If the UK loses the Battle of Britain where would the US concentrate its troops?

[Culise]

I'm not sure if the Fall of Britain would make the US more or less aggressive against Japan. Given concerns by the US government about German hegemony in Europe, it might cause the US to take a more conciliatory role in the East as they prepare for more active intervention against Germany, but it might also cause the US to double-down against Japan to preserve their influence elsewhere in the world (read: China) even more than they historically did. Given that historical Japanese aggression against France after the capitulation of the metropole, Japan would likely attempt to opportunistically slice off pieces of the British Empire in the Far East, likely in the same manner as they accomplished it in Indochina. This would only make the US even more antagonistic rather than less. I'm not certain Japan's opportunism would reach quite as far as Malaya, Borneo, or Singapore, but it would be of a piece with Indochina regarding their long-term ambitions. Even without that, Hong Kong would be both trivial to accomplish and quite inflammatory. Personally, I suspect it's more likely that the US would view an larger power vacuum in the East with even more concern, and view Japanese expansion into that vacuum with hostility mandating a response.

Though I personally consider it rather unlikely, if the US does back off from their policies in China due to the Fall of Britain and refuse to embargo Japan, I think an attack is very unlikely. The attack was only because the US refused to sell Japan the oil they needed to continue the invasion of China, which forced Japan to choose between ending the war in China or seizing the oil they needed for the war from the "weak and degenerate" western powers. No oil embargo means no Japanese invasion of the Dutch East Indies before China falls and an ongoing meatgrinder in the west as they continue to push deeper into China. They'll push hard to cut Western aid to China through Indochina (as historical) and Burma, but while that ongoing aid may lead to open hostilities, I don't think it's as likely Japan will start an overt war over it. On the flip side, a US that backs off this thoroughly is not going to have the nerve to start a fight.

I'm also not convinced that the USSR would fall outright without Lend-Lease, or even that Lend-Lease would become impossible without the UK. Historically, the most significant single route from the US to USSR was the Pacific route, which equaled the combination of both the Murmansk route and the Persian Corridor. This couldn't include military supplies and had to be carried in Soviet-flagged ships after 1941 (assuming the Japanese war does go off on schedule; if not, US ships can continue the route as easily as before), but conveniently for the USSR, key examples of non-military goods permitted through Vladivostok historically included field radios and telephones, Jeeps, and other goods that could technically, theoretically have been put to non-military uses (but probably not). Murmansk is likely going to be less useful than historical for the reasons already outlined even with the US replacing the UK in Greenland and Iceland to keep the part of the GIUK gap open, and Persia will almost certainly never become a possibility without British India in the war. However, Vladivostok will remain open. With or without lend-lease, the Soviets eventually start rolling the Germans back, but without lend-lease, they do this with a far weaker logistical foundation that does not permit the grand rolling offensives of 1943 and 1944 due to a lack of trains and trucks, and they do it while battling earlier and more severe famine due to a lack of food aid. Without any lend-lease, the Great Patriotic War ends up stretching as late as 1947-1948 and ends in a settlement with the frontlines potentially anywhere between the original pre-war borders of Poland (though my WAG would be the Vistula due to its convenience as a geographic barrier). Both sides end the war starving, exhausted, and crippled both industrially and militarily, but still hungry for a rematch. Whether such a rematch actually happens in the 50s or 60s comes down to the sanity of the leadership of both nations post-Hitler and post-Stalin: the USSR is more likely to settle down as per history given the ranks of people surrounding Stalin include people like Malenkov, Molotov, and Beria (less likely the historical Khrushchev), but I have no such confidence about a Germany that includes people like Himmler and Goebbels.

My own opinion of the Great Patriotic War? The Germans are still stopped in 1941 at the gates of Moscow and Leningrad. They still make their southern pivot in 1942, which bogs down in Caucasus before they can even reach the oil fields of Baku. Even if they do still somehow reach Baku and take it, they still cannot get the oil to where they most need it at home. The US as led by FDR continues its hostile policies against Germany, including an increase in shipments through Vladivostok compared to history and the application of their Neutrality Patrol policy of providing military escort for (originally British) lend-lease supplies to those convoys sent to the Soviets through the Atlantic. German raiders, tempted by a lack of proper air cover on these convoy routes due to the loss of the UK, will continue to get into occasional skirmishes with US ships like the historical incidents involving USS Reuben James, USS Greer, USS Kearny, or USS Texas while they try to go after those convoys, making US headlines and putting the Germans in a vise between either reining in their U-boat captains and letting the convoys through, or else killing even more US servicemen (and having more German servicemen killed) until either FDR or Hitler finally makes it the war official.

Either way, when the US officially enters the European war somewhat later than historical, likely in 1942 but probably no later than 1943, there will likely be a lot of political pressure from their Canadian allies and the British government in exile in Ottawa to take a northern rather than southern route. This will stage from Iceland and Newfoundland to invade the British Isles and liberate the United Kingdom, with or without Irish complicity, then follow up with Norway (to threaten German iron supplies from Sweden) and/or northern France. As far as softer routes are concerned, the southern route will be even more tempting than it was historically. This will stage from the US East Coast, an occupied/liberated Bermuda, and possibly-but-unlikely a "borrowed" Canaries to launch Operation Torch to liberate North Africa from across the Atlantic, followed up by invasions of Italy and/or southern France. Given the industrial strength of the US, they could try both back to back, starting with pinprick raids at places like Scapa Flow (reference Dieppe for both rationale and likely outcome) and eventually a full invasion that see-saws German forces north and south to cover threats on both Western axes along with the ongoing war in the East. As with history, the war with Japan (which would have taken off on or even ahead of schedule in my opinion, the Fall of Britain prompting either actual or fears of Japanese opportunistic aggrandizement that spooks the Americans) ends up taking second place once the war with Germany begins in earnest, unless our counterfactual somehow also kills off FDR early; he's too strong a proponent of the Europe-first strategy and has been since 1940 to keep the US out of war forever.

 

[Henry IX]

With a few more years of Purges USSR would have even worse situation with officers.

On paper, USSR could defeat Nazis in 1941 alone. But reality had a pretty bad situation with commanders, officers, a lot of mismanagement. Would another bunch of tank brigades save USSR? No, it would be far worse for them if Nazis could come into war better prepared. Even attacking Nazis first would become a massive failure like the war was in 1941. Maybe worse since they would have to concentrate their numbers on border, making them more detestable.

I'm afraid I have to disagree. The worst of the purges were over by 1940 and the red army was desperately training up its officers to a level of minimal competence after the triple impact of massive expansion, purges of senior officers and the purging of key training staff at the Frunze Academy (the main officer training school). If given a few years the worst of these impacts would likely have diminished. The Red Army was in an unusually bad position in 1939-41 due to its too rapid expansion, loss of officers and numerous reorganisations and the Germans had a major stroke of luck to be invading in this timeframe.

If the Red Army attacked many of the most problematic features of the border battles could have been avoided :

1.The mechanised corps would have full loads of fuel, full ammunition load outs and be concentrated rather than dispersed over long distances.
2. The existing divisions could be filled out with conscripts, rathe than being thrown into battle and destroyed, leaving the conscripts to be formed into new divisions, which were then poorly equipped and lacking a backbone of longer service soldiers.
3. Planning could be conducted at a more reasonable pace rather than the hurried and ineffective operational planning that marked Soviet actions throughout 1941. It was common for divisional commanders to have less than 24hrs from when they received orders to when they were to attack, leaving very little time to coordinate artillery, plan actions and draft orders, leaving attack plans at the battalion and lower levels as little more than 'attack in this direction, starting at this time'

This is not to say the Red Army of 1941 or 1942 could beat the Germans on the attack, but rather that it would be very likely to perform significantly better than it did in OTL.

 

[Director]

@Andre Bolkonsky - I didn't mention that because I think it was a low order possibility. More likely, Edward and Wallis would be kept on Bermuda (was it the Bahamas? I forget) or moved to someplace like Regina. Wallis might want to be queen at any price; Edward, under the circumstances, perhaps not as much. And then there is the matter of what the Nazis might want - they had a history of trouble with kings and so might prefer putting up a lesser noble or dispensing with a monarchy and going straight to a republic.

I do think that even if Edward had wished to be a collaborator-king under Nazi occupation, he would have found he was expected to sign what he was told and say and do nothing; he would be even more a figurehead than previous monarchs. From what I know of his personality he would have tried to express himself or exert some authority at some point, and might then have been 'disappeared'.

This really does get into territory where (despite the above) I'm not qualified to offer an opinion, and don't feel strongly about it in any way. Perhaps I resist because it is one of the standard tropes fiction-writers use for Nazi-occupied Britain.


I take it for granted that the Germans had Allied defense plans; it seems likely to me that most powers knew what their enemies planned to do in wartime. The preferred German plan, however, was to recreate the Schlieffen Plan with a larger hook taking in the Netherlands as well as Belgium. It was only the capture of those plans that led Manstein to offer a different idea - which was rejected by the General Staff and only implemented at Hitler's direct order. So... knowledge of the Dyle Plan mattered, but not as much as the crash of a courier.

 

[bz249]

@Andre Bolkonsky - I didn't mention that because I think it was a low order possibility. More likely, Edward and Wallis would be kept on Bermuda (was it the Bahamas? I forget) or moved to someplace like Regina. Wallis might want to be queen at any price; Edward, under the circumstances, perhaps not as much. And then there is the matter of what the Nazis might want - they had a history of trouble with kings and so might prefer putting up a lesser noble or dispensing with a monarchy and going straight to a republic.

I do think that even if Edward had wished to be a collaborator-king under Nazi occupation, he would have found he was expected to sign what he was told and say and do nothing; he would be even more a figurehead than previous monarchs. From what I know of his personality he would have tried to express himself or exert some authority at some point, and might then have been 'disappeared'.

This really does get into territory where (despite the above) I'm not qualified to offer an opinion, and don't feel strongly about it in any way. Perhaps I resist because it is one of the standard tropes fiction-writers use for Nazi-occupied Britain.


I take it for granted that the Germans had Allied defense plans; it seems likely to me that most powers knew what their enemies planned to do in wartime. The preferred German plan, however, was to recreate the Schlieffen Plan with a larger hook taking in the Netherlands as well as Belgium. It was only the capture of those plans that led Manstein to offer a different idea - which was rejected by the General Staff and only implemented at Hitler's direct order. So... knowledge of the Dyle Plan mattered, but not as much as the crash of a courier.

There was another element... namely that the French reacted to a false German invasion in January 1940, so the Germans could get a much better view of the possible French deployements.

 

[Rubidium]

To get back to the initial thread question: if the UK is magically occupied by the Germans and the US still gets involved, surely the main American staging point for European invasions would be Africa? You'd have to take it first, but that would be a significantly easier task than going straight for anywhere in Europe (especially if some or all of the British and Commonwealth forces there continue fighting). Historically it provided the staging point for invading Sicily, and from there on to the various other Allied Mediterranean adventures.

 

[JodelDiplom]

To get back to the initial thread question: if the UK is magically occupied by the Germans and the US still gets involved, surely the main American staging point for European invasions would be Africa? You'd have to take it first, but that would be a significantly easier task than going straight for anywhere in Europe (especially if some or all of the British and Commonwealth forces there continue fighting). Historically it provided the staging point for invading Sicily, and from there on to the various other Allied Mediterranean adventures.

Without the British in the war, the Mediterranean no longer has all that many allied friendly ports and bases. Egypt would pull out of the war or align with Italy and Germany, Malta and Gibraltar would be occupied or at least isolated.

The allies (US + free French + exile UK) would have a much harder time in North Africa if the med were hostile like that. Not impossible, their navies would be still superior. But harder.

 

[Rubidium]

Without the British in the war, the Mediterranean no longer has all that many allied friendly ports and bases. Egypt would pull out of the war or align with Italy and Germany, Malta and Gibraltar would be occupied or at least isolated.

The allies (US + free French + exile UK) would have a much harder time in North Africa if the med were hostile like that. Not impossible, their navies would be still superior. But harder.

Absolutely it would be harder (even leaving everything else aside, Germans in North Africa would be fighting on one front rather than two). But not impossible. (although probably requiring several more campaigns). A lot would depend on how the UK fell and its results (among other things, if the Allied forces in Egypt keep fighting, the Egyptian government doesn't really have much choice in the matter, any more than they did historically).

If Egypt falls, I'd expect the Allies in this case would probably content themselves with fighting their way into Tunisia and holding it, rather than advancing all the way into Egypt. Grab Tunis and the Algerian ports, and then advance just far enough from their to establish a defensible position against any Axis counter-attack. That would require vastly less logistical hurdles, and the Suez Canal is much less important for a US-centered alliance than a British one (especially if India drops out). Torch would obviously be more difficult, but not impossible, and once they have those ports they'll have a decent position for their navy to contest and eventually control the Mediterranean, and then support amphibious operations in the Western Mediterranean.

 

[LizarDAMN]

I wonder if Italian and Vichy France troops would be more motivated to fight, if it seems that they are on the winning side? Operation Torch might be harder to pull of against determinated opposition and very green troops and very little experience hoe to conduct naval invasion.

 

[Director]

If the British keep control of Gibraltar and Suez, it would be possible to invade North Africa. But it would not fit in with American strategic thinking; the US was dragged, almost kicking and screaming, into the North Africa/Sicily operations by Churchill's persuasion of FDR.

I've been reading 'Partners In Command' about Marshall and Eisenhower, and I believe no force short of FDR could drag Marshall into an invasion of Africa instead of a thrust at England or the Continent (since that's what it actually took to get Torch done). That said, after Torch wrapped up both Marshall and Eisenhower agreed that it had been necessary: American troops were greener than they thought, commanders didn't work out as they had thought and supply and logistics were not a 'solved' as they had thought. A cross-Channel operation in 1943 could have been a failure, a disaster or a catastrophe - but odds for a D-Day-type success are, I think, very small.

So I don't see an easy first step; George Marshall was unmovably opposed to a 'diversion' or 'sideshow' in Africa, and going into England after crossing the Atlantic is just a fantasy. Not even the US could build the ships, landing craft, artificial harbors, etc that would take - and move them across the Atlantic in the required numbers. I just can't see it being tried much less done. What could happen would be a US agreement (arm-twisting or conquest) with Ireland or a US cross-ocean invasion of Scotland. With either of those you have to think you can reinforce faster than an enemy who has control of the Channel and troops in the south, so... maybe, if Germany is stuck deep in Russia, but probably not even then.

The first conception of D-Day was a three-division landing against German 25-50 divisions in France. Montgomery reworked that to a five-division landing with rapid reinforcement. Everyone on the Allied side knew that would only succeed if they had surprise, air superiority for fighter cover and to wreck the French transportation network, good weather and if the artificial harbors and PLUTO (pipeline under the ocean for fuel delivery) worked. Take out the nearby (50 miles or less) airfields, ports and troops ready-to-sail, and the Mulberrys, all easily available in England in our history, and D-Day is impossible.

If Egypt and/or Gibraltar fall (or go over to the new government) then the Mediterranean becomes an Axis lake and will be abandoned by Allied forces. Suez is useful if you are trying to sustain India, but I agree that it is not essential in the way Gibraltar is. What IS essential is keeping the Germans from controlling a cross-country rail-or-pipeline route to the oilfields, of which Egypt and/or Syria are good first steps. With sufficient oil, a lot of things the Axis could not do in our history become achievable.

So if you are the US, what do you do? It depends on what the Japanese do. If they jump (as they did in our history) then the Pacific becomes the main theater, the rescue of India becomes a high priority, and picking up colonial possessions where they are threatened by the Axis is necessary. After that... manuevering with the French to get control of NW Africa is a possibility. it is really the only place you can get a foothold with a small number of troops. Norway is another candidate for a small operation. Both NW Africa and Norway have the potential to become serious diversions that absorb lots of Allied forces without requiring the Axis to do much to keep them.

So... without Britain, the strategic choices in the Atlantic are all bad. Everything the US has will go to the Pacific if the Japanese attack and perhaps even if they don't.

 

[Rubidium]

But that's in a scenario where the US has a ready-made base in England to launch cross-channel invasions, with North Africa having no real strategic value other than protecting the British imperial holdings in Africa (and, through Suez, Asia). Without such a base, the US will need to secure one. Which leaves North Africa as the only choice (barring strong-arming Ireland, as you suggested). If there was one thing the US quickly developed expertise in during WWII, it was the logistics of amphibious assaults. Marshall will be smart enough to recognize that a full-fledged invasion of the UK with no friendly base closer than Iceland (or maybe the Faroes) is a disaster waiting to happen. North Africa (or potentially a series of North African campaigns) can be staged as needed from whichever African ports remain in Allied hands, and once the key ports/airfields have been captured, they can just fortify what they have and move on to the next target, which would presumably be (without Churchill living out his dreams of being Pitt reincarnated) Mediterranean France.

An interesting comparison would be the Allied plans for the invasion of Japan (which had some of the same challenges): securing bases nearby in preparation, invading either Kyushu or Shikoku (the final plan was for Kyushu, but both were considered) and securing the key ports, airfields, and just enough of the island to establish a secure defensive perimeter, and then use it to support the invasion of Honshu and the environs of Tokyo itself. Now, obviously this plan was drafted with the benefit of years of amphibious operations in the Pacific and the invasion of Europe, but it's probably the most realistic model we have.

 

[Director]

I take your points and I am enjoying the discussion with you - there is a lot we agree on. Where it may sound like I am arguing with you, I point out that we have other readers and I am fully stating my ideas for them.

As you know, that is usually the prequel to a 'but'.

So, 'but'.

Going from the strategic to the tactical:

1) There is no strategic reason to invade North Africa. Everyone on the American side recognized that the 'soft underbelly' wasn't, and conquering North Africa doesn't get you anywhere unless you can go all the way to Suez (to cut German access to oil). To Suez... thousands of miles to Suez... with thousands of miles of open seacoast flank on a sea you do not control... North African airfields are out of range of anything but southern Italian targets (for B-17s) so maybe they would invade for that? But a base is needed for something, and North Africa doesn't go anywhere but stalemate in Sicily or heartbreak in Italy or the Balkans. The strategic goal of assisting and freeing-up 8th Army doesn't exist, so... I just doubt it is a priority even if it is tried.

But in any case North Africa becomes a theater that is easier for the enemy to reinforce, with thousands of miles of disposable, defensible terrain behind the defenders, with no strategic target worth mentioning short of Egypt. Remember, there's an American election coming up (there always is) and voters will demand to know why. 'Because there's nothing better' is not a persuasive answer. Southern France cannot be invaded before 1944 without either Sardinia or Corsica (or both) as friendly airbases, which does telegraph your intention... so I'll label that as an undesirable-but-doable option like Salerno. And we all know how well that turned out. (In our history Sardinia and Corsica were not as critical because Italy was out of the war, we had airbases as close as Rome and we had a lot of escort carriers - and we knew German forces were fully committed in northern Italy).

We always want to think that 'they would think of something' and 'there's North Africa, we could do that'. In the face of bad options, I think they might well have decided not to do anything unless they got the French in North Africa to switch sides. Then - perhaps - it becomes an idea worth trying.

Left alone in the West the Germans might have thrown into Russia the troops they committed to Tunisia, Sicily and Italy. Von Arnim surrendered more men in Tunisia than Von Paulus at Stalingrad, so it is not a trivial factor. Without British bombing and American support for a 2nd Front, the Soviets could (I don't say would) crack or deal. Either is disastrous; no European operation like 'Sledgehammer' can be mounted to take pressure off the Soviets, and if they are not fighting then the Germans have all the troops and equipment they need to secure Europe. They are still starving for oil, so the best way to do maximum damage to them is to let them commit to an oilfield-grab and then smash them. In Iraq, probably...

2) Operationally, the Allied island-and-base hopping campaigns in the Pacific were all intended to secure one or more of three things: airfields suitable for aircover over the next objective, airfields suitable for heavy bombers, or ports/ground areas suitable for the navy and ground force elements required for the next hop. No Allied invasion, without air supremacy from forward bases, ever succeeded.

Without Britain, there are no airfields to cover an invasion of the British isles or the continent. Without air supremacy there is no invasion; we had air supremacy in our history and D-Day was a near-run thing anyway. Without Britain there are no airfields for heavy bombers, no degradation of German war industry and transport networks. There is a whopping great airfield ideally placed to interdict any bombers coming in from Ireland (or America... somehow...). It's called Britain, and it already has radar and a powerful aircraft industry. As you say, a Trans-Atlantic invasion of Britain has everything against it and nothing for it.

Olympic-Coronet were massive operations, so large that either the Philippines or Formosa had to be secured for a base before either could move forward. Without that need for a base the US would have invaded over the Arctic Circle route - it is much shorter - instead of going through the horrors of Tarawa, the New Guinea campaign, the fight for Leyte and the atrocities of Manila.

There is no Philippines or Formosa in the Atlantic except for Ireland and Britain, and no Australia/New Guinea/Marianas behind them closer than Newfoundland.

3) Tactically, the Allies needed a dozen or so amphibious landings to develop proficiency and a few fights where they outnumbered the enemy 3-to-1 to develop tactical confidence and ability (North Africa, Sicily, Salerno; Guadalcanal, New Guinea, Gilberts/Marshalls). A cross-channel invasion was viewed as extremely risky in 1944, and D-Day nearly came unstuck several times. A cross-Atlantic invasion by green troops in numbers far inferior to the defenders and without air superiority - well, the technical term for that is 'a slaughter'. The German word translates to 'gift'.


It galls my soul to say it, but without the British Isles as forward bases I think the best strategic move in the West is to do nothing and wait for an opportunity. The second is to jab left and right at North Africa and Norway, knowing that the best option there is to avoid them turning into bottomless demands for men and equipment. Norway at least threatens Britain and Denmark, and opens a sea line to Murmansk.

Just to break it down to the atomic level: for the Allies the essential ingredient is airbases; for Germany it is oil. ALL ELSE is non-essential.

 

[Acheron]

I would expect German defenses to be significantly heavier in occupied Britain and Ireland. A landing in Africa might be necessary, simply to establish a foothold. The initial landing would be the most critical part, once that is accomplished, US industrial might goes a long way to negate German advantages.

 

[DystopianAlphaOmega]

I mean, presumably the Royal Navy and USN have total naval supremacy of the Atlantic. So The US can just do some island hopping (if the territories have fallen at all) from Iceland to Shetland/Faroes, to Orkney/Western Isles/Isle of Mann/North Ireland. From here you have enough air bases to support an invasion of the mainland UK. Also, unlike France/D-Day, reinforcements and supplies from Germany would have to come by sea, which would leave them vulnerable to intercept.

 

[Acheron]

I mean, presumably the Royal Navy and USN have total naval supremacy of the Atlantic. So The US can just do some island hopping (if the territories have fallen at all) from Iceland to Shetland/Faroes, to Orkney/Western Isles/Isle of Mann/North Ireland. From here you have enough air bases to support an invasion of the mainland UK. Also, unlike France/D-Day, reinforcements and supplies from Germany would have to come by sea, which would leave them vulnerable to intercept.

Good point on Atlantic island hopping, though I worry there are few enough islands to turn them into fortresses with a prohibitive costs of invading.

As for German reinforcements, the channel seems to narrow and too far away to interdict well from outside Britain. I think Ireland would be a better target for isolation and invasion. Though I am assuming that USN carrier fleets cannot handle the Luftwaffe, I know they managed to bring down both the IJA's and the IJN#s air force, but against Japan, they had the advantage of grinding the airforces down during island campaigns in isolated engagements, the Luftwaffe I would assume be much more concentrated in Europe.

 

[pithorr]

You could make island hopping with forces of division size, not whole armies, which you have needed to take Britain and France...

 

[JodelDiplom]

I mean, presumably the Royal Navy and USN have total naval supremacy of the Atlantic. So The US can just do some island hopping (if the territories have fallen at all) from Iceland to Shetland/Faroes, to Orkney/Western Isles/Isle of Mann/North Ireland. From here you have enough air bases to support an invasion of the mainland UK. Also, unlike France/D-Day, reinforcements and supplies from Germany would have to come by sea, which would leave them vulnerable to intercept.

Island hopping doesn't work when the islands have one or two airfields each, and the scottish/Irish mainland has like a hundred air fields. You can surprise grab one island but naval aviation based in Ireland and Scotland will attack in superior numbers, overwhelm the forces you brought to that island, and totally shut down those islands as bases within a short time.

That being said... The Americans strength would be fuel, war materials and economy, their weak point tolerance for casualties. The German strength would be tolerance for casualties, their weak point fuel, war materials and the economy.

So the optimal approach, for the Americans, would be to play their strengths against German weakness. Force the Germans to continuously expend more fuel than they produce, and attrite more war materials than they can replace.

This means the Americans should attack as many places as possible even if none of them offer good chances to deliver quick victory. It does not matter whether that is in the Atlantic, around Britain, in North Africa, or in Norway, as long as the Germans accept the battle and engage with air and naval forces.

The aim would be to force the Germans to keep sortieing their navy and air force all the time, thus burning up their fuel, until they run out and cede sea and air superiority over certain theaters, yielding victory in these places to the Americans.

A bit like the Falkenhayn strategy at Verdun in WW1 but what can you do...

Defending the British isles from naval threats requires high intensity air operations so once they run out of fuel for that, the door can be pushed open for invasion.

 

[Acheron]

What about Africa? There one would have land front forcing the Wehrmacht to burn resources. Plus, the Middle East oil fields should at least be kept out of production, not sure how quickly the axis could establish the refineries and transportation capacities to actually use them.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

This is not going to be a situation where Germany crosses the Thames and they capitulate like it was France. This conversation completely overlooks the nightmarish time the British people would give a German force of occupation. SOE would set Britain on fire until she was free once more. And the population would welcome a mass American landing on her shores with George VI riding his horse at the head of the victory parade.

Assuming Germany can cross the Channel. Assuming Germany TAKES Britain and holds it because the US might be in the war fifteen minutes later. Assuming the Germans get into the hills of Scotland and ferret out the riflemen in Ghillie suits while Rob Roy and Braveheart set off explosive and mine the roads because Scotland is not easily occupied. Ask anyone. This is a lot of assumptions stacked on top of one another and none of them is remotely true.

Good luck, you'll need it. How many divisions of troops will this require do you think IF you take Britain? @Easy-Kill what's your estimate, and at what point is the Royal Army and Navy willing to lay down their arms?

 

[Easy-Kill]

This is not going to be a situation where Germany crosses the Thames and they capitulate like it was France. This conversation completely overlooks the nightmarish time the British people would give a German force of occupation. SOE would set Britain on fire until she was free once more. And the population would welcome a mass American landing on her shores with George VI riding his horse at the head of the victory parade.

Assuming Germany can cross the Channel. Assuming Germany TAKES Britain and holds it because the US might be in the war fifteen minutes later. Assuming the Germans get into the hills of Scotland and ferret out the riflemen in Ghillie suits while Rob Roy and Braveheart set off explosive and mine the roads because Scotland is not easily occupied. Ask anyone. This is a lot of assumptions stacked on top of one another and none of them is remotely true.

Good luck, you'll need it. How many divisions of troops will this require do you think IF you take Britain? @Easy-Kill what's your estimate, and at what point is the Royal Army and Navy willing to lay down their arms?

I think that there are a number of different caveats to this question that will elicit different answers.

If you magically transport Guderian's Panzer Corps to Portsmouth, Southampton or Dover in June 1940 with those reserves of munitions and fuel, there is no doubt that it could have conquered South East England. If you magically keep it supplied it can probably conquer most of England and force a capitulation of regular forces in the UK. The Royal Navy, RAF and remnants of the army are likely to retreat and organise resistance while they wait for the support of the 'new world'. Let's not forget that Canada was still populated by people who probably considered themselves more 'British' than British people feel today.

In this case, you start to see why the UK invested more into its navy and air-warfare capability than its own Army (and probably more than the rest of Europe spent on their armies). In this case, the challenge with occupying Britain is that it is an island, with pretty inhospitable weather and terrain. Germany would need to garrison the island to a degree far greater than it did France. The problem is that Germany cannot spare the men; it cannot spare the industry necessary to build the infrastructure to supply them (it already showed it was not able to.mobilise the French industrial base), does not have the equipment to supply them and likely suffers from the stay behind parties. What you probably end up with is a smattering of lightly equipped forces throughout the isles supported by a corps or army sized rapid reaction force concentrated in the middle or south of England somehow. These forces will suffer constant attrition from professional stay-behind sabotage attacks (not the mini militia armies we saw in the Balkans and east). The QRF is likely to be chasing these units around the isles.

My view on what the allies would do, is that they will likely force a landing in a remote location during the dead of winter where they are covered from air attack (long nights and poor weather) in a location which is unfavourable to counter attack (lots of difficult terrain in the North of England and Scotland) and hold this position while over the winter while building up strength. Once the spring comes you then have a well equipped but poorly supported German mobile corps fighting it out with an allied corps of similar strength (similar to the battles in Tunisia). The allies are unlikely to stop the flow of supplies (and possibly even troops) onto the British isles but once there is a substantial (and mostly unnoposed) naval force present protected by air, it will be possible to outflank the German forces up and down the isles. The question for Germany becomes whether they want to move into a transactional campaign with the allies over the British Isles, or whether they abandon and the allies are able to then make another hop to Northern France.

So while it isn't island hopping, it will be a hop in poor weather followed by a build up, followed by a series of hops down the coast to turn and flank the Germans forcing them to commit (and maybe over commit) or abandon the occupation.

Of course,this assumes that a well equipped Panzer corps can land in England and maintain supplies.

 

[Acheron]

This is not going to be a situation where Germany crosses the Thames and they capitulate like it was France. This conversation completely overlooks the nightmarish time the British people would give a German force of occupation. SOE would set Britain on fire until she was free once more. And the population would welcome a mass American landing on her shores with George VI riding his horse at the head of the victory parade.

Assuming Germany can cross the Channel. Assuming Germany TAKES Britain and holds it because the US might be in the war fifteen minutes later. Assuming the Germans get into the hills of Scotland and ferret out the riflemen in Ghillie suits while Rob Roy and Braveheart set off explosive and mine the roads because Scotland is not easily occupied. Ask anyone. This is a lot of assumptions stacked on top of one another and none of them is remotely true.

Good luck, you'll need it. How many divisions of troops will this require do you think IF you take Britain? @Easy-Kill what's your estimate, and at what point is the Royal Army and Navy willing to lay down their arms?

I would say about as many as were needed to occupy France. As for the SOE or Scotland, resistance movements can tell you the price they had to pay. Or rather, their people.