Germany & Oil WW2

[Morgoth I]

It is often said that Germany by 1941 had no option but to attack the USSR owing to the fact that there was no other way for Germany to fulfill its requirements for oil. This is a view that has gained popularity but in my estimation at least there is one major flaw in this line of thinking, namely it ignores the possibilities of Germany expanding its hydrogenation capacity.

The OKW estimates in 1941 that it needed 7.25 million barrels of oil per month to meet its needs, around 87 million barrels per annum or 12.4 million tons.

Now in 1941, Germany's home production of oil was only 5.7 million tons per annum, of which 4.1 million came from coal liquefaction, by 1943, oil production from hydrogenation plants had expanded to 5.7 million tons, another 4.7 million tons came from domestic and foreign oil fields, imports constituted around 2.8 million tons of this figure.

Hence total oil supply by 1943 was 10.4 million tons of oil, to fulfill the requirements of 1941 only another 2 million tons of oil or 14 million barrels would be needed, since 1 ton of coal generates 1 - 1.5 barrels of oil, hydrogenation plants with the capacity of liquefy another 14 million tons of coal would have met the 1941 requirements.

Now by 1943 oil requirements were most likely higher then what they had been in 1941, however considering that the German Government by 1942 controlled mines that could produce 420 million tons of coal per annum, if Germany had taken a longer term strategy, instead of invading the USSR and instead just focused on building hydrogenation plants, by 1945-46 Germany could have easily achieved self-sufficiency in oil.

Hence the view that Germany had to go on the offensive to acquire more oil is in my opinion wrong insofar as Germany had more then enough coal with which it could easily attain self-sufficiency in fuel, of course both the OKW and Hitler were very short sighted in their thinking and were extremely impatient so I doubt this possibility was ever seriously considered by them.

For example redirecting just 6% of 1942 coal production, around 25 million tons would have increased oil output by at least 3.5 million tons, nearly double the consumption of the Luftwaffe.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

It is often said that Germany by 1941 had no option but to attack the USSR owing to the fact that there was no other way for Germany to fulfill its requirements for oil.

Why even listen to such people ? Its obviously the same crap likie the Soviets would have attacked then and whatnot.

 

[Holmes]

It is often said that Germany by 1941 had no option but to attack the USSR owing to the fact that there was no other way for Germany to fulfill its requirements for oil. This is a view that has gained popularity but in my estimation at least there is one major flaw in this line of thinking, namely it ignores the possibilities of Germany expanding its hydrogenation capacity..

You mean by the leading nazis in ww2. Your right its what they said, your also right they planned to treble synthetic output in 4 years, as they predicted rumn aia would not be providing 94% of all German imports for long.

Its being established fact from the end of ww2, for two reason, the Nazis said so, it was why they invaded the USSR and second the economic data shows that to have been a driving factor behind AH choice.

Halder emphatically stated to the OKH Naval Liaison Officer, that the conquest of the Caucasus was 'absolutely vital' for Germany's continued war effort.If the oilfield were notcaptured, 'the Reich will not survive long'

The OKW estimates in 1941 that it needed 7.25 million barrels of oil per month to meet its needs, around 87 million barrels per annum or 12.4 million tons..

OKW Command study in May of 1941 noted that with monthly military requirements for 7.25 million barrels and imports and home production of only 5.35 million barrels, German stocks would be exhausted by August 1941. The 26 percent shortfall could only be made up with petroleum from Russia. The need to provide the lacking 1.9 million barrels per month and the urgency to gain possession of the Russian oil fields in the Caucasus mountains, together with Ukrainian grain and Donets coal, were thus prime elements in the German decision to invade the Soviet Union in June 1941. Your own citied report answers your question for you.

Now in 1941, Germany's home production of oil was only 5.7 million tons per annum, of which 4.1 million came from coal liquefaction, by 1943, oil production from hydrogenation plants had expanded to 5.7 million tons, another 4.7 million tons came from domestic and foreign oil fields, imports constituted around 2.8 million tons of this figure..

In 1941 German stocks of fuel fell to 797,000 tons, less than a months requirements, to wage war in Rusiia for 6 month plus everywhere else ment using 1140000 tons of fuel stocks. LW used stocks for 25% all missions flown in 41. KM had only enough fuel for 30% of its needs.In 41 Rumania supplied 46000 tons amonth in 41but only 8000 a month in 42. SO when invaded, stopped its 1.6 million tons a year export.Italy was depenhdednt on German imoports of oil, which were so low, its fleet largley spent the war in port imobolised.

AH "If i do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozney , i must end this war." 2nd Feb 1942.

Hence total oil supply by 1943 was 10.4 million tons of oil, to fulfill the requirements of 1941 only another 2 million tons of oil or 14 million barrels would be needed, since 1 ton of coal generates 1 - 1.5 barrels of oil, hydrogenation plants with the capacity of liquefy another 14 million tons of coal would have met the 1941 requirements..

https://qph.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-6b590c52aa03487f14d33288e29c0610

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...HcAhXDPRQKHTRCAaAQ6AEIfDAM#v=onepage&q=german fuel consumption in 1943&f=false

Now by 1943 oil requirements were most likely higher then what they had been in 1941, however considering that the German Government by 1942 controlled mines that could produce 420 million tons of coal per annum, if Germany had taken a longer term strategy, instead of invading the USSR and instead just focused on building hydrogenation plants, by 1945-46 Germany could have easily achieved self-sufficiency in oil..

AH controlled it because he invaded and occupied a coal rich nation in 41, now you want the coal without invading?, and how much RR use will it require to get the coal to the plants to turn it into oil?. Germany was in war it started and had not ability to end, from 39 onwards, and its oil stocks went down every year till 43, it turned to syntyhetics as it had no other option, because sythetic oil was over twice the cost of importing oil.

AH to his generals on why he was invading the SU 20 January 1941, 'Russia can turn the Rumanian oilfields into an expanse of smoking debris ... and the very life of the Axis depends on those fields.'

Hence the view that Germany had to go on the offensive to acquire more oil is in my opinion wrong insofar as Germany had more then enough coal with which it could easily attain self-sufficiency in fuel, of course both the OKW and Hitler were very short sighted in their thinking and were extremely impatient so I doubt this possibility was ever seriously considered by them.

Yes what did AH Speer and the head of the armed services know, they only lived in the real world and had to deal with reality. they planned to treble syntyhetic output by 44its why its contribution to total production rose during the war, in 44 the allies bombed andlargeley destroyed its ouput.
In March 1941, by way of illustration, General der InfanterieGeorg Thomas, head of the War Economy and Armaments Office, had warned both Goring and Keitel in a detailed report that stocks would be exhausted by late October.

'It is crucial,to seize quickly and exploit the Caucasus oilfields, at least the areas around Maikop and Grozny. In oilfields that have not been completely
destroyed, it will take about a month to resume production, and another month for its transport; the areas concerned will have to have been seized by us by no later than the end of the second month of operation: this includes transport facilities (tankers on the Black Sea, an operational route from Odessa to Przemysl on a Russian gauge so as to take advantage of Russian stocks of tankwagons). If this is not successful, we must expect the most serious
repercussions, with unpredictable consequences for military operations after 1.9.41 and for the survival of the economy.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Wait.

Didn't we just have this thread last week?

 

[Ming]

Wait.

Didn't we just have this thread last week?

No no they are completely different.

This one is about how Hitler made the wrong choice to go to war because Germany didn't have enough oil.

The last one was about how Hitler made the right choice to go to war because Germany didn't have enough oil.

 

[Morgoth I]

In 1941 German stocks of fuel fell to 797,000 tons, less than a months requirements, to wage war in Rusiia for 6 month plus everywhere else ment using 1140000 tons of fuel stocks. LW used stocks for 25% all missions flown in 41. KM had only enough fuel for 30% of its needs.In 41 Rumania supplied 46000 tons amonth in 41but only 8000 a month in 42. SO when invaded, stopped its 1.6 million tons a year export.Italy was depenhdednt on German imoports of oil, which were so low, its fleet largley spent the war in port imobolised.

AH "If i do not get the oil of Maikop and Grozney , i must end this war." 2nd Feb 1942.



https://qph.fs.quoracdn.net/main-qimg-6b590c52aa03487f14d33288e29c0610

https://books.google.co.uk/books?id...HcAhXDPRQKHTRCAaAQ6AEIfDAM#v=onepage&q=german fuel consumption in 1943&f=false





AH controlled it because he invaded and occupied a coal rich nation in 41, now you want the coal without invading?, and how much RR use will it require to get the coal to the plants to turn it into oil?. Germany was in war it started and had not ability to end, from 39 onwards, and its oil stocks went down every year till 43, it turned to syntyhetics as it had no other option, because sythetic oil was over twice the cost of importing oil.

AH to his generals on why he was invading the SU 20 January 1941, 'Russia can turn the Rumanian oilfields into an expanse of smoking debris ... and the very life of the Axis depends on those fields.'




Yes what did AH Speer and the head of the armed services know, they only lived in the real world and had to deal with reality. they planned to treble syntyhetic output by 44its why its contribution to total production rose during the war, in 44 the allies bombed andlargeley destroyed its ouput.
In March 1941, by way of illustration, General der InfanterieGeorg Thomas, head of the War Economy and Armaments Office, had warned both Goring and Keitel in a detailed report that stocks would be exhausted by late October.

'It is crucial,to seize quickly and exploit the Caucasus oilfields, at least the areas around Maikop and Grozny. In oilfields that have not been completely
destroyed, it will take about a month to resume production, and another month for its transport; the areas concerned will have to have been seized by us by no later than the end of the second month of operation: this includes transport facilities (tankers on the Black Sea, an operational route from Odessa to Przemysl on a Russian gauge so as to take advantage of Russian stocks of tankwagons). If this is not successful, we must expect the most serious
repercussions, with unpredictable consequences for military operations after 1.9.41 and for the survival of the economy.

Firstly, Germany did have insufficient oil in 1941 but it was hardly pursuing a continental scale struggle prior to operation barborossa, the shortfall of fuel itself was not about to cause a collapse in Germany and hence waiting until 1945-46 was entirely feasible.

Secondly the vast majority of coal under german control was from mines not located in the USSR, in 1942 total production from Ukrainian mines was very limited, in any case coal production even before the invasion was sufficiently large that increased oil output would scarcely affect coal supply.

Thirdly, I agree it was obvious to many in the government of the necessity of expanding synthetic output, my claim simply is that Germany could have avoided the entire issue of going east for oil if it had just waited a few more years, the naval force might lack fuel, but before June 1941, there was no real threat to german dominance of continental Europe and hence there was no real necessity to be on the offensive against the UK whether in the Atlantic or in the air, both theatres of war that would consume fuel. Germany could simply have pursued a defensive strategy visa vi the UK until it had built up its internal fuel production.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

No no they are completely different.

This one is about how Hitler made the wrong choice to go to war because Germany didn't have enough oil.

The last one was about how Hitler made the right choice to go to war because Germany didn't have enough oil.

How foolish of me

Thanks, Ming

 

[Zinegata]

Now by 1943 oil requirements were most likely higher then what they had been in 1941, however considering that the German Government by 1942 controlled mines that could produce 420 million tons of coal per annum, if Germany had taken a longer term strategy, instead of invading the USSR and instead just focused on building hydrogenation plants, by 1945-46 Germany could have easily achieved self-sufficiency in oil.

Hence the view that Germany had to go on the offensive to acquire more oil is in my opinion wrong insofar as Germany had more then enough coal with which it could easily attain self-sufficiency in fuel, of course both the OKW and Hitler were very short sighted in their thinking and were extremely impatient so I doubt this possibility was ever seriously considered by them.

Yes, but then they wouldn't be Nazis if they didn't have delusions of conquering lands and taking their stuff. An ideologically-driven government is not one that tends to let math get in the way of its ideology.

 

[Holmes]

Firstly, Germany did have insufficient oil in 1941 but it was hardly pursuing a continental scale struggle prior to operation barborossa, the shortfall of fuel itself was not about to cause a collapse in Germany and hence waiting until 1945-46 was entirely feasible.

I just explained to you, your own OKW report showed that your wrong. AH/Speer et al said your wrong. Its a prime economic reason for the invasion. In 1939 Germany imported 60% of its oil from overseas, this was practically all stopped by the UK blockade and US cutting oil sales to Germany. Sythetics never, ever made up the shortfall in oil, of going to war in the first place.

Ribbentrop "The only way out of the suituation, would be to seize more terrortories rich in oil"

Raeder "The oil situation is very critical, the naval requirements have been cut by 50% thus has imposed an intolerable restriction on our vessels"

Secondly the vast majority of coal under german control was from mines not located in the USSR, in 1942 total production from Ukrainian mines was very limited, in any case coal production even before the invasion was sufficiently large that increased oil output would scarcely affect coal supply.

I just explained for you that turning coal into oil was only done by Germany because it had no other choice but to to do it, this should tell you something about its oil insuffieciency, and to do it cost 10 times in 39 falling to twice by 1945 what oil cost for everyone else, doing more synthetic oil requires vast expense, and exptertise, Germany invested as much into trebbelling its synthetic output as it was able to do. You appear to not understand Germany was all war on a global scale with no means to end the war. Your further under the illusion that coal can magicly be teleported to syntyhetic plants on the same infrastucture of RR. Do you know how much rolling stock is required to move your 2 million tons of coal to be turned into oil?. And you have yet to explain the maths, USSR is sending 1.6 million tons in 41 to Germany, twice that in 1940, so your 2 million is actually rather wrong. 1937 economic plan AH wanted in place the sythetic oil to fuel his war machine for 42, ie it took 5 years to increase sythetic output by roughly a factor of 3, one of limits to this was steel, more steel for infrastucture, less for civilian and mil use.

Thirdly, I agree it was obvious to many in the government of the necessity of expanding synthetic output, my claim simply is that Germany could have avoided the entire issue of going east for oil if it had just waited a few more years, the naval force might lack fuel, but before June 1941, there was no real threat to german dominance of continental Europe and hence there was no real necessity to be on the offensive against the UK whether in the Atlantic or in the air, both theatres of war that would consume fuel. Germany could simply have pursued a defensive strategy visa vi the UK until it had built up its internal fuel production.

Germany sought to do that by trebelling its sythetic output, it was as much as it could achieve and it was not enough. Yopur seem unaware that germany was in a global war without the resourc e base to conduct it. Try a young adults education and work up from there. http://histclo.com/essay/war/ww2/eco/raw/oil/w2ero-ger.html

Mich "The hydrogenation plants are our most vulnerable spots; with them stands and falls our entire ability to wage war. Not only will planes no longer fly, but tanks and submarines also will stop running if the hydrogenation plants should actually be attacked".

Ah was not unmindfall of what oil consumption cost in his wars of conquest, Poland France, Netherlands and Belgium cost the Armed forces used 700,000 tons as o[posed to planmned consumptio greater than that, of oil but aquired for the state 8 million tons of oil, war paid for itself in terms of oil. He thought to continue that principle.

Your confusing playing HOI, with reality.

 

[gagenater]

I’ll see if I can dredge up some of the statistics from my previous posts on this exact topic. The long and the short of it:

The generals and admirals of Germany were incredibly conservative about how much fuel they needed. In reality they could have been vastly more combat effective if they had been able to secure much much much more fuel. They made their estimated requests based on a realistic assessment of what could be obtained for them - not based on what they might like to have in a perfect world.

The German war economy needed more or less ALL its coal for ‘normal’ uses - steel, explosives and fertilizer production being the most critical for keeping the war effort going. There wasn’t any significant extra coal production capacity lying around waiting to be used in oil conversion plants. There was more coal in the ground waiting to be mined, but large scale coal mining projects in that era take years of planning, and have massive labor requirements.

Making coal liquefaction plants is a daunting technological and financial challenge requiring vast quantities of difficult to make and operate industrial equipment. Even a wealthy country like Germany well endowed with heavy industry and chemical industry experts found it a difficult thing to pull off. It’s unclear if the process of constructing more capacity could have gone forward any faster than it did in real life.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

I’ll see if I can dredge up some of the statistics from my previous posts on this exact topic. The long and the short of it:

The generals and admirals of Germany were incredibly conservative about how much fuel they needed. In reality they could have been vastly more combat effective if they had been able to secure much much much more fuel. They made their estimated requests based on a realistic assessment of what could be obtained for them - not based on what they might like to have in a perfect world.

The German war economy needed more or less ALL its coal for ‘normal’ uses - steel, explosives and fertilizer production being the most critical for keeping the war effort going. There wasn’t any significant extra coal production capacity lying around waiting to be used in oil conversion plants. There was more coal in the ground waiting to be mined, but large scale coal mining projects in that era take years of planning, and have massive labor requirements.

Making coal liquefaction plants is a daunting technological and financial challenge requiring vast quantities of difficult to make and operate industrial equipment. Even a wealthy country like Germany well endowed with heavy industry and chemical industry experts found it a difficult thing to pull off. It’s unclear if the process of constructing more capacity could have gone forward any faster than it did in real life.

Agreed.

Not to mention the continued outflow of German coal required to keep the high grade Swedish iron ore flowing into Germany.

 

[Holmes]

https://repository.library.georgeto...Toprani_georgetown_0076D_11993.pdf?sequence=1

 

[bz249]

I’ll see if I can dredge up some of the statistics from my previous posts on this exact topic. The long and the short of it:

The generals and admirals of Germany were incredibly conservative about how much fuel they needed. In reality they could have been vastly more combat effective if they had been able to secure much much much more fuel. They made their estimated requests based on a realistic assessment of what could be obtained for them - not based on what they might like to have in a perfect world.

Indeed the size of the mobile forces of the Heer pretty much stagnated, because supply the given amount represented a challenge.

 

[gagenater]

https://repository.library.georgeto...Toprani_georgetown_0076D_11993.pdf?sequence=1

Dang - that's an impressive resource. Here is a quote of myself from another thread, indicating the overall size of the oil and fuel problem that the Germans had in WWII:

The German synthetic fuels industry was mostly constructed pre war, or was pre war plans completed during the war. It wasn’t an industrial expansion at all however. It was diversion. The coal, steel, concrete and expertise that went into creating the synthetic fuels boondoggle in an attempt to achieve autarky was taken from other projects including fleet expansions, materials for defensive fortresses, munitions production and a program intended to electrify and further improve the productivity of German factories. And the whole thing was abandoned immediately after the war because it’s useless except for paranoid dictators (even Stalin never contemplated something so wasteful).

Doubling German oil production as a result sounds incredible, but it started from a very very low base level. In 1936 German oil production including synthetic plants was 74,000 barrels a day. By 1943 (their peak year) this had risen to 139,000 barrels a day. Sounds impressive right? It’s not. In 1936 the US produced 3,000,000 barrels of oil a day, and during the war this was immediately increased to 4,000,000 barrels a day by 1940 and use to as high as 4,800,000 barrels a day in 1945. Total German production of oil is smaller than the variations between months of the US production.

As you can see, German plans to triple synthetic fuel production to ~ 225,000 bbls a day instead of the 139,000 bbls a day it actually achieved is still nowhere within the range of numbers that might bring them to a point where they could have enough oil to be contemplate winning the war. Rather than tripling production, an increase by a factor of 10 or 20 or 30 would have been required.

• An increase by a factor of 10 would probably have been required to effectively combat the allied control of the air so as to be able to fly more aircraft and train more pilots and prevent immediate industrial collapse and defeat
• an increase by a factor of 20 to obtain a strategic stalemate with the USSR by effectively motorizing the German army enabling it to rapidly shift reserves and reinforce weak points (or conversely, have this increase by a factor of 10 only, but ready to go in 1940 so as to succeed in Barbarossa)
• in increase by a factor of 30 to achieve sufficient mechanization to actually return to the offensive after getting on the 'back foot' by starting the war in 1939 with inadequate resources.

Nothing of this sort was even remotely possible however. Europe doesn't have enough coal.

A discussion illustrating how much oil the Germans might have needed to motorize/mechanize the army they used to attack the USSR up to contemporary US levels:

Here's the problem though - you cannot merely increase the number of AFV's and expect that their effectiveness will go up in proportion. You absolutely NEED all those other motorized vehicles in order to make any reasonable use of the heavy armored ones. An armored spearhead cannot break through the enemy and then hold onto those gains if there aren't significant numbers of infantry who can get there just about as fast as the tanks can in order to hold the ground and prevent your tanks from simply being cut off and surrounded. You cannot get significant numbers of infantry moving that fast and that far without a heavily motorized supply chain. You cannot keep getting fuel, ammunition and food to these forces unless everything is motorized from 'head to tail' so to speak. The amount of fuel that this takes is enormous. Now of course at some point behind the lines things are moved around by rail, but in a scenario where you want to advance fast, and for a long distance your logistics are going to have to depend on motorized transport - i.e. trucks. And this is an enterprise that takes up an enormous amount of fuel and an enormous number of trucks. For a good example of this look at the 'red ball express'

These 3 articles are my sources for the below discussion:

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Red_Ball_Express

http://www.allpar.com/history/military/red-ball-express.html

http://www.skylighters.org/redball/

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Order_of_Battle_for_Operation_Barbarossa#Panzergruppe_4

The Red Ball express was organized to supply 28 allied divisions. Barbarossa involved roughly 120 German divisions at the start of the war. 33 of the Divisions in Barbarosa were designated as parts of Panzergruppes, but not all of these divisions were in fact motorized - and even the ones that were were less motorized than the allies would be in the late war era. . Lets assume that the Germans DID in fact motorize these groups as completely as the allies had - to provide maximum maneuvering capability, since at least in the first season of Barbarossa speed was probably the biggest thing slowing the Germans down. Lets assume the Germans were building rail lines out at a good pace and needed the trucks just to go from the railheads to the front (don’t forget that the Germans needed to rebuild sabatoged lines and convert Russian Gauge to European gauge rails for any level of efficiency) – so the 400 miles that the Red Ball Express had to cover across France is actually a reasonable ballpark for the distance the germans had to haul supplies too. How many trucks and how much petroleum are we talking about here to motorize/mechanize the German Army at this sort of level?

From Wikipedia:
http://www.airpower.maxwell.af.mil/airchronicles/aureview/1981/jul-aug/becker.htm


Operations were tremendously effected by shortages of fuel even at the start of Barbarossa. It's just that the general staff planned to 'live within their means' so to speak. They knew that they didn't have access to massive amounts of petroleum fuels or motorized forces, so they made plans that didn't require more than they expected to have. Within those restrictions you are right - it wasn't until 1944 that it became a major liability, but it was a serious planning constraint even in the beginning. A German army that was 5 times more mobile at the start of Barbarossa would have easily crushed the Russians in the first year of that campaign. After defeating the Russian armies at the front they would have been able to take their mobile elements and capture places like Moscow and Leningrad before the Russians could have even raised or moved significant defensive forces to those cities (St Petersburg would have been a different story since it was so close to the front lines already and was defended) The end of the first season of Barbarossa would have seen the less mobile elements of the German army catch up and the lines in the winter of 1941-42 probably stabilized on the Volga river in the South, around Moscow in the center (with the Germans in total control of Moscow) and around St. Petersburg in the North with the Russians holding on to the city for dear life.

TLDR: The elements of the German army consisting of 120 divisions prepared to invade at the start of Barbarossa would need to increase their oil usage from it's existing ~ 200,000 bbls a day, to an estimated 1,000,000 bbls a day to be motorized to the same extent that the allies and soviets were. This doesn't count other formations in other areas, units in training, the eventual need to expand the armed forces even more (German forces facing the soviets in 1943,44 and 45 were larger than the ones lined up for the initial invasion) need for aircraft, naval usage, or anything else.

It takes roughly 1.5 tons of coal to make a barrel of oil. The existing German Coal liquifaction program making ~ 140,000 bbls of oil a day was using ~ 75 million tons of coal a year. Germany produced ~ 2,500 million tons of coal a year, so to get up to 1,000,000 bbls a day (probably the minimum amount Germany needs to have pre war to be successful) they need 540 million ton of coal a year for conversion.

So what gets cut instead? steel and vehicle production? munitions production? or fertilizer? Because all of these depend completely on coal as their input fuel, and raw materials feedstock source. Without vehicles (realistically you need to radically increase production of them too to benefit from the increased oil production), you don't have the stuff that you need to burn the fuel in. Without munitions, they can't fight. Without fertilizer, workers and soldiers will starve to death.

PS: Stick to barrels or other units of volume when discussing oil. The energy and value of an oil is best expressed in volume, not weight. Low density oil products (like gasoline and diesel) are actually more useful than high density ones (like asphalt and fuel oil) so measurements by weight are not very good.

 

[Holmes]

Dang - that's an impressive resource.

This is as well and should save you some looking.
https://www.cia.gov/library/center-...ence/kent-csi/vol6no4/html/v06i4a07p_0001.htm

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

There are certain times in a conversation when it is best to sit back and just listen because it is evident others know something you do not. This is one of those times. Kudos, Gage and Holmes.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Here is a quote of myself from another thread, indicating the overall size of the oil and fuel problem that the Germans had in WWII:

Adding to this, it is also important to remember that Germany suffered from a shortage of both coal and steel. Pre war, Germany took steel from the civilian sector to greatly expand its armaments priduction. Once France was conquered, Europe's third largest coal producer stopped producing in great volume ... France was also a net importer of coal and without Britain providing it, Germany had to provide it. Not only did Germany not have enough Oil, it didn't have enough coal, steel or even manpower to build the military industry necessary to pursue it's war.

 

[Holmes]

How many trucks and how much petroleum are we talking about here to motorize/mechanize the German Army at this sort of level?

Nice post btw, a pleasure to read.

Historicly the Germans had in 39 14% of its ground forces mot/mech, this would fall to 10% in 40 before rising to 18% for 41 to 44.
In 41 this ment 322,000 MTV of assorted types. Of these, 44% were present in Inf Div, principly for logistical use as the inf div were for the most part not mot/mec h but leg horse powered. (20 trucks, carries 120 tons forward lift 200 klicks in 24 hours/40 Wagons 30 tons foward lift 20 klicks in 24 hours/ weight of fodder is greater than weight of fuel. Fuel expenditure in Russia in 41 was 330000 tons a month, 9000 tons a day, planning allowed for 250000 tons.

The German Army was actually two armies, the leg/horse powered 82%, and the mot/mech 18%,this second army, the mot/mech one had 30% of all the MTV.
22% of all trucks were not in Div siz formations but assigned to non Div logistical and transport units. This Grosstruppen gave each of the three Army groups,in the east a logistical forward lift on 19500 tons a day, compared to Allied 69400 in 44 for D day.

So the question what would it take to fully mot/mech the German army of 41, is 170.000 more MTV, problem is of course only 67000 were produced in 41 and 25000 were written of. Each Mot/mech Div had 430 tons of fuel, at its corps was held a further 500 tons to cover its operational bounds of 300 miles.

So a year, theoritical 200 Div force *365*430 is 31390000 tons.

When the plan of Invasion was shown to the logistics department of OKW, they pointed out that they could maintain supply for 33 mot/Mec Div 300 miles from the forward base of supply, but nothing at all for the rest of the army Div. AH counterd this by determining logistics will not matter as the campaign will be over in 6 weeks, so logisticaly it was not a real problem.

 

[gagenater]

Holmes; that works out to ~ 650,000 barrels per day. In my estimate, I added a fairly large addition of trucks to run a ‘red ball express’ type effort with a bunch of extra trucks running a lot of material up and down the roads. That extra effort would allow the Germans to outrun their main rail based logistical effort by a considerable margin. It would IMHO allow the Germans to actually advance far enough and fast enough to beat the Soviets in a single campaign season.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Holmes; that works out to ~ 650,000 barrels per day. In my estimate, I added a fairly large addition of trucks to run a ‘red ball express’ type effort with a bunch of extra trucks running a lot of material up and down the roads. That extra effort would allow the Germans to outrun their main rail based logistical effort by a considerable margin. It would IMHO allow the Germans to actually advance far enough and fast enough to beat the Soviets in a single campaign season.

What is the shortfall between what is required and what was available? One of you is discussing tons, the other bbls; oil management is not my forte.

And, I add tongue in cheek, how close would Hitler have had to come to use directional drilling to drink Stalin's milkshake?