The Russian Army was doing it, surprisingly enough. And the Turks, who were in even worse shape than the Russians, had the same challenges.
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Unless the Germans start an offensive to relieve their allies... and knowing that the Russian Army diverts resources to Turkey seems to be a good chance at least gain some territory.
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Russia had a tonne of resources. The Kerensky Offensive was very big. It just wasn't big enough in the era of the trench and shovel. You could have put a lot of those resources on the main fronts and just tried to secure key Russian defense points. A fraction of the Russian Army which died uselessly in Poland could have been used much more effectively in Anatolia.
Again, very much century-past quarterbacking.
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No, because as bad as the Ottoman Army was at attacking, it was (made to be) pretty good at defending. Still, if you need to depopulate one front to strengthen the other, you should depopulate the front with your weaker neighbour, because the stronger one (Germany) will roll over your weakened defenses.
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Except the Russians, with limited support and resources, were winning in Anatolia even in 1917. You don't need to depopulate any front to just not send hundreds of thousands of men to their death against superior German forces.
And again, limited victory > no victory
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Success in Anatolia was due to the factor of surprise, exclusively by the talent of General Yudenich. There were no special advantages of Russia over the Ottoman Empire in resources and logistics.
The fortress of Erzurum was considered impregnable, especially in winter. Yudenich struck at this time, because they did not expect to see him in the fortress, they believed that such an attempt was impossible, so they did not prepare.
The British in Gallipoli played a double game against Russia.
The fortress of Erzurum was considered impregnable, especially in winter. Yudenich struck at this time, because they did not expect to see him in the fortress, they believed that such an attempt was impossible, so they did not prepare.
The British in Gallipoli played a double game against Russia.
Russia owned the province of Kars, inhabited by Armenians, which is now part of Turkey. So the logistics of Russia were all right, but not that Russia was superior to Turkey. Turkey, on the other hand, was considered a weak adversary that lost the Balkan wars.
In accordance with the secret treaty, Constantinople was to go to the Russian Empire. But the British violated this agreement, thinking to conquer Constantinople for themselves, and not for Russia, but crap in Gallipoli. Therefore, although formally allies, England tried to harm Russia.
In accordance with the secret treaty, Constantinople was to go to the Russian Empire. But the British violated this agreement, thinking to conquer Constantinople for themselves, and not for Russia, but crap in Gallipoli. Therefore, although formally allies, England tried to harm Russia.
I think that @Yakman has said most of what there is to say. Kerensky messed up big and he should have known better from how the war had proceeded so far.
I will mention that I don't think, from my potentially ignorant perspective, that it would be possible for the post-Tsar duma to leave the war entirely. As liberals and parlamentarians they would presumably want to keep good relations with Britain and France and leaving the war would hurt those relations very badly as I've understood the situation.
I will mention that I don't think, from my potentially ignorant perspective, that it would be possible for the post-Tsar duma to leave the war entirely. As liberals and parlamentarians they would presumably want to keep good relations with Britain and France and leaving the war would hurt those relations very badly as I've understood the situation.
More important: they did not want to sign a humiliating treaty of surrender.
Kerensky's survival was fairly unlikely what ever he did - the power vacuum left by the collapse of the Russian government was always going to make gaining control of the state difficult at best. However, without a doubt the Kerensky offensive doomed him.
Although the Russian army was in a state of partial disintegration it may have been salvageable prior to the offensive. The offensive ruined Kerensky's chances for 3 major reasons:
1. Loss of the best. The units that spearheaded the attack were those that remained functional and loyal. They bore the brunt of the casualties. The lesson the ordinary frontniki took was that the shirkers survived and the brave and loyal died. This reduced the already shaky loyalty of the units further. In addition, many soldiers who could have formed the core of a loyal functional army were casualties, further weakening the army as a tool of control.
2. Bread and Peace. The Bolsheviks were able to claim that the new government was no different from the old. This argument held sway with many of the soldiers' soviets that were one of the key power bases in the new republic. If the Kerensky government had managed to win over the soviets by showing concern for them and not ordering more futile attacks they may have retained the loyalty of the volatile soviets. As it was the slaughter of the offensive played right (or left...) into the hands of the Bolsheviks.
3. Don't back a loser. The simple fact that Kerensky lost crippled his appeal. Prior to the offensive his abilities as an orator and as a candidate acceptable to both the centralists and the socialists made him a key individual in any government, and gave him a wide selection of potential allies, from conservative generals like Kornilov to the radicals of the soviets. After the failure of the offensive he became a political pariah, as nobody wanted to be associated with a loser. He went rapidly from a dangerous political game of playing off factions against each other to a desperate search for allies.
Even if the Bolshevik uprising had failed, which was certainly possible, Kerensky was doomed.
Although the Russian army was in a state of partial disintegration it may have been salvageable prior to the offensive. The offensive ruined Kerensky's chances for 3 major reasons:
1. Loss of the best. The units that spearheaded the attack were those that remained functional and loyal. They bore the brunt of the casualties. The lesson the ordinary frontniki took was that the shirkers survived and the brave and loyal died. This reduced the already shaky loyalty of the units further. In addition, many soldiers who could have formed the core of a loyal functional army were casualties, further weakening the army as a tool of control.
2. Bread and Peace. The Bolsheviks were able to claim that the new government was no different from the old. This argument held sway with many of the soldiers' soviets that were one of the key power bases in the new republic. If the Kerensky government had managed to win over the soviets by showing concern for them and not ordering more futile attacks they may have retained the loyalty of the volatile soviets. As it was the slaughter of the offensive played right (or left...) into the hands of the Bolsheviks.
3. Don't back a loser. The simple fact that Kerensky lost crippled his appeal. Prior to the offensive his abilities as an orator and as a candidate acceptable to both the centralists and the socialists made him a key individual in any government, and gave him a wide selection of potential allies, from conservative generals like Kornilov to the radicals of the soviets. After the failure of the offensive he became a political pariah, as nobody wanted to be associated with a loser. He went rapidly from a dangerous political game of playing off factions against each other to a desperate search for allies.
Even if the Bolshevik uprising had failed, which was certainly possible, Kerensky was doomed.
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Kerensky probably get pressured and direction from the West, so an offensive in the Ottoman will not help the Western's offensive. He had better not do it and just plotting. He didn't control army. The soldiers and workers was under many small Soviet (Assembly) 's control, but some Soviet leaders allowed Kerensky to form the top Goverment. The Bolshevic was the one against it. Sooner or later when the Bolshevic become majority they will kick Keerensky out.
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