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Tsavong

First Lieutenant
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Nov 24, 2010
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In 1917 after the first russian revolution of the first world war , powers took over in the russian empire that are often considered to day as democratic.
Those powers pushed for an continued war against Germany ,Austria and there partners.
I read some books (probably a lot) about those war, but one question actually remains for me: Was this decision, the decision for the kerensky offensive, without alternative? Was there any option for that new russia to not fall into a next revolution? Any serious option for an not soviet russia after the first world war, thats also not authoritarian , but democratic.

What do you think?
 
The path of the Bolsheviks was uncontested.
The forces of the Provisional Government turned out to be extremely small and they could not defend their status, except for local skirmishes in the village of Gatchina near Petrograd.
In Petrograd, only the Women's Battalion of Death remained loyal.
 
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THE PROPHECY OF THE FATHER OF RUSSIAN MARXISM

Robespierre's fate is known. Lenin's fate will not be the best. But I don't wish him the fate of Robespierre. Let Lenin live to see the time when he will clearly understand the fallacy of his tactics and shudder at what he has done.

The path of the Bolsheviks, no matter how short or long it may be, will inevitably be vividly colored by falsification of history, crimes, lies, demagoguery and dishonest deeds.
Everything that has been said about the Bolsheviks - their tactics, their ideology, their approach to expropriation, their unlimited terror - allows us to say with confidence: the collapse of the Bolsheviks is inevitable. The terror that the Bolsheviks hope for is the power of the bayonet. I admit the idea that Lenin, relying on total terror, will emerge victorious from the Civil War, which he so stubbornly strives for. In this case, Bolshevik Russia will find itself in political and economic isolation and will inevitably turn into a military camp, where citizens will be frightened by imperialism and fed with promises.

But sooner or later the time will come when the fallacy of Lenin's ideas will become obvious to everyone - and then Bolshevik socialism will collapse like a house of cards...
The future of Russia will largely be determined by the duration of the Bolsheviks' stay in power. Sooner or later it will return to the natural path of development, but the longer the Bolshevik dictatorship lasts, the more painful this return will be...
A country cannot be great while its citizens are poor. The wealth of citizens is the wealth of the state. The true greatness of a country is determined not by its territory or even by its history, but by democratic traditions and the standard of living of citizens. As long as citizens are poor, as long as there is no democracy, the country is not guaranteed from social upheavals and even from disintegration." - G.V. Plekhanov

XBaivUtYF6Tn66gH0FMjXbou3LzcwS_-Y2ouPfRVAszONc10i36hvFE99kmeSEfVtZLylAsB.jpg
 
In 1917 after the first russian revolution of the first world war , powers took over in the russian empire that are often considered to day as democratic.
Those powers pushed for an continued war against Germany ,Austria and there partners.
I read some books (probably a lot) about those war, but one question actually remains for me: Was this decision, the decision for the kerensky offensive, without alternative? Was there any option for that new russia to not fall into a next revolution? Any serious option for an not soviet russia after the first world war, thats also not authoritarian , but democratic.

What do you think?
Kerensky did not need to launch the offensive. He could have reached an accommodation with the Germans, as the Bolsheviks later did, but he also could have just... not done the offensive.

He thought that a successful offensive would knock Germany out of the war, so the logical conclusion is that Germany is close to losing the war - which was pretty near to the case in the summer of 1917.

The failure of the offensive wiped out whatever faith remained in his government - the attempted autogolpe didn't help, nor did Kerensky's many other failings - but he wanted to pre-empt the convening of the General Assembly and have a big win coming into that.

Ultimately, he was seeking to control the country and sought to use a military victory to do so. But it was a ridiculous gamble on its face - Russia had fought hard, but had lost pretty much every major battle. With the disorganization caused by the emergence of Soviets and the fall of the Czardom, the Kerensky offensive was a silly thing to do. He would have been better served by trying to salvage the fighting forces, fix supply chain problems, and lay out defenses against the Germans.
 
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The Brusilov offensive of 1916 did come very close to knocking Austria out of the war, but they didn't follow the strategic maxim of, "Stop when you have won." They tried to continue the push past the point where it was paying dividends, and that led to the loss of pretty much the whole original force.

Austria was the weakest enemy that Russia could get at (logistical problems made it very hard to fight the Turks in the Caucasus) so it made sense to try to kneecap them. Russia was simply not able to fight Germany on anything like equal terms, so staying on the defensive in the north was the proper thing to do.

After the Brusilov offensive ended, Russia had no real offensive power left and logistical support for the armies collapsed. Any offensive operations past that point should have been low-level counter-attacks... just as Nivelle should have known better than to try a grand offensive, so should the Russian army leaders during Kerensky's time in office.

The proper thing to do was to play for time, giving up space and working on the fundamental problems of the army - arms and artillery, munitions, supplies, promoting leadership on merit and getting some morale back.
 
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The Brusilov offensive of 1916 did come very close to knocking Austria out of the war, but they didn't follow the strategic maxim of, "Stop when you have won." They tried to continue the push past the point where it was paying dividends, and that led to the loss of pretty much the whole original force.

Austria was the weakest enemy that Russia could get at (logistical problems made it very hard to fight the Turks in the Caucasus) so it made sense to try to kneecap them. Russia was simply not able to fight Germany on anything like equal terms, so staying on the defensive in the north was the proper thing to do.

After the Brusilov offensive ended, Russia had no real offensive power left and logistical support for the armies collapsed. Any offensive operations past that point should have been low-level counter-attacks... just as Nivelle should have known better than to try a grand offensive, so should the Russian army leaders during Kerensky's time in office.

The proper thing to do was to play for time, giving up space and working on the fundamental problems of the army - arms and artillery, munitions, supplies, promoting leadership on merit and getting some morale back.
Russia was still very successful in Anatolia until 1917. Kerensky, had he wanted an easier political victory could have shifted addforces to that front.

While the terrain was miserable, and the Turks tenacious, the Turkish Army was in terrible condition.

A victory like taking Trebizond and avoiding a horrible defeat might have been enough for Kerensky had he not also done a lot of other stupid things in Petrograd.
 
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The Baltic Fleet was completely under the control of the RSDLP (b). After Lenin's arrival in April, they refused to obey Kerensky. Delegations from the Provisional Government traveled there, to Kronstadt, but to no avail. Prior to Lenin's arrival, the Bolsheviks in Petrograd were planning cooperation with the Provisional Government.
In June 1917, a riot took place in Petrograd, first caused by anarchist unrest, then they were supported by the Bolsheviks. At this point, the Provisional Government succeeded in crushing this uprising and imprisoning their leaders. During the armed uprising of the sailors of the Baltic Fleet in Petrograd, Trotsky, who had previously leaned towards the Mensheviks, saw in the unrest of the Bolsheviks a force capable of sweeping away the Provisional Government. Therefore, in August he joined the Bolsheviks.
In August 1917, Kornilov spoke out, who, with the help of officers, tried to curb the revolutionary elements. Kerensky opposed and therefore became unpopular in the army. Thus, the once popular party of the Right SRs, whose representative was Kerensky, heir to the populist party and their tradition of revolutionary terror, began to lose its footing in society. The Bolsheviks branded them compromisers with the bourgeoisie and capitalists.
 
Who are those Bolsheviks who controlled the Baltic Fleet? There were 2 of them fanatics, who in reality cost the army.
1) Roshal, Semen Grigorievich. This Jewish boy was 21 years old in 1917. Participated, led the uprising in Petrograd. Without him, Lenin would have been a miserable verbal critic. In December 1917, he was killed in Romania by White Guard officers, where he arrived alone in order to persuade the army to the Revolution. Previously, he single-handedly forced the surrender of entire corps and armies loyal to the Provisional Government and White Russia with his outstanding oratorical talent.
2) Raskolnikov Fedor Fedorovich. He was 25 years old in 1917. He was often confused with Roshal, they were political twins.
Had it not been for these two young Bolsheviks, Kerensky would not have ceded power to Lenin.
 
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Who are those Bolsheviks who controlled the Baltic Fleet? There were 2 of them fanatics, who in reality cost the army.
1) Roshal, Semen Grigorievich. This Jewish boy was 21 years old in 1917. Participated, led the uprising in Petrograd. Without him, Lenin would have been a miserable verbal critic. In December 1917, he was killed in Romania by White Guard officers, where he arrived alone in order to persuade the army to the Revolution. Previously, he single-handedly forced the surrender of entire corps and armies loyal to the Provisional Government and White Russia with his outstanding oratorical talent.
2) Raskolnikov Fedor Fedorovich. He was 25 years old in 1917. He was often confused with Roshal, they were political twins.
Had it not been for these two young Bolsheviks, Kerensky would not have ceded power to Lenin.
This is Bolshevik propaganda.

while I will admit that the naval mutiny contributed to the fall of the Kerensky government, there were many other factors involved.
 
All Jews massively joined the Bolsheviks.
The pro-Bolsheviks were set up by Finland, which, in its desire for independence, relied on the Reds. Petrograd and Finland are the bases of the Baltic Fleet. Therefore, some suggested to Kerensky that Petrograd be torn to pieces by the Germans.
The Bolsheviks, Anarchists, Menshevik-Internationalists, Left Socialist-Revolutionaries took control of the trade unions in the factories.
There was also a parallel government, these were the Soviets.

The peasants, that is, 80% of the population of Russia, were controlled by the Socialist Revolutionaries. The Socialist Revolutionaries were in the majority in Siberia, many of them wanted separation from Central Russia. They contributed to the appearance of Kolchak in Omsk. However, during the war, Kolchak ordered their arrest, forbade them to express their policy. Therefore, the socialist revolutionaries contributed to the death of Kolchak.
 
The pro-Bolsheviks were set up by Finland, which, in its desire for independence, relied on the Reds.

Hello. Can you more precisely explain, what do you mean by saying this?

Petrograd and Finland are the bases of the Baltic Fleet.

Isn't that rather Kronstadt and the Suomenlinna-sea-fortress at Helsinki?
 
Hello. Can you more precisely explain, what do you mean by saying this?



Isn't that rather Kronstadt and the Suomenlinna-sea-fortress at Helsinki?
V. I. Musaee "RED REAR REVOLUTION": FINLAND AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURYhttp://www.spbiiran.nw.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/r-mysaev-kr-tyl.pdf.
Finland played a special role in the development of the Russian revolutionary movement. In 1905-1907. it was called "the red rear of the revolution." Such a characteristic which belongs to the pen of one of the active participants in the revolutionary movement V. M. Smirnov, is quite fair: indeed, not only during the years of the first Russian revolution, but throughout the entire period of the late XIX - early XX centuries. the territory of the Grand Duchy of Finland served as a base for Russian revolutionary groups of the social democratic and (to a lesser extent) populist direction. Here the revolutionaries hid from persecution on the territory of crown Russia, here they held their meetings and conferences, published illegal literature, stored weapons and engaged in other activities in relative safety, feeling much more at ease than in Russia proper. The activity of Russian revolutionaries in Finland often developed with the obvious connivance of local authorities: the officials of the Grand Duchy not only turned a blind eye to their activities, but sometimes even assisted them, hiding from the Russian police and gendarme authorities information about the presence and activities of revolutionaries on Finnish territory or warning them of the danger that threatened them.
Such a seemingly paradoxical situation was associated with increased dissatisfaction with the policy of the imperial government and the growth of separatist sentiments in Finland. The Finnish authorities were jealous of the attempts of the Russian police to suppress the activity of revolutionary groups in the territory of the Grand Duchy, seeing this as interference within their competence, and in fact sabotaged the efforts of the Russian law enforcement agencies to combat opponents of the regime on the territory of the Grand Duchy. In one of the reports on the situation in Finland it was noted: “The commanding officers of the police, with their defiant behavior, only kindle passions among the population and encourage all sorts of secret organizations in the region. With such in this situation, not only are all persons and organizations hostile to the empire in Finland not detected by the police, but, on the contrary, all of them from her side meet with the most energetic and active support. Therefore, here the revolutionary organizations have woven themselves reliable nests and, having settled down, act on the whole empire.
Сonnivance towards individuals and organizations engaged in anti-government activities was one of the ways to once again emphasize their independence, a kind of opposition. The more strained relations between Finland and the imperial center in the so-called "periods of oppression", all the more cordial welcome was met on Finnish soil by the Russian opposition, and the more obstacles the Russian police and gendarmerie authorities encountered here in the fight against them. Finnish radical opposition organizations of various orientations - from the Red Guard to the nationalist "Active Resistance Party" - directly collaborated with the Russian revolutionaries. The latter, opposing the tsarist regime, turned out to be natural, albeit temporary, allies of the supporters of Finnish independence: the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” worked.
The first Russian revolutionary groups arose in Finland as early as the last quarter of the XIX century. So, in September 1882, the Finnish press reported that in Helsingfors (Helsinki) and Sveaborg, a branch of the “criminal society existing in Russia” was opened, the members of which were Russian officers, civil officials and teachers of the Russian Alexander Gymnasium. The investigation showed that it was a group of the military-revolutionary organization "Narodnaya Volya", founded in Helsinki, a member of the organization N. Rogachev, closely associated with A. Zhelyabov. Six members of the group were arrested (later on the territory of Russia were Three more have been found and arrested. At the same time, as the Uusi Suometar newspaper noted, “the prosecutor of the Finnish Senate made a statement regarding the order in which these arrests were made”, due to the fact that “Russian subjects, excluding military personnel, are under the protection of the laws of the Grand Duchy; in this case, the arrests were not made by the Finnish authorities.” The Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries managed to establish their own printing house near Vyborg, in which in 1901 they began to print the underground newspaper Revolutionary Russia. This, however, soon became known to the police, and the Minister of the Interior, D.S. Sipyagin, personally ordered that measures be taken to stop the work of the printing house. But the Social Revolutionaries were warned in time about the intentions of the police and managed to move the printing house to Tomsk. On April 15, 1902, Minister Sipyagin was killed in St. Petersburg by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary militant organization, student S. Balmashov, who, a few days before the assassination attempt, stayed at a hotel in Vyborg and had a meeting with a well-known leader of the militant organization G. A. Gershuni, who gave him the relevant instructions.
In the future, the activity of Russian revolutionaries in Finland increased in parallel with the development of the activities of the Finnish opposition proper. groups. A. Mustonen, a former member of one of the underground Finnish revolutionary organizations, engaged in the "expropriation" of funds for the needs of the revolution, noted that "members of secret revolutionary organizations ... act together with Russian revolutionaries in favor of the Russian and Finnish revolutions", and pointed out on various forms of this cooperation: assistance to the Finnish opposition in arming the Russian revolutionaries, agitation among the troops and direct handing sums of money to Russian revolutionaries. At the same time, the Voima, a right-wing secret society formed on the basis of the Active Resistance Party, was also ready to cooperate with Russian opposition organizations: according to the report of V. I. Musaev. "Red Rear of the Revolution": Finland and the Russian Revolutionary Movement at the Beginning of the 20th Century. Minister of the Interior P. A. Stolypin dated June 2, 1906, the central committee of the society sent out a circular in which he called on the population of Finland to prepare for an armed struggle against the tsarist government and, in particular, recommended that the Finns “support the Russian revolutionaries in every possible way in their struggle against the government” , "so that weaken Russia as much as possible. There were also specific examples of Voima's connections with Russian opponents of the tsarist regime. Finnish Governor General at the end August (early September NS) 1908 informed the Secretary of State of the Grand Duchy of Finland that the Voima branches operating in the Vyborg province collaborated with Russian revolutionary circles, and a member of the society, Oikonen, who had extensive connections throughout the country and abroad , received smuggled weapons, which he transferred to Russian revolutionaries who came to Imatra through the owner of the local hotel U. Sirenius, a member of the Karyalan Kansan Makhti organization.
Russian, Finnish and other national opposition groups sought to coordinate their actions and agree on cooperation. On September 30, 1904, a congress of Russian revolutionaries of various nationalities was held in Paris, at which a declaration was signed on joint actions against the tsarist government. The initiative of this congress came from Finnish politicians, and the declaration adopted by the congress was signed on behalf of the well-known Finnish separatist leaders Konni Zilliakus and Arvid Neovius. In January 1905, as an echo of the events in St. Petersburg on January 9, demonstrations took place in various cities of Finland, coinciding with the day of the resumption of the Seimas of 1904-1905. The bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated a partial transition of passive resistance to active. A series of political assassinations and assassinations follows: the prosecutor of the Finnish Senate Jonson, the gendarmerie lieutenant colonel Kramarenko were killed, attempts were made on the privy councilor Deitrich, the Vyborg governor Myasoedov, there was an increase in agitation and secret transportation of weapons to the region. The unity of the Finnish and Russian opposition was demonstrated during a mass demonstration and rally in Helsingfors May 21 (June 3), 1906, organized by the Red Guard and social democratic groups. Representatives of Russian, Estonian and Latvian Social Democrats took part in the demonstration. Among the speakers at the rally were two Russian orators who introduced themselves as deputies of the State Duma. They addressed the audience with a message from the Duma with the following content: “There is a terrible discord between the State Duma and the State Council, and therefore, as it is believed, the Duma will disbanded soon. Then a general revolution will break out, during which Finland must organize the whole people and help the Russian revolutionaries overthrow the tsar from throne." The Ministry of the Interior had undercover information about what some members of the Duma expected if the Duma was dissolved or the deputies will leave for the summer holidays, go to Finland and continue their meetings here. As you know, this is exactly what happened: on July 9, after the dissolution of the First Duma, many of its deputies went to Vyborg. The meeting continued all night in the Belvedere Hotel in Vyborg, and the next day the famous Vyborg Appeal was adopted.
After the suppression of the first Russian revolution, its participants, wanted by the police, often found refuge in Finnish territory. SR militant organization, which was led by the notorious E. F. Azef, had one of her bases in Finland.
Azef himself, as well as B. V. Savinkov, who was associated with the military organization, repeatedly visited Finland. In particular, Savinkov and Azef stayed for some time with the famous Finnish artist Eero Jarnefelt. Not far from Imatra, the Zilberberg terrorist group was hiding, with the aim of killing Stolypin. In the summer of 1905, Trotsky came to Finland to escape persecution. About the stay of V. I. Lenin in Finland, about Lenin's places on the Karelian Isthmus more than well known. In 1906-1907. the headquarters of the Bolsheviks and the main residence of V. I. Lenin was the dacha "Vaza" in the village of Kuokkala. In the village and other revolutionaries also hid in the vicinity, as well as in Terijoki. In addition to Kuokkala, Lenin also repeatedly visited Terijoki, Vyborg, Helsingfors and Tampere (Tammerfors), where, as is known, the first Social Democratic Party Conference took place in December 1905, at which Lenin met JV Stalin for the first time. In total, four Social Democratic conferences were held in Finland: the second conference was also held in Tampere in November 1906, the third in Kotka in August 1907, and the fourth in Helsinki in November of the same year. The Socialist-Revolutionaries also held their conferences in Finland. One of them was organized at the Valtio Hotel in Imatra in 1906, the other in Tampere in February 1907; it was organized by the socialist Timo Korpimaa with the help of local activists. In Finland, there was a committee for helping political refugees, which supplied the hiding revolutionaries here with money, participation in it was taken, in particular, by university professors. The secretary of the committee V. M. Smirnov handed over the collected funds to L. B. Krasin, who lived in Kuokkala. A few kilometers from Kuokkala, on the Haapala farm, in the spring of 1907, a Bolshevik laboratory for the manufacture of explosives was founded, which, however, was soon discovered, 11 people were under arrest. In 1908, in connection with the events at the Khaapala farm, Krasin was arrested, but soon he had to be released due to insufficient evidence?
Among Finnish cities and towns, a special place in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, along with Vyborg, Tampere and Kuokkala, was occupied by Terijoki, which after 1905 was the stronghold of the revolutionaries in Finland. Here, since the end of the summer of 1907, there was a secret dacha of the Central Committee of the RSDLP. In 1906-1907. conferences of the St. Petersburg organization of the party were also held here. In addition, Terijoki in 1905-1907. was known as a venue for opposition rallies, which were attended by many Petersburgers. One of these rallies, which took place in June 1907, is described in the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: “On June 4, in a public garden near the station Terijoki on the Finnish Railway held a rally organized on the initiative of the members of the "labor group", representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the Russian Social Democrats and the Finnish and Finnish Red Guards. After mutual greetings, the crowd, lining up at the station and raising red flags with various revolutionary inscriptions in Russian and Finnish, moved to the public garden singing "La Marseillaise", "Varshavyanka" and other revolutionary songs, and passing by the Finnish workers' house, stopped for a few minutes and sang "The Internationale". <...> All speeches were distinguished by an extremely revolutionary content, and almost every speaker ended his speech with a call for an active struggle with the government, after which those present applauded and shouted: “Long live the armed uprising.”
In the second half of the 1910s, when ties with Zilliacus were cut off among Russian socialists, the “Finland route” for smuggling was no longer used, but soon attempts began to be made to restore it. Another such attempt took place after the outbreak of the First World War. Autumn 1914 A. Shlyapnikov went to Stockholm to establish new contacts. Here he came into contact with the Swedish left and moderate social democrats, made inspection trips to the Swedish-Finnish and Norwegian-Finnish border areas. Transportation through the Finnish ports of Turku and Rauma with the onset of winter had to be stopped due to freezing and tightening of military and police control. In the summer of 1915, however, a new route was opened: by land through the Swedish-Finnish border in the north, in the Haparanda-Tornio region. Shlyapnikov was given effective assistance in organizing this route by the Finnish socialists Adam Laaksonen from Kemi and Hannes Uksila from Oulu, who also helped Finnish volunteers to cross the same route to Germany, where at that time the Finnish Jaeger battalion was being formed. Shlyapnikov himself used this route in October 1915 to return to Russia. Shlyapnikov's main assistant in Finland was Karl Wiik, who in 1910 met with Lenin in Copenhagen, was in correspondence with Alexandra Kollontai (perhaps it was she who attracted him to underground activities). At first, both Bolshevik and Menshevik literature were transported along the secret route, but with In 1916 preference began to be given to Bolshevik publications.
Underground periodicals were not only transported through Finland, but also published there. In August-September 1906, the publication began in Vyborg Bolshevik newspapers "Proletary" and "Forward", which were then also transported to Russia. The Police Department had information that a Russian revolutionary publication was being printed in the printing house of the Finnish newspaper Tyuyo, for which Russian typesetters were specially invited and a supply of Russian type was purchased (it was about the newspaper Proletariy), however, at the request of the department to take measures addressed to the Minister of State Secretary of the Grand Duchy of Finland A.F. Langof, he gave a characteristic answer: “The Vyborg Governor, with whom I really entered case for intercourse, reports that although the local police carried out a thorough investigation into the case, no circumstances confirming the information about the printing of revolutionary publications in the mentioned printing house were established. The story of the secret printing house, discovered in February 1907, is also very indicative. in Helsingfors, in the apartment of the engineer V. S. Alanna, in which the newspaper "Barracks Bulletin" and various leaflets were printed. Аlanne, having received a subpoena, disappeared from the city, and the arrested compositor, an Estonian native VG Arman, was acquitted by the Ratgauz court. The Finnish governor-general called the actions of the court “an inexcusable leniency towards political criminals.” In Vyborg, in the autumn of 1906, the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper Trud was published. In 1908, the owner of the newspaper Viborgs Nyheter, G. Ekholm, was fined for allowing the newspapers Za Narod and Vperyod to be printed in his printing house. Later, in the years preceding the revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks founded their own printing house in Helsingfors, printed here and then transported another newspaper, Volna, to Petrograd.
Cooperation between Russian and Finnish radicals also manifested itself in the Sveaborg uprising of 1906. The uprising was planned by Russian revolutionary organizations, in particular the military organization of the Bolsheviks, whose branches operated in Helsinki, Vyborg, Lappeenranta and other Finnish cities. The main role in organizing the uprising in Sveaborg belonged, however, to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who insisted on hastening the preparations for the uprising, while the Bolsheviks considered it premature. The uprising was to begin simultaneously in Sveaborg, Kronstadt, Reval and Baltic Fleet, which was then to go to St. Petersburg to raise an uprising in the capital. The uprising of part of the Sveaborg garrison took place on July 30 (17), to him sailors stationed in the barracks on the island of Katajanokka also joined (Scatudden). 250-300 Finnish Red Guards joined the rebel sailors, who were transported by ship to one of the islands in the hands of the rebels, and participated in the shelling of government units. The Red Guards sent their people to blow up the railway track in order to prevent the delivery of troops sent to put down the uprising. The Finns also tried to campaign among the soldiers who arrived in Helsinki, which did not stop even after the suppression uprisings. The police were forced to turn to the military command with a request issue an order prohibiting military personnel from visiting cafes and restaurants where they were indoctrinated. Bolshevik military organization continued to act in the future, conducting agitation among the troops, until the arrests in August 1907 did not devastate its ranks. However, in 1908, the St. Petersburg Finn Adolf Taimi, sent to Finland a year earlier by N. K. Krupskaya, actively worked among military sailors. In 1911, fermentation began again on some ships, and from the beginning of the next year, the “revolutionary committee”, created by the Russian branch of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, began to prepare an uprising in the navy.
The activity of Russian anti-government organizations in Finland and the connivance towards them on the part of local officials caused understandable concern of the imperial authorities. Chairman of the Russian government and the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs P. A. Stolypin on December 5 (18), 1907, sent a letter to A. F. Langof, in which he noted with alarm: “The information received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 1905 indicates that the territory The Grand Duchy of Finland, and especially the provinces of Vyborg and Nyland, became a permanent refuge for Russian revolutionaries, who not only systematically engaged in propaganda among the local troops, but also formed strong organizations there to lead agitation and prepare terrorist acts in the Empire.”39 According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1907 alone, about 15 meetings and conferences of Russian Social Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary organizations were held in Terijoki, Kuokkale and Tampere. In Finland, terrorist acts were “organized and prepared to the smallest detail”, including the assassination of the chief military prosecutor, Adjutant General Pavlov, and the assassination attempt on the Minister of War. The St. Petersburg police established "the existence in the town of Kellomyaki of a whole bureau of terrorists who prepared the murders ... and had cards of persons who took upon themselves the commission of political murders." “At the same time,” Stolypin continued, “search officials, trying to continue monitoring criminals within the Grand Duchy, find themselves in an exceptionally unfavorable situation, not only not receiving support from the local authorities, but meeting with some of its representatives, and then from population, a clearly hostile attitude, which in many cases has already reached open persecution. Thanks to this, the imperial government can now, on the basis of the indisputable data of hard experience, state that in all cases when Russian revolutionaries wish to move to Finland, they become inaccessible to a much greater extent than when they leave for one of the foreign states, the authorities of which show much more significant assistance to the stubborn struggle of the Russian government against the revolutionary movement than the organs of the Finnish administration.”41 When, in November 1910, the Special Conference on the Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland, chaired by Stolypin, raised the question of joining part of the territory of the Vyborg province to Russia, among the circumstances that dictated the need to move the border, the needs of the fight against revolutionary elements, "who are now able to find themselves .. ... a safe haven a few tens of miles from St. Petersburg. A draft law developed by a special commission on the transfer of the Finnish parishes of Kivennap (Kivineb) to Crown Russia and Uusikirkko (New Church), however, was not put into practice.
Under pressure from the center, the Finnish authorities were forced to abandon their former liberalism in relation to the opponents of the tsarist regime and demonstrate somewhat greater activity in their persecution. A. F. Langof, reacting to a letter Stolypin, outlined a number of measures that were supposed to increase the efficiency of work law enforcement agencies in the territory of the Grand Duchy. It was supposed to “prohibit until the time the Russians convene and arrange conferences, congresses and other meetings in Finland without the permission of the Governor-General; oblige the Finnish authorities to immediately take measures to remove Russian natives from the region, granted the right to stay in Finland, if the imperial authorities receive a message that these persons are deprived of the said right; to transform or strengthen the police in Finland to such an extent that they can more quickly and more successfully search for Russian political criminals who are hiding in Finland, keep them under unremitting surveillance, conduct searches and detain them. At the beginning of 1908, in Finland, “eight meetings organized by various Russian revolutionary organizations were warned or closed” There were also reports of arrests, confiscations of consignments of illegal literature, discovery of depots of weapons and ammunition. Despite this, until 1917, the territory of Finland remained a safer place for Russian revolutionaries compared to actually Russian regions, although they had to go deeper underground. It is well known that V. I. Lenin safely hid in Finland before going to Petrograd to lead an armed uprising in October 1917.
 
V. I. Musaee "RED REAR REVOLUTION": FINLAND AND THE RUSSIAN REVOLUTIONARY MOVEMENT IN THE BEGINNING OF THE XX CENTURYhttp://www.spbiiran.nw.ru/wp-content/uploads/2021/02/r-mysaev-kr-tyl.pdf.
Finland played a special role in the development of the Russian revolutionary movement. In 1905-1907. it was called "the red rear of the revolution." Such a characteristic which belongs to the pen of one of the active participants in the revolutionary movement V. M. Smirnov, is quite fair: indeed, not only during the years of the first Russian revolution, but throughout the entire period of the late XIX - early XX centuries. the territory of the Grand Duchy of Finland served as a base for Russian revolutionary groups of the social democratic and (to a lesser extent) populist direction. Here the revolutionaries hid from persecution on the territory of crown Russia, here they held their meetings and conferences, published illegal literature, stored weapons and engaged in other activities in relative safety, feeling much more at ease than in Russia proper. The activity of Russian revolutionaries in Finland often developed with the obvious connivance of local authorities: the officials of the Grand Duchy not only turned a blind eye to their activities, but sometimes even assisted them, hiding from the Russian police and gendarme authorities information about the presence and activities of revolutionaries on Finnish territory or warning them of the danger that threatened them.
Such a seemingly paradoxical situation was associated with increased dissatisfaction with the policy of the imperial government and the growth of separatist sentiments in Finland. The Finnish authorities were jealous of the attempts of the Russian police to suppress the activity of revolutionary groups in the territory of the Grand Duchy, seeing this as interference within their competence, and in fact sabotaged the efforts of the Russian law enforcement agencies to combat opponents of the regime on the territory of the Grand Duchy. In one of the reports on the situation in Finland it was noted: “The commanding officers of the police, with their defiant behavior, only kindle passions among the population and encourage all sorts of secret organizations in the region. With such in this situation, not only are all persons and organizations hostile to the empire in Finland not detected by the police, but, on the contrary, all of them from her side meet with the most energetic and active support. Therefore, here the revolutionary organizations have woven themselves reliable nests and, having settled down, act on the whole empire.
Сonnivance towards individuals and organizations engaged in anti-government activities was one of the ways to once again emphasize their independence, a kind of opposition. The more strained relations between Finland and the imperial center in the so-called "periods of oppression", all the more cordial welcome was met on Finnish soil by the Russian opposition, and the more obstacles the Russian police and gendarmerie authorities encountered here in the fight against them. Finnish radical opposition organizations of various orientations - from the Red Guard to the nationalist "Active Resistance Party" - directly collaborated with the Russian revolutionaries. The latter, opposing the tsarist regime, turned out to be natural, albeit temporary, allies of the supporters of Finnish independence: the principle “the enemy of my enemy is my friend” worked.
The first Russian revolutionary groups arose in Finland as early as the last quarter of the XIX century. So, in September 1882, the Finnish press reported that in Helsingfors (Helsinki) and Sveaborg, a branch of the “criminal society existing in Russia” was opened, the members of which were Russian officers, civil officials and teachers of the Russian Alexander Gymnasium. The investigation showed that it was a group of the military-revolutionary organization "Narodnaya Volya", founded in Helsinki, a member of the organization N. Rogachev, closely associated with A. Zhelyabov. Six members of the group were arrested (later on the territory of Russia were Three more have been found and arrested. At the same time, as the Uusi Suometar newspaper noted, “the prosecutor of the Finnish Senate made a statement regarding the order in which these arrests were made”, due to the fact that “Russian subjects, excluding military personnel, are under the protection of the laws of the Grand Duchy; in this case, the arrests were not made by the Finnish authorities.” The Russian Socialist-Revolutionaries managed to establish their own printing house near Vyborg, in which in 1901 they began to print the underground newspaper Revolutionary Russia. This, however, soon became known to the police, and the Minister of the Interior, D.S. Sipyagin, personally ordered that measures be taken to stop the work of the printing house. But the Social Revolutionaries were warned in time about the intentions of the police and managed to move the printing house to Tomsk. On April 15, 1902, Minister Sipyagin was killed in St. Petersburg by a member of the Socialist-Revolutionary militant organization, student S. Balmashov, who, a few days before the assassination attempt, stayed at a hotel in Vyborg and had a meeting with a well-known leader of the militant organization G. A. Gershuni, who gave him the relevant instructions.
In the future, the activity of Russian revolutionaries in Finland increased in parallel with the development of the activities of the Finnish opposition proper. groups. A. Mustonen, a former member of one of the underground Finnish revolutionary organizations, engaged in the "expropriation" of funds for the needs of the revolution, noted that "members of secret revolutionary organizations ... act together with Russian revolutionaries in favor of the Russian and Finnish revolutions", and pointed out on various forms of this cooperation: assistance to the Finnish opposition in arming the Russian revolutionaries, agitation among the troops and direct handing sums of money to Russian revolutionaries. At the same time, the Voima, a right-wing secret society formed on the basis of the Active Resistance Party, was also ready to cooperate with Russian opposition organizations: according to the report of V. I. Musaev. "Red Rear of the Revolution": Finland and the Russian Revolutionary Movement at the Beginning of the 20th Century. Minister of the Interior P. A. Stolypin dated June 2, 1906, the central committee of the society sent out a circular in which he called on the population of Finland to prepare for an armed struggle against the tsarist government and, in particular, recommended that the Finns “support the Russian revolutionaries in every possible way in their struggle against the government” , "so that weaken Russia as much as possible. There were also specific examples of Voima's connections with Russian opponents of the tsarist regime. Finnish Governor General at the end August (early September NS) 1908 informed the Secretary of State of the Grand Duchy of Finland that the Voima branches operating in the Vyborg province collaborated with Russian revolutionary circles, and a member of the society, Oikonen, who had extensive connections throughout the country and abroad , received smuggled weapons, which he transferred to Russian revolutionaries who came to Imatra through the owner of the local hotel U. Sirenius, a member of the Karyalan Kansan Makhti organization.
Russian, Finnish and other national opposition groups sought to coordinate their actions and agree on cooperation. On September 30, 1904, a congress of Russian revolutionaries of various nationalities was held in Paris, at which a declaration was signed on joint actions against the tsarist government. The initiative of this congress came from Finnish politicians, and the declaration adopted by the congress was signed on behalf of the well-known Finnish separatist leaders Konni Zilliakus and Arvid Neovius. In January 1905, as an echo of the events in St. Petersburg on January 9, demonstrations took place in various cities of Finland, coinciding with the day of the resumption of the Seimas of 1904-1905. The bodies of the Ministry of Internal Affairs stated a partial transition of passive resistance to active. A series of political assassinations and assassinations follows: the prosecutor of the Finnish Senate Jonson, the gendarmerie lieutenant colonel Kramarenko were killed, attempts were made on the privy councilor Deitrich, the Vyborg governor Myasoedov, there was an increase in agitation and secret transportation of weapons to the region. The unity of the Finnish and Russian opposition was demonstrated during a mass demonstration and rally in Helsingfors May 21 (June 3), 1906, organized by the Red Guard and social democratic groups. Representatives of Russian, Estonian and Latvian Social Democrats took part in the demonstration. Among the speakers at the rally were two Russian orators who introduced themselves as deputies of the State Duma. They addressed the audience with a message from the Duma with the following content: “There is a terrible discord between the State Duma and the State Council, and therefore, as it is believed, the Duma will disbanded soon. Then a general revolution will break out, during which Finland must organize the whole people and help the Russian revolutionaries overthrow the tsar from throne." The Ministry of the Interior had undercover information about what some members of the Duma expected if the Duma was dissolved or the deputies will leave for the summer holidays, go to Finland and continue their meetings here. As you know, this is exactly what happened: on July 9, after the dissolution of the First Duma, many of its deputies went to Vyborg. The meeting continued all night in the Belvedere Hotel in Vyborg, and the next day the famous Vyborg Appeal was adopted.
After the suppression of the first Russian revolution, its participants, wanted by the police, often found refuge in Finnish territory. SR militant organization, which was led by the notorious E. F. Azef, had one of her bases in Finland.
Azef himself, as well as B. V. Savinkov, who was associated with the military organization, repeatedly visited Finland. In particular, Savinkov and Azef stayed for some time with the famous Finnish artist Eero Jarnefelt. Not far from Imatra, the Zilberberg terrorist group was hiding, with the aim of killing Stolypin. In the summer of 1905, Trotsky came to Finland to escape persecution. About the stay of V. I. Lenin in Finland, about Lenin's places on the Karelian Isthmus more than well known. In 1906-1907. the headquarters of the Bolsheviks and the main residence of V. I. Lenin was the dacha "Vaza" in the village of Kuokkala. In the village and other revolutionaries also hid in the vicinity, as well as in Terijoki. In addition to Kuokkala, Lenin also repeatedly visited Terijoki, Vyborg, Helsingfors and Tampere (Tammerfors), where, as is known, the first Social Democratic Party Conference took place in December 1905, at which Lenin met JV Stalin for the first time. In total, four Social Democratic conferences were held in Finland: the second conference was also held in Tampere in November 1906, the third in Kotka in August 1907, and the fourth in Helsinki in November of the same year. The Socialist-Revolutionaries also held their conferences in Finland. One of them was organized at the Valtio Hotel in Imatra in 1906, the other in Tampere in February 1907; it was organized by the socialist Timo Korpimaa with the help of local activists. In Finland, there was a committee for helping political refugees, which supplied the hiding revolutionaries here with money, participation in it was taken, in particular, by university professors. The secretary of the committee V. M. Smirnov handed over the collected funds to L. B. Krasin, who lived in Kuokkala. A few kilometers from Kuokkala, on the Haapala farm, in the spring of 1907, a Bolshevik laboratory for the manufacture of explosives was founded, which, however, was soon discovered, 11 people were under arrest. In 1908, in connection with the events at the Khaapala farm, Krasin was arrested, but soon he had to be released due to insufficient evidence?
Among Finnish cities and towns, a special place in the history of the Russian revolutionary movement, along with Vyborg, Tampere and Kuokkala, was occupied by Terijoki, which after 1905 was the stronghold of the revolutionaries in Finland. Here, since the end of the summer of 1907, there was a secret dacha of the Central Committee of the RSDLP. In 1906-1907. conferences of the St. Petersburg organization of the party were also held here. In addition, Terijoki in 1905-1907. was known as a venue for opposition rallies, which were attended by many Petersburgers. One of these rallies, which took place in June 1907, is described in the report of the Ministry of Internal Affairs: “On June 4, in a public garden near the station Terijoki on the Finnish Railway held a rally organized on the initiative of the members of the "labor group", representatives of the Socialist-Revolutionary parties, the Russian Social Democrats and the Finnish and Finnish Red Guards. After mutual greetings, the crowd, lining up at the station and raising red flags with various revolutionary inscriptions in Russian and Finnish, moved to the public garden singing "La Marseillaise", "Varshavyanka" and other revolutionary songs, and passing by the Finnish workers' house, stopped for a few minutes and sang "The Internationale". <...> All speeches were distinguished by an extremely revolutionary content, and almost every speaker ended his speech with a call for an active struggle with the government, after which those present applauded and shouted: “Long live the armed uprising.”
In the second half of the 1910s, when ties with Zilliacus were cut off among Russian socialists, the “Finland route” for smuggling was no longer used, but soon attempts began to be made to restore it. Another such attempt took place after the outbreak of the First World War. Autumn 1914 A. Shlyapnikov went to Stockholm to establish new contacts. Here he came into contact with the Swedish left and moderate social democrats, made inspection trips to the Swedish-Finnish and Norwegian-Finnish border areas. Transportation through the Finnish ports of Turku and Rauma with the onset of winter had to be stopped due to freezing and tightening of military and police control. In the summer of 1915, however, a new route was opened: by land through the Swedish-Finnish border in the north, in the Haparanda-Tornio region. Shlyapnikov was given effective assistance in organizing this route by the Finnish socialists Adam Laaksonen from Kemi and Hannes Uksila from Oulu, who also helped Finnish volunteers to cross the same route to Germany, where at that time the Finnish Jaeger battalion was being formed. Shlyapnikov himself used this route in October 1915 to return to Russia. Shlyapnikov's main assistant in Finland was Karl Wiik, who in 1910 met with Lenin in Copenhagen, was in correspondence with Alexandra Kollontai (perhaps it was she who attracted him to underground activities). At first, both Bolshevik and Menshevik literature were transported along the secret route, but with In 1916 preference began to be given to Bolshevik publications.
Underground periodicals were not only transported through Finland, but also published there. In August-September 1906, the publication began in Vyborg Bolshevik newspapers "Proletary" and "Forward", which were then also transported to Russia. The Police Department had information that a Russian revolutionary publication was being printed in the printing house of the Finnish newspaper Tyuyo, for which Russian typesetters were specially invited and a supply of Russian type was purchased (it was about the newspaper Proletariy), however, at the request of the department to take measures addressed to the Minister of State Secretary of the Grand Duchy of Finland A.F. Langof, he gave a characteristic answer: “The Vyborg Governor, with whom I really entered case for intercourse, reports that although the local police carried out a thorough investigation into the case, no circumstances confirming the information about the printing of revolutionary publications in the mentioned printing house were established. The story of the secret printing house, discovered in February 1907, is also very indicative. in Helsingfors, in the apartment of the engineer V. S. Alanna, in which the newspaper "Barracks Bulletin" and various leaflets were printed. Аlanne, having received a subpoena, disappeared from the city, and the arrested compositor, an Estonian native VG Arman, was acquitted by the Ratgauz court. The Finnish governor-general called the actions of the court “an inexcusable leniency towards political criminals.” In Vyborg, in the autumn of 1906, the Socialist-Revolutionary newspaper Trud was published. In 1908, the owner of the newspaper Viborgs Nyheter, G. Ekholm, was fined for allowing the newspapers Za Narod and Vperyod to be printed in his printing house. Later, in the years preceding the revolution of 1917, the Bolsheviks founded their own printing house in Helsingfors, printed here and then transported another newspaper, Volna, to Petrograd.
Cooperation between Russian and Finnish radicals also manifested itself in the Sveaborg uprising of 1906. The uprising was planned by Russian revolutionary organizations, in particular the military organization of the Bolsheviks, whose branches operated in Helsinki, Vyborg, Lappeenranta and other Finnish cities. The main role in organizing the uprising in Sveaborg belonged, however, to the Socialist-Revolutionaries, who insisted on hastening the preparations for the uprising, while the Bolsheviks considered it premature. The uprising was to begin simultaneously in Sveaborg, Kronstadt, Reval and Baltic Fleet, which was then to go to St. Petersburg to raise an uprising in the capital. The uprising of part of the Sveaborg garrison took place on July 30 (17), to him sailors stationed in the barracks on the island of Katajanokka also joined (Scatudden). 250-300 Finnish Red Guards joined the rebel sailors, who were transported by ship to one of the islands in the hands of the rebels, and participated in the shelling of government units. The Red Guards sent their people to blow up the railway track in order to prevent the delivery of troops sent to put down the uprising. The Finns also tried to campaign among the soldiers who arrived in Helsinki, which did not stop even after the suppression uprisings. The police were forced to turn to the military command with a request issue an order prohibiting military personnel from visiting cafes and restaurants where they were indoctrinated. Bolshevik military organization continued to act in the future, conducting agitation among the troops, until the arrests in August 1907 did not devastate its ranks. However, in 1908, the St. Petersburg Finn Adolf Taimi, sent to Finland a year earlier by N. K. Krupskaya, actively worked among military sailors. In 1911, fermentation began again on some ships, and from the beginning of the next year, the “revolutionary committee”, created by the Russian branch of the Finnish Social Democratic Party, began to prepare an uprising in the navy.
The activity of Russian anti-government organizations in Finland and the connivance towards them on the part of local officials caused understandable concern of the imperial authorities. Chairman of the Russian government and the head of the Ministry of Internal Affairs P. A. Stolypin on December 5 (18), 1907, sent a letter to A. F. Langof, in which he noted with alarm: “The information received by the Ministry of Internal Affairs since 1905 indicates that the territory The Grand Duchy of Finland, and especially the provinces of Vyborg and Nyland, became a permanent refuge for Russian revolutionaries, who not only systematically engaged in propaganda among the local troops, but also formed strong organizations there to lead agitation and prepare terrorist acts in the Empire.”39 According to the Ministry of Internal Affairs, in 1907 alone, about 15 meetings and conferences of Russian Social Democratic and Socialist-Revolutionary organizations were held in Terijoki, Kuokkale and Tampere. In Finland, terrorist acts were “organized and prepared to the smallest detail”, including the assassination of the chief military prosecutor, Adjutant General Pavlov, and the assassination attempt on the Minister of War. The St. Petersburg police established "the existence in the town of Kellomyaki of a whole bureau of terrorists who prepared the murders ... and had cards of persons who took upon themselves the commission of political murders." “At the same time,” Stolypin continued, “search officials, trying to continue monitoring criminals within the Grand Duchy, find themselves in an exceptionally unfavorable situation, not only not receiving support from the local authorities, but meeting with some of its representatives, and then from population, a clearly hostile attitude, which in many cases has already reached open persecution. Thanks to this, the imperial government can now, on the basis of the indisputable data of hard experience, state that in all cases when Russian revolutionaries wish to move to Finland, they become inaccessible to a much greater extent than when they leave for one of the foreign states, the authorities of which show much more significant assistance to the stubborn struggle of the Russian government against the revolutionary movement than the organs of the Finnish administration.”41 When, in November 1910, the Special Conference on the Affairs of the Grand Duchy of Finland, chaired by Stolypin, raised the question of joining part of the territory of the Vyborg province to Russia, among the circumstances that dictated the need to move the border, the needs of the fight against revolutionary elements, "who are now able to find themselves .. ... a safe haven a few tens of miles from St. Petersburg. A draft law developed by a special commission on the transfer of the Finnish parishes of Kivennap (Kivineb) to Crown Russia and Uusikirkko (New Church), however, was not put into practice.
Under pressure from the center, the Finnish authorities were forced to abandon their former liberalism in relation to the opponents of the tsarist regime and demonstrate somewhat greater activity in their persecution. A. F. Langof, reacting to a letter Stolypin, outlined a number of measures that were supposed to increase the efficiency of work law enforcement agencies in the territory of the Grand Duchy. It was supposed to “prohibit until the time the Russians convene and arrange conferences, congresses and other meetings in Finland without the permission of the Governor-General; oblige the Finnish authorities to immediately take measures to remove Russian natives from the region, granted the right to stay in Finland, if the imperial authorities receive a message that these persons are deprived of the said right; to transform or strengthen the police in Finland to such an extent that they can more quickly and more successfully search for Russian political criminals who are hiding in Finland, keep them under unremitting surveillance, conduct searches and detain them. At the beginning of 1908, in Finland, “eight meetings organized by various Russian revolutionary organizations were warned or closed” There were also reports of arrests, confiscations of consignments of illegal literature, discovery of depots of weapons and ammunition. Despite this, until 1917, the territory of Finland remained a safer place for Russian revolutionaries compared to actually Russian regions, although they had to go deeper underground. It is well known that V. I. Lenin safely hid in Finland before going to Petrograd to lead an armed uprising in October 1917.
in the future, just post the link. nobody wants to see these huge blocks of ugly, unformatted text.
 
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So, some of you seem to think that just not doing the offensive could have rescued the government. I actually thought that too ,but was not doing the offensive really that easy?
I mean there were a lot of interests groups which pushed for a continued war. For example the russian allies in france and great britain and of course a lot of powers in russia. They would most likely not accept russia just leaving the war, at least they did not when soviets left.
Another point is the question of nationalist uprisings. In the soviet Civil war the soviets did not only fought the so called whites, but also nationalists in different parts of the former russian empire who tried to or suceeded to form an own state. (For example the soviet polish war 19-21)
Do you think those would happen too if russia did not do the offensive and signed a seperate peace with the central powers?

Also what you think about central powers chances to win first world war if russia leaves the war 6 month earlier ? That would allow german offensive of 1918 to start in autumn 1917, so before most american forces arrived to free french forces from duty.
 
So, some of you seem to think that just not doing the offensive could have rescued the government. I actually thought that too ,but was not doing the offensive really that easy?
I mean there were a lot of interests groups which pushed for a continued war.

It would have been possible to find a middle ground between leaving the war and mounting an all-out offensive. Given that the Russian army hadn't been able to decisively defeat the Germans even before it was plunged into chaos by the revolution, a period of defensive operations while reorganizing was distinctly called for (while keeping a keen eye open for chances of small-scale victories that could be exploited for propaganda purposes), and I feel like this should have been obvious even without the benefit of hindsight.
 
It would have been possible to find a middle ground between leaving the war and mounting an all-out offensive. Given that the Russian army hadn't been able to decisively defeat the Germans even before it was plunged into chaos by the revolution, a period of defensive operations while reorganizing was distinctly called for (while keeping a keen eye open for chances of small-scale victories that could be exploited for propaganda purposes), and I feel like this should have been obvious even without the benefit of hindsight.
Yup. An offensive in Anatolia (there was one, but like, a bigger one) would have made more sense vis a vis Russia's actual wartime goals, a comparison against their enemy's army, and - although no one knew this at the time - it was the collapse of the Balkan front which directly led to the Central Powers' resistance ending the next year.

You can carry an offensive with the goal of seizing something like Trebizond, or liberating Armenia... that was doable in 1917.

Remember, the reason that Kerensky is doing this at all is to secure political victory in the upcoming general elections. So... like, just win a battle. And don't lose the war like a loser.
 
Yup. An offensive in Anatolia (there was one, but like, a bigger one) would have made more sense vis a vis Russia's actual wartime goals, a comparison against their enemy's army, and - although no one knew this at the time - it was the collapse of the Balkan front which directly led to the Central Powers' resistance ending the next year.

You can carry an offensive with the goal of seizing something like Trebizond, or liberating Armenia... that was doable in 1917.

Remember, the reason that Kerensky is doing this at all is to secure political victory in the upcoming general elections. So... like, just win a battle. And don't lose the war like a loser.

If any victory would do why not just fake one. Are there any way that the illiterate rural electorate could do a fact check?

OR in reality he needed a victory on the main front.
 
If any victory would do why not just fake one. Are there any way that the illiterate rural electorate could do a fact check?

OR in reality he needed a victory on the main front.
The rural electorate? The immediate danger was always in Petrograd... with the military, with the Petrograd Soviet, with the rightists, with the leftists...

Kerensky was trying to get headlines. Show that his new government could fight a better war than the Tsar - after all, why else get rid of the Tsar?

As such, yeah, throw men at a WIN rather than at a LOSS. The Germans had won pretty much every battle, although the Russians had fought hard. Kerensky should have recognized that if an offensive the size of Brusilov's didn't work, why would his?

On the other hand, the war in Anatolia was a) winnable, and b) in-line with Russia's war aims.

This is very much armchair quarterbacking. But if Kerensky wanted a victory he should have thrown his resources AT A VICTORY.
 
The rural electorate? The immediate danger was always in Petrograd... with the military, with the Petrograd Soviet, with the rightists, with the leftists...

Kerensky was trying to get headlines. Show that his new government could fight a better war than the Tsar - after all, why else get rid of the Tsar?

As such, yeah, throw men at a WIN rather than at a LOSS. The Germans had won pretty much every battle, although the Russians had fought hard. Kerensky should have recognized that if an offensive the size of Brusilov's didn't work, why would his?

On the other hand, the war in Anatolia was a) winnable, and b) in-line with Russia's war aims.

This is very much armchair quarterbacking. But if Kerensky wanted a victory he should have thrown his resources AT A VICTORY.

Anatolia requires pushing past the utterly terrible Caucasus supply lines. Good luck.
 
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