Skirmishers (archers) in ancient & middle ages warfare question

[Avernite]

Perhaps the discussion was muddied by the detail. Essentially, @Zinegata stated:


My initial point was that the concept of a decisive battle formed out of the English Civil War (probably given experience in the Swedish style in the 30 years war) and formed the base principals for how the English/British military developed over the next centuries. This then resulted in the rather agressive responses which followed. I also struggle when people claim that, despite multiple citations specifically discussing the concept, claim it is 'bs'.

I suppose I am arguing something else then, yes - I do not dispute or agree with the claim that the English military focused on decisive battles (since I don't know), but if they did focus on decisive battles, it didn't show succesfully in the field during the 17th and 18th century. There may have been some decisive battles in the colonies and one or two decisive naval battles, but in European field battles the victories needed to come in large quantities to have a big impact (and that was pretty rare, to have such a concentrations of victories on just one side).

 

[Zinegata]

I suppose I am arguing something else then, yes - I do not dispute or agree with the claim that the English military focused on decisive battles (since I don't know), but if they did focus on decisive battles, it didn't show succesfully in the field during the 17th and 18th century. There may have been some decisive battles in the colonies and one or two decisive naval battles, but in European field battles the victories needed to come in large quantities to have a big impact (and that was pretty rare, to have such a concentrations of victories on just one side).

Again, they disbanded the New Model Army, which was the product of Monck's reforms and for the longest time would be the last really professionally-led English Army. That's why they kept losing on the ground.

This is why thinking that Monck's reforms had lasting impact and it came in the form of "decisive battle" victories is silly. The instrument of winning said battles was disbanded to begin with, replaced by a system were nobles could bribe their way to command. And in any case the person claiming that Gustavus wanted to win "decisive battles" is wrong. His reforms were much more extensive as I will explain in my next post.

 

[Zinegata]

Since the focus here seems to be about the reforms of Gustavus Adolphus, the adoption of lighter artillery that was more suitable for field battles than sieges may be relevant. While it ultimately turned into a weapon of attrition, in its original form field artillery was an important tool in ”decisive battles” however you define them.

The thing here to realize however is that all of his reforms made the Swedish army better at both sieges and battle. It wasn't just limited to improving artillery. The key was the professionalism of its soldiers and officers. Both native Swedes and mercenaries for instance were equipped and trained along the same lines, and a clear understanding of "combined arms" and what role each unit had on the battlefield was developed. And this is before we get to the navy reforms and the supply improvements.

This is why his sobriquet is Father of Modern Warfare - and not just Father of Modern Battle. The reforms were applicable to all kinds of military operations.

Indeed, that the one poster falsely insisting that Gustavus was a proponent of "decisive battle" instead of reforming the entire military is English should really circle back and prove my point that it's English history with an obsession over the "decisive battle concept" despite the English being generally bad at it except in the naval field.

Military operations and reforms, as Gustavus proved and attested to by later French and German military writers, cover more than just battle. By contrast it's English posters poorly educated by their historical establishment who tend to insisted military operations are just battle.

 

[Arilou]

The thing here to realize however is that all of his reforms made the Swedish army better at both sieges and battle. It wasn't just limited to improving artillery. The key was the professionalism of its soldiers and officers. Both native Swedes and mercenaries for instance were equipped and trained along the same lines, and a clear understanding of "combined arms" and what role each unit had on the battlefield was developed. And this is before we get to the navy reforms and the supply improvements.

This is why his sobriquet is Father of Modern Warfare - and not just Father of Modern Battle. The reforms were applicable to all kinds of military operations.

Indeed, that the one poster falsely insisting that Gustavus was a proponent of "decisive battle" instead of reforming the entire military is English should really circle back and prove my point that it's English history with an obsession over the "decisive battle concept" despite the English being generally bad at it except in the naval field.

Military operations and reforms, as Gustavus proved and attested to by later French and German military writers, cover more than just battle. By contrast it's English posters poorly educated by their historical establishment who tend to insisted military operations are just battle.

It should be noted that sieges remained a notable weak point in the swedish system despite them fielding a very effective field artillery. (basically it was a byproduct of attempted standardization and an emphasis on speed which meant carrying around big siege guns was seen as impractical) that wasn't a big problem in the east or scandinavia (where fortresses were rare) but there are a bunch of cases during the 30-years war were the lack of siege artillery became quite a problem.

 

[Easy-Kill]

but if they did focus on decisive battles, it didn't show succesfully in the field during the 17th and 18th century.

I would agree with you, but I would also disagree with you. There were some battles that were highly decisive on the tactical level and greatly influenced the general course of a war at the operational level. While Seige Warfare still influenced strategy, the English/British never had the numerical strength to be able to be pinned down either as the besieged or seigers. Some examples of battles which were decisive in the 17/18C:

Marston Moore: Prince Rupert understanding he needed to defeat Parliament's army embattled despite being fewer in strength.The Royalists lost and subsequently lost control of Northern England.

Naseby: The Royalist Army was shattered, effectively removing them as a military threat and allowing much of the west country to be recaptured.

Dunkirk: Important as an example of the English intervening overseas and that a decisive battle that destroyed an enemy's ability to maintain control over a region.

Post english restoration, the Army went through a period of change. Charles II effectively disbanded the new model army, keeping several corps of cavalry and infantry, formed from New Model Army units. The regimental nature of these units ensured that they were loyal to Monck and by definition, then the Crown. Continental commitments were considered expensive and mostly benefitting other nations, thus England/Britain tended to stay out of them. The big stand out is of course the War of Spanish succession. Marlborough followed the idea and forced the French into a battle whose result had wide ranging operational and strategic effects. Of course you are correct that later in the century, Britain rarely intervened in large continental conflicts, and most of the colonial fighting was on a scale that did not really have large armies fighting over strategically important areas. Instead it was a war of dispersed occupation. Thus, the idea of using a large threatening force on the continent didn't really become apparent again until the French Revolutionary wars. But even there you see the British using its force to stay mobile and avoid being besieged or forced into decisive battle (or at least trying to), in order to maintain its strength and avoid operational reverses that lead to strategic defeats.

 

[Easy-Kill]

Again, they disbanded the New Model Army, which was the product of Monck's reforms and for the longest time would be the last really professionally-led English Army. That's why they kept losing on the ground.

Actually only part of the new model army was disbanded. 2 corps of cavalry and 4 of infantry were retained to make a professional standing force (albeit small). Whats more is that those units that were kept were principally those under the command of Monck and are those units at the head of the order of precedence f the Modern British Army. The Life Guards and Grenadier Guards keep the battle of Dunkirk (new model army) as part of their battle honours.

This is why thinking that Monck's reforms had lasting impact and it came in the form of "decisive battle" victories is silly. The instrument of winning said battles was disbanded to begin with, replaced by a system were nobles could bribe their way to command.

Again, the new model army structure may have been disbanded, but the core force was maintained. Even in Orrey's 'A treatise on the art of war', published in 1677 and remained the foundation of post restoration Doctrine specifically highlights the concept of seeking a 'decisive battel'.

As for the point of purchasing commissions. Ther are many benefits ... Generally somebody who has money to invest will typically have a better education and be skilled in the practice of logistics and management both the key skills of an officer (education still being required by the British Army today) ... It was generally a good process as it ensured that those with sufficient education held office. Being a good soldier does not make one a good manager. It was undoubtedly outdated in the mid 19th century as state education became more widespread, but then the reforms came and it started to change. I think you have been watching too much Sharpe!

And in any case the person claiming that Gustavus wanted to win "decisive battles" is wrong. His reforms were much more extensive as I will explain in my next post.

Do you have a real problem with reading comprehension? I never said that at all. I said that Civil war generals developed the decisive battle concept (as documented in their respective books) based on experience of the aggressive swedish style of war in the 30 years war. Please stop making things up!

 

[Easy-Kill]

Indeed, that the one poster falsely insisting that Gustavus was a proponent of "decisive battle"

Please take the time to actually read and understand what I wrote before you start insulting :/

 

[Avernite]

Actually only part of the new model army was disbanded. 2 corps of cavalry and 4 of infantry were retained to make a professional standing force (albeit small). Whats more is that those units that were kept were principally those under the command of Monck and are those units at the head of the order of precedence f the Modern British Army. The Life Guards and Grenadier Guards keep the battle of Dunkirk (new model army) as part of their battle honours.

After looking the wiki up - don't they keep the battle honour from being on the royalist (and thus losing) side of that battle, there being opposed to Monck's troops?

 

[Easy-Kill]

After looking the wiki up - don't they keep the battle honour from being on the royalist (and thus losing) side of that battle, there being opposed to Monck's troops?

Probably so with the Life Guards as they were the formed the King's troop of cavalry. The grenadier guards are most definitely parliament as they are behind the coldstream guards in order of precedence because of this fact. Also, Monck's was a royalist turned parliamentarian turned restoration royaliat again. He wrote his observations while imprisoned in the tower.