly atrocious and I could go into book length level of detail about how troops expected to drive the B1 were trained solely on the FT17 if they were lucky. Many reservists simply held up signs that said "tank" and walked around while in training for armored maneuvers, or if infantry were given only four rounds _a week_ of rifle ammunition for firing training. I'm dead serious, and you can verify it in Arming Against Hitler by Eugenia Kiesling. The French army had tons of modern kit by the time the way started, but the vast majority of it was produced in the year prior and many soldiers in specialist roles had never used or even seen the equipment they were supposed to be experts on before being handed it and sent off to war.
There was also an incredibly unhelpful culture of not admitting the massive issues within the army as it was believed that doing so would only provide succor to the enemy and hurt the prestige of the army and the morale of the citizens. Complaining about the bureaucratic morass that everyone was mired in (routine maneuvers could generate three inch thick piles of paperwork and require approval from senior army leadership) or the dire state of training (barely trained conscripts training reservists who were expected to bring front line units to full strength) were seen as good ways to end your career: if you complain that you can't get the job done with the shit sandwich you've been given, it must be because you suck, not because the army is insane. You can read account after account of pre-war French officers bemoaning the many failures of their army in private while fiercely attacking any suggestion that it was not the best in the world in public.
A final point. At every decisive moment in the Battle of Sedan it was German infantry, not armor, leading the way and crushing French resistance. Both Doughty and Karl-Heinz Frieser give German infantry the credit for the impressive tactical successes of the German army. At the operational level certainly the armor was decisive, but the breakthroughs were fought and won with incredible courage and skill by the infantry.
I don't generally compliment the German army in WW2, so that really is saying something.
It'snot arbitrary, this was about the average engagement range in Normandy.
@Aeon221
Well said. When the germans initially tried to take Tobruk in 1941 against Australian 9th Division, they penetrated the perimeter with a spearhead of armour, and trundled off into what was essentially an internal killing ground, and ran into massed AT/Arty and the armoured reserve. The infantry got stuck at the perimeter, and were in fact counter-assaulted by the defending forces. The german inf/art/support lost 1200 men, and the panzers found themselves cut off, getting hammered, and had to fight their way out through the perimeter again. The problem they had was that although 9th Div actually formed while it was moving into the perimeter, the Div commander, staff, and most of the division had specifically studied and trained to fight panzer and motorised troops, and the defence was organised accordingly...on top of which the Division was sitting on top of massive dumps of Italian weapons and ammo, so virtually every 'non-combatant' unit was organised to fire either captured artillery or anti-tank guns; while every unit had well above the org table in auto-weapons.
It was very much a situation where the attack was defeated by doctrine...a WW1 defensive doctrine modified and adapted to face a modern armoured force.
Well said. When the germans initially tried to take Tobruk in 1941 against Australian 9th Division, they penetrated the perimeter with a spearhead of armour, and trundled off into what was essentially an internal killing ground, and ran into massed AT/Arty and the armoured reserve. The infantry got stuck at the perimeter, and were in fact counter-assaulted by the defending forces. The german inf/art/support lost 1200 men, and the panzers found themselves cut off, getting hammered, and had to fight their way out through the perimeter again. The problem they had was that although 9th Div actually formed while it was moving into the perimeter, the Div commander, staff, and most of the division had specifically studied and trained to fight panzer and motorised troops, and the defence was organised accordingly...on top of which the Division was sitting on top of massive dumps of Italian weapons and ammo, so virtually every 'non-combatant' unit was organised to fire either captured artillery or anti-tank guns; while every unit had well above the org table in auto-weapons.
It was very much a situation where the attack was defeated by doctrine...a WW1 defensive doctrine modified and adapted to face a modern armoured force.
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