Japan staying out of WW2 and not taking a trip into China in 1937

[Director]

@Dinglehoff - an excellent question. What made those men culpable was complicated, and I'm not sure I could sum up the book in a few paragraphs. Perhaps I can hit a few high points. I urge anyone interested to pick it up, whether at a library or by purchase. It is a deep inside look at how the Army and Navy were run and how they interfaced with the government pre-war - IE how the military sausage was made - and it will help the reader to understand why initial US military performance was so bad and late-war performance so good.

The Army and Navy separately prepared reports on the attack but both were full of whitewash; they were aimed at avoiding blame rather than finding truth. Clausen also suspected the Army report had false testimony in it and was slanted to slight Roosevelt and George C Marshall in order to protect General Short and his staff. His investigation bears that out - some testimony was incomplete or not truthful. Clausen was directed by the Secretary of War (over all armed forces at that time) to prepare a full and true report. He was given extraordinary powers, interviewed around a hundred people, reviewd 30-something volumes of testimony and evidence and made an unsparing report.


Basically, the situation was that diplomatic talks between Japan and the US were not making any progress. The US knew that Japan was living on borrowed time - on stored oil - and that some Japanese response would soon be coming. But whether it would be a renewed diplomatic offer, a strong short-of-war closing of the embassies or outright war was unknown.

US governmental and military officials did not believe war was likely. They thought Japan was a weaker power (true), knew it (possibly true) and would act rationally (false). They also only understood their own viewpoint... Admiral Kimmel even told his officers that Japan would strike at the Soviets, but not this winter - the Germans were pulling back from Moscow and there would be no point. So there does seem to have been an awareness that trouble was possible, but everyone had their peacetime rose-colored glasses on and had a giant chip on their shoulder. Pre-war assessment of Japanese armed forces was frankly condescending and dismissive. They missed the fact that a skilled knife man can carve you up with a butter knife, especially if what you think is a butter knife turns out to be three feet of sharp steel.

It is true that Japan's penchant for a surprise attack was known and that American naval maneuvers had shown that a surprise aerial attack on Pearl Harbor was possible. But against that the harbor was very shallow, the distance from Hawaii from Japan was extreme, the US Army defenses (including airplanes) were extensive and there was a feeling that any large movement of the Japanese fleet must inevitably be spotted. And, of course, US carriers could do it but the Japanese certainly could not... Peacetime routine and complacency led officers in Washington and Honolulu to disregard the signs they did receive. No-one in the US government or military realized that Japan had resolved on war in October and was already moving ships.

The US had partially broken some Japanese codes. Not the naval codes to a great extent, but they did have some success with the diplomatic codes (as Purple and Magic). That doesn't mean they could read the entire text outright: they could read parts of it, after it was translated from Japanese and after they tried to fill in the missing parts and work through the cultural gaps and assumptions. The key thing was that Japanese diplomatic staff were instructed to burn papers and break up their code machines. The former might have just been a signal to the US that 'we are angry', followed by a return of diplomats to Japan and a period of sulking. The latter was much more serious as it implied the staff would soon be unable to move the equipment.

The US had intelligence sections with separate pieces in the Army and Navy and in Washington and Honolulu. Naturally none of the pieces would talk to the others... and there were the usual bureaucratic power-struggles over who reported to whom, so message traffic moved around slowly and incompletely. Plus, again, there was the peacetime mindset: no hurry, office hours only, we'll know if they start to move, they really wouldn't dare, it's the weekend after all.

Repeated alerts were sent to the armed forces and especially to commanders in the Philippines and Hawaii, but they were full of 'may' and 'could' and 'possible' since the code-breaking could not be revealed. This had the effect of crying 'wolf'. Plus there was the peacetime attitude of, 'don't overstep your bounds - wait for direct orders'. Washington thought the commanders had been warned and were ready but the commanders thought they should maintain routine and Washington had to directly tell them that war was declared. MacArthur was as culpable as Kimmel and Short but MacArthur was needed to command the Philippine Army against invasion and was politically prominent whereas the others were not - so he got promoted and they were reprimanded for essentially the same lack of action (though the Philippines had nowhere near the death toll and destruction in the initial attacks).

Admiral Kimmel and General Short took the blame because they let their forces be surprised and got thousands of Americans killed: they were responsible for their men and for their commands and they failed to take precautions. Most of the others on Clausen's list were intelligence officers who were playing power games, taking a long time to transmit information or just not pushing hard enough when they thought it was urgent. The President was listed as culpable because his office commands the military. He thought he had given them sufficient warning but they thought he had not been clear and direct enough. The President was handicapped by the fading-but-still-strong power of the isolationists - no 'provocative' actions (like any change from the routine) could be taken without a political fight.

In my opinion, a great deal of the 'blame' for the Pearl Harbor attack goes to the Japanese Navy, who prepared and executed the operation with consummate skill. Every contingency had been planned out and the actual attack went even better than they had hoped. It was an impressive, truly professional effort that would have been hard for the Royal Navy or the US Navy of the time to match... But the fact is, neither American or British officers took the Japanese armed forces seriously before WW2. As the old Confederate said, when asked why the Confederacy failed, "I rather thought the Yankees had something to do with it." So if we ask why Pearl Harbor was such a disaster, perhaps the Japanese Navy had something to do with it.

 

[Dinglehoff]

Thanks for that generous write up.

That looks a lot like political scapegoating to me. I'd expect something a lot more clear cut to determine culpability. Like someone getting photos or a sighting report or picking up radar readings and being like: "Hmm. Nothing to see here">I sleep.
Or being directly specifically ordered to go on high alert and not doing that.
Without anything clear like that; I'd say the blame (for the surprise) lays in Washington, since people there would be getting the intelligence and determining policy. An alternate course of action also opens up the problems of what to do, if for example US air or sea patrols encounter the Japanese ships or fighters before the attack is underway.

 

[Cavalry]

That looks a lot like political scapegoating to me. I'd expect something a lot more clear cut to determine culpability. Like someone getting photos or a sighting report or picking up radar readings and being like: "Hmm. Nothing to see here">I sleep.

That story about radar is true but by that time, nothing could change the outcome of PH.

 

[Cavalry]

And Pearl Harbor did save the US to declare war first to Japan. Otherwise they would do it like the Soviet in 1945. Hitler also declared war to US some days later. He was tired of US ships escorting British ships.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

@Dinglehoff - an excellent question. What made those men culpable was complicated, and I'm not sure I could sum up the book in a few paragraphs. Perhaps I can hit a few high points. I urge anyone interested to pick it up, whether at a library or by purchase. It is a deep inside look at how the Army and Navy were run and how they interfaced with the government pre-war - IE how the military sausage was made - and it will help the reader to understand why initial US military performance was so bad and late-war performance so good.

The Army and Navy separately prepared reports on the attack but both were full of whitewash; they were aimed at avoiding blame rather than finding truth. Clausen also suspected the Army report had false testimony in it and was slanted to slight Roosevelt and George C Marshall in order to protect General Short and his staff. His investigation bears that out - some testimony was incomplete or not truthful. Clausen was directed by the Secretary of War (over all armed forces at that time) to prepare a full and true report. He was given extraordinary powers, interviewed around a hundred people, reviewd 30-something volumes of testimony and evidence and made an unsparing report.


Basically, the situation was that diplomatic talks between Japan and the US were not making any progress. The US knew that Japan was living on borrowed time - on stored oil - and that some Japanese response would soon be coming. But whether it would be a renewed diplomatic offer, a strong short-of-war closing of the embassies or outright war was unknown.

US governmental and military officials did not believe war was likely. They thought Japan was a weaker power (true), knew it (possibly true) and would act rationally (false). They also only understood their own viewpoint... Admiral Kimmel even told his officers that Japan would strike at the Soviets, but not this winter - the Germans were pulling back from Moscow and there would be no point. So there does seem to have been an awareness that trouble was possible, but everyone had their peacetime rose-colored glasses on and had a giant chip on their shoulder. Pre-war assessment of Japanese armed forces was frankly condescending and dismissive. They missed the fact that a skilled knife man can carve you up with a butter knife, especially if what you think is a butter knife turns out to be three feet of sharp steel.

It is true that Japan's penchant for a surprise attack was known and that American naval maneuvers had shown that a surprise aerial attack on Pearl Harbor was possible. But against that the harbor was very shallow, the distance from Hawaii from Japan was extreme, the US Army defenses (including airplanes) were extensive and there was a feeling that any large movement of the Japanese fleet must inevitably be spotted. And, of course, US carriers could do it but the Japanese certainly could not... Peacetime routine and complacency led officers in Washington and Honolulu to disregard the signs they did receive. No-one in the US government or military realized that Japan had resolved on war in October and was already moving ships.

The US had partially broken some Japanese codes. Not the naval codes to a great extent, but they did have some success with the diplomatic codes (as Purple and Magic). That doesn't mean they could read the entire text outright: they could read parts of it, after it was translated from Japanese and after they tried to fill in the missing parts and work through the cultural gaps and assumptions. The key thing was that Japanese diplomatic staff were instructed to burn papers and break up their code machines. The former might have just been a signal to the US that 'we are angry', followed by a return of diplomats to Japan and a period of sulking. The latter was much more serious as it implied the staff would soon be unable to move the equipment.

The US had intelligence sections with separate pieces in the Army and Navy and in Washington and Honolulu. Naturally none of the pieces would talk to the others... and there were the usual bureaucratic power-struggles over who reported to whom, so message traffic moved around slowly and incompletely. Plus, again, there was the peacetime mindset: no hurry, office hours only, we'll know if they start to move, they really wouldn't dare, it's the weekend after all.

Repeated alerts were sent to the armed forces and especially to commanders in the Philippines and Hawaii, but they were full of 'may' and 'could' and 'possible' since the code-breaking could not be revealed. This had the effect of crying 'wolf'. Plus there was the peacetime attitude of, 'don't overstep your bounds - wait for direct orders'. Washington thought the commanders had been warned and were ready but the commanders thought they should maintain routine and Washington had to directly tell them that war was declared. MacArthur was as culpable as Kimmel and Short but MacArthur was needed to command the Philippine Army against invasion and was politically prominent whereas the others were not - so he got promoted and they were reprimanded for essentially the same lack of action (though the Philippines had nowhere near the death toll and destruction in the initial attacks).

Admiral Kimmel and General Short took the blame because they let their forces be surprised and got thousands of Americans killed: they were responsible for their men and for their commands and they failed to take precautions. Most of the others on Clausen's list were intelligence officers who were playing power games, taking a long time to transmit information or just not pushing hard enough when they thought it was urgent. The President was listed as culpable because his office commands the military. He thought he had given them sufficient warning but they thought he had not been clear and direct enough. The President was handicapped by the fading-but-still-strong power of the isolationists - no 'provocative' actions (like any change from the routine) could be taken without a political fight.

In my opinion, a great deal of the 'blame' for the Pearl Harbor attack goes to the Japanese Navy, who prepared and executed the operation with consummate skill. Every contingency had been planned out and the actual attack went even better than they had hoped. It was an impressive, truly professional effort that would have been hard for the Royal Navy or the US Navy of the time to match... But the fact is, neither American or British officers took the Japanese armed forces seriously before WW2. As the old Confederate said, when asked why the Confederacy failed, "I rather thought the Yankees had something to do with it." So if we ask why Pearl Harbor was such a disaster, perhaps the Japanese Navy had something to do with it.

Claussen was hired to do a job, protect Marshall and the President. He did a cursory survey of the intelligence intercepts in a brief period of time, did not actively follow up on actionable intelligence available to him, and wrote a report specifically designed to criticize decision making at lower levels while omitting relevant details.

Claussen is an attorney who has two areas of expertise: Why the US military high command was not to blame for Pearl Harbor, and Scottish Rite Freemasonry. In other words, he knows how to keep a secret and tell a story that obfuscates truth in broad daylight.

When Robert Stinnet did a review through the Freedom of Information act on the documents available to Claussen and those which he chose not to use, Stinnet - a Pearl Harbor survivor - thinks Claussen should have been court-martialed. His words, not mine.

Regardless, who knew what at the last moment, and who didn't contact whom is irrelevant to the point.

The point on the table is Commander Arthur McCollum's "Policy of Provocation".

The Prococation Policy goes something like this.

On Oct 7, 1940 Mcollum states Adolph Hitler is on the verge of conquering Europe without immediate and direct intervention of the United States. The American people are adamant they will not get involved in another European conflict. Germany cannot pull America into the war, but Japan can be baited into attacking America. McCollum, who was born and raised in Japan, then lays out his 8 point plan to do exactly that: bait Japan into a war.

The Eight-Action plan
The McCollum memo contained an eight-part plan to counter rising Japanese power over East Asia, introduced with this short, explicit paragraph:

It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore the following course of action is suggested:

• A: Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore
• B. Make an arrangement with the Netherlands for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies
• C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek
• D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore
• E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient
• F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific[,] in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands
• G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil
• H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire

If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.



Roosevelt is campaigning on the promise no boys will be sent to Europe while directly conspiring with Winston Churchill through intelligence intermediaries to bring America into the war as quickly as possible. McCollum is directly linked to Commander Rochefort in Hawaii and is the primary conduit of naval intelligence intercepts between ONI and the president. Specific intelligence items are delivered directly from McCollum to the president himself, who demands access to the raw intercepts.

When Will Bill Donovan, head of OSS, meets with Roosevelt the night of December 7th in Washington, Donovan states the president is in no way surprised by this action and was immediately ready to move against Germany first per his agreement with Churchill.

Donovan's mentor, INTREPID, and SOE, have been actively campaigning for US entry and providing a private conduit of communication between Churchill and Roosevelt since France fell. The Pentagon under Roosevelt's every action has been to deny war is coming while preparing in the shadows.

For the sake of space, I won't go into great depth on intelligence warnings sent by internal security such as FBI, the Soviets, the Brits. I'll leave TRICYCLE for the next post. As well as the knowledge Takeo Yoshikawa was transmitting ship locations from Pearl Harbor using PURPLE - and Roosevelt read the transcripts.

So, bottom line:

No one is saying they had a clear radar picture of inbound aircraft they supressed - it is the fact the United States did everything in its power to provoke Imperial Japan then shut its eyes and closed its ears and waited for the blow to land.

Because the United States only goes to war when its attacked, Pearl Harbor is just Fort Sumter writ large.

Why? If America did not join the fray, God help the world. In the world of Intelligence and Counter-Intelligence, treason and conspiracy are just words.

 

[Director]

@Dinglehoff - Thank you, that's generous praise.

Actually there is something like that, though it didn't come out in the Army Board hearings. The secret of Purple/Magic was too critical to talk about, and there was definitely some career-saving butt-covering going on. Mostly though, the 'villain' seems to be the dysfunctional way the Army and Navy worked at not sharing information. As an example, when the full text of the Japanese declaration of war was intercepted and translated it was past midnight and some officers had already gone home. One testified he had delivered 13 (of 14) sections of the text to various officials that night, but he lied. In fact he went home, and the junior officer he left working decided to wait to the morning as 'all of the usual recipients were asleep'. That postponed the deliveries by six hours or so and, with numerous transmission delays, meant it arrived in PH after the attack.

Even MacArthur testified that he considered he had received all the information he needed to be on alert, and Generals Gerow, Marshall and Short's predecessor all said they believed sufficient warning was given for precautions to be taken. General Short and Admiral Kimmel had received numerous messages, one saying 'This is a War Warning' for Pete's sake. But they'd had a spat on November 3rd and hadn't spoken for a month... though Kimmel did have a conference on whether or not to sail the fleet for a few days. His staff convinced him not to do so.


@Andre Bolkonsky - Clausen was hired to find out the truth and did so. A Republican, he did notice how 3 senior members of the Army board had all been fired by Marshall... He actually turned down the offer to serve as Marshall's defense attorney, and his report is clear that Marshall lied under oath (to protect Purple/Magic, but still) and that the Army and Navy badly botched intelligence, improperly supervied by the civilian secretaries and the President. The trail is pretty clear and it doesn't leave any room for secret conspiracies. I just re-read his book and it doesn't provide much defensive cover for Marshall or Roosevelt, aside from noting that the Army Board hearings were slanted to whitewash and based on tainted evidence.

From what I've read and heard, Roosevelt (and 2/3 the US population) thought war was coming sooner or later. But unlike his cousin Teddy, FDR doesn't seem to have been fond of war or eager for one to start - just resigned to having to fight one sooner or later. And as far as his wanting to help Churchill... FDR was probably hoping to prop up Britain and not have to enter the war, or at the least to delay entry until the US was ready.

If you have clear evidentiary proof of the conspiracy, trot it out. Documents, letters, sworn testimony... Anything? A conspiracy of that scope, involving as many people as would have to have been taking part, surely there would be some crumb? Some deathbed confession? Anything?

Anyway - Clausen has sworn testimony and 35 volumes of documentation to support bureaucratic incompetence, peacetime lack of urgency and simple butt-fumbling. You make extraordinary claims of a nefarious conspiracy. That requires extraordinary proof, not unsupported allegations and suppositions. Cite it please.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

If you have clear evidentiary proof of the conspiracy, trot it out. Documents, letters, sworn testimony... Anything? A conspiracy of that scope, involving as many people as would have to have been taking part, surely there would be some crumb? Some deathbed confession? Anything?

So let it be written, so let it be done:

No one said Roosevelt went looking for a war, but he found a war raging around him and could see with his own eyes the threat Hitler posed to the world. What should he do?

I summon Sir William Stephenson to the stand, a direct confidential link between Roosevelt and Churchill during the FORMER NAVAL PERSON correspondence when US was AMERICA FIRST and any suggestion of intervention in Europe was political suicide. His British Security Coordination in New York City was entirely illegal and it took Roosevelt himself to make J. Edgar Hoover stand down against foreign operators on his soil. His hand picked protege - 'Wild Bill Donovan' of the OSS - and he become so close they are referred to as 'Little Bill' and 'Big Bill'. They operate in an entirely extralegal fashion at the will of the President of the United States domestically and abroad. This man's INTREPID testimony provides all you want and more of Roosevelt engineering America into war based on urgent need against the will of his people, not stumbling forward, all while maintaining plausible deniability.

A cursory examination of Intrepid proves beyond a shadow of a doubt Roosevelt's intentions and his willingness to bend the law to do the right thing.

Problem: America won't be sucked into an attack in Europe even with the threat to maratine trade.
Solution: Japan can be coerced into attacking America
Therefore: If we must help stop Hitler, Japan is the path to war.

In chess, it is called a 'gambit'. Just like Fort Sumter. Just like the Gulf of Tonkin. You have to attack America - real or imaginary - to bring them to war.

McCollum designed the plan described in great detail above and privately briefed Roosevelt and worked closely with the Rochefort organization in Hawaii pushing buttons and reading feedback - a classic counter-intelligence technique.

You have a 'Splendid Arrangement' where intelligence sources are monitoring and recording all Japanese transmissions from every American, British, Dutch, Australian port and passing them on to Hawaii. The Allies are reading Japan's mail.

The intelligence feedback allows them to know what buttons to press to enhance the 'Provocation' of Japan.

The end result, Yamamoto's masterstroke using map plots provided by a Japanese spy who laid out ship locations on a map plot seen by Roosevelt creates 'The Day of Infamy' which hurled America into the war loaded for bear.

Karl Haushofer's Tri-partate Alliance was turned against itself. Japan's attack allows America to move against Germany immediately with Japan as an afterthought after Germany conveniently DOW'd America the following day.

I repeat, who is going to stop Hitler? The Russians alone? Not bloody likely in the fall of '41. We are discussing good and patriotic men who are willing to break laws to do the right thing. They were good men who made a hard decision to save the world, and God bless them for it.

Final thought: Treason never prospers, because if it prospers none dare call it treason. World War II was America's high point in world history, so any illegal actions to bring about a good deed are covered up like the true identity of the Man Who Shot Liberty Valance.

 

[DarthJF]

Not having checked any of the discussion outside of OP. Japanese Empire would have inevitably crumbled for few reasons.

First is that China developed rapidly during the Nanjing decade which was cut short by the Japanese invasion in 1937. Already by 37 China proved not to be the pushover Japanese had expected them to be and the war turned into a stalemate. Give Chiang another decade to continue industrialisation, root out communists and rein in warlords and China will be able to stand up to Japan. When that happens war over Manchukuo becomes only a matter of time.

Second issue is that assuming things go historically in Europe, Japan would find itself with colonial empire in a world where colonial empires were going out of fashion. Manchukuo was an artificial state that was to be heavily populated by Japanese settlers, so perhaps it wouldn't have been an issue there, but Korean nationalism would only be growing stronger with the emergence of anti-colonial movements around the world. Sooner or later Japanese would find themselves spending huge amount of resources trying to keep things in Korea from boiling over. Resistance to Japanese rule in Taiwan was always lighter than in Korea because Taiwanese didn't have strong identity at the time, so maybe things wouldn't have been as bad over there, but I would still expect some trouble.

Third is that Japan in 1937 was a mess. The economy had taken a dive during the Great Recession, which was the reason why militarists were running rampant in the first place, and Japan would find itself politically and economically isolated in a world where fascist powers of Europe had been defeated. No major war to focus their enegies on would most likely mean they'd be preoccupied with domestic crises and power stuggles. Economy would remain geared towards the idea of self-sufficiency and focused on internal trade between the mainland, Manchukuo, Korea and Taiwan. As the empire shields itself from international competition with high tariffs it misses the post-war boom in rest of the world.

All this would inevitably result in a major war between China and Japan over Manchukuo and Japan most likely losing Manchukuo to China and Korea becoming independent. Maybe they could have kept Taiwan thanks to maintaining naval superiority. After that the empire would be gone and humiliated Japan would either go through a communist revolution or having to re-integrate itself with the capitalist world economy.

 

[Culise]

Problem: America won't be sucked into an attack in Europe even with the threat to maratine trade.
Solution: Japan can be coerced into attacking America
Therefore: If we must help stop Hitler, Japan is the path to war.

Problem with your fundamental premise here: attacking Japan does not automatically result in stopping Hitler. It results in stopping Hirohito. Recall, in 1939-1941, Japan systematically ignored all calls to war by Hitler. When Germany invaded France and the UK, Japan didn't follow. When Germany invaded the USSR, Japan didn't follow. They did even less than the USSR, which cleaned up the eastern half as a part of their quiet deal to partition the country. In fact, Japan went even further and invaded a German-friendly nation that was supplying them with critical stores of tungsten and hosting a German military mission (say what you will about Chiang, but it's a rare person who could balance military aid from the Germans, Soviets, and Allies). Germany is not exactly any more honorable, either, signing an anti-Soviet alliance with Japan and then signing an agreement with the Soviets; there's no indication that Germany will be any more honorable about the Tripartite Pact than they were about the Anti-Comintern Pact. There is no real reason to believe that an attack on Japan would result in Germany attacking the US, and every reason to believe that any war between the US and Japan alone would prove a massive distraction from Roosevelt's primary focus in 1941: Germany.

If you want to see how Roosevelt wanted war with Germany, just look at his actual policies that we have clear and present evidence for from the highest to the lowest levels. The Neutrality Patrols were established immediately in 1939 and systematically pushed eastward across the Atlantic in 1941 with active US-British cooperation on tracking and hunting U-boats. This is where Roosevelt's cause for war would have appeared. He didn't even need to declare war: the US was already acting as a belligerent power in all but name. His bloody flag came with the Reuben James, but unfortunately, it was preempted by Pearl Harbor a week later and forced him into a war on the wrong side of the world. If it hadn't, there would have been more Reuben James, more Greers, and more U-652s, until either American public opinion went over the brink into denouncing German aggression or Hitler lost patience and declared war on his own. If after Pearl Harbor, Hitler had simply laughed and let the US and Japanese fight each other while he got on with his own eastern war, Roosevelt would have been rather pressed politically at home when it came to pushing the Germans while simultaneously fighting an active war in the Pacific. Japan-first advocates were already rather influential and the position was politically popular at home, and the US historically devoted more resources to the Pacific until 1944 in spite of FDR's intentions. They would have been even more the case without an active war with Germany to provide the reason for more Germany-first advocates to coalesce openly behind FDR. He likely still would have gotten his war as long as Lend-Lease continued to the USSR via Atlantic routes the Germans could interdict, but it would have been in spite rather than thanks to the Japanese.

 

[JodelDiplom]

Problem with your fundamental premise here: attacking Japan does not automatically result in stopping Hitler. It results in stopping Hirohito. Recall, in 1939-1941, Japan systematically ignored all calls to war by Hitler. When Germany invaded France and the UK, Japan didn't follow. When Germany invaded the USSR, Japan didn't follow. They did even less than the USSR, which cleaned up the eastern half as a part of their quiet deal to partition the country. In fact, Japan went even further and invaded a German-friendly nation that was supplying them with critical stores of tungsten and hosting a German military mission (say what you will about Chiang, but it's a rare person who could balance military aid from the Germans, Soviets, and Allies). Germany is not exactly any more honorable, either, signing an anti-Soviet alliance with Japan and then signing an agreement with the Soviets; there's no indication that Germany will be any more honorable about the Tripartite Pact than they were about the Anti-Comintern Pact. There is no real reason to believe that an attack on Japan would result in Germany attacking the US, and every reason to believe that any war between the US and Japan alone would prove a massive distraction from Roosevelt's primary focus in 1941: Germany.

If you want to see how Roosevelt wanted war with Germany, just look at his actual policies that we have clear and present evidence for from the highest to the lowest levels. The Neutrality Patrols were established immediately in 1939 and systematically pushed eastward across the Atlantic in 1941 with active US-British cooperation on tracking and hunting U-boats. This is where Roosevelt's cause for war would have appeared. He didn't even need to declare war: the US was already acting as a belligerent power in all but name. His bloody flag came with the Reuben James, but unfortunately, it was preempted by Pearl Harbor a week later and forced him into a war on the wrong side of the world. If it hadn't, there would have been more Reuben James, more Greers, and more U-652s, until either American public opinion went over the brink into denouncing German aggression or Hitler lost patience and declared war on his own. If after Pearl Harbor, Hitler had simply laughed and let the US and Japanese fight each other while he got on with his own eastern war, Roosevelt would have been rather pressed politically at home when it came to pushing the Germans while simultaneously fighting an active war in the Pacific. Japan-first advocates were already rather influential and the position was politically popular at home, and the US historically devoted more resources to the Pacific until 1944 in spite of FDR's intentions. They would have been even more the case without an active war with Germany to provide the reason for more Germany-first advocates to coalesce openly behind FDR. He likely still would have gotten his war as long as Lend-Lease continued to the USSR via Atlantic routes the Germans could interdict, but it would have been in spite rather than thanks to the Japanese.

That's hardly a conclusive argument. The neutrality patrols are not the result of warmongering by FDR, they are the result of the United States seeing itself as a top naval power and seeing the western Atlantic (and the eastern pacific) as their ocean, their backyard, their must-control ocean, no matter what goes on in the world, no matter whether the USA are formally at war or at peace. This is just a logical part of the United States self image as a top naval power of the world. See White Fleet, Washington Naval Treaty, and other aspects of US foreign policy dating back way before FDR.

No US administration could just sit by as the Atlantic is turned into a war zone, and restrict the US Navy to patrols just along the eastern sea board and let the RN and German Navy duke it out all across the Atlantic because a strict reading of 19th century neutrality laws would dictate that. It would mean surrendering the role of a top naval power and all that stems from that

 

[Culise]

That's hardly a conclusive argument. The neutrality patrols are not the result of warmongering by FDR, they are the result of the United States seeing itself as a top naval power and seeing the western Atlantic (and the eastern pacific) as their ocean, their backyard, their must-control ocean, no matter what goes on in the world, no matter whether the USA are formally at war or at peace. This is just a logical part of the United States self image as a top naval power of the world. See White Fleet, Washington Naval Treaty, and other aspects of US foreign policy dating back way before FDR.

No US administration could just sit by as the Atlantic is turned into a war zone, and restrict the US Navy to patrols just along the eastern sea board and let the RN and German Navy duke it out all across the Atlantic because a strict reading of 19th century neutrality laws would dictate that. It would mean surrendering the role of a top naval power and all that stems from that

I have no objection to that argument, either, and I concede the point. I do consider the argument I presented that you quote as the most uncharitable possible assertion of Roosevelt's policy. Whether we assert it as FDR trying intentionally to spark a war with Germany or an assertion of the US's strength as the second most powerful (later most powerful) fleet in the world to keep the goods moving based in US policy going back a century, it still contrasts significantly with what we have supporting the argument Andre presents regarding an intentional conspiracy to invade Germany by provoking Japan.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Andre presents regarding an intentional conspiracy to invade Germany by provoking Japan.

Andre presents an argument culled from the US Navy's Office of Naval Intelligence through the Freedom of Information Act which was entirely unknown until the statute of limitations expired.

In the posts above, I provided a tremendous amount of detail regarding an intelligence operation run by Commander McCollum who regularly met privately with Roosevelt and the Rochefort intel operation in Pearl Harbor. The premise of ONI's operation stated without question the US would not be pulled indirectly into another European war via Lusitaniazation similar to your able descriptions above. It would require a direct attack upon America or her territories, and Japan could be induced to do so.

A series of 8 provocations were conceived by a US intelligence officer born and bred in Japan, written and was begin to be implemented in October of 1940. All 8 points are demonstatably implemented through executive order.

The end result is a direct attack upon US forces by Japan. The next day Hitler declares war.

Enraged, America rises from its bed and grapples with Hitler first, Tojo second; as per the telling of every history of WWII written.

Sounds like a very, very effective operation to me. No?

 

[Avernite]

The Eight-Action plan
The McCollum memo contained an eight-part plan to counter rising Japanese power over East Asia, introduced with this short, explicit paragraph:

It is not believed that in the present state of political opinion the United States government is capable of declaring war against Japan without more ado; and it is barely possible that vigorous action on our part might lead the Japanese to modify their attitude. Therefore the following course of action is suggested:

• A: Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore
• B. Make an arrangement with the Netherlands for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies
• C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek
• D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore
• E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient
• F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific[,] in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands
• G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil
• H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire

If by these means Japan could be led to commit an overt act of war, so much the better. At all events we must be fully prepared to accept the threat of war.

So for the peanut gallery, which of these were actually done? Given the ramshackle nature of the ABDA taskforces and the Philippines themselves, I see only C, F, G and H - i.e. the less directly militarily provocative. Did the others happen?

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

So for the peanut gallery, which of these were actually done? Given the ramshackle nature of the ABDA taskforces and the Philippines themselves, I see only C, F, G and H - i.e. the less directly militarily provocative. Did the others happen?

My pleasure, good sir; thank you for asking:

The 8 Point Plan:

• A: Make an arrangement with Britain for the use of British bases in the Pacific, particularly Singapore
• B. Make an arrangement with the Netherlands for the use of base facilities and acquisition of supplies in the Dutch East Indies
• C. Give all possible aid to the Chinese government of Chiang-Kai-Shek
• D. Send a division of long range heavy cruisers to the Orient, Philippines, or Singapore
• E. Send two divisions of submarines to the Orient
• F. Keep the main strength of the U.S. fleet now in the Pacific[,] in the vicinity of the Hawaiian Islands
• G. Insist that the Dutch refuse to grant Japanese demands for undue economic concessions, particularly oil
• H. Completely embargo all U.S. trade with Japan, in collaboration with a similar embargo imposed by the British Empire

McCollum conceives of this strategy in Oct '40 based on his intimate knowledge of Japan and her internal reactions to US policy to this point:

A / B - Reflects the 'Splendid Arrangement' where the intelligence networks and listening posts around the Pacific Rim in control of our allies forward all intelligence to the US codebreakers, thereby 'wiring Japan for sound'. As intelligence relevant to ULTRA was flowing to Bletchley Park, so all PURPLE/MAGIC traffic flows to Pearl. The main battle fleet is not pushed forward beyond Pearl but the possibility exists.
C - '40 and '41, Roosevelt formalizes aid to China
D - USS Houston, a modern US heavy cruiser, and CL Boise and Marblehead are tranferred from the Flag of the Pearl fleet to become the Flag of the Phillipines squadron
E - Submarine Squadron 2, 12x Salmon class SS; Sub squadron 5, 11 x porpoise/sargo class SS; 4x porpoise/sargo w/ long range sub tender based at Naval Station Sangley Point, Cavite, Manila Bay.
F - Roosevelt orders the US Navy's Pacific Fleet to rebased from San Diego to Pearl Harbor in fall of '40 - the Colorado BB's, the pride of the fleet, are left behind
G - You know the Dutch relations with Japan better than I, but the Dutch (and Brits) mirror US actions to maximize provocation
H -

• 1940: July 31, exports of aviation motor fuels and lubricants and No. 1 heavy melting iron and steel scrap were restricted.
• October 16, “all exports of scrap iron and steel to destinations other than Britain and the nations of the Western Hemisphere.”
• July 26, 1941, Roosevelt “froze Japanese assets in the United States, thus bringing commercial relations between the nations to an effective end.
• Aug 7th, embargo on the export of such grades of oil as still were in commercial flow to Japan. The British and the Dutch followed suit, embargoing exports to Japan from their colonies in southeast Asia.

This places Japan in an untenable economic position attempting to fight a war without access to oil and iron, demanding a reply. The Empire of Japan is now on the horns of the dilemma.

The extended Japanese long term militiary planning and training of the naval aviators of the Kido Butai planning to attack the US fleet is well documented, but for if anyone needs the background fleshed out I'll pull @Graf Zeppelin encyclopedic knowledge of the Japanese fleet to bear.

November 5, 1941 - Hirohito, despite his own misgivings, approves moving forward with the plan after it is fully vetted by the Army
November 26, Kido Butai sails
Dec 1, '41 - Approval is given for the strike

Dec 7, Pearl Harbor
Dec 8, US DOWs Japan
Dec 11, Hitler DOWs the US

The US marches against Hitler AND mount offensives built around their new Fast CV carrier groups simoultaneously, but by all accounts the strategy is termed 'Hitler First'.

Sidenote: Stalin - operating on intelligence from Richard Sorge (RAMSAY), a journalist working for Russian intelligence who had been ordered to join the Nazi party early in its existence later based in Tokyo - begins moving Soviet Far East units in Oct/Nov to be in place in time for Zukov's counterattacks beginning on Dec 5, '41. Sorge is captured, tortured, and executed soon after transmitting the data regarding the Japanese intentions in the Pacific.

Sorge has been credited with helping save Moscow, and was awarded a Hero of the Soviet Union posthumously after the war.

The fact the Japanese are 'Coming to America' is a secret to no one, the only question is when.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Given the ramshackle nature of the ABDA taskforces and the Philippines themselves.

Well yes and no, on paper the US had a major and capable force on the PI. Considering on how much they underestimated the Japanese more than capable enough to hold the Japanese off untill the US fleet arrives.
However the US warplan fell apart 5 minutes into the war and put the US Pacific forces into dissaray in two weeks.

The US navy underestimated Japan so much that they assumed they still use biplanes on their carriers.

 

[DarthJF]

The US navy underestimated Japan so much that they assumed they still use biplanes on their carriers.

I watched one of the pre-war British travel films about Singapore a while back and couldn't help but chuckle a bit when the film mentioned how Singapore hosts "the finest airforce in the Far East".

In hindsight it's pretty hilarious how much the British and Americans took their superiority against Japan for granted. Too bad they had to learn their mistake the hard way.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Well yes and no, on paper the US had a major and capable force on the PI. Considering on how much they underestimated the Japanese more than capable enough to hold the Japanese off untill the US fleet arrives.
However the US warplan fell apart 5 minutes into the war and put the US Pacific forces into dissaray in two weeks.

The US navy underestimated Japan so much that they assumed they still use biplanes on their carriers.

I watched one of the pre-war British travel films about Singapore a while back and couldn't help but chuckle a bit when the film mentioned how Singapore hosts "the finest airforce in the Far East".

In hindsight it's pretty hilarious how much the British and Americans took their superiority against Japan for granted. Too bad they had to learn their mistake the hard way.

I completely agree the professionalism of the Japanese Naval Aviators, the systematic tactics used, and their inventiveness illustrated for example by using wooden fins on Long Lance torpedos to allow them to function in a shallow harbor are exemplary. A textbook tactical strike ordered by a strategic genius forced to start a war he never wanted. Yamamoto, there is a reason the US jeopardized their intelligence network to eliminate him from the equation.

And to be perfectly frank, the charges brought by @Director and @Kovax regarding incometence, professional infighting, and a peace time mentality hamstring US forces on the ground are entirely valid.

It becomes a perfect storm of outrage and reaction; someone has to swing, and it won't be Roosevelt.

 

[Easy-Kill]

I watched one of the pre-war British travel films about Singapore a while back and couldn't help but chuckle a bit when the film mentioned how Singapore hosts "the finest airforce in the Far East".

In hindsight it's pretty hilarious how much the British and Americans took their superiority against Japan for granted. Too bad they had to learn their mistake the hard way.

In fairness, they were superior. Japan's military endeavours ended in the fiery nuclear hell of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan chose to attack using her strongest forces, at the peak of their preparation; against the allies at their weakest and least prepared point in time and in space. The Japanese very quickly reached the limit of their advance and subjugated East Asia to a brutal regime of murder and death, while the western allies marshalled the resources and equipment necessary to beat them. And beat them they did - Imperial Japan was obliterated, their entire way of life was destroyed.

Superior indeed. I would argue that it was Japan that learned of allied superiority the hard way.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

In fairness, they were superior. Japan's military endeavours ended in the fiery nuclear hell of Hiroshima and Nagasaki. Japan chose to attack using her strongest forces, at the peak of their preparation; against the allies at their weakest and least prepared point in time and in space. The Japanese very quickly reached the limit of their advance and subjugated East Asia to a brutal regime of murder and death, while the western allies marshalled the resources and equipment necessary to beat them. And beat them they did - Imperial Japan was obliterated, their entire way of life was destroyed.

Superior indeed. I would argue that it was Japan that learned of allied superiority the hard way.

Yamamoto called it; he said he would run wild for a year, after that he had no expectation of victory if the war continued. I have a great deal of respect for that particular man, despite him being the enemy of my people.

 

[bz249]

Yamamoto called it; he said he would run wild for a year, after that he had no expectation of victory if the war continued. I have a great deal of respect for that particular man, despite him being the enemy of my people.

On the other hand he lost against the US Navy as of 07.12.1941 (ok, the USS South Dakota was not in service, but already in a quite advanced state). The rest was required to mop the rest up.