Chapter 281: November 1950
Chapter 281: November 1950
Reinforcements and replacements arrived for both sides at the start of the month. For the LN Coalition forces, this was considered their last chance to stabilise the situation as the Pusan Perimeter was constricted by three North Korean corps.
The US administration of President Harry Truman had considered and discarded the use of atomic weapons to support the failing LN position. It now considered a plea from General Douglas Macarthur, the LN Supreme Commander in Korea, for direct US Army support and an amphibious invasion force to outflank the enemy – perhaps by landing at Inchon and driving on Seoul, to force the Communists to split their forces and thus relieve the pressure on Pusan.
US President Harry Truman presides over a meeting of the National Security Council on 1 November 1950 to consider options for reinforcing the war effort in Korea.
On one end of the internal debate were the ‘Hawks’ who advocated the immediate assignment of two US marine divisions to conduct the initial landing at Inchon. At the other end were the those who considered the war was lost and that no further troops should be committed. This faction was named the ‘Ostriches’ by their opponents, accused of sticking their heads in the sand. Some argued for an intermediate approach, with no new risky landing, but with one to two marine divisions to be prepared for reinforcement.
The reinforcements and replacement for both sides are marked in green below. The Coalition revived one new US division, one LN and Japanese replacement. The North received one new division; South Korea received none, as the loss of Mokp’o saw its capacity fall below that needed to provide replacements for its many previously destroyed divisions. [An LN Coalition reorganisation on the ground was also permitted before the next DPRK impulse.]
LN Coalition deployments in the Pusan Perimeter after the landing of the US 25th Div in early November 1950.
The Japanese would be principally responsible for holding Ulsan to the north. Pusan, sitting behind a river line and with the benefit of urban terrain, was considered ‘worth the risk’, as it could only be attacked from the west on a narrow front. The hills of Taegu were considered to be undefendable, subject as they were to attack from five directions by the entirety of the Communists’ forces and was abandoned.
The key effort was made to ensure the hills of Kyongju, between Ulsan and Pusan, were held. In extremis, the previous division on the ground between Japanese and LN forces was waived, given the compressed space available for the defence and the need for the fine balance of strengths with the limited forces available. If Kyongju fell, the Coalition armies would be split in two and Pusan could not then be realistically held. It was also hoped that by forcing the DPRK to fling itself against strong defences that they might suffer enough casualties to weaken their offensive power enough to see the LN through until the end of the year.
Korean War: First Pusan Offensive, 2-8 November
The North Koreans consolidated their army into three full corps, with one closing up in the centre to occupy Taegu while the other two would launch probing attacks against both Ulsan and Pusan in the hope of ‘shaking something loose’ in the meantime. They reasoned that they could afford a few losses but one bad defeat for the LN would spell the end of their fragile position.
The attack on Ulsan was soon called off, with neither side forced to either yield ground or losing significant casualties. For the attack on Pusan, air support [-1 die roll] was added to the natural river defence [1/2 strength attack] and urban terrain [another -1 die roll: then a 1 was rolled anyway]. The attack was a setback for the DPRK, with one division destroyed and the rest forced back from their positions in Masan.
DPRK troops assaulting Ulsan, 2 November 1950. The attack would not be pressed after little initial progress was made.
Troops of the US 25th Division hung on grimly to the west of Pusan, administering a heavy defeat to the attacking North Koreans by 6 November 1950.
The LN decided against occupying Masan but was able to keep just a light garrison on Pusan itself, as it would take another week for the North to reoccupy Masan. Instead they ensured Kyongju and Ulsan were more heavily defended, no Taegu was in DPRK hands.
This initial period had been weathered well enough for the LN and hopes were raised that they could indeed hold out until the end of the year.
Kashmir
On 27 October the LN-sponsored Jammu & Kashmir Conference had proposed a resolution to help resolve the sore point between the two countries. If approved, a constituent assembly would be elected in an LN-supervised vote to determine the final disposition of the area.
On 5 November, the Indian Cabinet came firmly down on the side of a peaceful resolution [die roll 1], approving the LN-brokered proposal and agreeing to an independent democratic process to decide the future of the contested territory. Given their position, Pakistan could do no other than agree, with relations between both countries improving. Nonetheless, tensions and a degree of suspicion over Kashmir would continue, with the Constituent Assembly elections planned for the late spring of 1951.
Jinnah (left) and Nehru were both pleased that conflict had been averted and a peaceful way ahead made possible – if not certain – after agreeing to the LN proposal for Kashmir in November 1950.
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Korean War: Re-consolidation, 9-16 November
After its botched attack on Pusan, the DPRK decided to refrain from more half-baked attacks and instead drew the ‘spare’ division that had been garrisoning Seoul (following Soviet intelligence warnings of a possible US amphibious invasion) to re-establish a full corps in Masan, which was reoccupied by 13 November.
The LN responded by readjusting their own lines, adding a Japanese division to the Pusan garrison while ensuring the odds in Kyongju would be no better than 1-1 [ie 50 v 26] if the Communists decided to launch their entire army in a single attack on it, meaning the US 25th Div was shifted to that crucial point in the line. But no matter how the Coalition arranged themselves, they would have to take some risks.
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Other Events, 9-15 November
As the Chinese invasion of Tibet continued, on 11 November representatives of the government of Tibet sought intervention by the League of Nations to obtain the withdrawal of Chinese occupying troops from the eastern section of their nation. However, no meaningful support would be forthcoming. There was no appetite to either oppose Chiang nor to divert focus from the desperate situation in Korea.
In Romania, location filming began on the new movie starring Audie Murphy, John Wayne and Perse Fotheringay-Phipps, “The Streets of Timisoara”. The film was jointly funded by MGM and a S.I.T.H. front company, with Turkish ‘production advisers’ on hand to ensure that the ‘right messages’ were being sent.
Audie Murphy (left) and John Wayne during location filming of “The Streets of Timisoara”, November 1950.
Perse relaxes (as much as she ever can) on the film set in a break between her scenes.
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Korean War: Crescendo, 16-22 November
The Second Pusan Offensive began on 16 November 1950. The DPRK decided to leave the heavily defended Kyongju alone, taking their chances instead with a main attack against the Japanese in Ulsan in the north at odds of 2-1. A secondary attack on Pusan was expected to be repulsed again but was attempted again as a ‘speculator’. US air support was provided to Ulsan, the more vulnerable of the two positions.
The results were a disaster for the LN Coalition [9s rolled for both], with the Japanese and South Korean troops in both locations forced out of their defences. Had the air power been switched to Pusan, it would have merely resulted in an exchange of casualties on both sides but still a defeat for the Coalition.
DPRK troops press forward in the Second Pusan Offensive, starting on 17 November 1950. After just two days of fighting, the Coalition defence had melted away in both Ulsan and more crucially the last remaining LN port in Pusan.
Refugees flee north from Pusan as the Communist advance rolls into Pusan.
This meant that for the LN’s last roll of the dice, just five divisions would have the residual supplies for a full-on counter attack from Kyongju, with another four left out of supply behind the front line. If the LN attack on Pusan failed to recapture the port, the whole force would be out of supply within a week [half strength, maximum of five divisions counting to combat]. A full defeat would be almost inevitable.
With air support having already been committed that week to the defence of Ulsan, it was not available to support the counter-attack. And again, it would not have been enough to change the result. With odds of no more than 1-1 available, the US 25th Division had been held back to secure Kyongju in case of failure. Which is exactly what transpired, with the participating Japanese division destroyed as the attack on Pusan was easily defeated.
LN troops retreat back to Kyongju after the defeat of their counter-attack on Pusan, 20 November 1950.
DPRK troops celebrate their decisive victory on the northern approaches to Pusan, 21 November 1950.
There was now nothing left to the LN and Japan but to come to terms in order to save their remaining forces trapped in Kyongju from destruction.
While frantic negotiations went on in the LNSC, with the USSR sponsoring the Communist North’s interests, at Stalin’s insistence a ceasefire was agreed to by the DPRK after the failure of the Pusan counter-attack on 21 November.
DPRK and LN officers sign the interim ceasefire agreement in Pusan, 21 November 1950.
As General Macarthur was compelled to negotiate terms on the battlefield in Korea, armistice arrangements were hastily concluded in Geneva. All remaining US, LN and Japanese troops in Korea would be permitted to retain their arms and be repatriated through Pusan. In return, Stalin secured the recognition of the DPRK as the sole government of Korea and his own reputation as the statesman who had brokered peace in Korea without any direct military involvement in the conflict.
NB: old style Romanised spelling of Mao's name used deliberately here for 'period' reporting.
North Korean soldiers around Pusan celebrate their final victory in what they would eventually term the Great Patriotic War of Unification, 22 November 1950.
US and LN representatives sign the formal articles of surrender on behalf of the Coalition in Pusan, 22 November 1950.
Kim Il Sung signs his copy of the formal Armistice to end the Korean War in Pyongyang, 22 November 1950.
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Other Event: 17-30 November
On 17 November the fifteen year old Tenzin Gyatso was enthroned as the 14th Dalai Lama, becoming both the chief of state of the semi-independent kingdom, and the spiritual leader of adherents of Tibetan Buddhism worldwide.
The 14th Dalai Lama enthroned, 17 November 1950, during a time of war for Tibet.
The Japanese Diet [the French Assembly in OTL] voted on 23 November to approve plans to transfer the administration of all lands in Southern Vietnam to the Hanoi-based puppet government by the end of the year. They would also gradually let the Imperial Vietnamese Army (IVA) take over the war effort against the Viet Minh. This was seen as the beginning of Japan’s intended slow withdrawal from Vietnam.
A soldier of the Japanese-sponsored Imperial Vietnamese Army, November 1950. The burden of fighting would fall increasingly on these troops as the Japanese sought to extricate themselves from another debilitating conflict, just as the situation in Korea was going from bad to worse for them.
Korean War: ‘Hawks v Ostriches’Reinforcements and replacements arrived for both sides at the start of the month. For the LN Coalition forces, this was considered their last chance to stabilise the situation as the Pusan Perimeter was constricted by three North Korean corps.
The US administration of President Harry Truman had considered and discarded the use of atomic weapons to support the failing LN position. It now considered a plea from General Douglas Macarthur, the LN Supreme Commander in Korea, for direct US Army support and an amphibious invasion force to outflank the enemy – perhaps by landing at Inchon and driving on Seoul, to force the Communists to split their forces and thus relieve the pressure on Pusan.
US President Harry Truman presides over a meeting of the National Security Council on 1 November 1950 to consider options for reinforcing the war effort in Korea.
On one end of the internal debate were the ‘Hawks’ who advocated the immediate assignment of two US marine divisions to conduct the initial landing at Inchon. At the other end were the those who considered the war was lost and that no further troops should be committed. This faction was named the ‘Ostriches’ by their opponents, accused of sticking their heads in the sand. Some argued for an intermediate approach, with no new risky landing, but with one to two marine divisions to be prepared for reinforcement.
- ‘All In’: 01-40%. Two US divisions immediately provided with the amphibious support needed to land both behind enemy lines.
- ‘Enhanced Support’: 41-70%. One US division landed in Pusan immediately, with another prepared for reinforcement at the start of December.
- ‘Token Effort’: One US division landed in Pusan immediately.
- ‘Cut Bait’: 91-100%. No additional support.
Truman ended up deciding that, based on available advice, the two-division amphibious landing plan was too great a risk with the Perimeter so far distant from the proposed landing point. The same could be said of the next logical land point at Mokp’o in the south-west, which was also garrisoned by the PLA volunteer division. And getting two divisions ready to join and invade at such short notice was deemed impractical anyway.
But neither was he ready to write off the fight in Korea. So the decision was taken to provide enhanced support (Option 2), with the most easily available regular army division deployed first. It was hoped the additional US division, along with one division each of LN and Japanese replacements, would be enough to stabilise the front, with another new division to be provided in December. If they could hold until the end of the year, improved training, equipment and experience was expected to improve the fighting power of the LN troops in 1951.
Troops from the recently arrived US 25th Infantry Division on the dock at Pusan, 2 November 1950. They would be deployed to secure Pusan itself, relieving other Coalition troops to reinforce the line further to the north.
But neither was he ready to write off the fight in Korea. So the decision was taken to provide enhanced support (Option 2), with the most easily available regular army division deployed first. It was hoped the additional US division, along with one division each of LN and Japanese replacements, would be enough to stabilise the front, with another new division to be provided in December. If they could hold until the end of the year, improved training, equipment and experience was expected to improve the fighting power of the LN troops in 1951.
Troops from the recently arrived US 25th Infantry Division on the dock at Pusan, 2 November 1950. They would be deployed to secure Pusan itself, relieving other Coalition troops to reinforce the line further to the north.
The reinforcements and replacement for both sides are marked in green below. The Coalition revived one new US division, one LN and Japanese replacement. The North received one new division; South Korea received none, as the loss of Mokp’o saw its capacity fall below that needed to provide replacements for its many previously destroyed divisions. [An LN Coalition reorganisation on the ground was also permitted before the next DPRK impulse.]
LN Coalition deployments in the Pusan Perimeter after the landing of the US 25th Div in early November 1950.
The Japanese would be principally responsible for holding Ulsan to the north. Pusan, sitting behind a river line and with the benefit of urban terrain, was considered ‘worth the risk’, as it could only be attacked from the west on a narrow front. The hills of Taegu were considered to be undefendable, subject as they were to attack from five directions by the entirety of the Communists’ forces and was abandoned.
The key effort was made to ensure the hills of Kyongju, between Ulsan and Pusan, were held. In extremis, the previous division on the ground between Japanese and LN forces was waived, given the compressed space available for the defence and the need for the fine balance of strengths with the limited forces available. If Kyongju fell, the Coalition armies would be split in two and Pusan could not then be realistically held. It was also hoped that by forcing the DPRK to fling itself against strong defences that they might suffer enough casualties to weaken their offensive power enough to see the LN through until the end of the year.
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Korean War: First Pusan Offensive, 2-8 November
The North Koreans consolidated their army into three full corps, with one closing up in the centre to occupy Taegu while the other two would launch probing attacks against both Ulsan and Pusan in the hope of ‘shaking something loose’ in the meantime. They reasoned that they could afford a few losses but one bad defeat for the LN would spell the end of their fragile position.
DPRK troops assaulting Ulsan, 2 November 1950. The attack would not be pressed after little initial progress was made.
Troops of the US 25th Division hung on grimly to the west of Pusan, administering a heavy defeat to the attacking North Koreans by 6 November 1950.
The LN decided against occupying Masan but was able to keep just a light garrison on Pusan itself, as it would take another week for the North to reoccupy Masan. Instead they ensured Kyongju and Ulsan were more heavily defended, no Taegu was in DPRK hands.
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Kashmir
On 27 October the LN-sponsored Jammu & Kashmir Conference had proposed a resolution to help resolve the sore point between the two countries. If approved, a constituent assembly would be elected in an LN-supervised vote to determine the final disposition of the area.
Die roll:
If a. Pakistan-India relations improve to a new high, both sides prepare for a democratic campaign.
If b. Relations sour; 1-4 no other response; 5-7 Pakistani rhetoric heats up, later chance of escalation; 8-9 Pakistan mobilises, heightened risk of war in coming months, insurgent groups start to form in Muslim-majority areas of Jammu-Kashmir; 10 Pakistan mobilises and privately commits to attack as soon as they are ready.
If c. Relations more tense but not too badly damaged; 1-7 no other response; 8-9 Pakistani rhetoric heats up, later chance of escalation; 10 Pakistan mobilises, heightened risk of war in coming months, insurgent groups start to form to exert limited pressure on India in Jammu-Kashmir.
If d. 1 Pakistan backs down, government crisis; 2-7 Pakistan mobilises defensively and seeks LN intervention; 8-10 Pakistan mobilises Pakistan mobilises and threatens war, seeks LN sanctions against India.
- 1-4, proposal approved;
- 5-7, proposal rejected out of hand;
- 8-9, decision deferred for further consideration for six months;
- 10, proposal rejected and India pre-emptively mobilises and increases its garrison in Kashmir.
If a. Pakistan-India relations improve to a new high, both sides prepare for a democratic campaign.
If b. Relations sour; 1-4 no other response; 5-7 Pakistani rhetoric heats up, later chance of escalation; 8-9 Pakistan mobilises, heightened risk of war in coming months, insurgent groups start to form in Muslim-majority areas of Jammu-Kashmir; 10 Pakistan mobilises and privately commits to attack as soon as they are ready.
If c. Relations more tense but not too badly damaged; 1-7 no other response; 8-9 Pakistani rhetoric heats up, later chance of escalation; 10 Pakistan mobilises, heightened risk of war in coming months, insurgent groups start to form to exert limited pressure on India in Jammu-Kashmir.
If d. 1 Pakistan backs down, government crisis; 2-7 Pakistan mobilises defensively and seeks LN intervention; 8-10 Pakistan mobilises Pakistan mobilises and threatens war, seeks LN sanctions against India.
On 5 November, the Indian Cabinet came firmly down on the side of a peaceful resolution [die roll 1], approving the LN-brokered proposal and agreeing to an independent democratic process to decide the future of the contested territory. Given their position, Pakistan could do no other than agree, with relations between both countries improving. Nonetheless, tensions and a degree of suspicion over Kashmir would continue, with the Constituent Assembly elections planned for the late spring of 1951.
Jinnah (left) and Nehru were both pleased that conflict had been averted and a peaceful way ahead made possible – if not certain – after agreeing to the LN proposal for Kashmir in November 1950.
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Korean War: Re-consolidation, 9-16 November
After its botched attack on Pusan, the DPRK decided to refrain from more half-baked attacks and instead drew the ‘spare’ division that had been garrisoning Seoul (following Soviet intelligence warnings of a possible US amphibious invasion) to re-establish a full corps in Masan, which was reoccupied by 13 November.
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Other Events, 9-15 November
As the Chinese invasion of Tibet continued, on 11 November representatives of the government of Tibet sought intervention by the League of Nations to obtain the withdrawal of Chinese occupying troops from the eastern section of their nation. However, no meaningful support would be forthcoming. There was no appetite to either oppose Chiang nor to divert focus from the desperate situation in Korea.
In Romania, location filming began on the new movie starring Audie Murphy, John Wayne and Perse Fotheringay-Phipps, “The Streets of Timisoara”. The film was jointly funded by MGM and a S.I.T.H. front company, with Turkish ‘production advisers’ on hand to ensure that the ‘right messages’ were being sent.
Audie Murphy (left) and John Wayne during location filming of “The Streets of Timisoara”, November 1950.
Perse relaxes (as much as she ever can) on the film set in a break between her scenes.
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Korean War: Crescendo, 16-22 November
The Second Pusan Offensive began on 16 November 1950. The DPRK decided to leave the heavily defended Kyongju alone, taking their chances instead with a main attack against the Japanese in Ulsan in the north at odds of 2-1. A secondary attack on Pusan was expected to be repulsed again but was attempted again as a ‘speculator’. US air support was provided to Ulsan, the more vulnerable of the two positions.
DPRK troops press forward in the Second Pusan Offensive, starting on 17 November 1950. After just two days of fighting, the Coalition defence had melted away in both Ulsan and more crucially the last remaining LN port in Pusan.
Refugees flee north from Pusan as the Communist advance rolls into Pusan.
This meant that for the LN’s last roll of the dice, just five divisions would have the residual supplies for a full-on counter attack from Kyongju, with another four left out of supply behind the front line. If the LN attack on Pusan failed to recapture the port, the whole force would be out of supply within a week [half strength, maximum of five divisions counting to combat]. A full defeat would be almost inevitable.
LN troops retreat back to Kyongju after the defeat of their counter-attack on Pusan, 20 November 1950.
DPRK troops celebrate their decisive victory on the northern approaches to Pusan, 21 November 1950.
There was now nothing left to the LN and Japan but to come to terms in order to save their remaining forces trapped in Kyongju from destruction.
While frantic negotiations went on in the LNSC, with the USSR sponsoring the Communist North’s interests, at Stalin’s insistence a ceasefire was agreed to by the DPRK after the failure of the Pusan counter-attack on 21 November.
DPRK and LN officers sign the interim ceasefire agreement in Pusan, 21 November 1950.
As General Macarthur was compelled to negotiate terms on the battlefield in Korea, armistice arrangements were hastily concluded in Geneva. All remaining US, LN and Japanese troops in Korea would be permitted to retain their arms and be repatriated through Pusan. In return, Stalin secured the recognition of the DPRK as the sole government of Korea and his own reputation as the statesman who had brokered peace in Korea without any direct military involvement in the conflict.
NB: old style Romanised spelling of Mao's name used deliberately here for 'period' reporting.
North Korean soldiers around Pusan celebrate their final victory in what they would eventually term the Great Patriotic War of Unification, 22 November 1950.
US and LN representatives sign the formal articles of surrender on behalf of the Coalition in Pusan, 22 November 1950.
Kim Il Sung signs his copy of the formal Armistice to end the Korean War in Pyongyang, 22 November 1950.
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Other Event: 17-30 November
On 17 November the fifteen year old Tenzin Gyatso was enthroned as the 14th Dalai Lama, becoming both the chief of state of the semi-independent kingdom, and the spiritual leader of adherents of Tibetan Buddhism worldwide.
The 14th Dalai Lama enthroned, 17 November 1950, during a time of war for Tibet.
The Japanese Diet [the French Assembly in OTL] voted on 23 November to approve plans to transfer the administration of all lands in Southern Vietnam to the Hanoi-based puppet government by the end of the year. They would also gradually let the Imperial Vietnamese Army (IVA) take over the war effort against the Viet Minh. This was seen as the beginning of Japan’s intended slow withdrawal from Vietnam.
A soldier of the Japanese-sponsored Imperial Vietnamese Army, November 1950. The burden of fighting would fall increasingly on these troops as the Japanese sought to extricate themselves from another debilitating conflict, just as the situation in Korea was going from bad to worse for them.
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