The Rise of the Sasanians

[trybald]

To be fair, I am not entirely convinced that the gold coins captured by the Goths were used solely or mostly as decorations and votives. If fact, the way they were handled suggest rather that they were primarily used as regular money. First of all, the holes made in the coins could indicate that they were held on a string to make them more portable and thus ready for being used. This method of keeping money is attested among several cultures, including fore-mostly the Chinese who even minted coins with a hole in them for that purpose. Same goes for the practice of cutting coins. This is again attested in cases of capture of coins valued well above the value of a typical purchase - the most famous example being the piece-of-eight, i.e. Spanish dollar cut into standard 8 pieces in Britain and its colonies for standard transactions.

Without doubt some of the coins were used in ritual or decorative purposes, but I doubt that most were used for that. It would be a huge waste of wealth that could've been better used elsewhere.

 

[Semper Victor]

To be fair, I am not entirely convinced that the gold coins captured by the Goths were used solely or mostly as decorations and votives. If fact, the way they were handled suggest rather that they were primarily used as regular money. First of all, the holes made in the coins could indicate that they were held on a string to make them more portable and thus ready for being used. This method of keeping money is attested among several cultures, including fore-mostly the Chinese who even minted coins with a hole in them for that purpose. Same goes for the practice of cutting coins. This is again attested in cases of capture of coins valued well above the value of a typical purchase - the most famous example being the piece-of-eight, i.e. Spanish dollar cut into standard 8 pieces in Britain and its colonies for standard transactions.

Without doubt some of the coins were used in ritual or decorative purposes, but I doubt that most were used for that. It would be a huge waste of wealth that could've been better used elsewhere.

I’m neither a numismatist like Bursche nor an expert in the history of the Germanic peoples, but I wouldn’t discard his arguments so quickly. Ancient Germanic peoples did throw weapons and other valuables into lakes or swamps, as attested in places like Illerup. And the value of most of this objects was higher than five aurei, so it’s quite clear that in certain circumstances and due to cultural reasons they were willing to part with valuable objects. That doesn’t mean (in my opinion, at least that’s how I understand Bursche’s position) that the Goths and other Germanic peoples associated with them did dispose of all the aurei they captured in Cniva’s raid in such a manner. Probably, elite warriors and chieftains accumulated sizeable amounts of gold coins (much more than the small deposits found in funerary pits), and they boasted of it by displaying a part of they newfound wealth in an ostentatious manner (by hanging it off their bodies, arms or horses). In Germanic society, what mattered was not so much the material objects that could be bought with Roman money in themselves, but the display or richness and luxury in order to buy loyalties, as a chief needed to distribute his wealth amongst his warriors, and boasting it would increase his prestige and thus gain him more followers. They had no interest in saving money in order to invest it in land or trading, to pay bribes to politicians or bureaucrats or to finance a public career like Romans did. That money had to be displayed and spent in the most ostentatious way possible, by purchasing prestige luxury objects (either of Roman or “barbarian” origin) or by distributing it among the chieftain’s followers.

Bear in mind that in his article Burche does not claim that all the aurei of Gordian III, Philip the Arab and Decius found in Gothic lands have been found either quartered or piered, far from that. He only points out that a significant part of them has been found in such a state, and most importantly, that such coins were mostly in a pristine condition, without signs of having circulated for a long time. It’s also rather evident and so Bursche doesn’t even say it that the coins that the Goths used for trading would have been long gone, and so that the coins that were deliberately buried in funerary or sacrificial rituals are overrepresented; as they were deliberately hidden they have survived to the present day in a much higher degree than the coins that were used for their “intended” (by the Romans) use.

Germanic graves (not only Gothic ones) are also abundantly attested as holding individuals (both male and female) buried with daily objects, and in the case of important individuals and warriors, with costly items: jewels, swords, helmets, armour, etc.). In Visigothic Spain, the Goths retained this custom until after the Muslim conquest, even if the canonical law of the church forbid strictly such practices. And the same is attested for the Franks, Anglosaxons, etc.

At least, that’s my view on this issue.

 

[Arilou]

It should be noted that we are running into issues of preservation: Coins that were buried or sacrified would often have been preserved, while coins that remained in use would have disappeared over time (melted down and re-minted, traded away, lost in various ways, etc.)

As usual, our archeological record tells us much more about what was preserved than what was actually there. The gap is hard to bridge.

Germanic graves (not only Gothic ones) are also abundantly attested as holding individuals (both male and female) buried with daily objects, and in the case of important individuals and warriors, with costly items: jewels, swords, helmets, armour, etc.). In Visigothic Spain, the Goths retained this custom until after the Muslim conquest, even if the canonical law of the church forbid strictly such practices. And the same is attested for the Franks, Anglosaxons, etc.

Scandinavia also continued the practice, which leads to some interesting weirdness. For instance, most of our preserved viking-era finds are grave goods, often with both daily items and weapons in them... There is an interesting exception however: From the viking age itself there are virtually no helmets found in these graves, which has lead to some interesting speculations (did 8th-11th century scandinavians even use helmets?) especially as often quite decorated helmets have been found earlier (including some that were apprently based on sassanian models, probably transmitted through mercenaries in roman service)

I personally leans towards it simply being a matter of record (either the style at the time favoured helmets made out of leather, or helmets were simply not in fashione as grave goods at this time) but there are some quite long arguments about it

 

[Semper Victor]

It should be noted that we are running into issues of preservation: Coins that were buried or sacrified would often have been preserved, while coins that remained in use would have disappeared over time (melted down and re-minted, traded away, lost in various ways, etc.)

As usual, our archeological record tells us much more about what was preserved than what was actually there. The gap is hard to bridge.



Scandinavia also continued the practice, which leads to some interesting weirdness. For instance, most of our preserved viking-era finds are grave goods, often with both daily items and weapons in them... There is an interesting exception however: From the viking age itself there are virtually no helmets found in these graves, which has lead to some interesting speculations (did 8th-11th century scandinavians even use helmets?) especially as often quite decorated helmets have been found earlier (including some that were apprently based on sassanian models, probably transmitted through mercenaries in roman service)

I personally leans towards it simply being a matter of record (either the style at the time favoured helmets made out of leather, or helmets were simply not in fashione as grave goods at this time) but there are some quite long arguments about it

Yes, exactly. Although I don't think that invalidates Bursche's hypothesis. The Goths and other Germanic peoples would have been burying coins and other valuables in graves or lakes continuously, as it was a common cultural practice. If that was the case, then the coins issued by Roman emperors should be represented according to the amount they issued in their respective reigns, had they come from regular commercial exchange or Roman subsidies; and the overrespresented coins should belong to the emperors who had the longest reigns and/or minted the most coins. Instead, as Bursche points out, there's a clear overrepresentation of coins issued by three augusti whose combined reigns lasted less than 13 years, and amongst the three the most common finds are coins of Decius, whose reign lasted from August/September 249 CE to June 251 CE at the latest (he was deified by the Senate on 25 June of that year).

That amount of coins can only have entered Gothic lands (and in locations removed very far away from the Roman border) in extraordinary circumstances, and given the short span of Decius' reign and the events that happened in it according to ancient sources, Bursche links it specifically to the defeat of Abritus. Given that Decius did not pay subsidies to the Goths, the coins issued by Decius can only have reached the emplacements they were found in because the Goths looted them in the empire. The case is somewhat weaker for the coins of Gordian III and Philip the Arab, as they both paid a regular tribute to the Goths and in the case of Gordian III he also hired Gothic contingents for his eastern war.

It's also curious that the coins were aurei; we don't really know in what species the Romans paid their subsidies to foreign peoples, but by Decius' reign the silver content of the antoninianus had fallen to a 39.3% median amount (according to Dominique Hollard) and it's quite probable that this coin was not accepted outside the empire anymore in normal circumstances. As for the aureus, although its weight was steadily reduced, its debasement was much lower. According to Hollard, for the aurei issued by the mint at Rome, the median weight for the 222-238 CE period was 6.32 g and 98.50% content of fine gold, and for the 238-249 CE period (marked by tribute payments to the Sasanians and Goths) the median weight fell to 4.49 g but the content of fine gold stood at 99,71%. A sharper drop can be observed for the 249-253 CE period (the one that includes the Gothic war), with the median weight falling to 3,58 g but the fineness staying at 98.56% fine gold.

Hollard also points out that the reduced weight of the aureus could also have been caused by another reason: due to the continued devaluation of the silver coinage, it was increasingly difficult to maintain the old Augustan parity of 1 aureus = 25 denarii = 100 sestertii, and the reduced weight of the aureus could have been an attempt to keep the exchange rates between gold and silver coins. But this measure doesn't seem to have been very effective; for the reign of Philip the Arab there's evidence that an aureus was being exchanged at a rate of 42 antoniniani already.

But the net result of this process and of the III century crisis for Roman coinage was a sharp increase in the value of gold in relation to goods and services, and in relation with the bronze, copper and billon coinage (the copper and bronze coinage virtually disappeared after 260 CE). In these circumstances, emperors would not have parted with such quantities of gold voluntarily if they could have avoided it.

 

[trybald]

Fascinating stuff. With the death of Decius we entered the most chaotic phase of the crisis of the Roman Empire. Quite embarrassing to admit that it ever occurred to me that the Empire could have been plunged into the depth of the abyss by the loss of its treasury. But it makes a lot of sense. The Empire became suddenly unable to meet its financial obligations towards the barbarian tribes, client states, the army and the administration. The barbarians, enraged by cessation of tribute, started raiding. Client kings either turned enemy or saw their own rules collapse owing to having no wealth to distribute. Unpaid army frequently mutined or plundered the provinces. And finally, the civil service in the administration collapsed with officials extracting taxes for their own needs probably without any supervision. This has the potential of a vicious circle.

 

[Semper Victor]

Fascinating stuff. With the death of Decius we entered the most chaotic phase of the crisis of the Roman Empire. Quite embarrassing to admit that it ever occurred to me that the Empire could have been plunged into the depth of the abyss by the loss of its treasury. But it makes a lot of sense. The Empire became suddenly unable to meet its financial obligations towards the barbarian tribes, client states, the army and the administration. The barbarians, enraged by cessation of tribute, started raiding. Client kings either turned enemy or saw their own rules collapse owing to having no wealth to distribute. Unpaid army frequently mutined or plundered the provinces. And finally, the civil service in the administration collapsed with officials extracting taxes for their own needs probably without any supervision. This has the potential of a vicious circle.

The III century crisis was a slow descent punctuated by sharp drops. What turned it into a crisis that menaced the viability of the empire itself was the convergence of several trends (most of which came from far back) that fed off each other and when put together drove the Roman state to its knees.

The monetary crisis was one of these trends, but it was something which had its roots way back, in the I century CE. When Augustus reformed the coinage, he issued aurei and denarii with 99% fineness. The weights and fineness set by Augustus lasted until Nero, who reduced the weight of the aureus (keeping its fineness) but devalued the fineness of the denarius to a 93% silver content, still a very high value. The next devaluation came under Trajan (if I’m not mistaken, he reduced it to a 89% silver content, but I’m quoting from memory and I could be wrong). In Nero’s case, numismatists think that the reason for the devaluation was his profligacy, and in Trajan’s case there’s consensus among scholars that it was due to the pay increase for the army ordered by Domitian. During the remaining years of the II century CE, the silver content of the denarius slowly eroded to a 73% amount at the time of Septimius Severus’ rise to power. This emperor though, with his massive pay increases to the army and his recruitment of new troops was the one who turned a slow erosion into a sharp drop: during his reign, the fineness of the denarius dropped precipitously to a degree lower than 60%, and this was the moment when the imperial fiscus began to show signs of distress.

But the trend had been there. Based on the evidence of Egyptian papyri (basically wheat prices), scholars have estimated that prices doubled between the reigns of Augustus and Septimius Severus. That amounts to a very low amount of yearly inflation (if we artificially consider it distributed equally along this period of time, which was probably not true). Combined with the slow but steady devaluation of the denarius, all points to a steady decline of the minted silver supply in relation to both the needs of civilian economy and state spending. There could have been many causes for it:

• Starting in the second half of the I century CE, the main source of silver in the Roman empire (the mines in southern Spain) began to show signs of exhaustion; the first one to stop their production were the ones around Carthago Nova (the city began to show signs of stagnation by them). Unfortunately for the Romans, they were unable to locate within the empire new sources of silver comparable to the ones that were becoming exhausted.
• The growth in population and trade, which meant that more silver coins were needed for trade.
• The slow but steady increase in state spending; the main reason was the continuous increase in army numbers.
• Thesaurization of precious metals in temples, private fortunes, luxury items, etc.
• Subsidies, bribes and tributes to foreign peoples (although part of this silver could return to the Roman empire via trade).
• Eastern trade, which was probably deficitary for the empire: Rome exported also its own luxury items, but mainly it exported precious metals to the east in exchange for exotic goods (Roman coins have been found in abundance in India and Afghanistan, but I’ve never heard of Indian or Kushan coins found in the territories ruled by Rome).

 

[Semper Victor]

As for the evidence of inflation in Egyptin papyri, today scholars don’t attribute it exclusively to the devaluation of the denarius, as there were other factors (probably much more important) that influenced those prices.

The denarius lost between Augustus and Septimius Severus 26% of its silver content, and that is not enough to cause a 100% increase in prices (and bear in mind also that inflation did not work in Antiquity the same way it does now). The main reason must have been an increase in demand that supply was unable to meet. The primary cause for that must have been:

• An overall growth in the empire’s population. The most commonly accepted estimate (beware, it’s a very rough estimate) is that the population of the empire grew from 50 million in Augustus’ reign to 75 million immediately before the Antonine plague.
• An increase in the urbanization rates in the empire, and especially in the the size of the city of Rome (as urban dwellers are net wheat consummers).
• Circumstances specific to Egypt, that probably can not be translated to other parts of the empire. Egypt was used by the Roman state as one of its main sources of wheat supply, both for the city of Rome (which according to Flavius Josephus was fed by Egyptian grain for four mounths of the year) and to the armies of the East and the lower Danube. As both the population of Rome and the effectives of the eastern and lower Danubian armies increased over this time period, this must have impacted on grain prices in Egypt.
• The easy communications provided by the Nile and the port of Alexandria, which meant that it was easy to export grain; apart from northern Africa, there were few other wheat production areas in the empire which were so interconnected to the overall Mediterranean economy (only islands like Sicily or Sardinia, or smaller areas like Campania).
• The constraints of a Malthusian economy. Land was finite, and in the absence of real productivity growth, sooner or later the growth in demand will surpass the growth in supply. The Romans were lucky in that they founded their empire in the middle of the Roman Climate Optimum which provided exceptionally good conditions in the Mediterranean basin, but this exceptionality would not last.

The Antonine plague, which hit mostly the consummer part of this trade should have driven prices down (as rural areas should’ve been less affected), but unfortunately for Rome this coincided with the end of the Roman Climate Optimum and the start of an erratic weather period that lasted for all the second half of the II century and intensified during the III century; Indian ocean mosoons seem to have been particularly affected and thus the yearly floods of the Nile must’ve become more unreliable. This would have caused a drop in supply that would have compensated for the drop in demand.

Some of these factors can be translated quite safely to other parts of the empire, but others can not. In interior areas with only overland communication (like for example the interior of the Iberian peninsula or Anatolia, which have no navigable rivers), there must’ve been practically autarkic economic regions, with very little foodstuffs imported or exported. Overland transport of bulky items became quickly uneconomical if it had to cover distances that could not covered in a single day’s journey (basically the immediate hinterland of the city, unless there were navigable water courses available).

 

[Semper Victor]

20.2. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE DISASTROUS REIGN OF TREBONIANUS GALLUS.

The events that surround the second campaign of Šābuhr I against the Roman empire are the darkest part of the already dark years of the mid-III century CE regarding written sources. The expedition of Gordian III was already badly and confusedly attested in sources, but in contrast with the events of 252-253 CE, it’s generously covered by ancient sources. Only two contemporary sources even acknowledge the facts: the ŠKZ and the extremely confusing Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle. Inevitably, this means that for these events modern scholars have had to resort to speculation to an extreme degree, usually not needed in the case of conflicts between the Sasanians and Rome.

We know of two contemporary Greek authors of the III century CE who wrote about the Roman-Sasanian wars of their time, but their works have been lost in their entirety. The first one is Nikostratos of Trapezos, briefly mentioned by the VI century CE author Evagrius Scholasticus in his Ecclesiastical History; Nikostratos’ work would have covered the events of the period 244-260 CE (just the time period that interests us), and quite puzzlingly it corresponds exactly with the missing gap in the Historia Augusta. The other author is Philostratos of Athens, a contemporary and relative of Dexippus, who wrote a history of the wars against Šābuhr I between 252/253-260, and perhaps a history of the Palmyrene war under Aurelian. Philostratos’ existence (and some very short passages of his work) are quoted by the VI century author John Malalas and the IX century author George Syncellus. The short quotation of Philostratos’ work by Malalas is important, because it confirms the accuracy of events told in the ŠKZ. Dexippus of Athens also wrote (in a brief way) about this war in his second historical work (also lost), which was a historical chronicle that stretched from the beginnings of Greek civilization to the year 260 CE. All the other references in major Greek and Latin ancient or medieval sources are derived from Dexippus, Nikostratos or Philostratos, or from local Antiochene lore (as in the case of the Antiochene authors Ammianus Marcellinus, John Malalas and Evagrius Scholasticus). The only independent surviving sources contemporary to the events are the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, and the ŠKZ.

The graves of the Achaemenid kings carved in stone at Naqš-e Rostam near Persepolis and Istakhr. The tower on the left part of the picture is the Ka'ba-ye Zartosht, an Achaemenid bulding whose purpose is still unknown, and onto which Šābuhr I had his inscription carved. On the bottom right part of the image you can also see one of Šābuhr I's triumphal reliefs.

The ŠKZ is quite a straightforward source, and the only “little” caveat that scholars need to remember when using it is that it was royal Sasanian propaganda, and that it intended in no way to be a historical work. But the other source, the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, is an extremely confusing and puzzling document. The current consensus is that it was written by a Jew in a verse format that merged both Graeco-Roman oracular tradition and Jewish prophetical tradition, using extremely complex and obscure allegories. Scholars also agree that this anonymous author was not only a contemporary of the events, but also probably an eyewitness, native of Syria or Palestine. What scholars don’t agree about is the purpose of this strange document (if it had one) but it’s the only contemporary source for these events, and from a person who saw it unfold before his eyes.

The problem of using such unreliable sources is quite evident: by following them, scholars have proposed three different dates for Šābuhr I’s second campaign against the Roman empire (as Šābuhr I himself named it in the ŠKZ):

• The campaign season of 256 CE, a dating that was majority in the past (based in the year when Dura Europos was destroyed by Šābuhr I’s army), but now few authorities defend it.
• The campaign season of 253 CE, which is now the dating defended by most scholars; it was first proposed by M.Rostovzeff and among its current defenders there’s the German historian Udo Hartmann.
• And finally, some scholars propose the campaign season of 252 CE, its main defender is the American historian David S. Potter. The irony is that both Potter and Hartmann have come to defend different dates (and very different chains of events) by following the same sources, especially the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle (Potter wrote quite an extensive study about it, Prophecy and History).

Due to this utter disagreement between scholars about the developments in the East and their dating, I will expose first the events in the European provinces of the Roman empire before writing in some extent about the two opposed theories about Šābuhr I’s second campaign in the Roman east.

As we saw in a previous post, before leaving the Danube Trebonianus Gallus had signed an unpopular peace treaty with the Goths; in which he allowed them to leave the empire with all of their loot and prisoners, and to resume the payment of “subsidies” to them , in exchange for a renovation of the treaty that Gordian III or Tullius Menophilus had signed with them, in which the Goths for their part accepted not to attack the empire and to provide troops for the Roman army. As the French scholar Michel Christol proposed in a 1980 paper, this was probably due not only to the recent defeat of the Danube army against the Goths, but also to the desire of Trebonianus Gallus and the governing elite of the empire to shift the focus of military action to the East against the Sasanians; and for this Trebonianus Gallus needed to renew the treaty with the Goths: this gave him peace in the Danube and the possibility to draw troops from there and send them to the East, and of recruiting Gothic contingents for use against the Sasanians.

Trebonianus Gallus was the scion of an Italian senatorial family which was based in Perusia (modern Perugia, in central Italy), and so he was a man of impeccable aristocratic pedigree who seems to have possessed the traditionalist frame of mind associated to such origins. As such, he seems to have shared the same opinions regarding internal and exterior politics as his predecessor Decius and the latter’s right-hand man, the Italian senator Valerian. After the Gothic débacle, Trebonianus Gallus probably decided to proceed anyway with what could have been the second part of Decius’ grand strategy and organize a new expedition to the East concentrating all the available resources there, just like in the good old times. But what neither Trebonianus Gallus nor his senatorial colleagues realized was that the times when Rome could decide where and when to attack were long gone. The correlation of forces had shifted against Rome, and now the empire was on the defensive. The only concession that Trebonianus Gallus and his associates were willing to make to this new reality was their decision to renew the treaty with the Goths, something that Decius had refused to accept. This became painfully clear in the 252-253 CE campaign of Šābuhr I.

Loss of silver content of the antoninianus suring the period 200-270 CE; table extracted from Kyle Harper's book "The Fate of Rome: Climate, Disease and the End of an Empire".

Numismatic studies have showed that after 248 CE, the silver content of the antoninianus began a precipitous descent. Kyle Harper linked this quickened devaluation to the effects of the Plague of Cyprian, to which we should add the increased military spending, the payment of tributes to both the Goths and Sasanians and disasters like the one at Abritus. To the devaluation of the silver coinage, we should add under Trebonianus Gallus a decrease of the weight of the aureus, with which extraordinary donativa to the troops were made; the aurei of Gallus weighed on average 3,9 g, while between Nero and Caracalla they’d weighed 7,5 g and 6,55 g after Caracalla’s reign.

Ancient authors like Eutropius, Aurelius Victor and Zosimus wrote very severely about the reign of Trebonianus Gallus and judging from the indirect account that can be found in the letters, treaties and sermons of bishop Cyprian of Carthage, his reign was the moment when a general feeling of hopelessness began to pervade the whole empire, even the lower strata of society in a province sheltered from invasions like Africa. Still in 251 CE, Cyprian appears in his writings as the voice of reason and hope in the middle of Decius’ persecution, making a great effort against the spread of millenarianism among his flock. But in 252-253 CE, under Trebonianus Gallus and with Decius’ persecution finished, the general tone of his writings changes radically. He’s won over by inquietude, he questions himself about the future of the world and spreads the most pessimistic reports about the immediate future: he’s awaiting the imminent coming of the Antichrist and the calamities that will challenge his flock before the Last Judgement. The best example of this sharp change in Cyprian’s attitude is his sermon De Mortalitate, where we see clearly that the immediate cause for this hopelessness is the spread of the horrific epidemic known as the Plague of Cyprian; it was during Trebonianus Gallus’ reign that it spread wide and far across the Mediterranean basin. In this sermon, the Roman empire is not anymore for Cyprian an obstacle for the end of times; its situation is so hopeless that its floundering seems to be impending and Christians must await the coming of novissima tempora.

Silver antoninianus of Trebonianus Gallus. On the reverse, the image of the god Apollo the Healer with the legend APOLL SALVTARI.

In the governing circles of the empire, the main reason for misgiving must’ve been the external situation, and the fear that Rome was not able anymore to maintain its imperium. Trebonianus Gallus seems to have acted as well as he could considering his traditionalist background and the circumstances he found himself in. On 24 June 251 CE, Decius was deified by the Senate (another hint against the rumors that painted him as a traitor to Decius) but after July (or November, according to some sources) of that same year Hostilian, Decius’ youngest son and Trebonianus Gallus’ joint augustus disappeared from scene, probably a victim of the Plague of Cyprian, although rumors spread immediately that Trebonianus Gallus had murdered him. Immediately, Trebonianus Gallus raised his own son the caesar Gaius Vibius Afinius Gallus Vendumnianus Volusianus to the rank of augustus. He also ceased to apply Decius’ edict on sacrifices, a wise decision given that in its current the situation the last thing that the empire needed was to create unnecessary problems.

As I wrote before, the army of the lower Danube and the populace of the border Danubian provinces and Thrace had felt deeply betrayed by Trebonianus Gallus’ peace treaty with the Goths, and now the emperor was to suffer the fruits of this resentment. One of the commanders of the Danubian army was an equestrian of African origin (born in Girba, the Latin name for the island of Djerba according to the Epitome de Caesaribus) called Marcus Aemilius Aemilianus. His exact area of command is attested very confusedly in the ancient sources: John of Antioch, Simeon the Logothete, Leo Grammaticus and Zonaras wrote that he commanded in Moesia, while Zosimus wrote that he was in command in Pannonia. As we will see, a command in Moesia was the most probable option; and that his command was a general one that covered several provinces (like it had been the custom in Decius’ time) seems also quite probable, so perhaps his command could have covered from Pannonia to Moesia.

Latin sources are almost unanimously hostile to Aemilianus (he was not a senator and is described in several sources as “being in disagreement with the Senate”), while most Greek sources are sympathetic towards him; this probably reflects a division in opinion which appeared already in the III century. Zosimus is clearly supportive of him:

Meanwhile, the Scythians who had taken over the whole of Europe quite unhindered now crossed into Asia and plundered as far as Cappadocia, Pessinus, and Ephesus. Aemilianus, commander of the Pannonian legions, did his best to encourage his troops, who did not dare resist the successful barbarians, and reminded them of their Roman honor. He then made a surprise attack on the barbarians in the district and killed most of them. Next he crossed over into the enemy territory, destroyed every obstruction and, contrary to every expectation, freed Rome's subjects from their tormentors. For this he was chosen emperor.

In other words, the Goths (or at least part of the Goths, or perhaps their allies) broke the 251 CE treaty and attacked the empire again. Zosimus’ text implies that the Pontic Goths and their allies began their seaborne attacks against the coast of Asia Minor and the Balkans at this point (which is disputed by some scholars, who postpone the start of such attacks until 255 CE); and if Aemilianus was able to attack and beat them (or at least a group or groups of them) then they had perhaps also crossed again the Danube into Moesia. For the Greek-speaking inhabitants of these parts of the empire, this was a mortal danger that threatened their lives, families and livelihoods, and so Zosimus (who wrote in Constantinople) represents the voice of the Greek population of these areas, who cared about the defense of their country, and not much about the defense of other parts of the empire. In this we see a growing (and lethal for the empire in the long term) trend: the growing localism, with separate parts of the empire caring only about their own defense, ignoring the priorities of the empire as a whole and so being willing to raise to the purple whatever military commander who promised to defend their lands.

Zonaras offers a slightly different account. He explicitly says that the Gothic attack was due to their complaints that they had not received the amounts promised by the 251 CE treat. It’s unclear if these charges were true (and is they were, if they were Aemilianus’ own initiative or Trebonianus Gallus’ orders) or simply an attempt by the Goths to extort more wealth from the Romans. And then, according to Zonaras, Aemilianus made a promise to his men:

A certain Aemilianus, a Libyan man, commander of the army of Moesia, promised that he would give to the soldiers all that had been given to the Scythians, if they would engage in war with the barbarians. Catching the Scythians by suprise, they killed all but a few and collected much booty from them, overrunning their territory. Afterwards, Aemilianus, having become haughty in his success, canvassed the soldiers under him. They proclaimed him emperor of the Romans.

So, Aemilianus basically tried (and succeeded) in bribing his soldiers with the promise of the booty they could gain from the Goths, and which possibly was the very same tribute the Romans were paying them.

The anonymous XIII century Chronological Survey, often identified as the work of Theodore Scutariotes, states that:

And a certain Aemilianus, being in command of Paeonians, emboldening the troops under him and having attacked the barbarians there, destroyed many, and was recognized sovereign by the troops there.

Jordanes in the Getica (following Cassiodorus) represents the Latin tradition, and is much more hostile towards Aemilianus:

At this time the Goths frequently ravaged Moesia, through the neglect of the Emperors. When a certain Aemilianus saw that they were free to do this, and that they could not be dislodged by anyone without great cost to the republic, he thought that he too might be able to achieve fame and fortune. So he seized the rule in Moesia and, taking all the soldiers he could gather, began to plunder cities and people. In the next few months, while an armed host was being gathered against him, he wrought no small harm to the state.

So, according to the Getica, Aemilianus bribed his men by allowing them to loot the Roman provinces.

One way or another, Aemilianus managed to be acclaimed as augustus by the Danubian armies, probably in July 253 CE. He then put together an army formed probably by vexillationes and auxiliary units from the Danubian border (and so, weakening again the border which was under threat) and marched towards Rome at top speed. The fact that he fought the Goths makes very probable that he commanded the Moesian legions, but his unimpeded march against Rome following the Balkan roads means that probably he was also in control of the Pannonian legions, which did not intercept his advance upon Italy.

The expeditionary force must’ve been small and Aemilianus seems to have relied on speed, he preferred to advance against Trebonianus Gallus with a small army before the emperor could call to his help troops from other parts of the empire. Given that Aemilianus’ reign lasted for three months (four according to some sources), the march from the Balkans to Italy must’ve been a very quick one; when Trebonianus Gallus received news of the usurpation attempt and Aemilianus’ approach, he sent a message to Valerian in Raetia asking him to come to his help, but despite the fact that Valerian was nearer to Rome than Aemilianus, the latter beat him to the mark. Another hint that Aemilianus must’ve commanded a small and highly mobile force is the fact that Trebonianus Gallus and Volusianus did not hesitate to march against him with the Roman garrison; which means that most probably they had numerical superiority and felt confident enough. The two armies met at Interamna (modern Terni) on the Via Flaminia in central Italy, where Trebonianus Gallus was defeated and he and he and his son were murdered by their own men, probably in August 253 CE.

Antoninianus of Aemilianus; on the reverse, VICTORIA AVG.

The Senate acknowledged Aemilianus as augustus and the new emperor acted in a conciliatory way towards the conscript fathers; he declared his intention to fight both Goths and “Persians” and that he was only the general of the Senate. But his reign was to be short-lived, because the following month (September 253 CE) Valerian’s army reached central Italy. Aemilianus left Rome and fought a battle against Valerian’s army on the Via Flaminia near Spoletum (modern Spoleto); there Aemilianus was murdered by his own men in the suitably called Bridge of the Sanguinarii.

These events had to be partially connected with events in the East, which I will approach later, but there’s the possibility that the discontent among the Danube army was due to a decision taken by Trebonianus Gallus to send part of its effectives to deal with the Sasanian onslaught in the East while the Danube was suffering Gothic raids. This was another sign of the growing localism that affected the empire, and a consequence of Septimius Severus’ decision to give marriage rights to the soldiers; they were now deeply rooted in the society of the provinces of their main bases where they had wives and children and were extremely reluctant to leave their homelands unguarded if they thought that there was a risk of a foreign attack. At this moment, either the Goths attacked breaking the treaty, or Trebonianus Gallus was forced to cut the subsidies or Aemilianus, who was general commander in the Balkans, chose deliberately to provoke them into attacking; either way he scored a victory (which after Decius’ disastrous war must’ve caused an impression) and the soldiers and provincials acclaimed him as augustus. In my opinion, the usurpation was probably planned by Aemilianus who deftly planned the act, who exploited the discontent that reigned in the Balkan provinces in military and civilian circles against the emperor.

What’s less clear is Valerian’s role in Aemilianus’ short-lived usurpation. In 252 or by early 253 CE, Trebonianus Gallus had sent Valerian (the old right-hand man of Decius) to gather an army north of the Alps. The French scholar Michel Christol noted in a 1980 paper that most probably Valerian’s real mission was to organize an expeditionary force with vexillationes from the legions and auxiliary units from the Rhine and upper Danube borders in preparation for an expedition to the East, and this has become ever since shared by many scholars. Christol noted that Aurelius Victor had written that at the moment of Trebonianus Gallus’ death Valerian commanded an army assembled in Raetia ob instans bellum (“because of the imminent war”). Given that the first coins of Valerian as augustus minted at Viminacium boast of a victoria germanica, it’s probable that the preparations for an eastern campaign included also preventive attacks against the empire’s northern neighbors (the Alamanni in this case if the army had been assembled in Raetia), as had been done before the expeditions of Caracalla and Gordian III (Severus Alexander did not take this precaution and suffered the consequences). The real question though is that if Valerian’s army was stationed in Raetia (and thus perfectly located to intercept Aemilianus’ advance into Italy), why did he not arrive into scene until it was too late?

Antoninianus of Valerian; on the reverse VICTORIA GERMANICA.

Udo Hartmann proposed as an explanation for this that Valerian could’ve been campaigning against the Alamanni (Raetia would be the ideal launching place for such a campaign) and that Aemilian’s march caught him and his army still in barbaricum and so unable to retreat quickly enough to cut his advance; that would also explain the victoria germanica coins. Upon receiving news of the death of Trebonianus Gallus, he would have refused to acknowledge Aemilian as himself clearly outranked him in lineage, rank and prestige and was commanding an army which had no reason to follow Aemilianus (as they came from areas free from Gothic raids), so he allowed his troops to acclaim him as augustus. Unlike Aemilianus, which is described in several ancient sources as a parvenu with very discreet origins, Valerian belonged to a senatorial Italian family, and had been married (he’s recently become a widower) to a woman called Egnatia Mariniana, who belonged to the distinguished Etrurian senatorial family of the Egnatii. He’d been consul at least once, governor of several provinces and had an extensive administrative, political and military experience (he was most probably involved already in the revolt of the Gordiani in 238 CE).

 

[Avernite]

Again, kinda amazing there even was a Roman empire left after all these serial disasters...

 

[Semper Victor]

Again, kinda amazing there even was a Roman empire left after all these serial disasters...

Just wait, bacause the Romans haven't hit rock bottom yet .

 

[Avernite]

Just wait, bacause the Romans haven't hit rock bottom yet .

I know...

And I was raised properly western, so I am inclined to see them as "the good guys", as a result it comes across as sad, too.

 

[Semper Victor]

20.3. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE BATTLE OF BARBALISSOS.

Let’s look now at events in the East, which are much less clear than the ones in Europe. As I said before, the exact chronology of Šābuhr I’s second campaign is hopelessly unclear, other than the events seem to have taken place wholly during Trebonianus Gallus’ short reign (summer 251 – August 253 CE). The first act of the play was the Sasanian seizure of Armenia, which probably happened during Decius’ Gothic war or immediately after it, taking advantage of Roman troubles at the Danube. If that was the case, then the decision of granting asylum to the Armenian prince Trdat was either one of Decius’ last decisions or one of Trebonianus Gallus’ first ones. Both would have been probably well aware that such a decision was a breach of the 244 CE treaty and would mean war against Šābuhr I.

This decision was taken at a disastrously bad moment for Rome, but probably any Roman leader would have done the same. The fate of Armenia was just too important to just concede victory to Šābuhr I. Armenia was the piece that gave an edge to any of both empires in the Middle East, and Rome had controlled it for two centuries. Allowing Šābuhr I to just take it with impunity was simply unacceptable; and we should remember what happened to Maximinus Thrax for ignoring Ardaxšir I’s conquest of Roman Mesopotamia, which had lesser strategic importance than Armenia. Rome had to react, but as the events that followed would show, the empire was just not able anymore to concentrate overwhelming forces in a single front when it suited it like it had been able to do since Augustus’ times. Now, it was Rome’s enemies who would set the pace of events, and the Romans would be forced to react to them as well as they could.

In his influential 1980 paper, Christol noted a telling sign that Trebonianus Gallus was preparing himself for war against the Sasanians. After 244 CE, the mint of Antioch had been issuing large amounts of billon tetradrachms (many eastern cities issued their own coinage), a production that was maintained under Philip (perhaps the only sign that could point towards a continuation of military operations in the East under this emperor) and Decius. The billon tetradrachm was the local equivalent of the Roman billon coin of the period, the antoninianus. Under Trebonianus Gallus, the issuing of tetradrachms ceased abruptly and was substituted by an equally massive production of regular antoniniani, the coin with which soldiers’ stipendia were paid, hinting at an upcoming military campaign in the East which would have included western troops which would have been used to being paid in antoniniani, the same had happened during Gordian III’s eastern campaign. The only difference is that under Gordian III a large amount of antoniniani had been minted at Rome and transported to the East, while under Trebonianus Gallus and his successors the mint at Antioch seems to have been in charge for the totality of the money supply. Another telling sign is that one of the main legends in the reverse of the antoniniani that were being massively issued by the mint of Antioch at the time read ADVENTUS AVGG, thus proclaiming the imminent arrival of the two augusti (Trebonianus Gallus and Volusianus) in the East.

Antoninianus of Trebonianus Gallus; on the reverse, ADVENTUS AVG.

As we’ve seen in the cases of Severus Alexander and Gordian III, launching an eastern expedition would have been a cumbersome affair, and it usually took an emperor between one and two years of preparations and marches before he reached the East with reinforcements from the West. And if there was something that Trebonianus Gallus probably did not have, it was time.

Either in the last months of Decius’ reign or during the first months of Trebonianus Gallus’ one, there had been some local trouble in Antioch of the kind that in normal circumstances should have never gone beyond a mere local anecdote, but these were not normal circumstances. It sounds like the plot of a bad movie, but several ancient sources corroborate the tale. First, the SHA (in the chapter Triginta Tyranni):

This man (Myriades), rich and well-born, fled from his father Cyriades when, by his excesses and profligate ways, he had become a burden to the righteous old man, and after robbing him of a great part of his gold and an enormous amount of silver he departed to the Persians. Thereupon he joined King Sapor and became his ally, and after urging him to make war on the Romans, he brought first Odomastes and then Sapor himself into the Roman dominions; and also by capturing Antioch and Caesarea he won for himself the name of Caesar. Then, when he had been hailed Augustus, after he had caused all the Orient to tremble in terror at his strength or his daring, and when, moreover, he had slain his father (which some historians deny), he himself, at the time that Valerian was on his way to the Persian War, was put to death by the treachery of his followers. Nor has anything more that seems worthy of mention been committed to history about this man, who has obtained a place in letters solely by reason of his famous flight, his act of parricide, his cruel tyranny, and his boundless excesses.

John Malalas, (an Antiochene author from the VI century CE, quoting the III century author Philostratos of Athens and local traditions from his native city):

Under this emperor (i.e. Valerian), one of the magistrates of Antioch the Great by the name of Mariades was expelled from the city council (boule) at the contrivance of the entire council and citizen body. He was found wanting in his administration of the chariot races, for whenever he was leader of the faction, he did not purchase horses but kept for his own benefit the public funds destined for the circus. He departed for Persia and offered to betray Antioch the Great, his own native city, to Shapur the king. This Shapur, the king of the Persians, came with a large force through the limes of Chalcis and occupied and devastated the whole of Syria. He captured Antioch the Great in the evening and plundered it, tormented it and set it on fire. Antioch then was in her three hundred and fourteenth year (=AD 265/6?). However, he decapitated the magistrate (i.e. Mariades) for his betrayal of his native city.

Another source is the VI century CE East Roman author Peter the Patrician (a high-ranking member of the administration of Justinian I):

When the king of the Persians came before Antioch with Mariadnes (i.e. Mariades), he encamped some twenty stadia (from the city). The respectable classes fled the city but the majority of the populace remained: partly because they were well disposed towards Mariadnes and partly because they were glad of any revolution; such as is customary with ignorant people.

What modern scholars have managed to put together from this garbled mess is that a man named Kyriades or Mariades, a rich and respected member of the Antiochian elite, was expelled from the city’s boule (governing assembly) either for embezzling public funds or for robbing his family, or both. This should have been the end of the affair, but this Kyriades/Mariades crossed into Ērānšahr and offered his help to Šābuhr I, who was planning an attack against the Romans and accepted the offered help gladly; judging by all the sources he acted moved by hatred and revenge against his native city although the SHA (beware the source) state that he also tried to usurp the purple with Šābuhr I’s help (who could have found this an useful distraction in his war against the Romans). The SHA also offer an important detail that scholars consider probably true: he names an “Odomastes”, whom modern scholars identify as none other than Hormizd-Ardaxšir, Šābuhr I’s heir presumptive and who had just been appointed as Great King of Armenia by his father.

Reconstructed computer view of ancient Antioch, as seen from the wall of the island on the Orontes, looking towards Mons Silpius, the mountains that dominated the city on its southern side.

The tale of Mareades is absent from the ŠKZ, but its historicity is confirmed by his mentioned in the only surviving Graeco-Roman contemporary source, the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle. Due to its importance, I’ll quote here at length the whole passage dealing with the Sasanian invasion and the events that immediately preceded it:

(107) And after him there shall rule powerfully
O'er fertile Rome another great-souled lord
Versed in war, coming from the Dacians
And numbering three hundred; he shall have
Also the letter of the number four,
And many shall be slay, and then the king
Shall all his brothers and his friends destroy
Even while the kings are cut off, and straightway
Shall there be fights and pillagings and murders
Suddenly on the older king's account.

(117) Then, when a wily man shall summoned come
A robber and a Roman not well known
From Syria appearing, he by guile
Into a race of Cappadocian men
Shall drive through and, besieging, shall press hard,
Insatiate of war. And then for thee,
Tyana and Mazaka, there shall be
A capture; thou shalt be enslaved and put
Upon thy neck again a fearful yoke.
Arid Syria shall mourn for men destroyed
And then Selenian goddess shall not guard
Her holy city. But when he by flight
From Syria shall before the Romans come,
And shall pass over the Euphrates' streams,
No longer like the Romans, but like fierce
Dart-shooting Persians, then, fulfilling fate,
Down shall the ruler of the Italians fall
In the ranks smitten by the gleaming iron;
And close upon him shall his children perish.
But when another king of Rome shall reign,
Then also to the Romans there shall come
Unstable nations, on the walls of Rome
Destructive Ares with his bastard son;

(140) Then also shall be famines, pestilence,
And mighty thunderbolts, and dreadful wars,
And anarchy in cities suddenly;
And the Syrians shall perish fearfully;
For there shall come upon them the great wrath
Of the Most High and straightway an uprising
of the industrious Persians, and mixed up
With Persians shall the Syrians destroy
The Romans, but by the divine decree
They shall not make a conquest of their laws.
Alas, how many with their goods shall flee
Front the East unto men of other tongues
Alas, the dark blood of how many men
The land shall drink! For that shall be a time
In which the living uttering o'er the dead
A blessing shall by word of mouth pronounce
Death beautiful and death shall flee from them.

(157) And now for thee, O wretched Syria,
I weep in sorrow; for to thee shall come
A dreadful blow from arrow-shooting men,
Which thou didst never think would come to thee.
Also the fugitive of Rome shall come
Bearing a great spear, Crossing on his way
Euphrates with his many myriads,
And he shall burn thee, and dispose all things
In a bad way. O wretched Antioch,
And thee a city they shall never call,
When by thy lack of prudence thou shalt fall
Under the spears; and stripping off all things
And making naked he shall leave thee thus
Coverless, houseless; and when anyone
Sees he shall of a sudden weep for thee.

(172) And thou shalt be, O Hierapolis,
A triumph, also thou, Berœa; weep
At Chalcis over lately wounded sons.
Alas, how many by the steep high mount
Of Casius shall dwell and by Amanus
How many, and how many Lycus laves,
And Marsyas as many and Pyramus
The silver-eddying; for even to the bounds
Of Asia they shall treasure up their spoils,
Make cities naked, and bear idols off
(182) And cast down temples on much-nourishing earth.

It reads like utter gibberish, and the fact is that the text is so dense with allegories and metaphors related to Jewish scripture and Graeco-Roman mythology and historical lore in its attempted imitation of oracular speeches that after more than a century of heated debate scholars are still in disagreement about the events it “prophesized” (the original text was written in Greek).

I’ll summarize now the reconstruction of events by the German scholar Udo Hartmann, which align with the prevailing view amongst scholars, and then I’ll expose the differing version defended by David S. Potter, who has devoted a long book to analyze the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle.

According to Hartmann, the war began in 252 CE with a Sasanian invasion of Roman Mesopotamia and a Roman counterattack, presumably to avoid the Sasanian capture of Nisibis (as described by al-Tabari and Eutychius). Most probably Nisibis fell at this time, because its mint ceased issuing Roman coins abruptly around this time. And the next year, it would be Šābuhr I’s turn to invade the Roman empire.

Hartmann construes the verses 117-130 as a description of Iotapianus’ rebellion, and according to him the verses 131-134 describe the death of Decius and his son in campaign against the Goths. From the verse 135 onwards, the “Sibyll” writes about the eastern events that happened during Trebonianus Gallus; short reign, in which is a long mourning of the destruction of Syria by the Sasanian army. Verses 142-148 attest to “Syrians” collaborating with “Persians” against “Romans”. According to Hartmann, this is a reference to the fugitive Antiochene leader Mareades.

He reconstructs the original name as “Mareades” from among all the variants transmitted in the sources. Hartmann notes that “Mareades” is the Hellenization of the Syriac common name “Mareas”. According to him, this man must’ve been a rich citizen of Antioch, and he must’ve served as a member of the city assembly (the boule), and would have been elected in 252 CE by the boule to be in charge of financing the chariot races at the circus, one of the acts of evergetism that the members of local governments were expected to provide to theirs fellow citizens at their own expense. This was a potentially ruinous commission (several cases of ruined local magistrates are known from across the empire due to similar obligations), and Hartmann thinks that this was probably the case for Mareades. Due to his failure at financing the chariot races, he was expelled from the boule (probably he was elected for this “honor” deliberately by political enemies who wanted to see him ruined), and he left Antioch and went to Ērānšahr to offer his services to Šābuhr I, then at war against Rome, perhaps taking with him funds that the boule of Antioch considered to be public funds (the money destined for the races) and Mareades considered to be his own money.

Mareades is described by ancient sources as having accompanied Šābuhr I in his invasion, and most scholars consider verses 142-148 to corroborate this. According to several sources, Mareades had a following in Antioch, and Hartmann thinks that these supporters would have been important for the fall of the city in Šābuhr I’s hands.

According to Hartmann, the invasion was launched by Šābuhr in the spring of 253 CE. About the chosen route there’s consensus among scholars; Šābuhr achieved strategical surprise by ignoring the western Mesopotamian cities (Carrhae and Edessa) still in Roman hands: he advanced by a completely unexpected route and aimed his attack directly against northern Syria (the Roman province of Syria Coele) with its capital Antioch, which was the main city and military center of the Roman East.

The route chosen was the Euphrates route, so often used by the Romans in their eastern attacks. But while for the Romans it made sense (as it allowed for the shipping of supplies downstream), this would be not possible for a Sasanian army advancing north against the current’s flow. It was probably the last thing that the Romans would have expected Šābuhr I to do. Taking this route implies several things:

• First, that Šābuhr I had a comfortable numerical superiority over the Romans, for such an advance would leave several Roman and Palmyrene fortified outposts (Anatha, Dura Europos, Circesium and others) in his rearguard which would have needed several strong enough Sasanian detachments left behind to surround and blockade them. And he would also have needed to guard his vulnerable left flank and rearguard against surprise Palmyrene attacks. This suggests the mobilization of a large army from all the corners of his vast empire, and such a mobilization would’ve needed to be planned in advance, if forces from eastern Iran, central Asia, Afghanistan and perhaps further away had to be ready on time (in the IV century, Ammianus Marcellinus attested the presence of contingents from Kušanšahr and Kidarite central Asian nomads in Šābuhr II’s army during one of his Mesopotamian campaigns). Such forces would have needed to cross the Iranian plateau and the Zagros passes and meet with Šābuhr I’s royal army near Ctesiphon. Given the inhospitable weather in the Iranian plateau and the Zagros (not to speak of central Asia and Afghanistan) in winter, it’s unlikely that such a force could have been ready very early in the campaign season.
• Second, that the Sasanian king must’ve had some sort of logistical preparations ready to feed such a large force and carry the supplies upstream.
• Third, that this bold move put the Romans on the strategical defensive, but it did not rend them unable to respond. The Romans had shorter communication lines and an excellent road and supply system that would have allowed them to concentrate their forces quickly when Šābuhr I’s intentions became evident. What they lost though was the sheltering screen provided by the fortified cities of northern Mesopotamia, and as we shall see soon, by the Euphrates river itself.
• Fourth, that Šābuhr I’s advance can’t have been very fast; he was moving with a large army, had to carry his supplies upstream and there’s evidence that he carried with him infantry forces and a siege train. This was not a large-scale cavalry raid, but a combined-arms invasion army well equipped and prepared. Again, this implies that the Romans must’ve had enough time to prepare themselves and gather their forces.
• Fifth, that Šābuhr I advanced along the right bank of the Euphrates, with the Syrian desert to his left. Advancing along the other bank would have prevented the danger of Palmyrene attacks from the desert, but it would have meant that the Roman army could have blocked any attempts to cross the river. Or worse still, it could have trapped the Sasanian army with its back to the river during the crossing, forcing it to fight a frontal battle without being able to use its cavalry advantage to full effect, like it happened to Šābuhr II at Singara (a narrowly avoided disaster) and at the catastrophic Sasanian defeat at Qadisiyyah against the Rashidun army in 637 CE.

The possibility that Šābuhr I must’ve enjoyed a numerical advantage and that he advanced along the Euphrates’ right bank is reinforced by the place where the decisive encounter took place: the Syrian town of Barbalissos (modern Balis), a small town located on the Euphrates’ western bank, where the river’s great western bend reaches the point closest to the Mediterranean coast (about 200 km).

Hypothetical advance of Šābuhr I's army along the western bank of the Ephrates river. Anatha was the first Palmyrene fortress on the river, and Doura (Dura Europos) was the first Roman fortress. As you can see, Barbalissos is already dangerously close to Antioch and the Mediterranean coast.

This was a defensive battle for the Romans, because they gathered their army in a place from which they could try to block Šābuhr I’s advance to Antioch and the Mediterranean coast. The scarcity of sources is such that only the ŠKZ even names the battle of Barbalissos: this name or even the fact that there was a battle is completely absent from Greek and Latin sources. It’s the same situation as with Mishike, but as with this last battle some historians are still skeptical about the veracity of the ŠKZ’s depiction of events, there’s consensus that the battle of Barbalissos really happened and ended with a crushing Roman defeat, by the simple fact that some surviving Greek and Latin sources confirm the tale of the ŠKZ about the devastation of Syria and the destruction of Antioch by Šābuhr I’s army; this could only have happened if the Roman army of the East had been severely beaten (or if it had banished into thin air).

Barbalissos is today an abandoned ruin; in ancient times it was a small town inhabited by an Aramaic-speaking population and emperor Justinian I surrounded it with strong fortifications, whose ruins are still visible. Archaeological digs have been done at this site, and scholars believe that in the III century the town was not fortified. Today it lays partially submerged under the waters of the Assad lake (a dam on the Euphrates built in modern times). The surrounding country is slightly hilly, but other than that it has no major obstacles to major troop movements (rivers, ravines, mountains, etc.). In other words, this was perfect terrain for cavalry, which did not bode well for the Romans; as Barbalissos lacked fortifications, the only strong point to which the Roman army could retreat in case of retreat would have been their camp, if they had fortified it.

View of the environs of Barbalissos in modern times; in the background the waters of Lake Assad.

But the major unanswered questions about the battle of Barbalissos don’t end with the nature and disposition of the battlefield; we don’t know who commanded the Roman army and how many men were involved on both sides. The ŠKZ says that at Barbalissos the Sasanian king “annihilated” a Roman army of 60,000 men. This number is usually considered an exaggeration, but given the number of men available to the Romans in the East and the fact that probably they had plenty of time to concentrate their forces, in my opinion the number is perfectly plausible (they were even operating very near their main supply bases, and in a fertile and populous countryside, with plenty of supplies and water available).

In his book The army of Severus Alexander, Bernard Michael O’Hanlon gives hypothetical numbers for the numbers of men garrisoned in each province at the end of the last Severan emperor in 235 CE; these numbers are still probably valid for 253 CE. O’Hanlon follows Hyginus for the strength numbers of each unit but considers that units would have probably at all times been at least 10% short of their paper-strength. The list is based primarily on epigraphic source, those units whose presence in the eastern provinces is unsure are marked with a question mark.

• Full legion: 5,000 men (including 120 cavalrymen)
• Auxiliary cohors (also called cohors quingenaria): 480 infantrymen.
• Auxiliary cohors milliaria: 800 infantrymen.
• Auxiliary cohors equitata (quingenaria): 480 infantrymen and 120 cavalrymen.
• Auxiliary cohors milliaria equitata: 800 infantrymen and 240 cavalrymen.
• Auxiliary ala (quingenaria): 480 cavalrymen.
• Auxiliary ala milliaria: 720 cavalrymen (a very rare unit, only 6 are attested for the whole empire).

For the eastern provinces, the list of units given by O’Hanlon for the end of Severus Alexander’s reign is:

Cappadocia: c. 19,000 infantrymen and 2,800 cavalrymen, broken down as:

• Legio XV Apollinaris.
• Legio XII Fulminata.
• Ala II Ulpia Auriana.
• Ala I Augusta Gemina Colonorum.
• Ala II Gallorum.
• Ala I Ulpia Dacorum.
• Cohors Apuleia. C. R. (for Civites Romanorum, a title which became redundant after the Constitutio Antoniniana)
• Cohors Bosporiana Milliaria.
• Cohors Milliaria Equitata C. R. (?).
• Cohors I Apamenorum Sagittariorum.
• Cohors I Claudia Equitata.
• Cohors I Germanorum Milliaria Equitata.
• Cohors I Lepidiana Equitata C. R.
• Cohors I Germanorum.
• Cohors II Claudia (?).
• Cohors II Hispanorum (?).
• Cohors III Ulpia Petraeorum Milliaria Equitata.
• Cohors IV Raetorum.

Mesopotamia: c. 8,000 infantrymen (minimum) and 1,500 cavalrymen (minimum), broken down as:

• Legio I Parthica.
• Legio III Parthica.
• Ala Britannica.
• Ala Nova Firma Catafractaria Milliaria.
• Cohors I Ascalonitarum Felix Sagittaria.
• Cohors I Flavia Chalcidenorum.
• Cohors II Equestris.
• Cohors III Augusta Thracum.
• Cohors VI I(turaeorum).
• Cohors IX Maurorum.

Syria Coele: c. 20,000 infantrymen (O’Hanlon does not give the total number of cavalrymen, but if we add the strength of the units listed below, they add up to c. 6,300 cavalrymen), broken down as:

• Legio IV Scythica.
• Legio XVI Flavia Firma.
• Ala Thracum Herculiana Milliaria (?).
• Ala I Praetoria C. R.
• Ala I Ulpia Dromedariorum Milliaria (?).
• Ala I Ulpia Singularium (?).
• Ala II Flavia Agrippiana (?).
• Ala III Thracum (?).
• Cohors I Ascalonitanorum Sagittaria Equitata (?).
• Cohors I Augusta Pannoniorum.
• Cohors I Claudia Sugambrorum (?).
• Cohors I Flavia Chalcidenorum Sagittaria Equitata.
• Cohors I Lucensium Equitata (?).
• Cohors I Ulpia Dacorum.
• Cohors I Ulpia Petraeorum Milliaria Equitata (?).
• Cohors I Ulpia Sagittaria Equitata (?).
• Cohors II Dacorum Equitata (?).
• Cohors II Equitum.
• Cohors II Classica Sagittaria (?).
• Cohors II Thracum Syriaca Equitata (?).
• Cohors II Ulpia Equitata C. R.
• Cohors II Ulpia Paphlagonum Milliaria Equitata.
• Cohors III Augusta Thracum Equitata (?).
• Cohors III Thracum Syriaca Equitata (?).
• Cohors III Ulpia Paphlagonum Equitata (?).
• Cohors IV Lucensium Equitata (?).
• Cohors IV Thracum Syriaca Equitata (?).
• Cohors V Chalcidenorum Equitata (?).
• Cohors V Ulpia Petraeorum Milliaria Equitata (?).
• Cohors VII Gallorum.
• Cohors XII Palestinorum Milliaria.
• Cohors XX Palmyrenorum Sagittaria Equitata Milliaria.

Syria Phoenicia: c. 10,000 infantrymen and 750 cavalrymen (here O’Hanlon makes an assumption that most of its auxiliary units must’ve been dropped from the record, for the list below doesn’t add up to the total above), broken down as:

• Legio III Gallica.
• Ala Vocontiorum.
• Cohors I Flavia (Chalcidenorum) C. R. Equitata.
• Cohors II Ulpia Galatarum.

Syria Palaestina: c. 18,500 infantrymen and 2,000 cavalrymen, broken down as:

• Legio X Fretensis.
• Legio VI Ferrata.
• Ala Anton(iniana?) Gallorum (?).
• Ala Gallorum et Thracum Ant(onin)iana (?).
• Ala VII Phrygum (?).
• Cohors I Damascenorum (?).
• Cohors I Flavia C. R. Equitata.
• Cohors I Montanorum (?).
• Cohors I Sebastena Milliaria (?).
• Cohors I Thracum Milliaria (?).
• Cohors I Ulpia Galatarum.
• Cohors II Ulpia Galatarum (?).
• Cohors IV Bracar(augustanorum) (?).
• Cohors IV Breucorum (?).
• Cohors IV Palestinorum.
• Cohors IV Ulpia Petraeorum (?).
• Cohors V Gemina C. R. (?).
• Cohors VI Ulpia Petraeorum (?).
• Numerus Maurorum (Moorish mercenaries from North Africa under Roman pay, led by their own officers and organized according to their custom, such units are impossible to quantify. Most probably, they were cavalrymen).

Arabia: c. 9,500 infantrymen and 2,000 cavalrymen, broken down as:

• Legio III Cyrenaica.
• Ala Celerum.
• Ala Dromedariorum.
• Ala Veterana Gaetulorum.
• Ala VI Hispanorum.
• Cohors I Augusta Thracum Equitata.
• Cohors I Hispanorum.
• Cohors I Thacum Milliaria.
• Cohors I Thebaeorum.
• Cohors III Alpinorum.
• Cohors V Afrorum Severiana.
• Cohors VI Hispanorum.
• Cohors VIII Voluntariorum.
• Gothi Gentiles (Gothic mercenaries under Roman pay, it’s probable that they were cavalrymen).

Egypt: c. 10,850 infantrymen and 2,500 cavalrymen.

• Legio II Traiana Fortis.
• Ala Apriana.
• Ala Augusta (Syriaca) (?).
• Ala Gallorum Veterana.
• Ala Herculanea.
• Ala I Thracum Mauretana (?).
• Ala II Ulpia Afrorum.
• Cohors Scutata. C. R.
• Cohors I Apamenorum Equitata.
• Cohors I Augusta Lusitanorum.
• Cohors I Augusta Pannoniorum.
• Cohors I Augusta Praetoria Lusitanorum Equitata.
• Cohors I Flavia Cilicum Equitata.
• Cohors I Pannoniorum.
• Cohors I Ulpia Afrorum (?).
• Cohors II Hispanorum (?).
• Cohors II Ituraeorum.
• Cohors II Thebaeorum (?).
• Cohors II Thracum.
• Cohors III Cilicum.
• Cohors III Galatarum.
• Cohors III Ituraeorum.
• Numerus Palmyrenorum (Palmyrene mercenaries under Roman pay, it’s almost sure that they were cavalrymen).

The grand total for the eastern Roman army according to O’Hanlon adds up to 113,700 men, including infantry and cavalry, which in my opinion means that a force of 60,000 men for the Roman army at Barbalissos is perfectly plausible. There are some commentaries to be made about the subject though (apart from the obvious fact that 18 years had passed since the death of Severus Alexander):

• The Romans would have also have had access to a considerable number of Palmyrene allied cavalry. Apart from the city’s own army, the Arabic rulers of Palmyra controlled most nomadic Arabic tribes in the Syrian and Arabic deserts, deep into Arabia.
• The different provinces would’ve contributed unevenly to the army. The army of Syria Coele would’ve been deployed almost in its entirety (as the battle was held within the province, which was the main target of the Sasanian attack). The army of Mesopotamia would’ve been in bad shape, as the province had been the target of a Sasanian attack the previous campaign season, which probably ended with the fall of Nisibis, and leaving such an exposed province ungarrisoned would have been unadvisable, so most probably most of it stayed in Mesopotamia east of the Euphrates. The other provincial armies would have contributed, but without leaving their own provinces unprotected, especially Cappadocia which now bordered Sasanian Armenia, and Egypt, a perpetually unstable province that was economically vital for Rome and just couldn’t be left unguarded.
• Apart from the two legions stationed in Syria Coele, which probably would have been deployed complete into the battlefield, the other legions would have been represented by vexillationes, as had been increasingly common since the II century CE. Apart from the unwillingness to leave provinces ungarrisoned, the legion had evolved into an administrative an organizational unit for the Roman army, and it was important to keep its basic structure in place in order to train new recruits; hence the unwillingness to risk having whole legions destroyed in battle by the Roman leadership.
• The cavalry forces listed above add up to 17,850 cavalrymen, which is 15% of the whole eastern Roman army. This number is in line with scholarly studies about Roman army deployment under Hadrian: about 20% of the total army strength was cavalry, and most of it was concentrated in the West and Africa west of Egypt. Surprisingly, this deployment stood the same under Severus Alexander, despite the growing threat from Arsacid and Sasanian cavalry-based armies. It’s probable that the Romans had previously made good for this weakness in the East through the use of allied cavalry (Armenians, Osrhoenians, Hatrenes, Palmyrenes, etc.). But by 253 CE only Palmyra remained as a Roman ally.
• The Roman army of the East seems to have received some reinforcements from the West, in small numbers but including significant units. In the mid-1980s a Belgian archaeological mission excavated the remains of the Syrian city of Apamea, and it discovered some interesting inscriptions. Apamea surrounded itself with a strong walled circuit in the late III century, and as elsewhere in the empire these walls were built in a hurry, re-using materials from cemeteries, ancient funerary monuments, etc. One of the towers of the wall (tower XV) was located relatively near to a ravine, and other side of the ravine there were the remains of the legionary camp of Legio II Parthica, which built it during Caracalla’s eastern expedition and re-occupied it again during Severus Alexander’s eastern campaign. But the camp seems to have been used by other Roman units when it was not being occupied by Legio II Parthica (whose permanent base was located at Alba near Rome). The ravine between the camp and the city of Apamea seems to have been used by Roman soldiers as a graveyard for their deceased comrades, and when tower XV was built, most of the gravestones of this military cemetery were used for as building material for this tower. The Belgian archaeological team disassembled the remains of the tower, and discovered a considerable number of gravestones, most of them of soldiers of Legio II Parthica which have helped considerably in the study of the Roman military in the Severan era. But apart from these tombstones, the Belgian team also discovered the gravestone of a certain Aurelius Bassus, a decurion of the Ala I Ulpia Contariorum, who’d died on 21 April 252 CE. The leader of the archaeological team, Jean-Charles Balty, reported on his paper about the digs that this is one of ten similar epigraphic inscriptions coming from Apamea that evidence the presence of cavalry units which had come from other parts of the empire in 252 CE (the Ala I Ulpia Contariorum was usually based in Pannonia). The presence of these units, and the facts that they all are cavalry units, its linked by Balty explicitly to the campaign that ended with the battle of Barbalissos.

The second great unknown issue is that of the identity of the Roman commander. Each provincial army was led by the provincial governor, and in order to gather an army including forces from several provinces it was necessary for the emperor himself to be present, or to appoint a really trustable commander (considering the long list of usurpations at the time, this was obviously a very delicate issue). Well, we ignore completely who this commander might have been. If according to Hartmann and most scholars the battle happened in the summer of 253 CE, then Trebonianus Gallus and his son Volusianus couldn’t have been present, as they were in Italy fighting against, and perishing under Aemilianus’ attack according to ancient sources. And Valerian was in Raetia, or in Alamannic territory. Who was in command of the eastern armies? There’s not a single source that offers an answer or even a hint at this key issue. David S. Potter proposes an alternative chronology for events and hypothesizes that the battle could’ve happened in the campaign season of 252 CE, which could have meant that perhaps Volusianus could have led the Roman army. It’s a risky proposition, based on his interpretation of the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, the tombstones of the auxiliary cavalrymen from Apamea (some of whose deaths are dated to the year of the joint consulship of Trebonianus Gallus and Volusianus, which happened from January 252 CE to January 253 CE), and the antoniniani issued by the mint of Antioch with legend ADVENTUS AVGG on their reverse, which he thinks must’ve responded to a real arrival of one of the two augusti in Syria. As I said it’s a risky hypothesis as it’s not backed by any documentary source, and Potter’s dating is not supported by most scholars. I’ll return to this issue later.

Satellite image of the environs of Barbalissos in modern times (Google Maps).

If the battle took place in the environs of Barbalissos, unless the Romans had prepared field works to strengthen their position (as they were fighting a defensive battle), they were at a clear disadvantage. They would’ve been facing south, and the most logical thing would’ve been to anchor their left flank on the Euphrates’ riverbank. But unless they had built fixed defenses, that left their right flank dangerously exposed; as Barbalissos was not fortified, in case of defeat the town would have not been a viable refuge, which means that again, unless the Romans had built a fortified camp, in case of defeat they would’ve been exposed to a pursuit by an enemy which was superior in cavalry; and that was a potential recipe for disaster (it was just what destroyed Crassus’ army after Carrhae, for it suffered most of its losses during the retreat and not during the battle itself).

As I wrote before, Šābuhr I’s army possibly had superiority in numbers, but I should make a precision here. In theory, both Romans and Sasanians could mobilize armies of more than 100,000 men and the eastern expeditions of Septimius Severus, Caracalla, Severus Alexander and Gordian III had involved numbers far larger than that. But it’s highly improbable that they concentrated at a single place such large armies. Ancient sources give lower numbers for single armies, which in the most extreme cases oscillated between 60,000 and 80,000 men tops, which seems to have been the absolute maximum number, probably due to logistical issues. For the Sasanian empire in the VI century CE, the maximum attested number of forces in Mesopotamia happened under Xusrō I, when two armies operated simultaneously; one of 70,000 men and another of 20,000 men. If the Roman army numbered 60,000 men then Šābuhr I’s army must’ve oscillated between that amount and 70,000-80,000 men maximum, especially considering that he would’ve been forced to leave many detachments behind him to block bypassed Roman fortresses and towns and protect his supply lines. Possibly he enjoyed numerical superiority, but not an overwhelming one.

With the benefit of hindsight, it’s easy to say that the Romans should’ve chosen another place to fight, but by this point of time the Roman command had probably lost its nerves. Barbalissos is located 260 km upstream from the southernmost Roman outpost on the Euphrates (Dura Europos) and 380 km upstream from Anatha, the southernmost Palmyrene outpost located on an island in the Euphrates. At Barbalissos, the Sasanian army had left the Syrian desert behind and could turn west from the river and advance along the Roman road to Chalcis (120 km from Barbalissos) across fertile countryside, from where it could’ve menaced Antioch to the west, Apamea and southern Syria to the south and Beroia and the rich and populous region of Cyrrhestica to the north. Barbalissos was the last spot where the Romans could stop Šābuhr I’s army with minimal damage to the rich Roman provinces of Syria Coele and Syria Phoenicia. Probably the Roman commanders felt that this was their last opportunity to avoid an unmitigated disaster.

A feature of Arsacid and Sasanian armies that differentiated them starkly from Roman ones is their dependence of a reduced number of elite fighters, the noble asvārān that came from the ranks of the wuzurgān and the āzādagān /āzādān. This heavy cavalry was a formidable fighting force, formed by men who were professional warriors, expensively equipped and who trained for war since childhood. Due to their very expensive equipment and life-long training, massive losses amongst their ranks were impossible to replace on a short amount of time and had serious (possibly even destabilizing) social effects, because the asvārān were not only soldiers, but the very governing elite of the empire. Also, because of the strict social order of Iranian society, belonging to the asvārān was strictly reserved to the wuzurgān and āzādān; other social groups were banned from joining its ranks, even if they had the economic resources to pay for the equipment and horse.

British reenactor Nadeem Ahmad wearing the arms and armour of a III century CE Partho-Sasanian heavy cavalryman. The helmet is based on the famous Dura Europos helmet.

These elite noble asvārān were formidable multi-purpose fighters, and Persian and Arab chroniclers have left ample testimony of their fighting abilities. But what surfaces from all these testimonies is how small their numbers were: as a young man, Šābuhr II led a force of 1,000 elite asvārān deep into Arabia which smashed all opposition in front of them, Bahrām V Gūr defeated soundly the Hephtalites with a force of 5,000 elite asvārān, and Bahrām Čōbīn defeated the Turks with a force of 7,000 asvārān. But despite their effectiveness and flamboyancy, the dependence over such forces was a serious weakness for the Arsacid and Sasanian empires. Huge losses among the asvārān were just unacceptable: they were a blow to the Iranian social fabric, and as they affected the dangerous Iranian nobility they could lead to discontent amongst the wuzurgān, always a very bad development for any Iranian king. Some scholars have suggested that the changes in the composition and tactics of Sasanian armies were partly due to this fact, as the extensive use of asvārān charges by Arsacid armies against Roman infantry would’ve been very costly for this elite force.

Now, the armies of Šābuhr I employed also infantry of three types: payghan soldiers (peasants conscripted into the army as cannon fodder, servants and sappers), mercenary units made of specific ethnic groups (traditionally Gilanis, Daylamites and other tribal groups within the Iranian plateau, but now also probably forces recruited in the Caucasus, Kušanšahr and even India) and especially the elite infantry archers, specialized in area shooting to which the massed ranks of Roman infantry were particularly vulnerable. To this, one should add the extensive use of mercenary and allied cavalry: nomadic Iranian tribes, Armenians, Iberians, Albanians, Kushans, Central Asian tribes, etc. And perhaps for the first time, also elephants (we know that Šābuhr I employed them, but we don’t know if they were present at Barbalissos) and a sizeable siege train (a giant battering ram employed against the gates of Antioch by Šābuhr I’s army was still surviving in the IV century and was reported by Ammianus Marcellinus).

Detailed view of the equipment worn by reenactor Nadeem Ahmad in the above picture.

Although much more heterogeneous and less cohesive than the Roman army, such an army was much more flexible in its tactical possibilities and if led by a competent commander (which Šābuhr I certainly was) against a cowered or incompetently led Roman army, it had good odds at succeeding in a field battle.

Barbalissos was according to the ŠKZ an unabated disaster for the Roman army, which was mostly annihilated. Due to this, to the numbers involved and to the devastation of one of the richest areas of the Roman empire, Barbalissos was a far worse defeat that Abritus, and ranks in the same league as Cannae, Arausio or Carrhae in the list of Roman military disasters. Scholars agree that in this instance the ŠKZ’s account is entirely believable, for both Greek and Latin sources and archaeology confirm that Syria was utterly devastated by a foreign invasion at this time, including some cities which held legionary garrisons, which hints that said legions had been all but wiped out at the disaster. In my opinion, a disaster of such magnitude could have unfolded in two possible ways:

• If the Romans fought (as I wrote above) with a linear deployment and their left flank anchored on the Euphrates, Sasanian cavalry could have bypassed their exposed right flank and then proceeded to surround the army; after being surrounded the Roman army would’ve been massacred, but such a battle would’ve come at a high cost to the Sasanian army for the Romans would’ve fought to the last man in a closed formation, which was their strongest battle ability.
• Another possibility is that the Roman army broke ranks and fled at a given point in the battle, and in the open countryside around Barbalissos with no fortresses nearby this would have led to the Roman army being massacred by the pursuing Sasanian cavalry (just like it had happened to Crassus’ army).

Both possibilities would have led to the virtual annihilation of the Roman army, with the second one being cheaper in manpower losses to Šābuhr I.

Now, I’ll address briefly the alternative reconstruction of events proposed by David S. Potter. He construes verses 117-130 of the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle as referring to Mareades, the Antiochene magistrate (and not to Iotapianus, like Hartmann supports) and implying that somehow this Mareades would have gathered an armed following and led an armed campaign (or acts of banditry) in Cappadocia. This is solely based on Potter’s interpretation of the aforementioned passage of the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, and according to Potter the failure of this campaign would have led to Mareades’ flight to Sasanian territory. The key difference though is chronological: Potter dates Šābuhr I’s offensive to the summer of 252 CE, based on Antiochene antoniniani (with their ADVENTUS AVGG legends), the order of events in the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle and Zosimus (both mention the Sasanian raids before Aemilianus’ usurpation) and the tombstones for Apamea; in this chronology he’s supported by Jean-Charles Balty, who also places the Sasanian invasion in 252 CE, although to other scholars it’s doubtful if a bunch of gravestones is enough evidence, for these stones don’t even describe how did these cavalrymen die, they could’ve died in a skirmish, due to an epidemic or to other causes, and not necessarily fighting against Šābuhr I’s great invasion.

And then there’s the issue of linking these events with the ones that were taking place in Europe. If the Roman disaster at Barbalissos happened in 252 CE, then it would’ve been a further reason for the success of Aemilianus’ revolt; but it would be strange that the German and Raetian armies would have been still willing to support Trebonianus Gallus if his military reputation had been so utterly humiliated (on another side, it’s worth remembering that the Italian army that accompanied him promptly changed sides at Interamna and sided with Aemilianus).

On the other side, if the invasion took place in 253 CE, then the situation changes, because the battle of Barbalissos would’ve happened almost simultaneously to Aemilianus’ usurpation, meaning that the Roman eastern army would’ve been left to its own devices while there was yet another Roman civil war in Europe.

Another factor are the resumed Gothic raids, some of which (the ones by land across the Danube) were repelled by Aemilianus. If these raids were unprovoked and undertaken by the Goths as a breach of the 251 CE treaty, and happened in late 252 CE or early 253 CE (just before Aemilianus’ revolt), they could have been an opportunistic reaction by the Goths to the news of the new Roman disaster in the East (just like Abritus would have been an encouragement to Šābuhr I). In my opinion, this could lend further support to Potter’s thesis.

 

[Ivashanko]

Estimating population from military size is always going to be a tricky thing to do in ancient times: Neither the romans nor their adversaries had anything close to universal conscription, and the size of armies has much more to do with logistics, administration, and the ability to pay than total population. (though sometimes it's restricted by sub populations of particularly "warlike" groups)

Historians of some later periods had an annoying habit of overestimating army sizes and the amount of casualties that accrued during conflicts. Did this tendency not exist during Roman times?

 

[Semper Victor]

In relation to the Roman army, modern scholars manage quite solid estimates about its total strength, and so it's quite straightfoward to detect exaggerations and overestimates by ancient sources. Another matter is the amount of forces which could be assembled and kept together as a fighting force under the logistical and sanitary constraints of the time.

As for the total strength of the armies which could be raised by Rome's enemies, scholars can only speculate and make educated guesses, except in some rare cases where hard data from archaeological, epigraphical or papyrological evidence is available. For the case of Sasanian Iran, the best attested case by far is the remains of the barracks and encampments discovered in the digs at the Great Wall of Gorgan, dated to the V century CE.

According to the British scholar James Howard-Johnston:

It is possible, however, to estimate the military strength of the Sasanian Empire independently of the written evidence. For a detailed survey has been carried out at one of the larger forts on the Gurgan Wall, fort 4 (5.5 ha), which was defended by 32 towers. Eight barrack blocks have been identified, with accommodation for 1000 men (at 4 soldiers per room) or 2000 (at 8 per room). Given that the total area enclosed by the 36 or so forts on the wall comes to some 90 ha, a rough total of 30,000 may be suggested for the permanent garrison. (...)

Rather more important, in terms of striking power, were the mobile forces which could be deployed in offensive or defensive operations in the field, analogous to the late Roman comitatenses. Here again there is some solid material evidence from which to extrapolate – the internal lay-out of one quadrant of one of the four similar square mud-brick fortresses situated behind the Gurgan Wall, Qaleh Kharabeh (41 ha). Tent enclosures, each capable of accommodating 8–10 men, were arranged in 14 rows of 20 (or, possibly, 21), each pair of rows being fronted by 17 m wide avenues where mounts could be tethered. This puts the capacity of one quarter of the fortress at between 2240 and 2800 men. If, as seems likely, at least one other quadrant accommodated infantry, with more tent enclosures packed in, the total capacity of Qaleh Kharabeh would have been at least 10,000 men.70 If similar totals may be attributed to the three strikingly similar fortresses which have been identified and to one or two of the other four compounds, we may envisage their total capacity as 50–60,000 men. They were designed, it appears, as permanent camps or campaign bases for the secure accommodation of expeditionary forces of 50–60,000 men, on the edge of the open steppes into which they would be venturing before long.

 

[Semper Victor]

20.4. ŠĀBUHR I’S SECOND CAMPAIGN. THE RAVAGING OF SYRIA AND THE FIRST CAPTURE OF ANTIOCH.

With half of the Roman army of the East destroyed, now the šahanšah had free way to unleash his army onto Syria and loot, burn and devastate this rich and populous province. And this is just what he did. According to the ŠKZ:

And āsūriyā xšahr (Syria) the environs of āsūriyā xšahr we all burned with fire, ruined and plundered. And on this one occasion we took of the Roman Empire forts and towns: The town of Anat (Anatha) with surroundings; Birt-Arūpān (perhaps a fortified Roman town at modern Tabous or Qreiye on the Euphrates) with surroundings; Birt-Aspōragān (probably the fortified Roman town of Zenobia on the Euphrates) with surroundings; the town of Šūrā (Sura) with surroundings; the town of Bēbališ (Barbalissos) with surroundings; the town of Mambōg (Hierapolis) with surroundings; the town of Halab (Beroia, modern Aleppo) with surroundings; the town of Kennešrā (Chalcis, modern Qinnasrīn) with surroundings; the town of Apamiyā (Apamea) with surroundings; the town of Refaniyos (Raphanaea, modern Rafaniyya) with surroundings; the town of Zūma (Zeugma) with surroundings; the town of Urnā (Urima) with surroundings; the town of Gindaros with surroundings; the town of Armenāz (Armenaza) with surroundings; the town of Selōkiyā (probably Seleucia at the Zeugma) with surroundings; the town of Andiyok (Antioch, modern Anṭākiya) with surroundings; the town of Kirros with surroundings; another town of Selōkiyā (probably Seleucia Pieria) with surroundings; the town of Aleksandriyā (Alexandria ad Issum, modern Alexandretta)) with surroundings; the town of Nēkpolis (Nicopolis, modern Iṣlāḥiye) with surroundings; the town of Sinzar (Larissa, modern Šaijar) with surroundings; the town of Hamāt (Epiphania/Amathe, Ḥamā) with surroundings; the town of Ariston (Arethusa, modern Rastan) with surroundings; the town of Dikhor with surroundings; the town of Dūrā (Dura, modern Ṣaliḥīye) with surroundings; the town of Dolox (Dolikhe modern Dülük) with surroundings; the town of Korkusyā (Circesium) with surroundings; the town of Germaniyos (Germanicea, modern Kahramanmaraş) with surroundings; the town of Batnān (Batna) with surroundings; the town of Xānar (Khanar) with surroundings; and in Cappadocia: the town of Sātal (Satala) with surroundings; the town of Domān (Domana) with surroundings; the town of Artangilyā (Artangil) with surroundings; the town of Sūš (Souisa) with surroundings; the town of Suvid (Sinda) with surroundings; the town of Frāt (Phreata) with surroundings – a total of 37 towns with surroundings.

The list of destroyed cities is hair-raising and encompassed three of the richest provinces of the Roman empire: Syria Coele, Syria Phoenicia and Cappadocia. This utter devastation by the armies of Šābuhr I can only have been achieved by dispersing his army into smaller columns after their victory at Barbalissos which would have then spread far and wide across the Roman East trying to devastate as much territory and seize as much plunder as possible.

Judging by the list of cities razed by the Sasanian army (which is confirmed by the fragments of Philostratos of Athens transmitted by John Malalas and by the works of later Antiochene authors) and the wide area they covered, they would have met with practically no resistance at least for several months after the battle, allowing them total freedom of movements and the possibility of setting up sieges if necessary. As I wrote before, several of the cities listed were legionary bases, and so their destruction by the Sasanians implies that their legions were either wiped out at Barbalissos or their remnants fled when faced with the advancing Sasanian forces:

• Zeugma in Syria Coele was the main base for Legio IV Scythica.
• Sura in Syria Coele was the main base for Legio XVI Flavia Firma.
• Satala in Cappadocia was the main base for Legio XV Apollinaris.

As for the rest of the cities listed, they include all the major cities in Syria Coele (Beroia, Chalcis, Apamea) as well as Antioch, the third (or fourth) largest metropolis in the Roman empire, and the main base for communications, trade, minting, and administration in the Roman east. Syria Phoenicia seems to have escaped relatively unscathed; as for Cilicia the Sasanian attacks seem to have stopped short from the Cilician plan where its greatest cities were located, and as for Cappadocia, only some cities on its eastern part were plundered, leaving its main cities unscathed. But Syria Coele was utterly devastated.

From the list of cities in the SKZ, scholars have tried to put together the advance routes of the several Sasanian detachments. One or two detachments led by Šābuhr I himself seem to have burned their path across northern Syria converging on Antioch, while a second column wheeled towards southern Syria and the limits with Syria Phoenicia and a third column wheeled north into northern Syria east of the Taurus and perhaps even into Cappadocia, although the attacks into Cappadocia could also have been undertaken directly from Sasanian Armenia. Apart from Šābuhr I himself, we know nothing about the other leaders of the Sasanian army. Probably one of its must commanders must’ve been Šābuhr I’s son and heir, the Great King of Armenia Hormizd-Ardaxšir, and other commanders could have been the hazārbed or hazāruft Pābag and the argbed (commander of the cavalry) Pērōz, who are both listed in the ŠKZ.

The first towns/cities listed in the SKZ are all fortified towns on the Euphrates river, which Šābuhr I must’ve been at the very least invested and besieged in his invasion path; they are named in south- to north order, as the Sasanians would’ve encountered them in their advance: Anatha, Birtha Arupan, Birtha Aspuragan/Zenobia (birtha means “castle” in Aramaic), Sura and Barbalissos. After Barbalissos, the first city listed is Hierapolis, 50 km north of Barbalissos; probably at this point a first Sasanian force split from the main army and headed north while the main body turned towards the southwest towards Beroia (modern Aleppo), 60 km to the southwest of Hierapolis along a Roman road. Probably at Beroia the Sasanian forces again split into a contingent heading south and another heading directly west towards the Mediterranean coast.

The northern column probably marched from Hierapolis to Zeugma following the Roman road on the Euphrates’ western bank (a distance around 50 km), and from here it could have kept its advance north along the Euphrates to Seleucia on the Euphrates (around 40 km upstream); this force probably was also the one which took Doliche (with its important sanctuary to Iupiter Dolichenus), located some 40 km to the west of Zeugma and Germanikeia (near the provincial limit with Cilicia, almost 70 km to the northwest of Doliche at the feet of the Taurus mountains). The location of the towns of Batna and Khanar is still disputed. This northern arm was also probably responsible for the pillaging of the important city of Cyrrus and the small town of Nicopolis, very near the limit with Cilicia.

The ancient city of Zeugma was an important commercial hub apart from being a military base. It controlled the main ford on the Euphrates on this rea, which also happened to be the one nearest to Antioch and the Mediterranean coast. Modern excavations of the site (today partially submerged under the waters of the Euphrates due to a modern dam) have revealed a worth of ancient mosaics of exceptionally high quality, probably the best ones surviving from anywhere in the Roman world.

The attack into Cappadocia must’ve been launched directly from Sasanian-controlled Armenia, because Satala is located far to the north, around 240 km from Germanikeia. Domana was a small town located about 10 km north of Satala; the location of the remaining Cappadocian towns and cities named in the SKZ is still unknown.

As for the central branch (or branches) of the Sasanian invasion that branched off at Beroia, it struck directly towards Antioch and the Mediterranean coast. Gindaros was a small town located at the very door of the Antioch plain, about 40 km from Beroia while Armenaza is the modern village of Biret Armanāz in northern Syria, almost halfway between Beroia (Aleppo) and Antioch), directly on the main Roman road from Beroia to Antioch, just where the hills leave way to the plain of Antioch. This is the reason why some scholars propose a two-winged Sasanian attack convergin on Antioch, as Gindaros and Armenaza are two separated entry ways into the plain, separated about 30 km from each other. The main pass along thus Roman road into the plain of Antioch can be blocked by relatively reduced forces at Immae (place of several battles in history), so a second attack further north must’ve been a security measure by Šābuhr I to avoid being bottled up in the pass by any kind of improvised defense the Romans could’ve been still able to put up. Antioch stood just 25 km to the west of Immae, and its taking by Šābuhr I was the crowning achievement of his campaign. It’s also here where the role of the “traitor” Mareades again comes to the fore.

According to ancient authors, Antioch ranked third in the hierarchy of great metropolis of the Roman empire. Little remains today above the surface of the ancient city, and archaeological surveys are hampered by the fact that the place is now occupied by the modern Turkish town of Anṭākiya. The first serious archaeological prospects were carried out in the 1930s and 1940s by American archaeologists and brought to the light a series of spectacular mosaics that have underlined just how rich and prosperous the ancient city must’ve been.

Antioch was a rich and populous city, although demographic estimates vary wildly between 100,000 and 500,000 inhabitants. It was also extensively fortified with a powerful wall that for once had real military purpose and was not a glorified urban limit like in many Roman cities. But the city also had important weaknesses if faced by a determined attacker.

Roman mosaic from the III century CE, found during excavations at the so-called House of the Psyches in the Daphne suburb of Antioch, which was the quarter of the city where the magnificent residences of the city's upper classes stood. Archaeological digs at the site have yielded many more rich mosaics, which are today preserved in Turkey and the USA.

The location of the city was quite particular. Antioch was built n a narrow stretch of land between the Orontes river and the steep sides of the Silpius Mons. Its north-eastern side was protected by the river Orontes, which acted as a deep moat in front of the massive wall; the main buildings of the city like the stadium and the ancient palace of the Seleucid kings were located on an inland in the Orontes (which has disappeared in modern times); the island was fully surrounded by high stone walls and was the most securely protected part of the city. Several bridges united it with the rest of the city; the streets that ran along these bridges had to pierce the city walls both in the island and in the other side of the river, as the walls ran all along the river banks in both cases. On the north-east and south-west stood the only sides of the city really open to an approaching army, on relatively narrow stretches of land which allowed only for cramped attack frontages. Then there was the long south-eastern flank which limited with Silpius Mons. Here Hellenistic and Roman military engineers found themselves in a tight spot, because although a large force with siege equipment could not escalate its rugged sides, a light infantry force could easily climb it and attack the city with the advantage of height (especially dangerous in the case of Arsacid and Sasanian bowmen). So, the walls had to be lengthened to encompass the highest ridges of Mount Silpius that dominated the city from the south-east.

The most venerated divinity of Antioch was the Tyche of the city (the personification of its Good Fortune). Its cult statue stood (made by Eutychides of Sicyon around 300 BCE) at the city's main temple, the Tycheion, and was celebrated as a masterpiece in Antiquity, with many copies circulating around the Mediterranean. This Roman copy in marble is preserved today in the Vatican Museums. In 253 CE though, the Tyche of Antioch failed to protect the city.

The result was a city formidably walled and very well protected, but with some key weaknesses. Firstly, the perimeter of the walls was absurdly long: it was even longer than the Aurelian walls of Rome, which were already considered impossible to defend in case of siege. More than half of the space enclosed within these walls (which was again larger than that of Rome itself within the Aurelian walls) was empty space, consisting on the rugged sides of Mount Silpius. En revanche, there were several fresh water springs within the walls on the mountainside, so unlike Rome Antioch would never be in danger of running out of drinkable fresh water in case of a siege. But food was an altogether different matter. Like Rome, Antioch was built at some distance from the sea and was linked to it by a small river which was not navigable by seafaring ships. The Antiochene equivalent to Ostia was the city of Seleucia in Pieria, 20 km downstream the Orontes on the seacoast, where seafaring ships unloaded their cargoes which were then loaded into smaller boats which then ascended the stream of the Orontes to Antioch’s river port.

This meant that any attacker who managed to close off the Orontes downstream from Antioch effectively cut the city off from the sea. And the Orontes is not a wide river; it can be closed off easily just by placing bowmen on both banks, something that the Sasanians had in abundance. And if that was not enough, among the list of cities conquered by Šābuhr I in the SKZ appear both Seleucia in Pieria and Alexandria ad Issum (modern Alexandretta), another near seaport.

Unless it had a strong garrison, the long walls of Antioch were untenable in front of a complete encirclement and there’s no evidence that the Romans managed to slip any forces into the city; in normal circumstances Antioch was garrisoned only by the tiny personal guard of the governor of Syria Coele, which would’ve been hardly able to cover even the island on the Orontes.

Restitution of Roman Antioch by the French archaeologist and architect Jean-Claude Golvin. The walls stretching to cover the slopes of Mount Silpius can be seen, as well as the island on the Orontes.

But according to Udo Hartmann and his interpretation of ancient reports (mainly the Thirteenth Sibylline Oracle, Peter the Patrician, John Malalas, Libanius, Evagrius and Ammianus Marcellinus) Šābuhr I did not even need to fight to take the city. Like Alexandria, Antioch was a city periodically wrecked by urban infighting and all sorts of disturbances. The episode of Mareades was just one amongst many, but in this occasion the defeated city decurion decided to turn to the Sasanians for help. Šābuhr I’s victory at Barbalissos offered the rancorous Mareades a gilded opportunity to extract revenge upon the rivals who had him expelled from the city.

According to Hartmann, the Sasanian army just encamped in front of the city’s walls and let Mareades do his job. An extant fragment by Peter the Patrician describes how in these circumstances, the “wise ones” (meaning the rich members of the city elite who had opposed Mareades) fled the city (meaning that it was not fully encircled) while the “unwise ones” (whom he identifies with the rabble of the city) opened the gates to Mareades and Šābuhr I. The result was that the Sasanian army looted the city and set fire to it. The sources contradict each other about Mareades’ fate; some say he was executed by Šābuhr I when he was no longer useful, but Hartmann believes he returned to Ērānšahr with his new lord and took part in the last campaign of Šābuhr I against the Romans.

As for the southern column of the Sasanian army, its path can be easily reconstructed from the list of cities looted in the SKZ. From Beroia it followed the Roman road south, looting and burning all towns and cities in their wake: the large and rich cities of Chalcis ad Belum (20 km south of Beroia) and Apamea (around 70 km south of Chalcis). From there, they kept advancing south towards Emesa (probably their next major objective) burning in their way the small towns of Larissa and Arethusa. But at Emesa they were encountered a local militia which put up an unexpected resistance, led by a local priest (probably the great priest of El Gabal, the local god of Emesa which had been venerated by Elagabalus) called Sampsigeramus (according to John Malalas) or Uranius Antoninus (according to Zosimus). There’s a lot of confusion at this point because it’s not clear if Zosimus confused him with another Uranius Antoninus who already led a usurpation attempt in the area under Severus Alexander. Apparently, this priest’s hurriedly organized militia was able to defeat and beat the Sasanian army back, thus sparing Emesa from destruction; some later writers go even further even saying that Sampsigeramus killed personally the Sasanian king Šābuhr I (a blatant falsehood, as Šābuhr I died in 273 CE).

Remains of the main colonnaded street in Apamea.

Probably, what happened was just a minor skirmish, and the local Sasanian commander, already loaded with booty and captives did not want to run any risks, so he turned back and began the long trek home. By all accounts, this was the only difficulty the Sasanians met during their pillaging raids in Syria and they were able to go back to Ērānšahr with all their booty and captives completely undisturbed.

But the episode at Emesa had its inevitable sequel: the Emesene priest proclaimed himself emperor and struck coins under the name L. Iulius Aurelius Sulpicius Severus Uranius Antoninus, adding to the growing political chaos within the Roman empire.

Bronze coin of L. Iulius Aurelius Sulpicius Severus Uranius Antoninus. On the reverse, the temple of Emesa with the rock (betylus) that was venerated as the god El Gabal.

 

[Semper Victor]

21.1. VALERIAN´S REIGN. THE PROMISING BEGINNINGS.

The reigns of Valerian and his son Gallienus mark a decisive point not only for the crisis of the III century, but also for Roman history as a whole. Valerian and Gallienus were the last emperors in the old style of the Principate: they were cultivated members of the senatorial elite, and of old aristocratic senatorial stock. They would be the last emperors of senatorial stock, and the last ones to have followed the old republican cursus honorum for senators, alternating military and civilian posts.

Aureus of Valerian, issued shortly after his rise to the purple.

The change was so radical that after Gallienus’reign it’s impossible to find a single senator in command of an army, thus breaking a tradition that had originated at the beginnings of the Roman Republic. The SHA even state that Gallienus issued a decree expressly forbiding senators from commanding armies, but modern scholars are highly skeptical about this point, because of the unreliability of the HA for this timeframe and the total absence of similar accounts in all the other surviving ancient sources. But be as it might have been, the fact is that after Gallienus’reign, the Roman army would be commanded exclusively by professional officers and thus it was instituted de facto the separation between military and civilian posts that later Diocletian would fix by law and which would become characteristic of the late Roman empire.

Their reign also marks the deepest point of the III century political crisis of the Roman empire: for the first time in history a Roman augustus was captured alive by the enemy, all the borders (Rhine, Danube and Euphrates) broke down unter enemy pressure, usurpations became commonplace and the empire fractured into three separated parts; for a decade there was no more a united Roman empire, but three distinct entities. It was also during this time that the devaluation of Roman bullion coinage hit rock bottom; by the start of Aurelian’s reign the antoninianus had a silver content under 4%. Yet it was also in this period when the first radical measures were introduced that would finally lead to a restoration of Roman power.

In September/October 253 CE, the senator Publius Licinius Valerianus entered Rome after the death of the former emperor Aemilianus having been acclaimed augustus by the troops of the Rhine and the upper Danube; the Senate confirmed and legitimized the troops’ choice, after which he took the full name Imperator Caesar Publius Licinius Valerianus pius felix invictus augustus pontifex maximus pater patriae proconsul.

He was not a young man: he’d been born in the 190s, and so he must’ve been between 53 and 63 years old at the moment of his rise to the purple. All the ancient sources are unanimous in underlying the nobility of his lineage. Scholars have been unable to track with certainty his lineage, but the nomen Licinius would imply his membership to the gens Licinia, an ancient clan attested since the IV century BCE which had attained senatorial rank under Augustus. He’d been married in a first marriage with Egnatia Mariniana, a member of the influential senatorial family of the Egnatii, who were based in Etruria. Egnatia Mariana died probably in 253 at the latest, and from this marriage was born a son (around 218 CE), who was named Publius Licinius Egnatius Gallienus, who by 253 CE was an adult man; he married a woman named Cornelia Salonina (also named in ancient sources with the Greek name Chrysogone, probably of another senatorial lineage of Greek stock based in western Anatolia, probably in Bythinia). From this marriage were born three children: the eldest Publius Licinius Cornelius Valerianus (short: Valerian Iunior), the middle one Publius Licinius Cornelius Saloninus Valerianus (short: Saloninus) and the youngest Licinius Egnatius Marinianus (short: Marinianus).

Marble bust of Gallienus as a young man, shortly after his proclamation as joint augustus with his father.

Bullion antoninianus of Valerian the Younger (still as caesar); on the reverse the legend PIETAS AVGG, emphasizing the attachment of the ruling augusti of the new Licinian dynasty to the traditional devotion due to the Roman gods.

Valerian had remarried after the death of Egnatia Mariniana, and had taken as his second wife a woman named Cornelia Gallonia, with whom he had another male child, also confusingly named Publius Licinius Valerianus, who was Gallienus half brother but was kept carefully apart from power positions by both his father and brother.

By 253 CE, Valerian had been already consul once (suffect consul, as he does not appear in the fasti consulares which listed ordinary consuls) and had behind him a long public career, both in the army and in the civil administration of the empire. Gallienus on the other hand had not yet attained his first consulship. Both he and his father seem to have been deeply cultivated individuals; the Egyptian grammar Lollianus praised their paideia, and on his maternal side Gallienus had for ancestors several noteworthy men of letters (he was probably even related to the imperial biographer and consul Marius Maximus). Gallienus in particular kept an interest in letters and philosophy for all his life, and he became the patron of the neoplatonic philosopher Plotinus in Rome.

Bullion antoninianus of Saloninus as nobilissimus caesar, On the reverse, again the legend PIETAS AVGG.

The first months of Valerian’s reign were characterized by the extreme degree of energy with which the new emperor applied himself to bring some order into the chaotic situation in the empire. And the first measure was taken very quickly: on October 22, 253 CE Gallienus was raised to the rank of co-augustus with his father. In itself this was nothing new, other III century emperors had done the same. But what was completely unusual was the degree to which Valerian led the sharing of the imperial power with his son. For starters, he conceded on Gallienus exactly the same titles he had (and for the first time in Roman history there were two pontifices maximi), the only subtle hint in imperial titulature of Valerian’s precedence was the fact that he always kept one consulship more than his son. This was completely unheard of, as until then co-augusti had usually been children or young adults kept in a position of clear subordination towards the elder augustus. But this was not the most revolutionary of his measures, because he went a step further: he divided the empire into separate geographical areas of resposibility for each augustus: Valerian would rule and defend the East, while Gallienus would take care of the West. In this unprecedented step, Valerian clearly anticipated the measures taken by Diocletian and the formation of the Tetrarchy.

It's also significant that Valerian had Gallienus proclaimed as augustus by the Senate, and not by the army (which duly followed and gave him the acclamatio as emperor). With this step, Valerian manifested his respect for the Senate and managed to win many sympathies within its ranks. It's also important that the army apparently did not resent Valerian for taking this step, this is a clear sign that despite his senatorial aristocratic background he was respected amongst professional soldiers.

The existence of three male heirs for Gallienus also helped to secure the position of the new augusti in power, because they immediately made clear their dynastical ambitions, with the deification of the deceased mother of Gallienus, Egnatia Mariniana. Valerian also used the support of the powerful clan of the Egnatii to further consolidate the family’s position in Rome in light of the imminent departure of both augusti to the menaced borders of the empire, and so he appointed his brother-in-law (Gallienus’uncle, the bother of his deceased first wife) L.Egnatius Victor Lollianus as Praefectus Urbis in their absence.

The first foreign menace they dealt with was the encroachment of Berber tribes in Numidia and Mauretania; Legio III Augusta (abolished by Gordian III) was restored (perhaps the step had been taken during the last months of Trebonianus Gallus’ reign), and a series of commanders with authority over the military forces garrisoned in the three African provinces of Mauretania, Numidia and Africa Proconsularis managed to get the situation under control between 253 an 256 CE.

As was customary, the two augusti inaugurated the new consular year of 254 CE by assuming both ordinary consulships for that year (the second one for Valerian, the first one in Gallienus’case) on January 1st. By early spring of the same year, as soon as the roads became practicable, Valerian began his long trip to the East taking with him a large army, via the great military route across the Balkans and Anatolia. His presence in Antioch is surely attested for January 18, 255 CE (according to the epigraphical remains of a dated letter sent by the emperor to the citizens of the city of Philadelphia in Lydia), so he probably entered the ruined eastern metropolis towards the very end of 254 CE.

His army must have included vexillationes from the Rhine and upper Danube armies, which weakened dangerously the defence of these areas which until now had been relatively secure, and jeopardized especially the defence of the exposed limes between the middle Rhine and the Danube along the border of the Agri Decumates. The situation in these areas had become dangerous even before Valerian took these troops out from the border defenses: there’s archaeological evidence for violent raids and widespread destruction in Raetia during Trebonianus Gallus’ reign, probably the doing of the Alamanni, and probably Valerian had been engaged in a punitive campaign against them during Aemilianus’march against Italy. But if Valerian wanted to restore quickly the situation in the East, he had little choice: half of the eastern army had been wiped out, and the Danubian army had been weakened by Decius’defeat against the Goths and the substraction of troops from the border by Aemilianus for his march on Italy.

Restitution of Roman Athens in the II century CE, by the French archeologist and architect Jean-Claude Golvin.

In this sense, the march of Valerian’s army across the Balkans seems to have served to stabilize temporarily the situation in these provinces. According to German scholars Andreas Goltz and Udo Hartmann, by the start of 254 CE new “Skythian” war bands had crossed the Danube (taking advantadge of the weakening of the border defenses by Aemilianus’ rebellion) and had advanced as far south as Thessalonica, which they besieged unsuccessfully. As a consequence, a wave of panic seems to have seized mainland Greece: Athens began rebuilding and reinforcing its walls, the pass of the Thermopylae was fortified and a wall was erected across the isthmus of Corinth to protect the Peloponnese. It can’t have been much more than a temporary relief, but as Goltz and Hartmann point out, it’s noteworthy that the following year the Goths switched to sea raids and abandoned (for a while) land attacks against the Balkan provinces. Valerian’s activities also must have served to support his son’s efforts, as Gallienus’ first task was to campaign in the middle Danube against unspecified Germans and Sarmatians.

That the two augusti undertook a massive military effort to try to stabilize and strengthen the beleaguered empire is made clear by another telling clue: the production of antoniniani intensified spectacularly under them, and their devaluation also accelerated accordingly.

 

[Semper Victor]

21.2. ŠĀBUHR I’S RETREAT.

When Valerian reached the east, he found that the armies of the Sasanian king had already left Roman territory. His first task in the East then must’ve been first to restore order and then to try to rebuild the middle Euphrates defenses which had been so thoroughly smashed by the Sasanian armies.

As for restoring order, his first step must’ve been to dispose of Uranius Antoninus, who disappears from the historical record just around the time of Valerian’s arrival in the East. According to Hartmann and Goltz, Antioch must’ve been Valerian’s residence only for a short amount of time. After his adventure in the city, the Antiochene mint began issuing coins with the legends AETERNITATI AVGG, FORTVNA REDVX, PACATORI ORBIS and RESTITVT(or) GENER(i) HUMANI(s). But among these coins, there are no gold aurei, which is very strange for a mint where the augustus himself was present. Hartmann and Goltz propose instead that after a short stay in the city, Valerian moved his main base to Samosata on the Euphrates, whose mint began issuing coins with the same legends, but this time also including gold aurei.

Hartmann and Goltz point out that Samosata offered several advantadges for Valerian’s main task of rebuilding the defenses of the Roman East: it lay on the Euphrates and so nearer to the border, but was not too exposed, as it was located immediately to the east of the protective screen offered by the western part of the Roman province of Mesopotamia which was still under Roman control with its two large fortified cities of Carrhae and Edessa; it was also situated relatively to the north, and so relatively safe from surprise attacks along the Euphrates as the one that the Sasanians had launched in 253 CE. This position also allowed Valerian a better access to the garrisons of Cappadocia, which had also been hit by the Sasanian offensive, thanks to the good communications offered by the Euphrates valley. Samosata also protected the main access into Cappadocia from the middle and lower Euphrates valley (via Melitene and Caesarea Mazaca), and so it could act as a blocking post in case of another major Sasanian offensive. Finally, it had been spared destruction during Šābuhr I’s invasion.

The ancient city of Samosata lies today flooded under the waters of the Atatürk Dam in sountheastern Turkey.

Quick communications to Anatolia were also important due to the Gothic threat in the Black Sea area; at this point in time first an unknown people called in Graeco-Roman sources as Borani began sea attacks across the Black Sea, which was soon followed by the Goths. Modern scholars are divided about the nature of the Borani; some consider it to be merely a designation for “northern peoples”in general (from Boreas, the north wind) while others consider them to have been a paople in their own right, probably a part of the Gothic confederacy. This was the result of yet another disastrous development for Rome in the political situation in continental Eurasia: from the I century CE, the Graeco-Scythian kingdom of Bosporus (based in Crimea) had been a Roman ally (Rome even kept a military presence in Crimea which allowed it to intervene swiftly in Bosporan politics). As a consequence of this, the naval defense of the Black Sea had been entrusted to the Bosporan fleet, and Rome kept only a small naval squadron based at Byzantium. By the 250s, the Goths and their allied peoples overwhelmed the Bosporan kingdom (it stopped minting coins) and modern scholars consider that one of the consequences of Gothic political control over the kingdom of Bosporus was that the Goths gained access to the Bosporan fleet. The Goths had no naval tradition or expertise, but the Bosporan did have it, together with a sizeable fleet, and both ships and sailors were now pressed into Gothic service, with disastrous consequences for Rome.

Šābuhr I’s departure from Syria after his devastating invasion in 253 CE has puzzled historians ever since. Modern scholars think that occupation and conquest had not been the goal of the Sasanian king when he launched the campaign, but opinions are divided about what its main goal was:

• A plundering campaign.
• A preemptive strike against the Roman eastern army before the Roman emperor arrived with reinforcements from the West.

In my own opinion, the second option seems more probable. As I wrote in previous posts, in 251 or 252 CE, Šābuhr I finally managed to conquer Armenia, and Trebonianus Gallus’ decison to give asylum to the fleeing Armenian prince Trdat in the Roman empire amounted to a declaration of war and a breach of the terms of the treaty signed in 244 CE. Given the course of previous conflicts, Šābuhr I probably knew what would be the Roman reaction: the emperor would gather reinforcements in the West and then launch an expeditio persica with the Roman massed armies (what Severus Alexander and Gordian III had done). The first stages of the war though were quite conventional, with the first campaign season (in 252 CE, according to the reconstruction of events by Udo Hartmann) the Sasanian king launched yet another attack against Roman Mesopotamia which was quite successful: the fall of Nisibis (a heavily fortified city) probably implied also the conquest of Singara (which would have been left completely isolated after it) and so the establishment of Sasnian control over the central and eastern parts of the Roman province of Mesopotamia. The usual thing to do would’ve been to launch a campaign the following year against the two great Roman fortified cities in western Mesopotamia (Carrhae and Edessa). But instead, Ŝābuhr I did something completely unexpected, that probably took the Romans by surprise. Why did Šābuhr I act in this way? Scholars propose several reasons for this:

• Balty, Potter, Millar and Huttner point out that there are signs pointing to bedouin attacks against the Hauran area in the Roman province of Arabia just at this time. The Hauran was a rich area, and neglecting its defense would mean (apart from economic losses) a menace for Syria Phoenicia if the raiders went further west and reached the Bekaa valley, as well as for northern communications between northern Syria and Palestine and Egypt. Another serious implication of such bedouin attacks is that for unknown reasons, Palmyrene control over these tribes had slipped. This could in turn imply that the Palmyrenes would’ve been busy trying to restore their control over the tribes in the Syrian and north Arabian deserts when Šābuhr I launched its attack. That would explain also why the Sasanian army could advance without trouble upstream along the Euphrates’western shore, without fear of Palmyrene harassment. As pure speculation on my part, it could even be that these bedouin raids were not a mere coincidence, but that they had been planned and encouraged by the Sasanians. And going further on with this speculation, it could be said in this case that this was in fact the first part of a meticulously laid campaign plan by Šābuhr I.
• The presence of Mareades in the Sasanian court would have given the Sasanian king good insider information not only about the situation in Antioch, but also about Roman defensive dispositions in the East.
• The chaotic situation in the empire and the continued failure of Trebonianus Gallus to march to the east with reinforcements would have emboldened the Sasanian king, and would have made the idea of a preemptive strike increasingly tempting.

As for Šābuhr I’s retreat and the lack of territorial conquests, probably the main cause was a structural one: the very nature of the Iranian state and its army. As I wrote in previous posts, the Sasanian army was a very different entity from Rome’s professional army. It was basically the assembly of the Iranian nobility under the leadership of their šāhānšāh, with the addition of the armed followers of each of the nobles and the king (who was probably seen as a primus inter pares by the wuzurgān) and the allied and vassal peoples. This military organization reflected closely the social and political fabric of the Iranian empire, and in this respect little had changed since Arsacid times, despite the continuous efforts by Ardaxšir I and Šābuhr I to strengthen the crown.

A group of Iranian wuzurgān ftom one of Šābuhr I’s triumphal reliefs. These were the men with whom any Iranian king had to deal carefully if he wanted to last in his post. Notice how every one of them bear a different motif or insignia on their hats; scholars think they must be some kind of “heraldic" sign, each one of them belonging to a different great family.

This meant that in order to mount an offensive of the magnitude of the one launched in the campaign season of 253 CE, Šābuhr I would’ve needed to bargain with the Iranian nobility and gain them to his cause. The real reason for the aggressiveness and effectivity of the Sasanian empire during the reigns of its two first kings is that they were exceptionally able individuals who possessed the charisma as well as the military and political skills needed to gather the unruly Iranian nobility around their leadership. In this sense, Šābuhr I’s campaign of 253 CE was the first full scale Iranian invasion of the Roman Middle East since the early reign of Marcus Aurelius, almost a century ago, and that invasion although it had been very successful at the start, had ended in defeat.

One thing was to gather the forces of the nobility and the subject kings for a defensive campaign (like against Severus Alexander and Gordian III), and another things was to launch an invasion that probably was seen by them as an outright aggression only for the king’s benefit , despite the fact that Šābuhr I had good reasons to launch it and that he was probably justified in describing it as a preemptive strike. But probably he had to work hard at selling that to the Iranian nobility, and despite all, the nobles probably set clear limits to their involvement: a short campaign, no lengthy sieges or actions that could cause heavy losses amongst their ranks, and no annexations (they would’ve had no intention to act as occupation forces for territories that probably would have become a royal domain, and anyway they couldn’t remain absent from their estates in Iran for long periods of time). If the king wanted annexations, he would’ve needed to garrison them himself with his own royal forces, and probably that was too much to ask from the relatively small amount of troops under Šābuhr I’s direct control.

But apart from these issues, there’s yet another factor that could’ve played a part at least as important in the decision to retreat. There’s not a proper surviving Iranian written literary tradition until the VI century CE, but Iran enjoyed a very lively tradition of oral history through the work of the gosān, the traveling minstrels that composed many epic verse works that became a permanent fixture of Iranian culture. After the Islamic conquest of Iran, in the X-XII centuries this rich tradition was put in writing in New Persian by several authors, especially Ferdowsī, but also in lesser known works belonging to the Sistani cycle or epics, like the Garšaspnāma. These epic poems present an idealized version of the Iranian past, but based in real history. And they all show a shocking lack of concern and interest for events in the West. Alexander the Great is a relatively minor character in the Šāhnāma, and Ferdowsī devotes very little space to the Sasanian wars against Rome (as a matter of fact, to Ferdowsī, Alexander, the Seleucids and the Romans were all Rumi, inhabitants of Rum without further distinction). Even when dealing with the campaigns of Šābuhr I, Firdawsī conflates them with the campaigns of Šābuhr II against Constantius II and Julian, making an utter mess of it all. It’s true though that the traditions compiled in these works are mainly based in the traditions of eastern Iran (Sistan and Khorasan), but their utter lack of interest about the West is obvious. On the contrary, these traditions devote endless pages to the fights between Iran and Turan (the mythological term to describe the nomadic peoples of Central Asia) and show a constant fascination with India as a land of untold riches, mystery and learning (all Iranian heroes undertake in their youth a travel to India as a rite of passage before returning to Iran).

Alexander and the Brahman, a miniature from the great illustrated manuscript of the Šāhnāma composed for the Safavid Shah Tahmashp in the XVI Century.

It’s also remarkable that absolutely all the great rock reliefs of Šābuhr I boasting about his victories against Rome have only been found in Pārs up to the current date, but there’s not a single one of them located outside this Iranian province. There are rock reliefs of Šābuhr I in other parts of his empire, but not a single one of them celebrates his triumphs against Rome.

These clues seem to hint to a fact that might seem surprising to modern western readers, but it appears that the ancient Iranians of Arsacid and Sasanian Iran (at least those who mattered, the nobles who could pay the gosān to compose their stories) did not care too much about the Roman empire at all, especially in eastern Iran. And this was a real problem for Arsacid and Sasanian kings who wanted to rally their nobility against Rome, because Sistan and Khorasan (ancient Parthia) provided the best cavalry of the army (Ammianus Marcellinus was quite explicit about this). Probably, once they’d smashed the Roman army at Barbalissos and were loaded with the booty pillaged in Syria, most of the Iranian nobles in the army simply told their king that they were going back home, and that if that he wanted to stay that was his problem.

The concentration of all of Šābuhr I’s victory reliefs in Pārs could (in my opinion) mean that by some reason victories against the Romans were deemed especially important by the Persians, but not by the inhabitants of other areas of Iran. To me, this could suggest that the Persians viewed Šābuhr I’s victories as some sort of vindication for the invasion of Alexander the Great. As I wrote earlier, in Firdawsī’s epic and in other surviving works, no difference is made between Greeks and Romans, and all are labelled as “Rumi”. For over a century, scholars have discussed if the early Sasanians really had some detailed historical memories about the Achaemenids. Strictly speaking, it’s been impossible to prove that they had any kind of historical records about them, which is not surprising given the generalized aversion amongst ancient Iranians to writing. But the absence of evidence is not evidence of absence. For one, the Arsacids and Sasanians ruled over non-Iranian peoples which did keep written historical records; the most noteworthy amongst them are the Mesopotamians (Khodadad Rezakhani argued convincingly that the Arsacids assumed the ancient Achaemenid title of “king of kings” after their conquest of Babylon), Jews and Greeks (Seleucia on the Tigris remained a thriving Greek polis until its sacking by the armies of Lucius Verus). And then there’s the priestly Zoroastrian tradition preserved in the Middle Persian sacred literature, especially the Bundahišn and Denkārt, which refer specifically to the “accursed Alexander” and fulminate against him for extinguishing sacred fires, killing priests and desecrating holy places. Probably the early Sasanians had a foggy memory of the Achaemenids, but this memory would have included the fact that once the Persians had ruled a vast empire and that this empire and the ancient glory of Pārs had been destroyed by a Rumi. It’s also significant that the early Sasanians remained closely linked to the impressive ruins of Persepolis; its ruins are near enough to Istakhr that they can be seen standing on slightly high ground, and they chose the rock cliff at Naqš-e Rustām, where the Achaemenid kings had their tombs carved, to place their great triumphal rock carvings, and so they established a continuity between their rule and the ancient glories of their Persian homeland. But other regions of Iran seem to have been far less interested in such past glories.

The Sasanian army probably retreated back towards Ērānšahr following again the same route along the Euphrates. Some graffiti in Pahlavi script found in the ruins of the palace of the Dux Ripae at Dura Europos have been dated by scholars to the winter of 253-254 CE, after which the city was reoccupied again by the Romans with Cohors XX Palmyrenorum being installed there again as garrison. The reoccupation of this important fortress in the middle Euphrates valley was probably part of Valerian’s efforts to rebuild the shattered Roman defenses along the middle Euphrates, and raises the question of which were Valerian’s plans for the restoration of the Roman eastern border defenses.

Fresco from Dura Europos dated to the first half of the III century CE, showing the commanding tribune of Cohors XX Palmyrenorum Iulius Terentius making a sacrifice to the gods.

The Roman defensive system in the East was different from the one they put in place in their European borders. In northern Britain, as well as the Rhine and Danube, as well as in Dacia, the Romans put all their forces in the front line, with full legions occupying large fortified camps and smaller auxiliary units scattered in smaller forts and watchtowers along the whole border. This deployment was efficient to prevent small raiding war bands from slipping into the empire and pillaging the border provinces, but it implied a large scattering of Roman forces, which were thus extremely vulnerable to a concentrated attack by a massed enemy. The Roman practice of dispersing the command of forces amongst provincial governors for political reasons (wholly justified, as the events of the III century showed painfully) only helped to make things worse in this respect. To some degree, it could be said that there never was a single “Roman army” in the modern sense of the word, as there was no integrated chain of command comparable to that of modern armies. What existed were provincial armies, each one commanded by the provincial governor, who was under the direct command of the ruling augustus in Rome. This system worked relatively well in Europe for more than two centuries because Rome’s potential foes along these borders were politically divided and unable to put together significant forces.

The problems began when these foes began to coalesce into larger political agglomerates with the potential of mobilizing thousands of warriors and so to put in the field armies large enough to wipe out Roman smaller forts and eventually even large legionary fortresses. The first warning in this sense was the large Marcomannic invasions of the 160s and 170s, but the long peaceful hiatus after Marcus Aurelius’ costly victory made the Romans confident enough in the soundness of their system until they were rudely waken up from their complacency by the Goths first in the late 230s and finally (in a most spectacular way) with the great invasion (or invasions) of the early 250s across the lower Danube.

In Asia though the situation was different. Here the Romans bordered not a scattering of bickering, small tribal entities, but a powerful empire able to mobilize large armies and which had already managed to conquer most of the Roman Middle East between Crassus’ defeat at Carrhae and the arrival of the army of Ventidius Bassus who drove the Arsacid armies back across the Euphrates.

Consequently the Roman approach to defense in the East was somewhat different than in the West. A completely linear defense was discarded, but they did not decide either for a “defense in depth” (this approach was not adopted until Diocletian’s reign); they opted instead for a mixed approach. Some legions were posted near the border (but rarely on the border, the only ones directly on the border were Legio IV Scythica at Zeugma and Legio XVI Flavia Firma at Sura. The remaining legions were posted further inside the empire, and the same applies for most auxiliary units. It’s also puzzling how the Romans dispensed with fortified cities; only Antioch and Jerusalem (before its sack by Titus in 70 CE) were seriously fortified; this was very convenient for reasons of internal politics (less danger of fortified cities being used as rebel bases), but exposed the Roman cities to catastrophic consequences if an Arsacid or Sasanian army managed to cross the border in strength. Fortified cities were deemed unnecessary in Europe, because “barbarian” war bands would have been rarely able to break across the border defenses, and because these small bands would have posed little danger to large cities, which could expect to be relatively safe. In the West, walls were more than anything symbolic constructions that defined the pomerium, the urban limit (like the Servian wall in Rome) and were little more than stone garden walls (they rarely exceeded a height of 4 meters), with some towers for decorative purposes and without even crenellations in many cases. But once again, things were quite different in the East.

Here the Romans seemed unable to enact a coherent defensive system to the same degree they had done in the West. A continuous linear defense was obviously out of the question, but the Romans were unable to either put together a defense in depth or to concentrate their forces. As a matter of fact, the distribution of Roman forces in the East at the start of the reign of Septimius Severus was quite unbalanced. The long Cappadocian border was garrisoned by only two legions which were placed in widely separated locations (Satala in the north and Melitene in the south). Syria, which was the richest and most exposed province was garrisoned with three legions, two of them placed near the other directly on the Euphrates (at Sura and Zeugma) but the third one was posted again further to the south at Raphanaea. Syria Palaestina, which had no foreign borders, had a large garrison including two legions posted there permanently after Hadrian’s suppressing of the third Jewish rebellion. This was an internal security measure that could have made sense in 135 CE, but sixty years later it’s dubious that such a heavy military presence in the province was still required. Arabia, which was open to nomadic raids, had a relatively large garrison as well including again a full legion since the time of Trajan’s annexation of the province; it’s again dubious if such a large military presence was called for in the 190s.

The logical step would have been to concentrate the troops in the north, in northern Syria and Cappadocia, and to at least try to unify command arrangements, but reasons of internal politics overruled such a possibility. Septimius Severus rearranged the eastern defenses, but he solved none of the existing problems, and in some cases he made them worse.

By dividing Syria into two provinces (Syria Coele and Syria Phoenicia) he worsened the problem of dispersion of command, and while the annexation of northern Mesopotamia increased the defensive depth of Roman Syria, it achieved so at the expense of creating a province that was very exposed to enemy attacks and whose defense would be a nightmare (as Dio bitterly noted in his work). The new province was an open, arid expanse of steppe which had foreign borders on the north, east and south. The northern border was the most exposed, for it bordered the Tūr Abdīn mountains (Mons Izala in Antiquity); which were the first of the mountain ranges that bordered the Armenian plateau on its southern side. From these mountains, it’s easy control the movements in the whole north Mesopotamian plain and to launch undetected surprise attacks into it. Luckily for Rome, Septimius Severus’ victories had brought Armenia into the Roman sphere of influence, and the rise of Ardaxšir I to the Iranian throne brought the Arsacid kings of Armenia into a tight alliance with Rome. But once Šābuhr I conquered Armenia, Roman Mesopotamia became impossible to defend. The eastern border was less long and it bordered the Tigris river which was a major obstacle in itself if it had to be crossed in order to invade. The approach along its western bank was guarded by the legionary fortress of Singara, and from Singara to the Euphrates ran the province’s southern border, equally long as exposed although a bit less vulnerable than the other two. From Singara, the border ran on a straight east to west line along the southern slopes of the Jebel Sinjar, and when these mountains ended it followed in a southwestern direction the course of the Khabur river until it joined waters with the Euphrates at Circesium. The risk of attacks along this border was limited to bedouin raids because to the south of it there was only the arid expanse of the Mesopotamian desert, but here the Romans built a long series of small forts and watchtowers similar to what they had built in the west in order to shield the settled parts of the province from nomadic raids. The province was garrisoned by two legions, Legio I Parthica at Singara and Legio III Parthica at Nisibis, as well as numerous auxiliary units scattered all over mainly along the Khabur river and the Jebel Sinjar.

Although these defensive arrangements had some logic, they were again utterly unsuited to the danger posed by the Iranian empires. The two legions were widely separated, with Singara being a particularly isolated and exposed location. Even Ammianus Marcellinus in the IV century CE noted so, when the defensive arrangements in the province had been much improved by Diocletian and a defense in depth had been adopted. The true defensive strength of the province lay in its three major fortified cities: Nisibis, Edessa and Carrhae. Especially Edessa boasted an impressive double circuit of walls and an a powerful citadel with commanding views over its environs. The three cities also enjoyed secure supplies of water in an arid environment, and proved able to withstand long sieges if they were properly garrisoned and commanded. Nisibis was the provincial capital, but it lay isolated in the middle of the province, far away from the border with Syria. It was less exposed than Singara, but in case of a major invasion its garrison could only be expected to hold on within the city walls and wait for reinforcements.

Carrhae and Edessa were in a different situation. They were close enough to the Euphrates to be within easy reach of Roman reinforcements, and they were also close enough to each other so that both garrisons could support each other. These two cities, if properly defended, could act as a veritable protective shield in front of the Euphrates to delay Sasanian attacks while large enough relief armies were gathered to the west of the Euphrates.

With the benefit of hindsight, it’s easy to say that the most logical defense arrangement for the Romans would have been to post the two Parthicae legions in these two cities, and garrison the rest of the province with auxiliary light forces. Instead, the two legions were posted in isolated forward positions that rendered them especially vulnerable to massed Sassanian attacks. After reconquering the province in 298 CE, Diocletian adopted a completely new approach to its defense, by filling it with new fortified towns and cities that acted as a protective ring around its capital Nisibis; and this arrangement worked admirably well in the long war between Constantius II and Šābuhr II.

But if, after taking stock of the situation Valerian was trying to go back to the old arrangements (as the return of Cohors XX Palmyrenorum at Dura seems to suggest), then it seems as if he was not really willing to contemplate radical changes. There’s no sign though that Valerian ever managed to recover the parts of Mesopotamia which had been lost to Šābuhr I (basically, everything to the east of Carrhae and Edessa), but at least it seems that he managed to stabilize the volatile political situation in the eastern provinces and in the eastern armies, restoring somewhat of their shattered confidence. At least he managed to address the larger problem of the Roman defensive system (unity of command) by his continuous presence in the East; and that couldn’t have been achieved without the radical decision of splitting the empire into areas of responsibility with his son.

It was also him who began relying heavily on the Palmyrene prince Septimius Odaenathus and trusting him with higher and higher responsibilities and commands. Palmyra was the only ally that Rome still had, and its help against the Sasanians was probably vital. According to Udo Hartmann, Odaenathus had been Ras of Palmyra (lord or prince, charged with defending the city) since the 240s, and had probably received the title from Gordian III. By the early 250s, Odaenathus and his close family had reached senatorial status. According to Peter the Patrician, after Šābuhr I’s devastating second campaign against the Romans and the destruction of the Palmyrene trading posts at Anatha and dura Europos, Odaenathus tried to enact a diplomatic approach to the Sasanian king, but when Šābuhr I reacted by having his gifts thrown into the Euphrates river, Odaenathus had no other option left but to throw his lot in with the Romans. Probably to ensure Odaenathus’ and Palmyra’s allegiance after this episode, Valerian awarded him with the title vir consularis; the highest social rank in the Roman empire. Odaenathus is referred as such in a 257-258 CE inscription from Tyre which also names him as governor of the province of Syria Phoenice, which would have given him command over all the Roman military forces within the province. By then, Odaenathus had become a Roman general as well as the prince of Palmyra and the leader of the Arab tribes of the Syrian desert.

But new problems would soon start coming from unexpected quarters.

 

[JodelDiplom]

Cliffhanger!! Loving it.

 

[Amallric]

Good to see you resumed writing. I was waiting to read your take on Gallienus. He's often said to be one of the worst emperors, but I have the impression that the very fact he managed to cling to power for 15 years, even in a very diminished empire, helped immensely as it stopped the endless pattern of military coups that you described in this thread.

 

[Semper Victor]

Good to see you resumed writing. I was waiting to read your take on Gallienus. He's often said to be one of the worst emperors, but I have the impression that the very fact he managed to cling to power for 15 years, even in a very diminished empire, helped immensely as it stopped the endless pattern of military coups that you described in this thread.

Thank you for your kind words. Yes, Gallienus is a very interesting figure but I'm not sure if I’m going to write about his reign with the same depth that I've done with other Roman emperors. After all, this thread is (or it was supposed to be) centered on the first Sasanian kings, and how they became such a formidable enemy for Rome and how they contributed to the troubled times that Rome experienced during the III century CE. Gallienus’activities were restricted almost exclusively to the European parts of the empire (excluding Postumus’ Gallic empire), and as far as I'm aware the further east he ever travelled after his rise to the purple was the city of Byzantium; he never even stepped on Asian soil. My original intention was to stop the thread with the death of Šābuhr I in 273 CE, but we'll see. Another possibility would be to continue until the 298 CE peace treaty between Narseh and Diocletian, but I'm still not sure.