There has been some discussion of the topic recently, and as I was bored, I decided to make some graphs illustrating this particularly fascinating part of history. Aside from providing final proof that I will forever be wholly unattractive to the female sex, these graphs are pretty, and present some interesting visual observations about the topic.
To offer some explanation (also included in the graphs), I have divided ships into those laid down, and those actually commissioned, at the date in question. Ships which are laid down are those which are not yet completed, but which exist as more than napkinwaffe (i.e., have moved beyond being an unrealized order or a sketch done by a member of the naval staff during a particularly harrowing trip the bathroom induced by eating a dodgy kebab). Ships are counted as commissioned when they are commissioned... obviously. I have not included losses in the graph, as the aim is to show naval building programmes rather than actual strength.
This first graph shows the relative strengths of the British and German Dreadnought fleets during the period. From this, one can draw several interesting observations. The arms race develops from a relatively equal footing in 1905/6, with both powers keeping pace through until 1910; at this point, Germany thinks better of the idea and substantially slows her building programme, whilst Britain thunders on ahead until easing off the steam in 1914. Really, 1908 is the key year; until that point German expansion is closing with British, and the gap narrows until the two meet, after this the British pick up their programme and the gap again widens.
The second graph is similar to the first, but includes Battlecruisers alongside normal Dreadnoughts. The main point of interest here is that the Battlecruiser race continues far longer than the Dreadnought race; both fleets continue to expand into the war. This also shifts the point at which Germany shifts away from matching Britain; instead of a sharp constriction after 1910 one instead sees a more gradual gap opening after 1908 (as per above). The other point to be raised is that the British commit substantially more to Battlecruisers than the Germans do.
The last two graphs compare all the major powers of the world in the period (plus Spain). I could have added the South Americans, but chose not to as the graph was already rather cluttered. It is interesting to observe just how far ahead Britain and Germany are from everyone else, even with the inclusion of the USA. Other interesting points include the relative time lag between Britain, Germany, and the USA, and everyone else; these three powers start earlier, expand at a greater rate, and reach a greater strength than many of the other powers would have managed even if their fleets were combined. One can also detect some of the major rivalries; Britain and Germany, the USA and Japan, and Austria-Hungary and Italy. Russia's rapid and perhaps somewhat over-ambitious expansion in 1910-12 is another interesting moment.
It is also worth commenting on the effect of war; rather than accelerating naval building programmes, in many cases war stinted them. With demand for so much material elsewhere (ammunition and artillery mainly), the battleline generally seems to have taken a back seat; the long building times involved in ships likely also plays a role. The effect of this is particularly seen in the German, Russian, French, and Austro-Hungarian navies, with large section of the battleline laid down but never completed. In the latter three cases, this number amounted to perhaps 33-50%+ of planned strength, in Germany the effect was also severe with several ships cancelled, though the size of the existing fleet cushions the percentage impact.
To offer some explanation (also included in the graphs), I have divided ships into those laid down, and those actually commissioned, at the date in question. Ships which are laid down are those which are not yet completed, but which exist as more than napkinwaffe (i.e., have moved beyond being an unrealized order or a sketch done by a member of the naval staff during a particularly harrowing trip the bathroom induced by eating a dodgy kebab). Ships are counted as commissioned when they are commissioned... obviously. I have not included losses in the graph, as the aim is to show naval building programmes rather than actual strength.
This first graph shows the relative strengths of the British and German Dreadnought fleets during the period. From this, one can draw several interesting observations. The arms race develops from a relatively equal footing in 1905/6, with both powers keeping pace through until 1910; at this point, Germany thinks better of the idea and substantially slows her building programme, whilst Britain thunders on ahead until easing off the steam in 1914. Really, 1908 is the key year; until that point German expansion is closing with British, and the gap narrows until the two meet, after this the British pick up their programme and the gap again widens.
The second graph is similar to the first, but includes Battlecruisers alongside normal Dreadnoughts. The main point of interest here is that the Battlecruiser race continues far longer than the Dreadnought race; both fleets continue to expand into the war. This also shifts the point at which Germany shifts away from matching Britain; instead of a sharp constriction after 1910 one instead sees a more gradual gap opening after 1908 (as per above). The other point to be raised is that the British commit substantially more to Battlecruisers than the Germans do.
The last two graphs compare all the major powers of the world in the period (plus Spain). I could have added the South Americans, but chose not to as the graph was already rather cluttered. It is interesting to observe just how far ahead Britain and Germany are from everyone else, even with the inclusion of the USA. Other interesting points include the relative time lag between Britain, Germany, and the USA, and everyone else; these three powers start earlier, expand at a greater rate, and reach a greater strength than many of the other powers would have managed even if their fleets were combined. One can also detect some of the major rivalries; Britain and Germany, the USA and Japan, and Austria-Hungary and Italy. Russia's rapid and perhaps somewhat over-ambitious expansion in 1910-12 is another interesting moment.
It is also worth commenting on the effect of war; rather than accelerating naval building programmes, in many cases war stinted them. With demand for so much material elsewhere (ammunition and artillery mainly), the battleline generally seems to have taken a back seat; the long building times involved in ships likely also plays a role. The effect of this is particularly seen in the German, Russian, French, and Austro-Hungarian navies, with large section of the battleline laid down but never completed. In the latter three cases, this number amounted to perhaps 33-50%+ of planned strength, in Germany the effect was also severe with several ships cancelled, though the size of the existing fleet cushions the percentage impact.
