Given that they managed to carry out several of the largest amphibious operations ever seen, over a massive geographical range, this would seem to be nonsense.
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Given that they managed to carry out several of the largest amphibious operations ever seen, over a massive geographical range, this would seem to be nonsense.
This is exactly wrong. The Allies prioritized the production of landing craft over nearly everything else, even before the US entered the war, as it was obvious that it was THE thing needed to attack the Germans or the Japanese directly. Shipping capacity in general was never even a restriction for the allies, although getting it to the right places at the right times often was, given the need to alternately disperse and concentrate ships for a variety of reasons across the entire globe. I'll agree that transport aircraft did not have the highest priority throughout the war. Early in the war, the highest priority was bombers to attack the Germans, then Fighters to defend S.E. England, then it switched back to bombers again roughly when the US entered the war. All that said, there were more than enough transports made and in plenty of time for air dropped forces to participate once that portion of the war began for the allies. The problem was that there simply weren't very many targets that could usefully be attacked via paradrop where the cost/benefit of trying to do it made sense. It takes a LOT of time to plan even a relatively small para-drop, and even small alterations by the enemy in the meantime can rule it out as being overly risky to attempt. To get that planning time, you need a front that is mostly static for a while, so that you have the opportunity to figure out if a drop makes sense, and where, and then physically prepare to do it. Happily, the allies were mostly making gains against the Germans too rapidly for such a static situation to develop very often, and paradrops weren't usually employed.
Sort of.
You can certainly plan airborne operations quickly if you want to. Market Garden went from the drawing board to a smaller less developed plan (Comet) to a full blown four+ division operation within the space of just over two weeks. There were plenty of other hastily planned drops; the German landings at Corinth in Greece and at Primosole Bridge in Sicily, various Allied operations in North-West Europe that got cancelled not because planning wasn't complete but because Allied forces had overrun the drop zones. In terms of valid targets, there were certainly a lot of ideas thrown about, though as ever there was the issue that precursors either didn't materialize or materialized too well.
For the Allies though, lack of transport aircraft really was the big problem. Almost all large operations fell short in this field, both in aircraft and in the necessary ground and air crews. Transport crews weren't particularly well trained initially, and further expansion in 1944 really exacerbated the problem in Normandy; for instance, many had never been trained to face enemy action, or to fly at night. Ground crews were also in chronically short supply, as when the troop carrier forces were expanded, noone thought to expand the ground echelon alongside.
What this meant is that the Allies never had the chance to deploy their full airborne might in a single operation, in a single lift. The largest airlift was Market Garden, with three+ divisions inserted and another planned, but this was carried out over a week. The largest single airlift was Plunder Varsity, the Rhine Crossing in March 1945, and this included just two divisions; all other airborne operations were either inserted in multiple lifts, or were sub-divisional scale.
The thing is, an allied landing on a massive scale was always dicey, but attacking Fortress Europe would really have been practically just as dicey as the landings they did perform. Maybe even a little less, certainly no more.
In Normandy, the defenses stood up reasonably well. They did exactly what they were designed to do, stall out an offensive for a few days and permit an armored counterattack to sweep the landing forces back into the sea. The problems that prevented the German defense from being more stout were structural, and were not going anywhere for as long as Adolf Hitler was in command. Hitler had too much direct authority over the armored divisions, the remaining forces were stretched over a number of commands rather than centralized into a single armored counterforce, and a combination of paratroopers, partisans, the brilliant effectiveness of the XX Committee's misdirection campaign, all magnified the normal disorder that takes place when an invasion is happening at a beach-head near you.
The success of the landings in Sicily, Normandy, and southern France would have been more likely, not less, if the Wehrmacht were covering more territory.
The irony is magnificent of Germany attempting to rely on static defenses when they themselves had proven time and again how limited and ineffective static defenses can be, especially in the Fall of France. the Atlantic Wall strategy might have been the best strategy they had, by virtue of being the least terrible, but it was still a bad strategy, and the structural problems with the armored divisions would have been repeated anywhere the Allies chose to land.
The Atlantic Wall strategy depended on being able to muscle up an armored column to be more powerful than what the enemy could land on a beach in a certain period of time. By 1944 after the massive attrition at Stalingrad, Kursk, and the Eastern Front in general, and fighting the Allies on at least 2 fronts already, German armored forces in the west simply could not be brought up to and kept at that level of strength and without that ability, forced to stretch what armored strength they had over way too large a territory while totally conceding naval and air superiority, the Atlantic Wall was nothing but an eggshell waiting to be cracked.
So to answer the question: A large scale Soviet armored offensive draws whatever Western reserves the Axis are desperately struggling to maintain over to the Ostwall to supplement the defenses and drive back any breaches or breakthroughs. At that point, Normandy is free to proceed more or less like it actually did. The more the Axis reserves its armor in the West the more dangerous its position is in the East. Germany simply did not have the industrial or manpower or material strength to meet the Allies on all fronts, even behind fortified lines.
The Soviet offensive would be bloody but Soviet offenses are always bloody, and the more liquid courage they give their men the more the Germans are going to have to throw bodies into the breach to stop them, and the more they're going to be forced to dilute their armor reserves in the West. In fact that's almost exactly what wound up really happening. Owning all of continental Europe just gives the Germans an even large border to defend, and no more men really to defend it with.
In Normandy, the defenses stood up reasonably well. They did exactly what they were designed to do, stall out an offensive for a few days and permit an armored counterattack to sweep the landing forces back into the sea. The problems that prevented the German defense from being more stout were structural, and were not going anywhere for as long as Adolf Hitler was in command. Hitler had too much direct authority over the armored divisions, the remaining forces were stretched over a number of commands rather than centralized into a single armored counterforce, and a combination of paratroopers, partisans, the brilliant effectiveness of the XX Committee's misdirection campaign, all magnified the normal disorder that takes place when an invasion is happening at a beach-head near you.
The success of the landings in Sicily, Normandy, and southern France would have been more likely, not less, if the Wehrmacht were covering more territory.
The irony is magnificent of Germany attempting to rely on static defenses when they themselves had proven time and again how limited and ineffective static defenses can be, especially in the Fall of France. the Atlantic Wall strategy might have been the best strategy they had, by virtue of being the least terrible, but it was still a bad strategy, and the structural problems with the armored divisions would have been repeated anywhere the Allies chose to land.
The Atlantic Wall strategy depended on being able to muscle up an armored column to be more powerful than what the enemy could land on a beach in a certain period of time. By 1944 after the massive attrition at Stalingrad, Kursk, and the Eastern Front in general, and fighting the Allies on at least 2 fronts already, German armored forces in the west simply could not be brought up to and kept at that level of strength and without that ability, forced to stretch what armored strength they had over way too large a territory while totally conceding naval and air superiority, the Atlantic Wall was nothing but an eggshell waiting to be cracked.
So to answer the question: A large scale Soviet armored offensive draws whatever Western reserves the Axis are desperately struggling to maintain over to the Ostwall to supplement the defenses and drive back any breaches or breakthroughs. At that point, Normandy is free to proceed more or less like it actually did. The more the Axis reserves its armor in the West the more dangerous its position is in the East. Germany simply did not have the industrial or manpower or material strength to meet the Allies on all fronts, even behind fortified lines.
The Soviet offensive would be bloody but Soviet offenses are always bloody, and the more liquid courage they give their men the more the Germans are going to have to throw bodies into the breach to stop them, and the more they're going to be forced to dilute their armor reserves in the West. In fact that's almost exactly what wound up really happening. Owning all of continental Europe just gives the Germans an even large border to defend, and no more men really to defend it with.
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Apologies, but there is way too much to reply to in a coherent sense - some I agree with, some I do not. However, I do think that you have focused far to closely on the 'numbers' and 'equipment' part. War is not just about the 'galloping hussar swinging a sword above his head', but also about how the forces are utilised and deployed. Again, consider that airborne forces can either be used for the small 'raid' style objectives (early war), or at the key point of focus as part of the critical point in an operation (e.g. as at Sicily, Normandy, Market Garden and Varsity). Your main argument appears to be that the manpower should have been distributed throughout the rest of the army. However, this goes against the key principal of warfare of concentrating maximum strength at the key/critical point. The use of airborne forces allowed a relatively small field army to undertake that. Yes, it would have made a more efficient force (on average), but it would have undermined the Allied (and British) ability to apply force at the key point in an engagement (for example, East of the Orne, Arnhem etc.). The failure of the 82nd at Nijmegan was a fantastic example of how a failure to concentrate at the key point of an engagement would mean that a risky operation could ultimately fail.
But this is precisely the point of Mission Command, part of military doctrine that is still taught from Sandhurst, all the way to Command College and further on. A platoon attack is merely a sequence of section objectives, a company attack is a series of platoon objectives, a battalion attack is a set of company objectives and so on. For example, if I were a sqn commander, I would give each of my platoons my intent and a mission objective (SEEK, DESTROY, DEFEAT, SEIZE etc.) and the troop commander would be free to do what he wants within his AO to achieve his objective.As far as Normandy goes, I shall offer a more in-depth explanation of my opinion. What I mean when I say that it was a series of battalion objectives is this; it was a series of targets within the divisional area, taking place in isolation before forces were again concentrated for a divisional objective. This map illustrates my point.
To summarize 6th Airborne's objectives:
- Secure Orne and Caen Canal crossings at Ranville (D Coy+ of 2 Ox & Bucks, later reinforced by 5th Parachute Brigade)
- Disable the battery at Merville (9 Para of 3rd Parachute Brigade)
- Blow the bridges over the River Dives/Divette to secure the invasion's right-flank against counter-attack (Remainder of 3rd Parachute Brigade)
- On D-Day afternoon the remainder of the division lands by glider (LZ-W) and by ship (Sword Beach), and forms up East of the Orne providing a defensive permiter
The point is that there is very little to say this work could not have been carried out by formations of a smaller scale. Indeed, only by the afternoon of D-Day would the entire division actually be committed to combat, before that you at most have two brigades in play, going after widely separate objectives, and without any practical cooperation. Really the only divisional input here is planning.
What is unique and what you clearly identify is that the objectives are all independent objectives assigned to various formations within the division. This is the same mission command, with the objectives and intent being made far prior to the engagement. Yes, the division didn't fight as a formed division, but that was principally because the mission planning part was conducted long before ... you will find that almost no divisions on D-Day arrived as a division and fought as a division. The whole reason that D-Day was such a spectacular success was due to the 'mission command' principal.
Yes, Normandy could have been undertaken without the airborne forces, but it would likely have been a more bloody affair. Omaha was a an example (although maybe not comparable) of how the failure of a single component (in this case armoured support) could have affected the landing. With regards to Market Garden, most of the failings were not really those of the airborne forces at the Brigade or Divisional level. There were many facets which affected the failure - the airborne forces achieved and exceeded most of their objectives. Had there been better cooperation at allied and corps level many of the short comings would have been overcome. However, this was one of the main failings of the Western Allies in most aspects of post-Normandy WW2 strategy and not necesarilly something isolated to the airborne.
I don't disagree with this at all. While the allies did this for the most part, it simply wasn't possible.
Well, yes, but then the British Airborne forces at Arnhem also prevented elements of the Dutch SS from deploying to the other side of the Rhine and further blocking the advance of XXX corps.
Apologies for the curt replies ... little one has been on the nintendo too long. There is a fantastic paper on the topic called "Operation Market Garden: The Manpower Factor" which is included as a chapter in Operation Market Garden: The Campaign for the Low Countries, Autumn 1944: Seventy Years On. It examines the manpower effect on the British Army by the Airborne forces stealing the fittest, brightest men of the British Army. It also examines the Guards fixation on 'large and fit' men and the effect this had on drawing men away from the line divisions. The whole Guards Armoured thing was something that I had not considered before. Worth a read.
My summary - yes, the airborne forces stole some of the best and brightest of the British Army and their reduction in size may have made the average line division more effective. And yes, the attempt at C2 at the corps and army level was part of what let it down. However, their additional funding, the additional training and their selective nature and their ability to deploy via non-conventional means meant that they could achieve objectives that would otherwise unreachable, and could affect the outcome of strategic operations through operational effect.[/QUOTE][/QUOTE]
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I am sorry but there are many studies which support the point that Landing Craft were one of the limiting factors of allied strategy. One of the major points preventing an Allied Invasion of France prior to 1944 was the lack of landing craft to support such a large operation and one of the major limitations to allied strategic planning.
The Allies had no good landing craft design prior to the war. In 1939 they experimentetd with the Higgins design but the real breakthrough was when they copied Japanese designs into the Higgins one in 1941.
The Japanese had by far the best and most advanced landing crafts until then. They even started the war with a handfull of LSDs
Lies .... Didn't the French invent the Higgins landing craft to invade England in the late 12 century? How else would they deploy cavalry onto the beach?
Sure, they were a limiting factor. But was that supply or demand? I would tend towards the latter, given that whilst they were doing everything else the war required, the Allies had to scratchbuild an amphibious force capable of operating in multiple theatres (the Channel, the Mediterranean, the Indian Ocean, the South Pacific, the Central Pacific) on a massive and hitherto unseen scale, and then to move the thing round the world every time they felt like performing another operation.
My argument isn't that one wants no airborne capability, far from it. Rather that one wants a limited airborne capability (i.e., a division+ in the British case, three+ in the American, allowing for the PTO), built in relation to the availability of transport and the operational uses of this force. Meanwhile, the manpower saved from the additional airborne formations can be distributed through other units to provide quality leadership.
As far as concentration of force goes, there never really was one on a scale which my suggestion would preclude.
Certainly they all fit into the wider divisional objective of securing the invasion's East flank. And yet from a tactical/operational perspective, the key bits are all achieved before the division itself actually came into it. The only real input at a division level here was in planning and in attempting to maintain the goals once they had been achieved. My point is that this really shows where airborne forces were useful and were they were less so.
Taking a bridge or eliminating a gun battery by surprise is one thing that airborne forces did very well. In Normandy these were all objectives assigned to individual battalions or brigades; they were small-scale, pin-point strikes, and rested on rapid relief and (at least in theory) on not having to stay in the line for conventional combat. This was the better use of airborne forces, as opposed to general attempts to control wide areas for long periods.
As far as Market Garden goes, I wouldn't see the airborne forces were blameless. Particularly within 1st Airborne Division there were a number of failures in planning and execution. Certainly not ones to pillory Urqhuart for (particularly as he was new to the job), but they do stand out in hindsight as failures. Concentrating the reconnaissance squadron into a coup de main force stopped it performing its intended role, there really shouldn't have been so much trouble getting through to the bridge on the first day, and the decision to stop in Oosterbeek at nightfall was also somewhat questionable. As far as corps level cooperation goes; Browning's HQ was never intended to have a battlefield role, and cooperation between the divisions wasn't really on the cards anyway due to their already overwhelming requirements and their geographic dispersion. Certainly though one can highlight failures in the ground element going up to Montgomery at the top.
Of course it's hypothetical and arm chair generalling (and a tangent noone has asked for), but I have one suggestion that might have substantially improved 1st Airborne's chances, albeit at great risk. This would be to abandon the idea of follow up lifts altogether, and simply attack Eastwards on the first day with every element of the division that had been dropped. The additional mass should hopefully see the whole group through. Two brigades and some divisional elements would then have to hold the bridge for four/five days, without reinforcement, but hopefully still receiving resupply.
It was certainly possible, it just wasn't done. In North Africa 1st Parachute Brigade dropped in and then spent most of the campaign in the line, suffering pointless attrition. Sicily again saw the American 82nd Airborne committed as infantry for most of the campaign. Italy, again, 1st Airborne Division, 2nd Parachute Brigade, and various American units spent their time mostly as infantry. After Normandy the 82nd and 101st stayed in the line into July, the 6th Airborne stayed in until late August. Market Garden and the Winter of 1944/5 again sees an extended commitment to conventional infantry roles.
To take Normandy as an example, I suggest it would have been far better had 6th Airborne dropped into Normandy, been relieved within a few weeks at most, and been replaced by a conventional infantry division which could just have easily been formed from what was IRL 1st Airborne. The only utility of having a second airborne division was if one wanted to perform drops in rapid succession, but this never really materialized. Similarly, having another infantry division instead of one of the airborne's would have meant that it could be committed to the Bulge, leaving the airbourne to train for their proper role.
The only Dutch SS element I'm aware of at Arnhem was the Wacht Battalion. This was a rather atrocious formation that got largely wiped out in its first engagement with British forces, and it's not particularly hard to see why, given that their advance was led by a marching band.
Certainly one can make the point that Frost's battalion denied Arnhem Bridge to the Germans and thereby forced them to take the long way round (there was a ferry some kilometers upstream). At the same time though, I think my original point really stands; Frost and co would probably not have been allowed to hold the bridge so long if the situation elsewhere had been different.
That one is on the reading list. Certainly the whole "large and fit" aspect, together with potential influences on the army administration by the Guards, is an interesting point. I think the very interesting part there though is that "large and fit" is great for infantrymen, not necessarily brilliant for tankers.
Sure, I'm not suggesting that the airborne forces were valueless, rather that their relative value declined as their size increased.
But earlier you said that a shortage of shipping and landing craft was 'nonsense'. Now you are saying that for two naval world powers there was a demand for landing craft (implying they didn't have sufficient landing craft ...). Either I am confused, or you are?
Possibly ... Although then you end up with the problem of only ever having a smaller force available. The concentrated and elite nature of airborne or amrine infantry meant that they made a fantastic reserve force capable of deploying at short notice (due to enhanced training) and punching far above their weight. The moat British example of the Falklands shows exactly how an elite and effective force can completely decimate a similarly equipped and trained force.
That is because you are focussing on divisional AOs in engagements where Bde/Bn level (and lower) objectives were assigned to everyone who participated that day. Again, I think you are getting caught up in maps and people and not ... Even Guderian's panzer corps rarely concentrated at the division level during the invasion of France. The schwerpunkt was a series of Regiment/Bn operations.
That is called mission command. The divisional commander gives his objectives and intent and lets his subordinates figure out the detail. There was no further benefit a divisional commander could have exercised and that's how it should be, right from army group down to platoon level.
Assigned by the Div commander who had been given the objective by his commander ... I don't see how you are using successful small examples to claim a divisional structure was unnecessary? The division typically brings additional assets which weren't generally part of the airborne Division and that is the case eventoday - look at 16 air assault Bde ...formation is very different from 1 Bde.
Absolutely, but they can achieve it when required ... And they are always required. Take away the divisional structure and you then have a bunch of poorly coordinated independent brigades with separate AOs and the problems that brings.
So you a battle doesn't go flawlessly yet still meets/exceeds most objectives. In other news, scientists prove that water really is indeed wet
Certainly there are many things that you could have changed, I even do that with my own experience, considering 'what if I had done that ... What if I was actually there instead of there's.
Sure, but that is how wars are fought and won. The Royal Marines were deployed in Helmand a land locked province with a crappy river that you can barely paddle in during the summer ... FOB PRICE was known as HMS PRICE. It isn't the most effective use of them, but they are therefore be used and without a role for them in the foreseeable future, they are easily highly useful where they were, particularly due to the shortage of trained formations in 42/43..
Not quite sure why I wrote Dutch SS ... I meant to say elements of 2nd SS Panzer Corps. However, most of what is said here has already been said before. Yes there were inefficiencies and yes, the battle could have gone differently, however nothing exists in isolation and changing one aspect invariably invites a reaction. This is one of the reasons map exercises at staff college are so effective and interesting (and also one of the things lacking in the MG planning IIRC). I don't think we will agree what was the most effective/efficient use of the personnel from airborne forces and largely it won't make a huge difference to the overall outcome of the war. I personally like the premise of concentrating your best and ablest into a single formation (Guderian - 'dont feel with the fingers, hit with the fist').
Large guardsmen being unsuited to operating within the confines of a tank is one of the aspects he highlights.
The nonsense was the idea that the Allies were fools for not having an ever greater armada. Certainly there was a shortage, but the idea that this brands the Allied planners as fools is unnecessarily critical.
But at the same time, would one have needed the reserve had there been an additional division in the line in the first place, and/or had every other division been higher in quality? For that matter, would one have been better off with an elite division that wasn't hampered by the light armament given to some airborne units?
Sure. But at the same time, one could have achieved this without the need for a full airborne division (and indeed, did). All the key elements were achieved before the full division had arrived.
Sure, but then what was the division really contributing here?
But in the Second World War context, what were these assets, and where they really necessary for operations to succeed? All the objectives were secured by the initial parachute landings. The division's artillery and glider infantry were certainly necessary for prolonged engagement, but played little to no role in the initial operations, and only arrived once the airborne had already linked up with ground forces, and might have been quickly replaced.
Sure, a coordinating divisional HQ probably was a good idea. But that doesn't alter the fact that it wasn't necessary. Moreover, would it not have been more effective to have just one divisional command, to which various airborne brigades could be attached as necessary.
Which is really my point. There wasn't a reason to have all these airborne units knocking about when you could have had a better equipped formation, at a time when formations were already in short supply. A normal infantry division would simply have been more cost effective, compared to airborne formations which either never saw combat whatsoever in their intended role, or only did so fleetingly. The example of 52nd Lowland Division is a perfect demonstration of this; the formation sat around in the UK training for an airlift that never came, before being redeployed into NW Europe as normal infantry, the role it had originally been converted from in the first place. All the airborne role achieved was keeping it out of battle for a good year whilst other line formations were already being disbanded to make up losses.
Hence the idea that there was nothing additional airborne formations achieved which having just one (or less) could not have. Indeed, a potential structure might have been to have a divisional HQ and assets, then a series of independent airlanding or parachute brigades attached or detached as operational conditions demanded.
My point on the other hand is that having three fists is pointless when you only have two arms to put them on. Particularly when to get a third fist, you are potentially removing a foot and leaving a leg empty.
Again, folks need to take the landing craft issue with a grain of salt. The Allies had already landed as many Divisions on the first day of Husky as they would in Normandy. The landing craft was in fact available.
The problem again is that the Allies postponed the original 1943 schedule for invading France. Whether this was wise or not is debatable but this opened the door for the US Navy to have a lot of the amphibious assets transferred to the Pacific, where the assets were used to chip away at the Japanese defensive perimeter.
The reason why people keep getting hung up over the landing craft issue is because (as usual) people keep uncritically taking the word of the leaders of the operation as fact. Eisenhower blamed production problems when in reality it was his own planning deficiencies that resulted in the shortage to begin with. First, as mentioned he has allowed the invasion to be delayed and hence the landing craft got transferred to the Pacific Campaign. Secondly, the original Normandy invasion plan was in fact a rather bad one - proposing a very narrow front that would land only half the forces that were deployed historically - and once Monty was named commander of the ground forces he quickly revised the plan to include a much broader front landing more Divisions.
The second belated revision of the plan was in fact the main reason why there was a landing craft shortage. The original plan drafted by Ike and his team was in fact a bad one, which Monty corrected.
Moreover there wasn't much point in landing even more Divisions than were deployed historically, because Divisions do in fact take up space and there simply wasn't room to land more stuff. That's why sealing off the Cotentin and capturing Cherbourg - the former of which was accomplished within days of the landing thanks to Monty's revised plan - were actually so important. The Cotentin was a lodgment area where new Divisions could be safely landed and organized before being thrown into battle. It's the reason why Patton's 3rd Army suddenly seemed to materialize out of thin air during the Cobra breakthrough - its Divisions were being safely organized and built up without disruption in the peninsula, whereas all the German formations were being constantly worn down and fought out by both the British at Caen and the US V Corps at St Lo; while those "resting" in reserve were constantly worn down by air attack.
The problem again is that the Allies postponed the original 1943 schedule for invading France. Whether this was wise or not is debatable but this opened the door for the US Navy to have a lot of the amphibious assets transferred to the Pacific, where the assets were used to chip away at the Japanese defensive perimeter.
The reason why people keep getting hung up over the landing craft issue is because (as usual) people keep uncritically taking the word of the leaders of the operation as fact. Eisenhower blamed production problems when in reality it was his own planning deficiencies that resulted in the shortage to begin with. First, as mentioned he has allowed the invasion to be delayed and hence the landing craft got transferred to the Pacific Campaign. Secondly, the original Normandy invasion plan was in fact a rather bad one - proposing a very narrow front that would land only half the forces that were deployed historically - and once Monty was named commander of the ground forces he quickly revised the plan to include a much broader front landing more Divisions.
The second belated revision of the plan was in fact the main reason why there was a landing craft shortage. The original plan drafted by Ike and his team was in fact a bad one, which Monty corrected.
Moreover there wasn't much point in landing even more Divisions than were deployed historically, because Divisions do in fact take up space and there simply wasn't room to land more stuff. That's why sealing off the Cotentin and capturing Cherbourg - the former of which was accomplished within days of the landing thanks to Monty's revised plan - were actually so important. The Cotentin was a lodgment area where new Divisions could be safely landed and organized before being thrown into battle. It's the reason why Patton's 3rd Army suddenly seemed to materialize out of thin air during the Cobra breakthrough - its Divisions were being safely organized and built up without disruption in the peninsula, whereas all the German formations were being constantly worn down and fought out by both the British at Caen and the US V Corps at St Lo; while those "resting" in reserve were constantly worn down by air attack.
Assuming that original plan for Normandy was carried out how would the campaign have likely gone?
I would say the Netherlands, it's far away from Britain, so it will catch the germans off-guard. and also the Netherlands have a border with Germany, so the allies will be somewhat closer to Berlin.
Badly. There would have been insufficient frontage for the Allies to turn the battle into anything but an inch-by-inch slog through the hedgegrows.