Tanks are included as both brigades and divisions.
Gas will be rockets and brigades.
Gas will be rockets and brigades.
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Since writing that I've discovered that there were, in fact, two successful airborne assaults during the First World War!StephenT said:
Quoting from the rulebook to Over There, the GR/D monster wargame of WW1:
So not on the scale of WW2 divisional-strength airborne assaults, but still worthy of consideration as a secret weapon...
StephenT said:Since writing that I've discovered that there were, in fact, two successful airborne assaults during the First World War!
Quoting from the rulebook to Over There, the GR/D monster wargame of WW1:
So not on the scale of WW2 divisional-strength airborne assaults, but still worthy of consideration as a secret weapon...
But where there enemy troops present...?
Hello all,
I am very excited to see that work is underway on this mod as frankly WWI holds much more interest to me then WWII.
I would like to suggest that while early forms of most weapons systems can predate the doctrines that call for in contrast to the tech system in HoI1. I maintain that the problem of putting new technologies into the field is more often a matter bureaucratic maneuvering and political clout then industrial feasability or scientific prowess as I discussed here: http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?t=191492 The effective use of any weapons system requires advances in strategic and tactical doctrine. Advances in doctrine combined with experience permit the development of more advanced weapon systems as I’ll show bellow.
The basic structure of technology trees as described by Allenby sound fine for the most part.
An exception is the matter of armored vehicles as secret weapons a great deal of work had been done with armored cars and trains for many years before the war started and none of it was secret. Armored trains are naturally most relevant to the Austro-Hungarians, Russians and Poles as they are ones that depended upon them quite heavily as a mobile form of tactical indirect fire support due to the long and varied fronts those armies operated on. I suppose that armored trains should belong to what ever tech categories are assigned to industrial transport and artillery doctrine. Please note however that the development of armored trains have nothing whatsoever to do with the monestrous rail guns which everyone hears so much about which proved strategic fire support at vast R & D costs in chemistry, metallurgy and fantastic expenditures to build and use for relatively little effect.
The British steam powered Fowler B5 used during the Boer war were clearly the first Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) used in combat. The B5s were so-called armored land locomotives (the military version of steam powered omni-buses common the earlier 1900s) that were used with moderately disappointing results as convoy protection elements in 1901 and scraped after the war. The Fowler sank into obscurity not because it was primitive technologically for it’s time but because it never had a doctrine developed for it’s use which allowed to be deployed effectively.
While the French, British, Russian, Belgians, Austro-Hungarians and Germans had created several varieties of functional, and even excellent, petrol powered armored cars from1904 to1913 very little thought had been given to their use. For the most part, petrol powered armored cars were seen as having vaguely defined anti-balloon, “mobile pill-box” and reconnaissance roles they received little attention to strategic planners prior to WWI. The Russians alone articulated a doctrine for motorized combat prior to the start of WWI and made much wider and better use of armored cars then any other nation during the “Great War” although the British and Italians made significant contributions as well. Russian doctrine envisioned armored cars principally as a “break through” element working along side calvary or covering tactical withdrawals although the Putilov-Garford series of armored cars was given a close fire support roll.
As an example related to infantry, everyone knows that the Bergman MP 18I was the first mass produced SMG used in mobile combat and that Hugo the fact that the Italians fielded a SMG (ex. the Fiat Revelli) in large nearly three years before Hugo Schmeisser’s more famous gun is now virtually forgotten. While the Fiat Revelli was not a very good weapon for numerous reasons it was nonetheless a SMG used as if it was a Light Machine Gun for the simple reason that Italian doctrine of the time had not developed Stosstruppen like units which were the impetus behind the Bergman’s development.
Like wise I will point out that it’s utter untrue that the first assault rifle was developed by the Germans towards the end of WWII. While some would say that the first assault rife was the Mauser C10/13 developed in 1913 I’d say that given it’s poor performance prevented it from being issued makes that an untenable claim. Rather, I’d say that the Mexican designed and Swiss built “Fusil Automatico de 7mm Porfirio Diaz (or 7mm Mondragon for short) adopted by the Mexican army in 1911 was the world’s first practical assault rifle.
Of the 4000 units made by the Swiss about 400 made it to Mexico when the government of Porfirio Diaz was overthrown and the Mexican government failed to pay for the rest. The Swiss firm SIG sold the remaining 3000 to Germany in 1915 where it was designated the 7mm Flieger-Selbstadekarabiner Model 15 (FSK15 for short) and it served adequately well with Marinekorps Sturmtruppen units on the Eastern front. The Germans attempted to make their own version of the FSK15 domestically and it was the Mauser Selbstade-Gewegr Model 15 which was issued in small numbers to the German navy but it was far less reliable and too expensive so it was taken out of production very quickly. The lack of adequate numbers of FSK15s for the first Sturmtruppen units was a major factor in commissioning the development of the Bergman SMG.
I am very excited to see that work is underway on this mod as frankly WWI holds much more interest to me then WWII.
I would like to suggest that while early forms of most weapons systems can predate the doctrines that call for in contrast to the tech system in HoI1. I maintain that the problem of putting new technologies into the field is more often a matter bureaucratic maneuvering and political clout then industrial feasability or scientific prowess as I discussed here: http://forum.paradoxplaza.com/forum/showthread.php?t=191492 The effective use of any weapons system requires advances in strategic and tactical doctrine. Advances in doctrine combined with experience permit the development of more advanced weapon systems as I’ll show bellow.
The basic structure of technology trees as described by Allenby sound fine for the most part.
An exception is the matter of armored vehicles as secret weapons a great deal of work had been done with armored cars and trains for many years before the war started and none of it was secret. Armored trains are naturally most relevant to the Austro-Hungarians, Russians and Poles as they are ones that depended upon them quite heavily as a mobile form of tactical indirect fire support due to the long and varied fronts those armies operated on. I suppose that armored trains should belong to what ever tech categories are assigned to industrial transport and artillery doctrine. Please note however that the development of armored trains have nothing whatsoever to do with the monestrous rail guns which everyone hears so much about which proved strategic fire support at vast R & D costs in chemistry, metallurgy and fantastic expenditures to build and use for relatively little effect.
The British steam powered Fowler B5 used during the Boer war were clearly the first Armored Fighting Vehicles (AFVs) used in combat. The B5s were so-called armored land locomotives (the military version of steam powered omni-buses common the earlier 1900s) that were used with moderately disappointing results as convoy protection elements in 1901 and scraped after the war. The Fowler sank into obscurity not because it was primitive technologically for it’s time but because it never had a doctrine developed for it’s use which allowed to be deployed effectively.
While the French, British, Russian, Belgians, Austro-Hungarians and Germans had created several varieties of functional, and even excellent, petrol powered armored cars from1904 to1913 very little thought had been given to their use. For the most part, petrol powered armored cars were seen as having vaguely defined anti-balloon, “mobile pill-box” and reconnaissance roles they received little attention to strategic planners prior to WWI. The Russians alone articulated a doctrine for motorized combat prior to the start of WWI and made much wider and better use of armored cars then any other nation during the “Great War” although the British and Italians made significant contributions as well. Russian doctrine envisioned armored cars principally as a “break through” element working along side calvary or covering tactical withdrawals although the Putilov-Garford series of armored cars was given a close fire support roll.
As an example related to infantry, everyone knows that the Bergman MP 18I was the first mass produced SMG used in mobile combat and that Hugo the fact that the Italians fielded a SMG (ex. the Fiat Revelli) in large nearly three years before Hugo Schmeisser’s more famous gun is now virtually forgotten. While the Fiat Revelli was not a very good weapon for numerous reasons it was nonetheless a SMG used as if it was a Light Machine Gun for the simple reason that Italian doctrine of the time had not developed Stosstruppen like units which were the impetus behind the Bergman’s development.
Like wise I will point out that it’s utter untrue that the first assault rifle was developed by the Germans towards the end of WWII. While some would say that the first assault rife was the Mauser C10/13 developed in 1913 I’d say that given it’s poor performance prevented it from being issued makes that an untenable claim. Rather, I’d say that the Mexican designed and Swiss built “Fusil Automatico de 7mm Porfirio Diaz (or 7mm Mondragon for short) adopted by the Mexican army in 1911 was the world’s first practical assault rifle.
Of the 4000 units made by the Swiss about 400 made it to Mexico when the government of Porfirio Diaz was overthrown and the Mexican government failed to pay for the rest. The Swiss firm SIG sold the remaining 3000 to Germany in 1915 where it was designated the 7mm Flieger-Selbstadekarabiner Model 15 (FSK15 for short) and it served adequately well with Marinekorps Sturmtruppen units on the Eastern front. The Germans attempted to make their own version of the FSK15 domestically and it was the Mauser Selbstade-Gewegr Model 15 which was issued in small numbers to the German navy but it was far less reliable and too expensive so it was taken out of production very quickly. The lack of adequate numbers of FSK15s for the first Sturmtruppen units was a major factor in commissioning the development of the Bergman SMG.
A question for Allenby,
I have complied a ton of data on fixed wing military aircraft world wide in terms of air bases, personell, aircraft inventory and bases world wide at the start of WWI or slightly before. However, I have no idea where to post any of it. Your input would helpful.
I have complied a ton of data on fixed wing military aircraft world wide in terms of air bases, personell, aircraft inventory and bases world wide at the start of WWI or slightly before. However, I have no idea where to post any of it. Your input would helpful.
Post the information about bases in the Resources and Manpower thread. Discuss the stuff about aircraft inventory in the OOB thread.
Thanks for the suggestion.
I'll do that as soon as time permits me the chance to type everything up.
A major crux of my first post in this thread is that I would maintain it is better to have tech introduction dates correspond to the actual development of the weapon system rather then the date the system was deployed in the field.
Given that HoI2 seems to have no mechanism for political types mucking about with R&D. purging engineers or other things that throw off development cycles I’d say that it makes sense to have the development target date be idea rather then actual. In other words, we should assume that the research team is being left to their own devices without dictates from policy makers (ex ministers, generals etc). If we do so, it would be reasonable, as an example already covered, to have the MP18I ready to be put in the field by mid 1917.
I'll do that as soon as time permits me the chance to type everything up.
A major crux of my first post in this thread is that I would maintain it is better to have tech introduction dates correspond to the actual development of the weapon system rather then the date the system was deployed in the field.
Given that HoI2 seems to have no mechanism for political types mucking about with R&D. purging engineers or other things that throw off development cycles I’d say that it makes sense to have the development target date be idea rather then actual. In other words, we should assume that the research team is being left to their own devices without dictates from policy makers (ex ministers, generals etc). If we do so, it would be reasonable, as an example already covered, to have the MP18I ready to be put in the field by mid 1917.
how about spies?
adding spy technology...
Espionage and Counter-Espionage
increasing org or decrease dissent effects...
20 IC probably can create a spy that can destabilize or destroy enemy installations of some sort...
imagine the spies like the caliber of Matahari and other spies and moles!!
how about techs pattern after the OSS or the MI-5
what do u think?
spies were extensively used at that time
adding spy technology...
Espionage and Counter-Espionage
increasing org or decrease dissent effects...
20 IC probably can create a spy that can destabilize or destroy enemy installations of some sort...
imagine the spies like the caliber of Matahari and other spies and moles!!
how about techs pattern after the OSS or the MI-5
what do u think?
spies were extensively used at that time
I think it is easier to simulate spies by events (both random and historical).
However, we should perhaps have a few intelligence techs too?
However, we should perhaps have a few intelligence techs too?
Things like wire-tapping, signal interception, etc. Perhaps something cool like spy gadgets that give some type of increase to the chance of getting blueprints (if this is possible).
That fits the way the game works too, as once you've developed the technology you still have to build the units (or pay to upgrade them) which can take months.Royaliste said:
However, remember that WW1 was still the era of the crackpot inventor dreaming up mad schemes in his garden shed. There's a long way between, let's say, one Royal Navy commander having his motor car shipped over to France and mounting armour plate on its sides, and a country developing a practical and sustained doctrine for armoured car development and operations. In other words, we should be conservative in assigning the date when a tech becomes available.
Also, bear in mind that a wealthy country with five tech slots, highly-skilled tech teams and enough money to pay them all constantly is perfectly capable of tech-rushing. Especially if played by a human.
If we give tanks a 1916 date, then we can expect to see a human-played Britain already fielding tank units in 1915. So I'd be even more conservative here, and give that tech a 1917 date. The same principle applies to things like Infiltration tactics.Thank you for the excellent points.
I would how ever caution against excessive conservatism with respect to technology development. Certainly one can point out to the extremely odd and impractical concepts that made it to prototype stage (ex. The Lebedenko tank) or perfectly sensible if equally odd prototypes (the American skeleton tank of 1918) yet the truth is that such examples are very much the exception that then the rule as I pointed out with respect to German/Austro-Hungarian AFVs. The latter you may recall, I could cover that ground again if I was unclear, were usually technically well polished and practical but failed frequently for political reasons alone.
Certainly a great deal of very good armored car designs were ready for production several years prior to WWI but, as mentioned before, they simply were not seen as serving any vital function due to related doctrine being under developed by everyone save the Russians. As a result, while fielding (rather then developing) tanks in 1915 is overly optimistic it’s not for the introduction of decent armored cars for the major powers.
The Russians coincidentally had an excellent 4 engined strategic bomber fielded by late 1915 ( which was a development of pre-war design intended to cross the Atlantic which also served as the foundation for the German VGO series and the Hadley-Paige bombers) so that’s worth keeping in mind. In the case of the Russians bomber development pretty much stopped by late 1916 and material shortages combined with production tech limitations pretty much kept them from ever fielding very many. The same situation applied to the excellent Italian strategic bombers during the war while the Germans were limited more by their decision to place vast resources into airships (thanks to Capt. Strasser being so closely allied with the Kaiser’s brother and head of the navy) so again I find it very reasonable to say that German strategic bombing R&D and deployment could have a been a full year ahead of what it actually was with just a simple change of who ran the navy or Strasser being killed earlier.
The same can not be said however for German tactical bombers for the simple reason that they never got the allocation of materials that airships and strategic bombers had. The tech teams they had were excellent for tactical bomber design/construction (and contrary to popular opinion the G designation was not limited to Gotha) but in the end they got result way better then their numbers would have indicated because of excellent doctrine, leadership and crews. If your interested I could go into detail.
I would how ever caution against excessive conservatism with respect to technology development. Certainly one can point out to the extremely odd and impractical concepts that made it to prototype stage (ex. The Lebedenko tank) or perfectly sensible if equally odd prototypes (the American skeleton tank of 1918) yet the truth is that such examples are very much the exception that then the rule as I pointed out with respect to German/Austro-Hungarian AFVs. The latter you may recall, I could cover that ground again if I was unclear, were usually technically well polished and practical but failed frequently for political reasons alone.
Certainly a great deal of very good armored car designs were ready for production several years prior to WWI but, as mentioned before, they simply were not seen as serving any vital function due to related doctrine being under developed by everyone save the Russians. As a result, while fielding (rather then developing) tanks in 1915 is overly optimistic it’s not for the introduction of decent armored cars for the major powers.
The Russians coincidentally had an excellent 4 engined strategic bomber fielded by late 1915 ( which was a development of pre-war design intended to cross the Atlantic which also served as the foundation for the German VGO series and the Hadley-Paige bombers) so that’s worth keeping in mind. In the case of the Russians bomber development pretty much stopped by late 1916 and material shortages combined with production tech limitations pretty much kept them from ever fielding very many. The same situation applied to the excellent Italian strategic bombers during the war while the Germans were limited more by their decision to place vast resources into airships (thanks to Capt. Strasser being so closely allied with the Kaiser’s brother and head of the navy) so again I find it very reasonable to say that German strategic bombing R&D and deployment could have a been a full year ahead of what it actually was with just a simple change of who ran the navy or Strasser being killed earlier.
The same can not be said however for German tactical bombers for the simple reason that they never got the allocation of materials that airships and strategic bombers had. The tech teams they had were excellent for tactical bomber design/construction (and contrary to popular opinion the G designation was not limited to Gotha) but in the end they got result way better then their numbers would have indicated because of excellent doctrine, leadership and crews. If your interested I could go into detail.
On the Home Front
Just a thought - how about propaganda as a tech - the recruiting drives of WWI were phenomenal! Various countries had propaganda ministries admittedly - but it was something that was researched....
Just a thought - how about propaganda as a tech - the recruiting drives of WWI were phenomenal! Various countries had propaganda ministries admittedly - but it was something that was researched....
Our friendly mod leader Allenby (may he live in eternity) has already stipulated that there will be no home front thingies, as it can be directed by the domestic policy sliders.
are there plans to incorporate a sort of ww1 style secret weapons section of technology? If so, things that could be included could be tanks, gas, air craft carriers (very very early, but hard to get) etc etc...there only ideas though...just thought i'd suggest
Hmmm, sounds like a cool idea. Gas, tanks, and the early carrier experimentations. Also, what about stuff like incenduty machine gun rounds (good for zepplin busting)?
As stated before, if one were to say go back and read the thread (it's only four pages) that there will be 'secret weapons', what they end up being in the final version may change of course from what is now being proposed. Gas and tanks will not be in secret weapons category, although some further developements of those techs may appear there. I believe tanks/armor will be in the cavalry/armor tech field, and gas will be under the industrial techs.
Wouldn't rationing, etc. have an impact not upon the actual production capability but on supply production?
I can understand throwing out a good chunk of TGW's homefront techs, but shouldn't some of the supply-related ones remain?
I can understand throwing out a good chunk of TGW's homefront techs, but shouldn't some of the supply-related ones remain?