So the United States, to the end of 1856, had held the overwhelming force of the British at bay while gradually conquering bits and pieces of Canada. By the end of that year the US Army had regional superiority in eastern Canada. It allowed the shifting of resources south.
There had never been a serious tasking of forces in the west because there was just too much territory. The British were bottled in by the US Navy at Vancouver Island, but the threat of the Royal Navy perhaps breaking the blockade meant the Seattle garrison couldn’t move to the offense.
Further south, the Mexico war was squirrelly because I was concentrating in too many directions – couldn’t bring full force to bear. Most US war strength was committed in the north against British Canada. Mexico became a catch-as-catch-can war.
My strategy in such situations is generally to move in and occupy territory with brigade size forces while having an army large enough to deal with concentrations of enemy army. But in Mexico, with its strength, compared to the smaller overall force commitment in the south, meant they had more large armies than I had.
As 1857 dawned, tentative efforts were made to extend American power into California and Colorado. Even so far as New Mexico, bypassing small Mexican armies instead of reckoning with them. Colorado was chosen as the first new war goal.
As resources moved south, a more coherent strategy began to develop. Always, always, always, priority has to be the reduction – en masse or gradually, as practical – of enemy armies so that they don’t just run. They have to disappear. I have to remove them from the map entirely, or they will grow and we’ll just have to fight them again.
Early on, the battle for northern California set up Gen. Tomas Barragin (again) as our primary nemesis. Gen. Mark Brown was set up in opposition, but could not overcome Barragin’s genius (+4 attack).
By mid 1857 Gen. Christopher Belknap had begun to show promising victories over the Mexicans, forcing Gen. Antonio Escandon to retreat first from Zacatecas in June, then facing him again and soundly defeating him at Durango in July.
The US had struggled to gain serious warscore against the British/Mexican alliance, since there had been few American victories against the real target of the war – Mexico. Individual Canadian provinces or Caribbean islands had little affect versus the size of the British Empire. But these victories raised American warscore to 27%.
Belknap positioned his army in the mountains of Parral in order to meet Gen. Barragin and cut him off from the rest of Mexico. He caused a delaying engagement that also claimed many Mexican troops and sapped Barragin’s strength. The -5 modifiers in the mountains, against his dug-in troops, offset Barragin’s +4 attack advantage.
Belknap’s immediate force retreated once sapped, but reinforcements had arrived that continued to hold the line against Barragin. Eventually, even that line gave way.
But a commander as savvy as Tomas Barragin realized that although he was winning battles, he was also trapped. He continued to move south toward Mexico City, where his army was needed more than where he was.
Ultimately, there was no escape possible. Belknap’s defeated army pursued Barragin’s on a parallel. And other armies awaited and dug in to await the approach of the inevitable battle.
Barragin probably knew he was falling into a trap, but either did not flinch from the fight or he assumed the weak organization of the American armies would not be sufficient to bring him to heel. In the end, he was right. Six armies converged upon San Luis Potosi, under the leadership of Gen. Joseph Grant. But Barragin escaped. This time he moved north instead of south.
Mexico City fell in October. And Gen. Belknap caught up with Barragin again at Monclova. Because Barragin was fleeing, and no longer had the initiative, Belknap was able to pick a fight on his own terms. His enemy was no longer the brilliant opponent, but rather an already beaten and flagging foe.
After four different American generals had chased Tomas Barragin and his army back and forth across half of Mexico, he was finally cornered at Torreon in the first month of 1858.
Gen. Grant accepted his surrender on January 17, 1858. Starting a year previous in California, his army had been whittled down from 19,000 troops to nothing. But it was such a gradual process, and at great cost to the American armies.
With Barragin’s defeat, the Mexican Army essentially ceased to exist. American troops spanned almost all of Mexico and were slowly establishing irreversible control.
The British Empire still stood strong, at nearly 600 brigades (nearly 2 million men) and 150 ships. But Mexico was beaten, and the British were having increasing difficulties projecting power against America.
Acquisition of the region of California was added to the existing wargoal desiring cessation of Colorado.
And -- shockingly enough – in April the United States actually demobilized its civilian conscripts, it being felt that the Mexico theatre was winding down and the existing professional army elements would be able to carry on the war.
The next stage of the war began as the Mexicans brooded upon now no longer the question, but rather the timing of their capitulation. By May even the British were sending peace overtures, albeit ones the United States government had no intention of settling for.
We landed troops in British Guyana, hoping to be able to take that colony. But as soon as we landed we realized they had a superior force that was descending on our army. I think maybe they had been busy in Brazil and had just returned or something? Not quite sure. Maybe they landed the troops fresh, after my first observation of the region.
During the middle of 1858 I was busy scouting out the rest of the British Empire, looking for opportunities and vulnerabilities. We landed troops in the Falkland Islands, ironically deposited by my slow-moving 3 remaining sail transports.
We even checked out New Zealand, and gosh – it really looked like they hadn’t garrisoned it at all!
But I’ve been burned by incomplete scouting previously. I spend a little extra time, and… Yup. There’s the doomstack hiding behind that small moon.
Amidst the confused fighting in Guyana Gen. Lucas Kimball – honored veteran of 15 years of American wars – fell to a British sniper.
But before the end of August, 1858, we had moved more troops into Guyana from Venezuela (and from Trinidad, recently captured). Guyana was a lost cause for the British, by this point. We were wearing them down and would eventually prevail.
So we’re in a good position, overall. I still have western Canada to conquer… And I judge that I CAN do that. Guyana is coming into place. There are surely other possibilities.
Again, I shall ask, what do you think I should do?
And, quite a different question – what do you think I did??
