Did the city retain (some of) its economic and strategic value, or was it so damaged that there's no prize for winning?
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It retained its strategic value as a rail hub and crossing point over the Volga. As far as I know it lost virtually its entire economic value. Its morale value was, however, priceless.
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Most tractors were mobilized to Red Army at the beginning of war. So German soldiers didn't see it in villages.
In villages:
Movie of 1939 year:
In Red Army:
In 1939 Germany had 1 tractor compare to 1211 men. ( 65 900 tractors)
In 1938 USSR had 1 tractor compare to 301 men (560 600 tractors)
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According Russian historians German army had to fight around Stalingrad because Worker-Peasant Red Army counter-attacked in the territories north of the city. According Russian point of view Germans didn't have enough troops to take Stalingrad because of constant battles north to the city.
Actually first two tanks armies formed firstly in Red Army (1st tank army and 4th tank army) were destroyed to north of the city.
In october 01, 1942 Donskoy Front includes next tank brigades: 121, 148, 167, 124, 241, 91, 64, 58, 2, 190, 217, 246.
Separate tank battalions: 646 and 647.
Actually first two tanks armies formed firstly in Red Army (1st tank army and 4th tank army) were destroyed to north of the city.
In october 01, 1942 Donskoy Front includes next tank brigades: 121, 148, 167, 124, 241, 91, 64, 58, 2, 190, 217, 246.
Separate tank battalions: 646 and 647.
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Counter attacks along the flanks of German penetrations was a standard Soviet tactic throughout 1941-43. They were often small scale and under-supported (particularly in '41-'42) leading to significant casualties. However, in situations where the German spearheads were unable to rapidly surround soviet forces and break through into the soviet operational space they did force the Germans to continuously detach formations from their spearheads, dissipating the power of the shwerpunkt particularly in cases where the Germans were short of infantry, either due to rapid advances by mechanised formations or due to casualties.
This is one of the reasons the attack in Stalingrad was conducted by mechanised forces, in spite of the unsuitability of those forces for urban assaults. There were simply not enough infantry to both cover the flanks and storm the defences, leaving the job of assaulting them primarily to the mechanised forces. Without the sacrifices of the Soviet forces attacking continuously along the flanks it is possible that the Germans could have gathered sufficient force to finish capturing Stalingrad.
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This was a complex event that had complex motivations, that defy any simplistic moral narrative. However one factor that is under played is that Hitler and the Nazi leadership were to use the old saw trying to re-fight the last war. As they saw it the strategy of the allies and particularly the British in WWI was to blockade and starve Germany into surrender. As they saw it the German leadership in WWI had allowed the German people to starve while still in control of huge areas of occupied territories, large populations and large food resources.
They felt that the leadership had lacked ruthlessness. They also saw the Liberal allies as hypocrites, complaining about atrocities, but in fact prepared to starve millions to death. That the allies were hypocrites who committed their atrocities at arms length but without getting their hand dirty. So a constant theme of the Nazis during the war was "We will not starve". There was this constant self radicalization and this constant self goading to be strong, to not give way to the "weakeness" of compassion and empathy, to not fall again for the perfidious British and American's strategy through the Weakness of compassion for the occupied peoples and the Jews that they had ghettoized. (The Jews were of course not the enemmies of German nationalism until the Nazis made them, but I going to leave aside here what led them down that path.)
After the Fall of France, Hitler started demobilizing the German war machine. His motivation for attacking the Soviet Union in 1941 was to make Britain come to terms. Its the same theme of they wouldn't allow a lack of ruthlessness to let British strategy be successful.
Now of course this pathology of seeing every problem as a test of ruthlessness led to catastrophe. The German occupation strategies and methods were not just immensely cruel damaging and murderous to the occupied populations but were totally counter productive, as many have pointed out. But there was a logic behind their apparent madness. And although that logic was misplaced it came out of the context of the First World War and the awareness of Britain's strategy towards Europe over hundreds of years. It wasn't just down to the personal psychologies of Germany's world War II leadership or the fact that they had listened to too much Wagner.
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it was a dangerous bridgehead too, where the Russia can hide troop there and attack into the open steppe of the Germans.
The German couldn't let the whole city intact . But if they couldn't seize it, then they should have a fortified line around it and move most of the troops elsewhere.
In real life they did surround the city, touch the Volga river on both sides of the city, and cut off the river transport line. But there is no order to fortify so most of the troops were still concentrate there and make the long flanks vulnerable.
The German also let the Soviet to establish many bridgeheads over the Don river on the North and South, that make the counter attack easier.
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Can you help me with numbers? Germany invaded France with one panzern group. After "demobilization the German war machine" Germany invaded USSR with four panzern groups. Cool demobilization....
After the fall of France a large part of the German Army relocated to Germany where the manpower was demobilised. The divisions were left as administrative shells while the manpower went back to normal life.
Taking Stalingrad wasnt even a requirment of the original plan. Coming into artillery range was seen as sufficient. Likewise the drive into the Caucasus was a change of plan and let to total chaos when Hitler sent the panzers down and then back.
Von Bock got fired for protesting against these shenengians.
Von Bock got fired for protesting against these shenengians.
According Muller-Gillerband:
German army in 1940 during invasion in France - 6.05 mln. men.
German army in 1941 before invasion in USSR - 7.23 mln. men.
So german soldiers demobilisated and army increased (+ 1.18 mln. men)?
Source:
Пятнадцать миллионов вермахта — Военная история (Айзен Тайчо) — NewsLand
Давно высказывается мнение что численность потерь вермахт а тотально фальсифицировнна.Раньше эта тема замалчивалась,в СССР и Германии об этом было совсем немного материала,но сегодня информации стало больше.
maxpark.com
According Muller-Gillerband:
German army in 1940 during invasion in France - 6.05 mln. men.
German army in 1941 before invasion in USSR - 7.23 mln. men.
So german soldiers demobilisated and army increased (+ 1.18 mln. men)?
Source:
Пятнадцать миллионов вермахта — Военная история (Айзен Тайчо) — NewsLand
Давно высказывается мнение что численность потерь вермахт а тотально фальсифицировнна.Раньше эта тема замалчивалась,в СССР и Германии об этом было совсем немного материала,но сегодня информации стало больше.
Demobilisation is a bit of a misleading term here. Let me try to clarify.
The economy was most certainly not demobilised at all. The production of various armaments was still going strong, the emphasis just shifted from short-term to a more long-term outlook. Munitions and older models of stuff were slashed badly, because after victory against France, there was no pressing need to get everything onto the field ASAP. However, planes, ships and more advanced weapons were prioritised instead. The wehrmacht was to be motorized to a large degree, Luftwaffe was to be brought up to a strength sufficient to defeat UK, and so on.
This shift of emphasis caused no end of headaches for german industry. All the newly retooled munition plants had to be converted to something else again, because there was no demand for ammo from government anymore, which pissed the industrialists off to no end. They converted their plants because of assurances of profits and long term contracts, which fell through.
The manpower itself was not really demobilized either. Right after the fall of France, in June 1940, there were plans to put Wehrmacht on a peacetime footing, which meant essentially halving the standing strength to some 60-odd divisions. Various industrial agencies, Todt organisation and others actually counted on the manpower thus released to solve workforce issues in industry. But when it became clear over the summer that UK won't surrender quickly, the large demobilisation was scrapped and only some of the older men were released, while the intake of new young conscripts pretty much cancelled the manpower drop out. In August 1940, when it became clear that the war with SU is happening, even this symbolic demobilisation was stopped cold. The demoblised men were then recalled in early 1941 in preparation for Barbarossa.
So the demobilisation was actually planned, but stayed mostly on paper and represented just a little dip in the growth of german military might.
For online sauce see here.
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A minor footnote, Manstein's fighting retreat out of the Caucuses was one of the most brilliant moves of the war. He never should have been sent until the rail and river hub was taken, but lets give the Wehrmacht their props for that one.