Just after a week of Operation Typhoon, light snow fell, turning Russia's already poor roads into rivers of mud. Soldiers lost their boots in the mud, horses and wagons collapsed in the mud, trucks got stuck in the mud, and only half-track and tracked vehicles were able to move (albeit much slower than normal) under these disastrous conditions. Rasputitsa, of course, hit German logistics hard and the confiscation of peasant carriages only slightly improved the situation. In the end, the German offensive had to stop until the first frost hit.
The first major frosts drove Rasputitsa away in mid-November. However, in late November and early December, it was extremely cold winter. The average temperature in Moscow in November 1941 was -5 degrees Celsius, and in the following month as much as -13 degrees. Of course, at times the temperature was even lower, reaching levels between -40 and -50 degrees. It was impossible to conduct military operations in such conditions without proper equipment. Of course, the Germans were aware of the conditions prevailing in winter in Russia. In January 1941, the average temperature in Moscow was -20 degrees, so another harsh winter shouldn't come as a surprise. The Germans had winter supplies for about 80-90 divisions, but at the end of 1941 the logistics services were unable to provide sufficient supplies of basic ammunition, fuel and food, let alone winter equipment.
Fighting in such conditions favored the defending side, especially in static positions, which provided protection against the cold, the possibility of warming up or drying clothes. On the other hand, the attacking side - deprived of winter equipment - must struggle in the cold through deep snow. Weapons and vehicles require special lubricants to work in such conditions - for the same reason motorised transport is limited. Even trains have problems operating at low temperature. As a result, German soldiers had to chase civilians to frost and take their houses (unless they were burned down by the retreating Red Army), seize any piece of clothes they could get, light fires under the vehicles to even start them etc.
Rasputitsa and severe winter are regular weather phenomena in Russia. Rasputitsa usually occurs in April-May and October-November, severe winter - in December-February. Countries participating in Barbarossa will receive maluses for combat in mud, snow and frost and transport capacity during their duration. While nothing can be done about Rasputitsa, the Germans can reduce the maluses a bit in the winter. First of all, Germany must have technologies for winter equipment before Barbarossa and produce enough reserves for the army (the cost will depend on the number of divisions). During the Barbarossa, Germany will have to sacrifice part of its transport capacity to bring winter supplies from the Reich to the front. And, well, that's it.
Since we are already waging the war in poor weather and terrain conditions, I should also mention the front in Libya & Egypt. I think we all know what the problem is - AI can place a million soldiers in one region, although it isn't possible to supply such a huge mass of troops in one place. While the British in Egypt had a railway line running near the Libyan border, the Axis troops hung on one poor Via Balbia, running from Tripoli to the Egyptian border. It's only 1700 km, what could go wrong?
Following Operation Compass, Afrika Korps was dispatched to Africa as a 'blocking force'. The 'blocking', a purely defensive unit intended simply to keep the Allies from taking over all of Libya. There was a very strong reason for this - the Italians were not able to supply very large forces, and certainly not at a distance of 1700 km from the main supply base with only two much smaller ports along the way (Benghazi and Tobruk). Italians knew it already in 1940. Rommel didn't, or he simply didn't consider logistics to be a binding factor
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We know what happened later - Rommel rushed to Egypt, and the logistics simply was not able to provide the right amount of supplies. That is, if he was ordered to stay in more or less central Libya or, at worst, on the border with Egypt, the Axis forces in Africa would be quite well equipped. Food, fuel and ammunition reached the port of Tripoli, but Italians and Germans didn't have sufficient means of transport. And no, Rommel's 'sEnD mOrE tRuCkS' wouldn't be enough. Because these trucks need more trucks with fuel and spare parts, and these in turn need more trucks with fuel and spare parts, and these in turn... etc., and at the same time, let's not forget that Via Balbia also had its capacity (in fact it was pretty narrow asphalt road where two vehicles would barely pass side by side) and was exposed to attacks by the Allied air force. The solution I came up with is simply a penalty to attack and move in the desert if Axis forces enter Egypt. This way, the Axis forces will be able to defend themselves effectively, but will not be able to attack. Unless they build a railway to Egypt
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