All naval warfare in EUIII was based around destruction of the enemy's fleet, followed by blockade or naval invasion. However this is entirely ahistorical for galley combat in inland seas, namely the Med and Red Sea. Galleys were given a bonus to shock to help them win battles, but the real advantage of galleys wasn't their enhanced ability to win battles, but rather their ability to avoid them. Galleys can sail in shallower water and don't rely on winds the way sailing ships do, meaning they can easily keep close to the shore to be protected by coastal fortifications, or they can slip past a blockade to resupply a besieged fort. Their small size also had a great disadvantage: They could not carry enough supplies for year-long operations, and thus the permanent blockades which were achievable in EUIII were practically impossible in reality. This gives them an entirely different strategic use than that which was represented in EUIII.
Since blockades were impossible, galleys were used to raid coastlines and shipping lanes, rather than to fight enemy fleets. Real engagements between enemy fleets at sea were so unpredictable that no sane commander would pursue such a thing unless having overwhelming odds - and then the enemy commander would have to be a fool to get caught in battle against such odds. Battles near the coast were more predictable because they were more lopsided - overwhelming defender advantage. A well positioned fortress armed with cannon could permanently prevent a hostile fleet from approaching the harbor where the friendly fleet would be stationed. The hostile fleet would have to maintain battle formation permanently in case it was attacked, while the friendly fleet could rest and attack only at the most opportune moment. The best illustration of this is the Battle of Preveza. Thus EUIII's method of giving victory to the larger fleet with the better admiral is ahistorical, since it doesn't take ownership of coastal fortresses into account. The best solution to this, in my opinion, is to drain a galley's morale slowly while it is out at sea. The longer your fleet remains away from home, the more likely it is to be destroyed in battle. This gives the defending galley fleet the advantage, as would be historical. Such a thing can explain the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto - giving up the protection of the fortress to fight an unpredictable battle at sea.
To represent the ability of a galley to easily avoid battle, upon contact with an enemy fleet at sea (before the battle begins) both sides should be able to attempt to withdraw (causing 0 casualties or captures). The success chance would be very high, modified by the maneuver score of both admirals and the distance to a friendly port. To catch a retreating enemy fleet, one would have to have a great advantage in maneuver compared to the retreating admiral. Of course, retreating after a battle has already started should incur the normal penalties of potentially losing ships in the process.
The last, and potentially most important use of galleys was their ability to get supplies to a besieged coastal fortress. Because of problems caused by weather and supply, a galley fleet could not blockade a port year-round. When the enemy fleet inevitably sent most of its ships back home to avoid a potential disaster, a much smaller fleet of galleys could move in to slip past the remaining blockaders and resupply the besieged fort. This happened, for instance, during the Siege of Famagusta and the Siege of Malta. Even though the Spanish fleet had been annihilated at Djerba, they were still able to slip a relief force past the much more powerful Ottoman fleet. It did not take a lot of effort to get men and supplies past a hostile fleet - this is why sieges typically failed if the fortress could not be conquered within the campaign season. In EUIV, this could be done by giving galleys the ability to do a 'resupply' mission on a besieged coastal fort. Success would depend primarily on the distance from the besieged fort to another friendly port, modified by both defending and attacking admiral maneuver, size of enemy fleet, and number of galleys sent on the mission. The larger the force sent to relieve the fort, the higher the chance of success, but also the higher the chance of losing ships in the process.
This is the reason why Mediterranean ports in the 16th Century split along two lines - Ottoman in the Eastern Mediterranean, Spanish in the Western. It was very easy to prevent the capture of a fort near to one's base of operations. The strength of forts were due to the revolution in fortress design that began at the turn of the century, spearheaded by the Italians. In the 15th Century, forts were not so easily defensible, as the sieges of Coron and Modon showed. In the 16th Century, the Spanish could not hope to conquer a port in Turkey or Egypt, and the Ottomans would be insane to attack Sicily or Barcelona, while both could, with great effort, conquer fortresses in their respective spheres of influence.
For any player in the Mediterranean, though primarily for the Spanish, Ottomans, Venetians, and Barbary states, galley warfare is going to be a very important aspect of gameplay, that is why it should be overhauled to be realistic and historically accurate.
tl;dr, Galley combat in EUIII is ahistorical and should be fixed by representing the way galleys and coastal fortresses worked together and protected each other.
EDIT: Removed a section on the relationship between big ships and galleys in which I said some things which, looking back on it, weren't completely accurate.
Since blockades were impossible, galleys were used to raid coastlines and shipping lanes, rather than to fight enemy fleets. Real engagements between enemy fleets at sea were so unpredictable that no sane commander would pursue such a thing unless having overwhelming odds - and then the enemy commander would have to be a fool to get caught in battle against such odds. Battles near the coast were more predictable because they were more lopsided - overwhelming defender advantage. A well positioned fortress armed with cannon could permanently prevent a hostile fleet from approaching the harbor where the friendly fleet would be stationed. The hostile fleet would have to maintain battle formation permanently in case it was attacked, while the friendly fleet could rest and attack only at the most opportune moment. The best illustration of this is the Battle of Preveza. Thus EUIII's method of giving victory to the larger fleet with the better admiral is ahistorical, since it doesn't take ownership of coastal fortresses into account. The best solution to this, in my opinion, is to drain a galley's morale slowly while it is out at sea. The longer your fleet remains away from home, the more likely it is to be destroyed in battle. This gives the defending galley fleet the advantage, as would be historical. Such a thing can explain the Ottoman defeat at Lepanto - giving up the protection of the fortress to fight an unpredictable battle at sea.
To represent the ability of a galley to easily avoid battle, upon contact with an enemy fleet at sea (before the battle begins) both sides should be able to attempt to withdraw (causing 0 casualties or captures). The success chance would be very high, modified by the maneuver score of both admirals and the distance to a friendly port. To catch a retreating enemy fleet, one would have to have a great advantage in maneuver compared to the retreating admiral. Of course, retreating after a battle has already started should incur the normal penalties of potentially losing ships in the process.
The last, and potentially most important use of galleys was their ability to get supplies to a besieged coastal fortress. Because of problems caused by weather and supply, a galley fleet could not blockade a port year-round. When the enemy fleet inevitably sent most of its ships back home to avoid a potential disaster, a much smaller fleet of galleys could move in to slip past the remaining blockaders and resupply the besieged fort. This happened, for instance, during the Siege of Famagusta and the Siege of Malta. Even though the Spanish fleet had been annihilated at Djerba, they were still able to slip a relief force past the much more powerful Ottoman fleet. It did not take a lot of effort to get men and supplies past a hostile fleet - this is why sieges typically failed if the fortress could not be conquered within the campaign season. In EUIV, this could be done by giving galleys the ability to do a 'resupply' mission on a besieged coastal fort. Success would depend primarily on the distance from the besieged fort to another friendly port, modified by both defending and attacking admiral maneuver, size of enemy fleet, and number of galleys sent on the mission. The larger the force sent to relieve the fort, the higher the chance of success, but also the higher the chance of losing ships in the process.
This is the reason why Mediterranean ports in the 16th Century split along two lines - Ottoman in the Eastern Mediterranean, Spanish in the Western. It was very easy to prevent the capture of a fort near to one's base of operations. The strength of forts were due to the revolution in fortress design that began at the turn of the century, spearheaded by the Italians. In the 15th Century, forts were not so easily defensible, as the sieges of Coron and Modon showed. In the 16th Century, the Spanish could not hope to conquer a port in Turkey or Egypt, and the Ottomans would be insane to attack Sicily or Barcelona, while both could, with great effort, conquer fortresses in their respective spheres of influence.
For any player in the Mediterranean, though primarily for the Spanish, Ottomans, Venetians, and Barbary states, galley warfare is going to be a very important aspect of gameplay, that is why it should be overhauled to be realistic and historically accurate.
tl;dr, Galley combat in EUIII is ahistorical and should be fixed by representing the way galleys and coastal fortresses worked together and protected each other.
EDIT: Removed a section on the relationship between big ships and galleys in which I said some things which, looking back on it, weren't completely accurate.
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