Chapter One Hundred and Fourteen: Naprzód na Ural!
(Onward to the Urals!)
(22-30 September 1947)
Polish officers instruct guards escorting the latest column of Soviet prisoners taken south of Petrograd, late September 1947. [MS Copilot]
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Eastern Front: Northern Sector
The attack to reduce the final Petrograd Pocket was launched by nearly two full corps of Polish infantry, with some heavy tank support, at 2200hrs on 22 September 1947. They faced ten Soviet divisions that had been worn down by previous combat and lack of supplies but fighting lasted until the morning of the 25th. Then it was all over, with around 75,000 more Soviet prisoners taken.
Later that day Polish troops in the sector, including those trying to recover organisation to the south, were redeployed towards the Volkhov-Tikhvin sector. They aimed to link up with a strong Allied push coming out of Finland, around the north of Lake Ladoga.
Those moves would take time of course. Further north, by 30 September the Allies were fighting hard along the Finnish border to further constrict the narrow corridor the Soviets maintained all the way to Murmansk. There, Soviet troops were increasingly in danger of being cut off and divided into a series of pockets, in a similar way to the long and painful Allied retreat from Western China.
Poland had also occupied Tikhvin by that afternoon, with their next immediate objective being clearing out the last two parts of the Tikhvin-Vologda rail line still in Soviet hands in that sector. Meanwhile, Polish militia divisions had managed to push east beyond Volkhov along the southern shore of Lake Ladoga.
Up in the far north, by the end of the month the British appeared to have landed by sea behind the lines to seize Murmansk itself, while the Allies had driven a wedge from Finland towards the White Sea in an attempt to cut off those Soviet divisions remaining in the Murmansk area. The Allies had brought in a lot of divisions to achieve this, though it was clearly straining supply to breaking point.
Eastern Front: Central Sector
Some adjustments were made in the allocation of air assets on 23 September. 150 Polish CAS remained operating in the Northern Front AZ, and a minor contribution remained in the Kuban Region AZ. More effort was redirected back to the CRAZ to support the operations around Vologda, though the primary Polish effort continued in the WSAZ for the Kuybyshev thrust. The Allies maintained air superiority in all the Eastern Front air zones.
No large battles were fought in the Central Sector in the last ten days of the month, but by the 30th, as noted previously, the whole rail line from Vologda to just east of Tikhvin had been occupied by the Poles. The rest of the Allies were slowly catching up with the broad-front Polish advance, but the Soviets had establish a contiguous defensive line.
And the usual supply problems made it hard to advance quickly. As in Iran, in some places supply-related attrition was very high, but unlike Iran, the Poles could not afford to pull back from key locations such as Vologda.
However, there was still a desire to cut through to the Archangelsk enclave and the Poles would be looking for a suitable place for a narrower and more concentrated thrust north in October. Both weak points in the Soviet line and ability to get supply forwards would be key factors in pursuing this next phase.
As temporary branch rail line had been under construction for a few days to quickly establish a link to Vologda and the newly secured (and still damaged) rail line that extended west from it.
This was also behind the impending operation to take the last section of rail line west of Tikhvin mentioned previously. If supply could be inserted from both ends, it should help power that desired push north to Archangelsk.
A review of air combat data from the last few months showed many more Soviet ground troops had been bombed that Polish in the three main air zones the PAF was contesting on the Eastern Front. In the CRAZ in particular, this ratio was assisted by a far higher disruption rate of Soviet bombing sorties, at the cost of higher aircraft losses on both sides (quite a few from AA). Polish fighter losses mainly seemed to be older models and were sustainable.
Eastern Front: Southern Sector
A new attempt was made to break out in the Uralsk oblast, east of Volgograd, on 22 September. The main component of the eight-division attack was recently resupplied 8th (EF) Army divisions, even if not all the participants were reorganised yet. The defending Soviet light tank divisions was easily dislodged after just four hours of fighting.
At the same time, reinforcements were reaching the Kuybyshev Salient and a new attack was launched to resume the momentum towards the main objective. However, by that time the Soviets had also strengthened their defences and the attack had to be abandoned after a disadvantageous nine-hour combat.
Yet more divisions were redirected to the salient by the end of the following day as the Poles regrouped and prepared for the next phase.
A survey of supply across the whole (Russian) Eastern Front on 24 September highlighted where the main Allied salients were pushing but also the supply challenges that lay behind them.
A day later, the heaviest fighting was in the lower Central and Southern Sectors, mainly Allied-led except in the Kuybyshev Salient.
By the end of the day, the tip of the salient had been widened by one province and the offensive renewed, while the rest of the Allies had also pushed forces forward to hold the ground gained in strength. Once more, the Poles were acting as the ‘shock troops’ to get the advance going again, with a victory at the tip finally won just before midnight.
In the three days up to 28 September, the salient had been extended and widened as the Poles continued to push forward towards Kuybyshev along both banks of the Volga and now east from Balakovo, as the rest of the Allies were left to hold the salient.
As September ended, the Polish advance guard had just reached the outskirts of Kuybyshev and continued to push along the northern bank of the Volga.
Eastern Front: Caucasus Sector
The drive to cut the rail line running north through Makhachkala ran out of steam on 22 September, with the single lead 8th Army division running into increasing enemy resistance and ending their attack quickly after an initial probe. Many Allied divisions were sitting back likely due to lack of supplies.
As with the main Eastern Front, supply in the Caucasus and Middle East-Iran sectors was poor on 24 September as overcrowding and sub-standard infrastructure hampered logistics.
At the end of the month, a new attempt was made to cut the Baku-Astrakhan rail line by reinforcing an existing British attack that was in difficulty with a regular and militia division, which soon had the odds reversed against the defending Soviet medium tank division. However, the line still held at the day ended.
Middle East and Iran
The Fars Pocket had been reduced by 24 September. The Poles had participated with one division in a large and bloody battle that ended in a nominal defeat earlier in the day, but a new Allied attack (which the Poles sat out this time) had begun soon after and was on the cusp of victory by the end of the day.
At the same time, to the north the Allies had at last pushed into western Iran at Hamadan, moving east from reclaimed Kurdish territory that had once been part of Iraq. And noting Iran was still a member of the Allies, so liberated Iranian territory was coming back under their sovereignty.
By 28 September, the Allies had heavily reinforced the entire front in Iran following the link up with Iraq. Despite past Polish efforts to improve the rail system in southern Iran this was overwhelming the supply system to the extent that heavy attrition was now affecting troops at the front.
Most Polish forces in Iran began withdrawing from the front at that point and by the following day almost all of the 4th Army was on trains and heading back south to regain supply.
The High Command considered where they might best be employed next as the long Polish expeditionary mission to save Iran was declared over. It would now be up to the Allies to prosecute the no doubt slow and grinding liberation of the rest of the country. That liberation was well under way as the month drew to a close.
South West Pacific Area (SWPA)
The general situation in the SWPA showed little movement in the last ten days of September 1947. The MAB and the US still held the initiative but seemed unable to make much progress – except for one new and potentially dangerous development: a Japanese amphibious landing in the north of Sumatra, of which we will see more detail in subsequent chapters.
The situations on the ground in Papua and northern Queensland were static and the US salient comparatively lightly held.
In Western Australia, the American advance had stalled and the Allies were now even counter-attacking the end of the poorly supplied US salient. The incoming Polish reinforcements had not yet arrived in Perth.
The Americas
The status quo also continued to prevail in North America.
Domestic Affairs
The French Commune made a useful new lend-lease offer on 21 September, which was gratefully accepted.
Following this and with infantry equipment production increasing, an extra infantry battalion was added to the reserve (militia) division orbat to start strengthening those formations. Rather than building new divisions (difficult due to other equipment shortages) current ones could at least be strengthened.
Indeed, by the end of the month infantry equipment was again in a healthy surplus. The other key equipment deficits remained, though there were almost enough new jet fighters for a new wing to be deployed and the first new modern Polish-built strategic bomber, the Szerszeń (Hornet). The other 30 aircraft were old models seized from defeated Soviet allies.
The 54 military factories (14 from occupied territory) were producing equipment with varying degrees of efficiency as the Polish War Ministry tried to maintain a relatively steady approach to gradually build efficiency in each production line, even as new factories were added through construction and occupation.
The heaviest effort remained on infantry equipment, followed by AT then light tanks, artillery, support equipment and jet fighters. Some other lines were kept ‘ticking over’ as they had achieved peak efficiency and a build-up of medium armoured gear could eventually facilitate the future addition of another mechanised division.
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Summaries
The main combat theatres clearly showed growing Allied encroachment into Russia, balanced against the strength of the MAB in the Far East and the newer encroachments of the US/TRA alongside them in the SWPA, where the Allies continued to wage a slow fighting withdrawal on multiple small fronts.
The end of the month saw a resurgence of Allied offensives all along the Russian and Middle-Eastern Fronts, especially in both the Far North and southern Caucasus-Middle Eastern areas. Most of this new fighting was being led by the wider Allies, with Polish offensives remaining limited and focused.
Advances since the start of the month were wide but not huge, with the biggest gains (both in land and actual or potential Soviet encirclements) being in the Murmansk, Petrograd-Vologda, Kuybyshev Salient, Caucasus and southern Iran sectors.
Both the Allies and the three enemy factions had suffered some heavy casualties during the month, both from offensive operations and pocket surrenders (notably in Borneo, around Petrograd and on a smaller scale in southern Iran). Polish casualties had been lower than they had been for many months, reflecting a more selective approach to offensive operations and deliberate resting of worn or unsupplied units. Manpower reserves remained strong, despite the recruitment of 20 new battalions for the reserve divisions.
The Soviets had lost the bulk of the enemy casualties (460,000 out of 600,000 total enemy monthly casualties). An estimated 28 Red Army divisions had been lost in net terms, mainly in the Petrograd Pockets, a few elsewhere and some in which the Poles had not been directly involved at the end (as in Fars). The assessed overall balance of the war had against shifted steadily in the Allies’ favour over the month, with the USR now 79% along the way to the point of capitulation.
