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The Development and Expansion of Infrastructural Advancements in the Overseas Province of Angola

07/01/63


_____________________________________________________________________________________


The Expansion of the Schools in Angola:

Expected Effects: The expansion of basic primary schools, highschool, agricultural schools, and a new university in Luanda are needed in order to raise the education level as a whole within the province.

SECRET: Furthermore the indoctrination of children towards being loyal to the State will be useful in proactively combating further insurgency in the future.
Expected Costs: 6,000,000 escudo.
The Application for the Petition of the Province of Angola to seek foreign funding:

Expected Effects: Angola needs further funding in order to boost the economy of the province and to spurn continual development within the province. As well, this may and can raise foreign support and sympathy to the cause of the Provincial Government, and therefore the state.

TOP SECRET: The Province can also seek private security firms to assist in the supplying of weapons, ammunition, and unconventional weaponry if need be.
Expected Costs: minimal.
The Continuation of Settlement of Portuguese into the Province:

Expected Effects: Angola has a very small white population, which can be relied in its entirety to support the government and its actions. The increase of such a population will spread peace and security within the nation.

TOP SECRET: If the worst of the worst happens, these populations can be used as insurgents against rebel forces if their lines advance too far into provincial territory.
Expected Costs: 75,000,000 escudo.

The Continuation of the Exploration of the Cabinda [CENSORED] Rumors:


Expected Effects: We recommend that scientists, engineers, and specialist technicians be funneled into the area to make sure if the rumors of [CENSORED] are true, which can bring untold wealth to the state. It is recommended that additional funds be given in order to provide heightened security in the region

TOP SECRET: The word censored is oil.
Expected Costs: 3,000,000 - 8,000,000 escudo.
The Continuation of the Paving and Maintenance of Angolan Roads:


Expected Effects: Angola has two European quality roads, a highway that runs from Lobito to Benguela all the way to Luso, and a highway from Luanda to Malanje. This is extremely insufficent to the needs and demands of both the Provincial Government and the people of Angola. As such an attempt to link at least every district capital with a European quality road is desireable for the Provincial Government.

TOP SECRET: The uses of roads in a backwater province in Africa are untold. This is a necessity.
Expected Costs: 60,000,000 escudo.
 
TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND AND ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE OVERSEAS PROVINCE OF ANGOLA: NORTHERN CONFLICT TERRITORY

07/01/63


_____________________________________________________________________________________


Commander of the Military Region of Angola (CMRA), Temporary Commander of the Northern Conflict Territory (NCT) - Major-General Venâncio A. Deslandes


Responsibilities: The effective administration and stewarding of the Province of Angola both domestically and militarily. Head of Command within the Province but under the direct control of the main branches of Government when required. Head of Command within the NCT in order to reestablish both control and peace within the Territory.

Direct Command: All Zone Commanders in the NCT.

Commander of the Zone of Cabinda - Major (NPC)


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Cabinda Enclave. The control of the city of Cabinda, the airport at Cabinda, the villages Guilhetme, Buco Zau, the surrounding hamlets and the Portuguese nationals there. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 2 Sector Commanders, the Cabindan Urban Sector and the Cabindan Rural Sector. Est. 700 troops each.

Notes: An added 200 troops in due to security threats. Requisition forms for an artillery battery on the outskirts of the city of Cabinda authorised.

Commander of the Zone of Zaire - Major (NPC)


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Zaire District. The control of the city of San Salvador, the airport at San Salvador, the villages of Lugo, Buels, Madimba, and the control of the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 3 Sector Commanders, the San Salvador Sector, the Zaire Rural Sector, and the Zaire Border Sector. Est. 500 troops each.

Notes: 300 troops removed due to lowered security threats.

Commander of the Zone of Lunda - Major (NPC)


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Lunda District. The control of the city of Henrique de Carvalho, the airport at Henrique de Carvalho, the villages of Portugalia, Luachimo, Lucapo, Caungola, and the control of the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 4 Sector Commanders, the Henrique de Carvalho Sector, the Lunda Rural Sector, Lunda Highlands Sector, and the Lunda Border Sector. Est. 750 troops each.

Notes: Requisition forms for additional airplanes and helicopters for the Henrique de Carvalho Wing authorised.


Commander of the Zone of Uíge - Major Cesário G. F. C. de Silva


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Uíge District. The control of the the city of Carmona, the airport at Carmona, the villages of Quimbele, Songo, Bembe, Damba, and Sanza, as well as the Uíge highlands and the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 4 Sector Commanders, the Carmona Sector, the Uíge Rural Sector, Uíge Highlands Sector, and the Uíge Border Sector. Est. 750 troops each.

Notes: The burning of the forest around the border of Congo-Léopoldville using napalm authorised.

Commander of the Zone of Malanje Norte-Cuanza Norte - Major David L. Grompos


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of Northern Malanje and Cuanza Norte Districts. The control of the cities of Malanje, Cacuso and Salazar, the airport at Malanje, the villages of Camabeteta, Golungo Alto, Duque de Braganca, Queic, the Malanje highlands, and the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 5 Sector Commanders, the Malanje Highlands Sector, the Malanje Border Sector, the Malanje Urban Sector, the Malanje Rural Sector, and the Salazar Sector. A detachment of riverboats will be assigned to the Cuarza Norte Sector for the defense and safety of the Rio Bingo. Est. 750 troops each.

Notes: The burning of the forest around the border of Congo-Léopoldville using napalm authorised. The Cuarza Norte Sector transferred to the Cuartza Zone.

Head of the International Police of State Defense (PIDE) - Brigadeiro-General Kaúlza G. C. da Silva Pais


Responsibilities: The persecution of state enemies and the removal of threats to the state. To cooperate with the CMRA.

Direct Command: [CENSORED BY ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY]
 
1963 in Angola

As the fighting forces throughout Angola rested and planned for the coming year, the FNLA propaganda machine tried to keep up to the Portuguese. Through pamphlets, agitators, and a radio station in Zaire the Government-in-Exile continued to promote its views among refugees in Zaire, and the Bakongo and Mbundu peoples in Angola. However, the apparent corruption inside the movement and dictatorial behaviour of Roberto put off many intellectual targets, while the peasants and other lower strata were hardly reached thanks to Portuguese efforts to prevent revolutionary literature and agitators from entering the country, and overshadowing the primitive FNLA-operated radios through extensive propaganda broadcasts from Luanda.


The difficulties posed when trying to reach the people in the Angolan hinterland were such that not much time was wasted, and military action commenced early in the year. The first notable action was a raid on the town of Quimbele, which was already heavily damaged in the UPA revolts less than two years before. The FNLA troops entered the town in the morning, rounding up all policemen, administrators, and other whites including doctors and teachers as well as their families in the village centre and after being subjected to several hours of abuse at the hands of the fighters, they were locked up in the village’s administrative centre which was burned. With nobody to oppose them, some young men were press-ganged into the FNLA forces as the town was looted and every town searched for money, munitions, and weapons. When Portuguese helicopters arrived a few hours later, the FNLA fled, leaving behind a town looted, burned, and with scores of dead in the streets.


Id3dkbH.png


Portuguese soldiers documenting the aftermath of the FNLA raid on Quimbele, supplied eagerly to leading news outlets throughout the western world.


Bombing runs by the Portuguese Air Force intensified in the region as the FNLA proceeded to raid and harass traffic going to Quimbele and the roads west, extracting tolls such as cargo, vehicles, jewellery, and children. It was no surprise to anybody that wherever the Portuguese went, they were cheered on and hailed as liberators and droves of young blacks joined the Army. They provided valuable knowledge of the land, much to the detriment of the FNLA force in the area. Still, land mines and ambushes continued to claim a serious toll amongst Portuguese forces.


The focus on the Bakongo was supported by the majority of FNLA figures, but the faction that included Jonas Savimbi pushed against these policies and said that the whole of Angola must become the focus of the struggle. While reluctant, Roberto agreed and over the year an uptick in FNLA activity was logged in Southern Malanje. Here, they behaved like their brothers-in-arms in Quimbele as no white man, woman, or child was certain of their life on the roads of southern Malanje that were infested by guerrillas. It was also noted that Mbundu and Ovimbundu civilians were robbed of their valuables by these guerrillas, but Bakongo civilians were left untouched. The most striking difference between these rebels and others seen thus far was their willingness to make battle with the Portuguese, as gunfights and ambushes were more common along these roads, but with heavy casualties on the FNLA side as a result.


Throughout the year, Agostinho Neto and his accomplices were seen travelling to the USSR and throughout the Eastern Block, currying favour with the political class in those countries. While Communist media eagerly reported on the successes achieved by the brave socialists of the MPLA, the Portuguese did not seem to feel any consequences of his tours. Instead, it seems weapons and recruits still came from the usual sources. The MPLA then worked on its image inside the country, deriding the FNLA and Portuguese are violent oppressors and the future of the peasants was secure with the MPLA. They added deed to word as the Portuguese were expropriated and their land was redistributed among the peasants.


vQxIQiN.jpg


Peasants working on their new lands


However, major activity by the MPLA remained limited to Cabinda where, together with the new FLEC movement, a small offensive against the Portuguese was undertaken in which the town of Caio was captured and all traffic leading to it stopped and inspected, with Portuguese army convoys being ambushed frequently. Still, their indifference to stand-up fights with the Portuguese set them apart from the more aggressive FLEC, where most volunteers went instead of to the MPLA.


Portuguese response to this all seemed to be focused on containment, still, as civil development continued. With the limited funds that were available, all major roads between district capitals and port cities in the west of the territory were at least partially paved, with completion expected next year. Furthermore, the territory received its first university with faculties in Luanda, Carmona, and Sá de Bandeira to go with many schools for blacks being constructed and upgraded.


Despite these advancements, Angola’s development was still severely limited by the corporatist state. Governor-General Deslandes, with the tacit support of the Overseas Ministry, went to Lisbon to make his case for increased Portuguese settlement and to allow foreign investment. While the foreign investment point was rejected by Salazar due to his fear of foreign control of the economy, the Prime Minister allowed for increased settlement in the province. While helpful, it only consisted of low-skill labour as many educated Portuguese still preferred the relative safety of Brazil.
 
(Unless I severely goof, I'll be done with school on the 8th. I figured that despite the long wait it'd be best to not shit out a rushjob update while revising like a mad cunt.

So orders are due on July 8th, you fucking Jonnes. )
 
320px-Movimento_Popular_de_Liberta%C3%A7%C3%A3o_de_Angola_%28bandeira%29.svg.png

Socialist revolutionary struggle – the only way to liberate the people of Angola from capitalism and colonialism

Like lions our brave revolutionary soldiers, men and women, farmers and workers, are fighting the imperialist forces wherever they can. Day by day, week by week, we grow stronger. Our fighters push into Cabinda, large swatches of which have already been liberated. And continuing mood in the cities and on the fields favors us. Our successes, and the global fraternal solidarity we have received, accurately point that our struggle is the righteous one, the one that all Angolans should aspire to join.

If we look at our Angolan brothers-in-arms fighting for the FNLA, we can notice a clear difference to the socialist MPLA. Indeed, the FNLA still upkeep the old roots of colonialism. They differentiate Angolans based on ethnic groups and tribal clans, which is something that must be eradicated in order for Angolans to really be free. For years, for decades, for hundreds of years, the Portuguese have kept us in bondage by splitting us. No more. And look, when the FNLA advances into an enemy city, what ensues? Blatant slaughter, horrible bloodshed. This isn’t revolution. This isn’t liberation. This is a crime against Angola. Just like the Portuguese, the FNLA is trying to make this a war of the European and African race. This is totally not the case. This is a war of revolutionary farmers and workers against their capitalist and colonialist oppressors. And this enemy, this enemy knows no race. For the plague of capitalism is rooted deep in Angolans too, due to the years of colonialist oppression.

Thus I call you to remember, o my brave lions, that just like the Portuguese officer or soldier, our enemy is also the Angolan brother who betrays his people, who steals and exploits from his people. Who sells the products of the land away while the men and women working on it starve? These criminals are almost as bad as our colonialist oppressors. Thus I call for a campaign to end the blatant rule of the capitalist roaders among us. Stand up, o’ workers and farmers, and make the traitors pay. Take back the land that belongs to you – even by arms if necessary. And to you collaborators: Now is the chance to repent, join us the people, or face the consequences of picking the side of the oppressor. The land and wealth of Angola shall be liberated and redistributed to its true owners. But fear not, unlike the FNLA we are not after lives of people. We simply reclaim what is ours by right.

Onwards with the Angolan revolution!

A. A. Neto
 
Private letter to Holden Roberto
Your Excellency,

In light of recent events I must voice my concern for the movement's future. I am glad to see that our advice has been taken seriously, and our armed activity seems to be spreading throughout Angola. However, with an expansion of these operations I simply cannot stress enough how important it is that we ditch the image of a Bakongo-centred group. This is something that has not been done. Non-Bakongo Africans are robbed, whilst whites have been murdered. The Portuguese government is our enemy, but the Portuguese whites carry with them money and expertise that are vital to running this country. And even if Your Excellency does not agree with this, the propaganda value for the Portuguese of this savagery -especially the burning of Quimbele- is undeniable. In the United States and Europe one sees sympathy for Portuguese Colonialism grow in political circles, but also in the streets. Furthermore, our commanders' savagery has led to many Bakongo joining groups friendly with the Portuguese, and other Africans acquiescing with Portuguese rule - or support the MPLA.

I suggest that Your Excellency works towards improving the Government-in-Exile's image rapidly, or else I shall have to take drastic measures myself.

-Jonas Savimbi, Foreign Minister of the Angolan Government-in-Exile.
 
Mumbo Luccundi gathered the men who followed him for a speech after a successful skirmish with Portuguese forces.

"Today we won another step on the long road to freedom. The imperialism of the Portuguese will come to an end one day if we continue this war in such a manner. And make no mistake, this is a war, and we are warriors. The very fate of Angola is at stake here, anyone who is not assisting us is supporting the continuation of the Portuguese enslavement, or worse is a communist support of the MPLA, who would sell our blood, sweat, and tears to Moscow for a few AKs. Far too many of our people are content to watch our fight though, they think that living under the thumb of colonialism is acceptable if the Portuguese decide to spend extra money to placate them as they rape our land of all its resources. They are cattle being fed on cheap grass on their way to the slaughterhouse. They think this is not war. We will disabuse them of this notion, and bring war to the farthest corners of Angola. There will be no place safe, and then all must choose whether they will fight for freedom, or fight for slavery, no more sitting by while the inevitable happens. Those who are worth the label of human being will support us, and those who are not will oppose us, leaving only the worthy behind once we free Angola. Many will die for our freedom, but no man lives forever, and I for one would much prefer death fighting for a righteous cause than to die working to improve the lives of our oppressors.

For a free Angola! Death to the Portuguese!"
 
(seekrit)​

347px-Coat_of_arms_of_Portugal.svg.png

Governor-General,

Talk about foreign investment has not interested Dr. Salazar much, fearing foreign enroachment in Portugal's economy. However, our efforts have not been without result. While restrictions are still heavy, the Prime Minister is in agreement that change is needed in the colonial economy, especially with unrest in Guinea and Mozambique requiring considerable sums of money to counter. Paired with good faith from the United States and Europe, even a slight opening up would reap great benefits. I will from now on argue for a small opening of Angola, a pilot programme if you will, to foreign investers. I ask of you to find a sector in which foreign investment would be worthwhile and spice the benefits up a bit, so I can work towards it being pushed as an example of success.

Furthermore, let me run down the changes made to the Organic Charter of Angola. First of all, you've got a head a government for the territory to work with - the Secretary-General. Departments for health, labour and welfare, education, the economy, rural development and public works, and communications have been instituted, all led by a Secretary. They carry responsibility for the civilian government, but answer to you. We hope that these changes positively affect the territorial administrations.

With kind regards,

A. A. Peixoto Correia, Minister of the Overseas.
 
((I dunno, sekrat?))

Da Silva had been delayed in his arrival to Carmona (Uige), and had spent much of 1962 and ’63 dealing with bureaucrats in Lisbon; finally freer, he arrived at his base of operations and began planning his moves against the rebels. He quickly opted to survey some of the towns under his command, finishing with the war-torn Quimbele – he was thoroughly displeased with the situation there. Most of the homes were a wreckage and many of the civilians there were starving; he resolved to change this soon.
 
204px-Lesser_coat_of_arms_of_Portuguese_West_Africa.svg.png


The Development and Expansion of Infrastructural Advancements in the Overseas Province of Angola

07/01/64


_____________________________________________________________________________________


The Rebuilding of Quimbele:

Expected Effects: The rebuilding of the city of Quimbele, which has been destroyed by rebel fighters. A logistical and military necessity, the city of Quimbele cannot be left in ruins.

SECRET: Furthermore this will assist in securing the heats and minds of the native population in northern Uige.
Expected Costs: 500,000 escudo.
The Introduction of Mbundu and Ovimbundu Citizens of Education to the Provincial Administration of Southern Malanje:

Expected Effects: The actions of the FNLA have disenfranchised Mbundu and Ovimbundu citizens of the jobs and wealth they have accrued through loyal service to the Republic. As such, in honour of such loyalty, it is recommended that upstanding citizens of these ethnicities with an education be allowed to assist in the running of the provincial administration of Southern Malanje.

SECRET: Furthermore this will assist in securing the heats and minds of the native population in Southern Malanje, as well as stop the risk of death to needed educated Portuguese in the increasingly dangerous Southern Malanje region.
Expected Costs: 40,000 escudo.

The Application for the Petition of the Province of Angola to seek Foreign Funding within the [CENSORED] and Coffee Sectors:

Expected Effects: Given the rise of the the [CENSORED] and the maintenance of the Coffee Sectors, it seems appropriate that these economic sectors be the first to be given foreign funding.

TOP SECRET: The censored portion is the oil industry. The seemingly endless wealth of the gas and oil industries are of great interest to the Colonial Government as an additional source of income.
Expected Costs: minimal.
The Continuation of Settlement of Portuguese into the Province:

Expected Effects: Angola has a very small white population, which can be relied in its entirety to support the government and its actions. The increase of such a population will spread peace and security within the nation.

TOP SECRET: If the worst of the worst happens, these populations can be used as insurgents against rebel forces if their lines advance too far into provincial territory.
Expected Costs: 75,000,000 escudo.

The Continuation of the Exploration of the Cabinda [CENSORED] Rumors:


Expected Effects: We recommend that scientists, engineers, and specialist technicians be funneled into the area to make sure if the rumors of [CENSORED] are true, which can bring untold wealth to the state. It is recommended that additional funds be given in order to provide heightened security in the region

TOP SECRET: The word censored is oil.
Expected Costs: 3,000,000 - 8,000,000 escudo.
The Continuation of the Paving and Maintenance of Angolan Roads:


Expected Effects: Angola has two European quality roads, a highway that runs from Lobito to Benguela all the way to Luso, and a highway from Luanda to Malanje. This is extremely insufficent to the needs and demands of both the Provincial Government and the people of Angola. As such an attempt to link at least every district capital with a European quality road is desireable for the Provincial Government.

TOP SECRET: The uses of roads in a backwater province in Africa are untold. This is a necessity.
Expected Costs: 60,000,000 escudo.
 
TOP SECRET

DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND AND ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE OVERSEAS PROVINCE OF ANGOLA: NORTHERN CONFLICT TERRITORY

04/01/64


_____________________________________________________________________________________


Commander of the Military Region of Angola (CMRA), Temporary Commander of the Northern Conflict Territory (NCT) - Major-General Venâncio A. Deslandes


Responsibilities: The effective administration and stewarding of the Province of Angola both domestically and militarily. Head of Command within the Province but under the direct control of the main branches of Government when required. Head of Command within the NCT in order to reestablish both control and peace within the Territory.

Direct Command: All Zone Commanders in the NCT.

Commander of the Zone of Cabinda - Major (NPC)


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Cabinda Enclave. The control of the city of Cabinda, the airport at Cabinda, the villages Guilhetme, Buco Zau, the surrounding hamlets and the Portuguese nationals there. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 2 Sector Commanders, the Cabindan Urban Sector and the Cabindan Rural Sector. Est. 900 troops each.

Notes: An added 200 troops in due to security threats. Requisition forms for an artillery battery on the outskirts of the city of Cabinda authorised.

Standing Orders: Recapture the city of Caio from MPLA insurgents.

Commander of the Zone of Zaire - Major (NPC)


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Zaire District. The control of the city of San Salvador, the airport at San Salvador, the villages of Lugo, Buels, Madimba, and the control of the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 3 Sector Commanders, the San Salvador Sector, the Zaire Rural Sector, and the Zaire Border Sector. Est. 500 troops each.

Notes: No major changes.

Standing Orders: Maintenance of the border and peace.

Commander of the Zone of Lunda - Major (NPC)


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Lunda District. The control of the city of Henrique de Carvalho, the airport at Henrique de Carvalho, the villages of Portugalia, Luachimo, Lucapo, Caungola, and the control of the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 4 Sector Commanders, the Henrique de Carvalho Sector, the Lunda Rural Sector, Lunda Highlands Sector, and the Lunda Border Sector. Est. 750 troops each.

Notes: Requisition forms for additional airplanes and helicopters for the Henrique de Carvalho Wing authorised.

Standing Orders: Maintenance of the border and peace.


Commander of the Zone of Uíge - Major Cesário G. F. C. de Silva


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Uíge District. The control of the the city of Carmona, the airport at Carmona, the villages of Quimbele, Songo, Bembe, Damba, and Sanza, as well as the Uíge highlands and the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 4 Sector Commanders, the Carmona Sector, the Uíge Rural Sector, Uíge Highlands Sector, and the Uíge Border Sector. Est. 750 troops each.

Notes: The burning of the forest around the border of Congo-Léopoldville using napalm authorised.

Standing Orders: Maintenance of the border and peace. Defeat of recent FNLA incursions into the province.

Commander of the Zone of Malanje - Major David L. Grompos


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of Northern Malanje and Cuanza Norte Districts. The control of the cities of Malanje, Cacuso, the airport at Malanje, the villages of Camabeteta, Golungo Alto, Duque de Braganca, Queic, Songa, Mugongo, the Malanje highlands, and the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 5 Sector Commanders, the Malanje Highlands Sector, the Malanje Border Sector, the Malanje Urban Sector, the Malanje Rural Sector, and the Malanje Southern Sector. Est. 900 troops each.

Notes: An added 150 troops in each Sector due to security threats. Requisition forms for an artillery battery on the outskirts of the city of Malanje authorised. The Cuarza Norte Sector transferred to the Cuartza Zone due to increasing security concerns in Southern Malanje. Increased amounts of jeeps and trucks authorised for the Urban, Rural, and Southern Malanje Sectors.

Standing Orders: Maintenance of the border and peace. Defeat of recent FNLA incursions into the province.

Head of the International Police of State Defense (PIDE) - Brigadeiro-General Kaúlza G. C. da Silva Pais


Responsibilities: The persecution of state enemies and the removal of threats to the state. To cooperate with the CMRA.

Direct Command: [CENSORED BY ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY]
 
Dutchguy. I am sorry i was going to send orders but real life is getting more and more heavy and will have to start cutting out games. I profundly apologize.
 
1964 in Angola

The FNLA had taken a large PR hit in the last year, fighting on their hind legs and razing the village of Quimbele had left an impression on not just northern Angola, but the entire world. The FNLA had to regain its reputation as a capable military force, but also as a civilised liberation movement, not a horde of brigands. Action was needed, but when the guerrillas around Quimbele attempted a stand-up fight with the Portuguese army they first found themselves massively outgunned and then slaughtered, with over 350 rebel casualties. The remaining rebels thus retreated and stuck to harassing Portuguese soldiers, policemen, and reconstruction teams with mines and snipers. PIDE reported that in engagements afterwards, FNLA rebels seemed to work as a team rather than a collection of individuals.


More importantly, FNLA activity was spreading out. Across Malanje, mines were reported (and often cleared), but around the Cuanza river a large FNLA band raided and fought the Portuguese. Fearing popular activation, the Portuguese Army and Air Force coordinated an efficient campaign to contain this band, and with heavy bombardments succeeded in apprehending its leaders, including a high-ranking warlord by the name of Mumbo Luccundi, who attracted a lot of PIDE attention.


Taking a string of beatings at the hands of the Portuguese, Holden Roberto decided it was time to act. As the Portuguese were growing complacent and were no longer considering the FNLA a threat, they were in for a rough awakening. In August, an estimated two thousand FNLA guerrillas, well-armed and drilled, stormed over the Angolan border and overran all Portuguese border posts and police stations, leaving no survivors. However, when facing a large Portuguese force the rebels still were outclassed, with a few hundred Portuguese troops holding out in the ruins of Quimbele and the city of São Salvador briefly being encircled, but supplied by the Portuguese Air Force.


BpBoPYU.jpg


Despite being incapable of challenging the Portuguese Army outright, the ENLA had seen vast improvements in the last years.
The inability of the FNLA to carry out a sustained campaign this far contributed to the relief of the towns and them being pushed back as much as Portuguese armour, aircraft, and cavalry did. But what killed the FNLA effort was the rug was being pulled from under them in the Congo with the former Katangan president, Moise Tshombe, becoming its prime minister. Tshombe did not want to host an array of foreign militias on Congolese territory and made efforts to remove both the FNLA and the MPLA from Congo. While the FNLA was pressed and put in more difficulty, it had a strong enough presence in Congo to resist Tshombe’s pressure.


The MPLA, on the other hand, was forced to move out of the Congo. This was not as big of a problem as it could have been due to it effectively administering and reforming parts of Angola, and the neighbouring countries of Congo-Brazzaville and the newly independent Zambia welcoming the socialist movement. What could potentially have been the death knell for the MPLA turned into perhaps the greatest blessing it could’ve hoped for with President Kaunda being so friendly with Agostinho Neto, something the latter was sure to build on.


MPLA military activity was limited to Cabinda, as it had been for a while. In the middle of the fighting season, the MPLA and MLEC launched a combined offensive that succeeded in driving the Portuguese closer to the coast, but the overzealous MLEC, stronger than the MPLA in Cabinda, gave away the strength and positions of one ‘Uncle Martti’. As the Portuguese Army, bolstered by accurate intel from PIDE, tore the MPLA apart until they retreated, the MLEC disappeared and harassed the Portuguese forces as they went up the road and recaptured Caio and moved on Belize. Realising the fight was lost, the MPLA left a token force in Cabinda but both PIDE and the MLEC noticed that most of the communists had left the enclave.


With Portugal in control of most of Cabinda and the FNLA contained, it was announced that a pilot programme for foreign investment in the territory would begin with the coffee plantations and explorations in Cabinda being opened to foreign capital. Due to Lisbon closely controlling the programme, little was actually invested by American and European corporations. But where there was investment, there was success. The Lisbon government happily announced that a major offshore oilfield was found off Cabinda, and the smaller investments in coffee resulted in lowering tariffs on ‘Portuguese’ coffee in Britain and Spain.


After PIDE earned their paychecks, it became apparent to the Portuguese that if they wanted to take care of the FNLA once and for all outside of the battlefield, they could. Not only through rebuilding Quimbele, but by pulling the rug of Bakongo support from under the FNLA. Smearing the FNLA as a murderous band was not difficult, but after identifying the necessary alternatives propaganda by pro-Portuguese groups, who wished to see the Kongo Kingdom restored under Portuguese suzerainty, sprung up and the Provincial Government silently condoned these organisations, as long as they were committed to non-violence.​

oPcubz3.jpg

oPcubz3.jpg


Quimbele, rebuilt with help from the Portuguese military, was no longer a ghost town – but not much more than that either.
A noticeably larger than usual number of Portuguese immigrants arrived in Angolan cities in 1964, where they bolstered the (excessively white) administration, and joined the (even whiter) middle class in an urban economy much like Europe’s. But even with this skill base arriving, it was obvious that the black man was still estranged from his government. General Deslandes thus introduced a system under which qualified Mbundu and Ovimbundu could sign a Declaration of Loyalty and work in public administration. This was a successful move in the coastal cities and on the central plateau, where despite the influx of whites most Africans did not sense alienation from the Portuguese.
 
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Approximate military situation in Angola, early 1965

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(Orders are due on Friday the 24th. Sorry for the map delay etc. Also, get IC'ing. Diary entries or talks between people in your following will do. It'd help me un-turd)
 
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An adress by Holden Roberto, leader of FNLA, to his troops and several foreign journalists

The Frente Nacional de Libertação de Angola faces a dire threat [...], it is not the battles to come, for time and time again, you fought and won countless times against a better equipped foe, because you showed more bravery and loyalty to the cause of independence than they can muster in their entirely lives. Because of your bravery, the cowardly PIDE, a weapon of terror and destruction created by Salazzar, claims that we killed in Quimbele, that we raped in Quimbele, that we destroyed Quimbele. Why would we kill, rape and destroy any Angolan Village, Kongo or Herero, Ovimbundu or Chowke, when these villages and these people suffered the fate of raping, death and desruction at the hands of Portugese like Salazzar for more than four centuries!? PIDE has spread these vile lies, and did not shy away of killing an entire village to create "evidence", just to discredit the Angolan peoples fighting for the independence of their peoples. But the cruelty of the PIDE does not end there, Mumbo Luccundi, an Ovimbundu FNLA political activist and Angolan nationalist, was arrested and executed by PIDE forces without trail, without mercy, to strike fear in the hearts of the FNLA, but we will not succumb to the systimatic terror brought down by PIDE, for we will not forget for what Luccundi stood, for what he fought for and if we remain true to the Angolan people and those who sacrificed their lives for Angola we will succeed!
 
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The Development and Expansion of Infrastructural Advancements in the Overseas Province of Angola

02/01/65


_____________________________________________________________________________________


The Foundation and Introduction of the South-East African Rail Route:

Expected Effects: The peace of the Angolan Southern Provinces and the Southeastern Province of the South African Republic create the perfect atmosphere for the creation of a rail line from Sa de Bandeira, through Gambos, Cahama, Pereira d'Eca into the South African Republic. Furthermore this will solidify both trade and transportation between our two glorious nations.

SECRET: A direct rail line with one of the few allies we have on the continent should show military value without explanation.
Expected Costs: 50,00,000 escudo.

Priority: High
The Continuation of the Adoption of Loyal Natives into the Colonial Administration:

Expected Effects: Seeing the success of the recent efforts to adopt limited Natives as public servants, it is the opinion of this office to expand the program.

SECRET: This will continue to result in the adoration of the Native populace to the State as the State will give them meaning within their lives. Furthermore, steady work gives stability which gives loyalty. Native loyalty is not something this Office underestimates.
Expected Costs: 4,000,000 escudo.
The Application for the Continuation of the Province of Angola to seek Foreign Funding within the [CENSORED] and Coffee Sectors:

Expected Effects: Given the rise of the the [CENSORED] and the maintenance of the Coffee Sectors, it seems appropriate that these economic sectors to continue to be searching for foreign funding.

TOP SECRET: The censored portion is the oil industry. The seemingly endless wealth of the gas and oil industries are of great interest to the Colonial Government as an additional source of income.
Expected Costs: minimal.
The Continuation of Settlement of Portuguese into the Province:

Expected Effects: Angola has a very small white population, which can be relied in its entirety to support the government and its actions. The increase of such a population will spread peace and security within the nation.

TOP SECRET: If the worst of the worst happens, these populations can be used as insurgents against rebel forces if their lines advance too far into provincial territory.
Expected Costs: 75,000,000 escudo.

The Continuation of the Exploration of the Cabinda [CENSORED]:


Expected Effects: We recommend that scientists, engineers, and specialist technicians be funneled into the area to make sure if the rumors of [CENSORED] are true, which can bring untold wealth to the state. It is recommended that additional funds be given in order to provide heightened security in the region

TOP SECRET: The word censored is oil.
Expected Costs: 3,000,000 - 8,000,000 escudo.
The Continuation of the Paving and Maintenance of Angolan Roads:


Expected Effects: Angola has two European quality roads, a highway that runs from Lobito to Benguela all the way to Luso, and a highway from Luanda to Malanje. This is extremely insufficent to the needs and demands of both the Provincial Government and the people of Angola. As such an attempt to link at least every district capital with a European quality road is desireable for the Provincial Government.

TOP SECRET: The uses of roads in a backwater province in Africa are untold. This is a necessity.
Expected Costs: 60,000,000 escudo.

 
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| TOP SECRET |

Diplomatic and Strategic Recommendations in the Overseas Province of Angola

06/01/65


_____________________________________________________________________________________


The Expansion of the Milicias in the Angolan Overseas Province:

Plan: Seeing the success of the recent efforts to adopt limited Natives as public servants, it is the opinion of this office to expand the Milicias within the Overseas Province to include exiles and refugees from Congo-Brazzaville and Zambia, Natives purged from the various terrorist organisations for political or religious reasons, and the adoption of a limited test of Native NCOs in Native Companies.


Effects: This will serve to utilise a greater source of manpower, to further divide the terrorists as a less viable option than the government, and to expand the currently limited leadership pool existing within the Overseas Province.
Expected Costs: 1,000,000 escudo.
The Establishment of the Support of the Lozi People of Barotseland:

Plan: Seeing the hostility offered by the Zambian Regime of Kenneth Kaunda towards the Portuguese State, it is recommended that the Lozi people of the Zambian Province of Barotseland be supported monetarily, militarily, and diplomatically. A highly stratified society with a cultural focus on loyalty. Barotseland is already an established region and was a protectorate under the reign of the British, so the assistance in creating a friendly pseudo-state would be easier than starting from the beginning.

Effects: If the State were to support this, the Zambian State would not only be distracted from assisting domestic Angolan terrorists, but this may provide the State with a screw in which to force the Zambian state to submit to the State's Will.
Expected Costs: 50,000,000 escudo.
The Creation of a Special Native Forces Unit in the Angolan Overseas Province:

Plan: Seeing the success of the recent efforts to adopt limited Natives as public servants, it is the opinion of this office to expand the Milicias to include specialised units of Natives in which to hunt their own. Acting as scouts, hunters, and assassins, these could be of great use to the State. The Overseas Government recommends the adoption of bushmen in this process if completed due to their belittlement by the general Native populace and their excellence as trackers.

Effects: This will serve to utilise a greater source of manpower, to further divide the terrorists as a less viable option than the government, and to expand the ability of the forces of the State to counter terrorists.
Expected Costs: 120,000 escudo.
The Pressuring of the Zambian State through the Benguela Rail Line:

Plan: Seeing as the Zambian state relies on the Benguela Line in which to transport the Zambian primary export of copper, this gives a perfect opportunity to pressure the Zambian state. If the State were to shut down or seize Zambian copper within the State, this would deny the Zambian state their primary source of income. Furthermore, the State could "convince" President Kuanda to use solely Portuguese companies to sell Zambian copper if Kuanda wants to sell copper at all.

Effects: This will serve as an excellent screw to place upon the Zambian State. A vital life line for the Zambian state, it's usage is entirely within the State's control. Furthermore, this plan could be used to support the Lozi, by requiring Lozi companies to be the primary Zambian contact with Portuguese companies/authorities.
Expected Costs: N/A.
The Defense, Securing, and Reinforcement of Sao Salvador & the Securing of the Soyo Pocket (OPERATION FALCAO)*:

Plan: Sao Salvador has been under threat by terrorist forces for the last 6 months. This cannot continue. The Overseas Office authorises a full offensive in which to secure the entire Province of Sao Salvador. Furthermore, the Overseas Province sees the perfect opportunity to trap terrorist forces in the Sao Salvador hinterlands. Through the extensive use of close air support, artillery, and Native milicias, Sao Salvador could be secured and have State forces push until they meet up with State forces in the small port of Soyo. This would enclose a pocket that air strikes could eliminate.

Effects: This would secure Sao Salvador, secure the port of Soyo, reinforce State positions in the North, trap terrorists in a pocket to be dispatched at the State's leisure, and otherwise show that the terrorists can be easily defeated by State forces.
Expected Costs: N/A.
The Elimination of the Terrorist Presence in Cabinda (OPERATION GAIVOTA)*:

Plan: Seeing as the abandonment of the MPLA from Cabinda, this is the perfect opportunity for the State to secure Cabinda in entirely. State forces can easily overwhelm the MLEC by launching a legitimate, fullscale offensive in the region. Since the MLEC are in the hinterlands of Cabinda, the Overseas Office recommends the full use of defoliants, artillery, and napalm in the destruction of cover prior to the major engagements.

Effects: Using troops within the region would secure the stability and protection of Cabinda oil, cotton, and tobacco as well as prove the might of the Portuguese Army.
Expected Costs: N/A.

The Defense, Securing, and Reinforcement of Cuango*:

Plan: Cuango has been under threat by terrorist forces for the last 6 months. This cannot continue. The Overseas Office authorises a full offensive in which to secure the city of Cuango and the border with Zaire. Limited use of napalm is authorised as well.

Effects: This would secure Caungo, push back the terrorist threat, and secure the overly porous border with Zaire.
Expected Costs: N/A.
The Reclamation of Luachimo*:

Plan: Luachimo is currently under terrorist control. This cannot continue. As such the Overseas Office authorises a full offensive in which to secure the village of Luachimo and the surrounding area. As well, the border with Zaire should be secured as well. Full use of napalm and defoliants in non-populated areas authorised

Effects: This would secure Luachimo, push back the terrorist threat, and secure the overly porous border with Zaire.
Expected Costs: N/A.
The Destruction of the Lucapa Pocket (OPERATION AGUIA)*:

Plan: The MPLA have been trapped in a pocket between Lucapa and HdC. As such, they must be destroyed. A full offensive is authorised in order to trap and kill as many MPLA soldiers and possible. Capture of officers for propaganda and State usage is recommended.

Effects: This would secure Lucapa, HdC, HdC airport, push back the terrorist threat, and secure a propagandic victory for the State.
Expected Costs: N/A.
*All Forces utilised are laid out in the latest DCOBOPA Document
 
| TOP SECRET |

DISTRIBUTION OF COMMAND AND ORDER OF BATTLE OF THE OVERSEAS PROVINCE OF ANGOLA: NORTHERN CONFLICT TERRITORY

12/01/65


_____________________________________________________________________________________


Commander of the Military Region of Angola (CMRA), Temporary Commander of the Northern Conflict Territory (NCT) - Major-General Venâncio A. Deslandes


Responsibilities: The effective administration and stewarding of the Province of Angola both domestically and militarily. Head of Command within the Province but under the direct control of the main branches of Government when required. Head of Command within the NCT in order to reestablish both control and peace within the Territory.

Direct Command: All Zone Commanders in the NCT.

Commander of the Zone of Cabinda - Major Luis J. Corte


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Cabinda Enclave. The control of the city of Cabinda, the airport at Cabinda, the villages Guilhetme, Buco Zau, the surrounding hamlets and the Portuguese nationals there. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 2 Sector Commanders, the Cabindan Urban Sector and the Cabindan Rural Sector. Est. 900 troops each.

Notes: No major changes.

Standing Orders: Conduct Operation Gaivota.

Commander of the Zone of Zaire - Major Henrique E. Fava


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Zaire District. The control of the city of San Salvador, the airport at San Salvador, the villages of Lugo, Buels, Madimba, and the control of the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 3 Sector Commanders, the San Salvador Sector, the Zaire Rural Sector, and the Zaire Border Sector. Est. 700 troops each.

Notes: An added 200 troops in each Sector due to security threats and due to the planned offensive.

Standing Orders: Conduct Operation Falcaio.

Commander of the Zone of Lunda - Major Jorge M. E. Moniz


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Lunda District. The control of the city of Henrique de Carvalho, the airport at Henrique de Carvalho, the villages of Portugalia, Luachimo, Lucapo, Caungola, and the control of the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 4 Sector Commanders, the Henrique de Carvalho Sector, the Lunda Rural Sector, Lunda Highlands Sector, and the Lunda Border Sector. Est. 800 troops each.

Notes: Requisition forms for additional airplanes and helicopters for the Henrique de Carvalho Wing authorised. An added 50 troops in each Sector due to security threats and due to the planned offensive.

Standing Orders: Conduct Operation Aguia as well as Securing Luachimo from terrorist hands.


Commander of the Zone of Uíge - Major Cesário G. F. C. de Silva


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of the Uíge District. The control of the the city of Carmona, the airport at Carmona, the villages of Quimbele, Songo, Bembe, Damba, and Sanza, as well as the Uíge highlands and the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 4 Sector Commanders, the Carmona Sector, the Uíge Rural Sector, Uíge Highlands Sector, and the Uíge Border Sector. Est. 800 troops each.

Notes: The burning of the forest around the border of Congo-Léopoldville using napalm authorised. An added 50 troops in each Sector due to security threats and due to the planned offensive.

Standing Orders: Secure Cuango.

Commander of the Zone of Malanje - Major David L. Grompos


Responsibilities: The safety and stability of Northern Malanje and Cuanza Norte Districts. The control of the cities of Malanje, Cacuso, the airport at Malanje, the villages of Camabeteta, Golungo Alto, Duque de Braganca, Queic, Songa, Mugongo, the Malanje highlands, and the border with Congo-Léopoldville. Overseen by the NCT.

Direct Command: 5 Sector Commanders, the Malanje Highlands Sector, the Malanje Border Sector, the Malanje Urban Sector, the Malanje Rural Sector, and the Malanje Southern Sector. Est. 800 troops each.

Notes: The removal of 100 troops in each Sector due to the security of the region and due to the planned offensives elsewhere.

Standing Orders: Maintenance of the border and peace. Defeat of recent FNLA incursions into the province.

Head of the International Police of State Defense (PIDE) - Brigadeiro-General Kaúlza G. C. da Silva Pais


Responsibilities: The persecution of state enemies and the removal of threats to the state. To cooperate with the CMRA.

Direct Command: [CENSORED BY ORDER OF THE DEPARTMENT OF SECURITY]
 
1965 in Angola

Holden Roberto’s government-in-exile had sent out propaganda messages to the people of Angola for a long time, but the communications infrastructure it possessed in the US and Europe remained largely untapped. To draw wider attention to the Angolan war, the FNLA began exploiting these contacts and connections to promote themselves as committed to a democratic and multiracial Angola. While in Europe most people saw the FNLA as butchers and brigands, and the pro-Angolan left stood behind the MPLA, Roberto enjoyed success in the United States, where the rank-and-file of the civil rights movement managed to take the issue of Portugal’s colonies to the floor of the House of Representatives where it was briefly discussed and ended in the House adopting a resolution that reaffirmed the United States’ disapproval of colonialism, but also clearly voiced it was suspicious of the communist presence in Angola and advised against hasty and violent decolonisation.


Despite the success in raising awareness, the FNLA was unable to hide from foreign observers that it was still failing to challenge the Portuguese military. With more and more arms flowing into Congo, it seemed that the FNLA would take a part of the Congo and organise a statelet for its operations to continue, until the Congolese political spectrum was turned upside down when the chief of the army, General Joseph-Desiré Mobutu, deposed the government and declared himself President. Mobutu immediately made a 180 degree turn and recognised the GRAE as Angola’s government, and Holden Roberto as its president. No longer endangered, the FNLA picked up its offensive but failed to dislodge the Portuguese, and São Salvador was defended by the Portuguese Air Force, Artillery, and the local militias assisting the army.


In the Uíge district and the northern reaches of Malanje the FNLA did not fare much better, with an attempt of sabotaging installations of the Portuguese Army failing due to poor-quality bombs. The militants that were subsequently captured revealed a fledgling network of informants that were subsequently rolled up and milked for information, revealing information about one of the FNLA’s commanders in Angola.

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An FNLA informant, disguised as a tribesman, taken prisoner by the Portuguese army.

Smelling weakness, the Portuguese prepared to launch an offensive around the Cuango area, where the FNLA consistently harassed traffic on the road between Cafunfo and the Congolese border and threatened the former. The Portuguese launched a heavy air assault before the paratroopers and commandos went in with high morale and expecting an easy victory, but all that was easy was proving Napoleon right. He said that there are no bad regiments; only bad colonels. And around Cuango, the guerrillas offered strong resistance to Portuguese incursions, stalling advances and inflicting significant casualties on the army. They too, with distressing regularity, demonstrated how fluid guerrilla warfare in the jungle is by appearing behind the Portuguese troops.


The Portuguese had more success against the MPLA in the East, where an attack was mounted from Henriques de Carvalho. The terrain here was more favourable for helicopter-borne assaults, and Alouette IIIs armed with 20mm cannons not only racked up casualties amongst the MPLA, but also brought a fear factor with them. The steppe and savannah slowly but surely fell under Portuguese authority again as the pocket between Henriques de Carvalho and Lucapa was cleared, and the town of Luachimo fell after a short and intense battle. Sadly, mining town was a shadow of its former self. The MPLA had stolen all stocks of diamonds and cash, as well as every vehicle, machine, and anything of use they could take away into the Congo. Still, Portuguese reports indicated that the MPLA would rather run than fight and the effectiveness of the operation all but indicated the MPLA was militarily ineffective.​


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A native man dances with a Portuguese soldier outside Luachimo, celebrating its liberation from the MPLA
The final military actions of the year took place in the north-west of Angola, where the use of chemical defoliants, napalm, and air cavalry tactics that had proven themselves in Luachimo were deployed in Cabinda, where the discovery of large oil deposits meant that it had to be as secure as possible. Prime Minister Salazar himself ordered that the rebel presence had to be removed. The disproportionate measures used against such a small movement were very effective, reducing MLEC operations to few, far between, far inland raids on non-military targets. The offshore oil in Cabinda was certainly secured.


In Angola proper, the FNLA’s alarmingly quick gains in the north-west were met with Portuguese counterattacks. Here, the Portuguese air force again bomber the guerrillas into submission as paratroopers and commandos spearheaded assaults against guerrillas who were gone before the Portuguese could open fire. Losing the initiative and large amounts of land, not only did the FNLA see another massive setback in the country, and did non-violent factions increasingly speak out in support of Portugal, but other factions allied with the FNLA in Congo started opposing Roberto’s leadership of the government and backed Jonas Savimbi as president instead. Action would have to be undertaken by Roberto, were he to secure his position.​


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An FAP P-84 on an attack run in North-Western Angola
The year also marked what could be seen as the first spillovers of the war. While militarily defeated, it was known that the MPLA had fertile soil to organise and prepare in Zambia. Seeing a potential rival in the MPLA, there were a number of assassinations in Zambia and Tanzania, targeting important MPLA organisers and Zambian/Tanzanian liaisons which severely hampered the establishment of contacts within the country. Whilst it seemed like the Portuguese had done it, investigations pointed at it being the FNLA’s work, simple points being that the assassins all ued Russian-fabricated rifles and in one instance shouted “Long Live the FNLA”. Agostinho Neto was anxious to retaliate, but two bombs were set off in the Kinkuzu training camp later in the year, injuring dozens of trainees.


Complementing military successes in the territory, the year was also bountiful for Angolan civilians as the Portuguese Government lifted most restrictions on foreign capital, foreign corporations operating in Angola, and allowed highly-skilled foreign workers to seek employ in Angola. This influx of foreign capital, knowledge, and consumers, as well as their entourages, ensured that trade and commercial activity saw a spectacular rise during the year. Future growth and rebuilding damaged industries were both expected to be faster after this measure. Together with this economic growth, immigration from Portugal went up slightly but saw restrictions for the coming years to ensure these people would work in West Germany, France, and the Benelux instead. Because of these restrictions the Territorial Government advocated for the further uplifting of the native African population, which manifested in the continued training of natives for the civil service.


To support this growth, infrastructural development continued with more European-quality roads being constructed throughout the territory, but also saw the railhead from Gambos extended to Cahama to eventually link it to South-West Africa, and the Republic of South Africa. On the other side of the border, the railway was extended as well, and it was expected that by 1968 the railways would be connected.​


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Portuguese Army engineers building a road
 
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