The Soviet Union Held Finland Strictly In Its Grip - The Peril Years 1944-1949 Were An Early Embodiment Of The Cold War

[Jopa79]

In the case of Finland, this is the more remarkable as Finland had quite recently been part of Russia, had fought several wars with it, had joined the Nazis in WW2 and had lost that last war.

Actually, there are only three "wars" in which the Grand Duchy of Finland fought together with the Russian Empire and the Finnish manpower in those wars is quite minor - the November Uprising 1830-1831 (one Finnish sharpshooter battalion) - the Crimean War 1853-1856 (the Gulf of Finland as a side stage of the war while the British-French navy bombarded the Finnish coast at Bomarsund and Viapori) - the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 (900 Finnish were recruited for the warfare in the Balkans).

While Finland became a part of the Russian Empire, there was no rule or law about the universal military service between 1809-1878. The Finnish vision was that the military service shouldn't lead Finnish men fighting for the Russian Empire wherever nor any Russian wars/conflicts.

'Military Millions' were a compensation for the Russian Empire, paid by the Grand Duchy of Finland in exchange for not setting up an universal Finnish military service after Finnish men organized strikes against the Russian draft 1902-1904. Finland didn't join the WWI under the Russian Empire. As an exception in here are the 2 000 of Finnish volunteers fighting for the German Empire and the 1 000 of Finnish volunteers fighting for the Russian Empire.

About the WWII, the Finnish view about Finland's involvement to the war is not considering the war as a one whole matter, but consisting of four different sections as follows, the Winter War 1939-1940 - the Interim Peace 1940-1941 (over one year period of peace) - the Continuation War 1941-1944 - the Lapland War 1944-1945. Finland allied with the Nazi-Germany only for the time during the Continuation War, but declared war on the Nazi-Germany during the Lapland War.

While the West was well aware that Finland's alliance with Hitler was not ideological, it had lost the Finns a lot of sympathy. In addition, Finland was neither strategically positioned nor rich enough for the US and its allies to enter in a costly struggle over its fate.

Finland was very aware of her troubled alliance with Germany. After the German defeat in Stalingrad, the future result of the Continuation War was quite clear for the Finnish decision makers. The Finnish government secretly proposed for the United States and asked them to occupy Finland to secure the Finnish independence and to resolve the Soviet threat. The United States rejected the Finnish proposal, but only after a carefully review.

Western leaders saw Finlandization not as a laughing stock but as a prudent strategy to keep Finland democratic.

Yes, thinking afterwards, I noticed that a laughing stock wasn't perhaps the most suitable word in the original context, but it surely was a humiliating situation for the Finnish sovereignty, to accept Soviet orders and implement Soviet set policies in her own affairs.

The reality is that Finland stood alone against an overwhelmingly stronger neighbor that had a proven penchant for imposing puppet regimes on the states bordering it and that, moreover, had good reasons to be very suspicious of Finnish irredentism. In these circumstances maintaining independence required a very delicate balancing act. It's impressive that Finland pulled it off. I think you give too much weight to an argument that was never about Finland, too little weight to the wider strategic context that impacted on Finnish politics, and too little credit to Kekkonen for successfully managing Finnish-Soviet relations.

I agree the view, Finland stood alone against an overwhelming, stronger neighbor (if we are talking about the eras of the WWII in here). Finland has been denounced and blamed heavily of her German relations in the Continuation War. But what other options there were? While Finland searched allies from the West, there was no answer, the Great-Britain, neither France wasn't interested to ally with Finland, because they knew that by doing so, they would probably end into a conflict with the Soviet Union. The Finnish choices she made, they were courageous and maybe, it should be the West looking to the mirror while rejecting Finland and denouncing her.

Yes, Kekkonen should be credited for managing the Finno-Soviet relations for many decades, but only for that. But why he succeeded in it was mostly because he was supported and trusted by Kremlin.

 

[Barsoom]

Actually, there are only three "wars" in which the Grand Duchy of Finland fought together with the Russian Empire and the Finnish manpower in those wars is quite minor - the November Uprising 1830-1831 (one Finnish sharpshooter battalion) - the Crimean War 1853-1856 (the Gulf of Finland as a side stage of the war while the British-French navy bombarded the Finnish coast at Bomarsund and Viapori) - the Russo-Turkish War of 1877-1878 (900 Finnish were recruited for the warfare in the Balkans).

While Finland became a part of the Russian Empire, there was no rule or law about the universal military service between 1809-1878. The Finnish vision was that the military service shouldn't lead Finnish men fighting for the Russian Empire wherever nor any Russian wars/conflicts.

'Military Millions' were a compensation for the Russian Empire, paid by the Grand Duchy of Finland in exchange for not setting up an universal Finnish military service after Finnish men organized strikes against the Russian draft 1902-1904. Finland didn't join the WWI under the Russian Empire. As an exception in here are the 2 000 of Finnish volunteers fighting for the German Empire and the 1 000 of Finnish volunteers fighting for the Russian Empire.

About the WWII, the Finnish view about Finland's involvement to the war is not considering the war as a one whole matter, but consisting of four different sections as follows, the Winter War 1939-1940 - the Interim Peace 1940-1941 (over one year period of peace) - the Continuation War 1941-1944 - the Lapland War 1944-1945. Finland allied with the Nazi-Germany only for the time during the Continuation War, but declared war on the Nazi-Germany during the Lapland War.



Finland was very aware of her troubled alliance with Germany. After the German defeat in Stalingrad, the future result of the Continuation War was quite clear for the Finnish decision makers. The Finnish government secretly proposed for the United States and asked them to occupy Finland to secure the Finnish independence and to resolve the Soviet threat. The United States rejected the Finnish proposal, but only after a carefully review.



Yes, thinking afterwards, I noticed that a laughing stock wasn't perhaps the most suitable word in the original context, but it surely was a humiliating situation for the Finnish sovereignty, to accept Soviet orders and implement Soviet set policies in her own affairs.



I agree the view, Finland stood alone against an overwhelming, stronger neighbor (if we are talking about the eras of the WWII in here). Finland has been denounced and blamed heavily of her German relations in the Continuation War. But what other options there were? While Finland searched allies from the West, there was no answer, the Great-Britain, neither France wasn't interested to ally with Finland, because they knew that by doing so, they would probably end into a conflict with the Soviet Union. The Finnish choices she made, they were courageous and maybe, it should be the West looking to the mirror while rejecting Finland and denouncing her.

Yes, Kekkonen should be credited for managing the Finno-Soviet relations for many decades, but only for that. But why he succeeded in it was mostly because he was supported and trusted by Kremlin.

Your first point is based on an unfortunate ambiguity in my wording. I meant not wars alongside Russia but wars against it. It makes no sense for Moscow to be suspicious because of previous cooperation, it does make sense to be on guard after a previous attack.

As to your second point, this confirms my point that the US was not interested in a fight over Finland. That this was based on a careful review of the options establishes that this was a deliberate policy decision.

Of course Kekkonen succeeded because he was trusted by the Kremlin. Again, that was my point. He earned that trust. He was not a communist and had actually fought on the White side in the Finnish Civil War. He had been a member of a society that supported annexation of East Karelia. To balance out these faults (which is what they were in Soviet eyes) he had as justice minister tried to ban some radical right wingers and he had been lucky enough not to be in office during either the Winter War or the Continuation War. He had also been prime minister under Paasiviki and had demonstrated his support for the policy of accommodation. This was enough for the Soviets to accept him initially and he subsequently built his reputation. His authoritarian style was not a weakness in Moscow's eyes but a further guarantee that his policies wouldn't be subverted by more nationalist Finns.

I am aware that Finns make fine distinctions between their wars. You should be aware that in the eyes of the rest of the world the one that matters is when your ancestors allied with Hitler. I understand the bitterness over the losses in the Winter War but I do not judge this sufficient reason to join forces with pure evil. There obviously was an alternative because it's what Finland did after it lost, namely accept defeat. Paasiviki saw this immediately; he resigned as soon as the Continuation War started and was among the first to try to negotiate an end to it. That war didn't achieve anything other than an excuse for the Soviets to impose Finlandization. Accepting defeat without further casualties, without Finlandization, and without the shame of having fought alongside Hitler would clearly have been the better option.

 

[Jopa79]

Your first point is based on an unfortunate ambiguity in my wording. I meant not wars alongside Russia but wars against it. It makes no sense for Moscow to be suspicious because of previous cooperation, it does make sense to be on guard after a previous attack.

Okay, I got it.

As to your second point, this confirms my point that the US was not interested in a fight over Finland. That this was based on a careful review of the options establishes that this was a deliberate policy decision.

Yes, I agree. The Allied unwillingness to support Finland was to be due to the existence of the Soviet Union and the Allied reluctance to end in a conflict with the Soviets. But I have to disagree to your earlier statement about Finland was not considered as strategically positioned.

The Allies pretty sure knew, that there would probably be a future showdown - by a way or other - with the Soviet Union after the WWII and if the Western Allies were present in Finland, it would be very much strategic.

Of course Kekkonen succeeded because he was trusted by the Kremlin. Again, that was my point. He earned that trust.

Kekkonen was a man whom could be controlled by Kremlin and that's the reason why the Soviets supported him. The trust came later, it didn't exist.

To balance out these faults (which is what they were in Soviet eyes) he had as justice minister tried to ban some radical right wingers and he had been lucky enough not to be in office during either the Winter War or the Continuation War.

Kekkonen was not in office (war-time governments) because the other members didn't accept him. The Finnish Prime Minister Cajander said: - "We will not accept that piece of s... into our government."

You should be aware that in the eyes of the rest of the world the one that matters is when your ancestors allied with Hitler.

And you should be aware that the slave trade your ancestors pursued also matters.

There obviously was an alternative because it's what Finland did after it lost, namely accept defeat.

I'm not sure if I understand this correctly, but are you suggesting that the alternative was to accept defeat after the Winter War and not to prepare for a new one? A new Soviet invasion would be forthcoming if the Finns didn't start the Continuation War. As unattended and weakened by the Winter War Finland wouldn't be able to counter a new Soviet invasion, but would need a strong ally and from where to get a such?

That war didn't achieve anything other than an excuse for the Soviets to impose Finlandization.

The Continuation War was a war of revanchism - Finland sought for her lost territories. The war however turned into Finland's survival - torjuntavoitto - a combat victory during 1944 secured a Finnish independence. Without the Continuation War Finland would be sharing the same position and status with the Baltic States (without despising any of them) - at least 50 years of Soviet rule.

 

[Barsoom]

Yes, I agree. The Allied unwillingness to support Finland was to be due to the existence of the Soviet Union and the Allied reluctance to end in a conflict with the Soviets. But I have to disagree to your earlier statement about Finland was not considered as strategically positioned.

The Allies pretty sure knew, that there would probably be a future showdown - by a way or other - with the Soviet Union after the WWII and if the Western Allies were present in Finland, it would be very much strategic.

There never was such a showdown. It was feared in the 1920s and 1930s but the fear receded during WW2. The strongest argument that there didn't need to be one was formulated in 1945 by George Kennan, it didn't drop out of thin air but reflected a development of thought shared more widely in the US foreign policy circles. That doesn't mean the US didn't think about a potential war of course but that it would like to avoid one if possible. Notice that the US was certainly rich enough to build stronger conventional forces than the SU but didn't choose to do so. If one were to be fought, the US would be on the defensive. The SU would certainly attack where the greatest gains were to be made, in west Europe. Plus, Finland is bad terrain for a defensive war by forces not entirely used to the terrain (the Finns are certainly good at it but US soldiers wouldn't necessarily be), it lacks strategic depth, and the logistics of supplying it from the Atlantic are a nightmare.

Kekkonen was a man whom could be controlled by Kremlin and that's the reason why the Soviets supported him. The trust came later, it didn't exist.

Kekkonen was not in office (war-time governments) because the other members didn't accept him. The Finnish Prime Minister Cajander said: - "We will not accept that piece of s... into our government."

Interesting. I didn't know that about him. Clearly he was a piece of work, quite authoritarian. But that used be more common when he started his career, I thought perhaps he had just outlasted the days when such character traits were seen more positively.

But you really need to think in less black and white terms about trust and control.

And you should be aware that the slave trade your ancestors pursued also matters.

Childish but true. You won't find me filling the History forum with nationalist posts about the darkest page in my ancestors' history.

I'm not sure if I understand this correctly, but are you suggesting that the alternative was to accept defeat after the Winter War and not to prepare for a new one?

Yes.

A new Soviet invasion would be forthcoming if the Finns didn't start the Continuation War. As unattended and weakened by the Winter War Finland wouldn't be able to counter a new Soviet invasion, but would need a strong ally and from where to get a such?

The Continuation War was a war of revanchism - Finland sought for her lost territories. The war however turned into Finland's survival - torjuntavoitto - a combat victory during 1944 secured a Finnish independence. Without the Continuation War Finland would be sharing the same position and status with the Baltic States (without despising any of them) - at least 50 years of Soviet rule.

You speculate that the SU would have invaded in any case. I don't believe that. And I don't believe glorious Finnish arms in 1944 changed the balance of power between them so fundamentally that it changed the cost-benefit analysis of a Soviet takeover for 20 years or more.

 

[Fulmen]

Your first point is based on an unfortunate ambiguity in my wording.

I have to say I personally found no ambiguity in your post, in fact I thought it was very well-written. It seems to me that Jopa's reply can be explained by a language barrier.

There obviously was an alternative because it's what Finland did after it lost, namely accept defeat.

Here you are genuinely wrong though, and I presume it is because you are not fully aware of the situation Finland was in during the Interim Peace of 1940-41; there really was no other choice than to align with Germany, or face another war with Soviet Russia, alone. A war that Finland would have no doubt truly lost, with fatal consequences to the Finnish nation. I have written about it in quite a few posts in various threads in the past. If you'd like, I can try and look up some of those for you tomorrow.

 

[Jopa79]

Here you are genuinely wrong though, and I presume it is because you are not fully aware of the situation Finland was in during the Interim Peace of 1940-41; there really was no other choice than to align with Germany, or face another war with Soviet Russia, alone. A war that Finland would have no doubt truly lost, with fatal consequences to the Finnish nation. I have written about it in quite a few posts in various threads in the past. If you'd like, I can try and look up some of those for you tomorrow.

I would like to see those posts of yours.

I’m further very interested about Ohto Manninen’s work - Miten Suomi Valloitetaan - How To Conquer Finland. And particularly Manninen’s statement about the two Soviet operative plans designed during the Interim Peace, in the first case, to attack Finland and Finland not having an ally and the other plan, to attack Finland while it’s allied with Germany.

 

[Fulmen]

I’m further very interested about Ohto Manninen’s work - Miten Suomi Valloitetaan - How To Conquer Finland. And particularly Manninen’s statement about the two Soviet operative plans designed during the Interim Peace, in the first case, to attack Finland and Finland not having an ally and the other plan, to attack Finland while it’s allied with Germany.

The Finnish National Archives platform Doria has the English version of the book available to the public: https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/119977/FDS 16 OCR.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

 

[Jopa79]

The Finnish National Archives platform Doria has the English version of the book available to the public: https://www.doria.fi/bitstream/handle/10024/119977/FDS 16 OCR.pdf?sequence=2&isAllowed=y

Thank you.

 

[Barsoom]

I have to say I personally found no ambiguity in your post, in fact I thought it was very well-written. It seems to me that Jopa's reply can be explained by a language barrier.



Here you are genuinely wrong though, and I presume it is because you are not fully aware of the situation Finland was in during the Interim Peace of 1940-41; there really was no other choice than to align with Germany, or face another war with Soviet Russia, alone. A war that Finland would have no doubt truly lost, with fatal consequences to the Finnish nation. I have written about it in quite a few posts in various threads in the past. If you'd like, I can try and look up some of those for you tomorrow.

Yes, I would like that. Mind you, the question of intention is not easily proven, and is particularly hard to prove for a secretive regime like the Soviet Union. It's important to distinguish between offensive military doctrine and the possible political decision to start a war of aggression. I've just read the part of Manninen's book about the Interim Peace* and it wisely sticks to doctrine.

I would also point that the argument that the Continuation War* prevented a full Soviet occupation of Finland hinges on the idea that a second lost war somehow demonstrated a military capacity that would make such an occupation too costly for them. I think it's reasonable to argue that Finnish tenacity in the Winter War imposed much heavier costs on the Soviets than they had anticipated. It's much harder to show that the second war established a perception that hadn't already been established by the first.

* I must say I dislike the Finnish terminology. It's useful to be clear about which war we're talking about but it's just so one-sided. Pretending that the second war was merely a "continuation" of the first, with just an "interim" between them, projects the idea that it's all a single war as if it wasn't a separate decision to go to war again. Well, it was. And it was specifically a decision to go to war alongside the most evil regime that ever existed.

 

[Jopa79]

You speculate that the SU would have invaded in any case. I don't believe that. And I don't believe glorious Finnish arms in 1944 changed the balance of power between them so fundamentally that it changed the cost-benefit analysis of a Soviet takeover for 20 years or more.

Yes, I would like that. Mind you, the question of intention is not easily proven, and is particularly hard to prove for a secretive regime like the Soviet Union. It's important to distinguish between offensive military doctrine and the possible political decision to start a war of aggression. I've just read the part of Manninen's book about the Interim Peace* and it wisely sticks to doctrine.

Now, when you have read the part about the Interim Peace in Manninen's book, it should prove you that a Soviet attack plan (actually two separate plans) to Finland did exist. Those plans were designed after the Winter War and were intended to be implemented in 1941. For instance, in January 1941 the Finnish intelligence observed heavy Soviet movement on the border and a Finnish mobilization was considered to be executed.

The Soviet Union carried out numerous border- and air space violations during the Interim Peace, one of the most severe event was shooting down a Finnish passenger plane, Kaleva.

In the presence of these things, it is quite clear, that the Soviet aggression didn't cease after the Winter War, it hardly is only speculative to assume if a new Soviet invasion would come, rather it would be foolish and childish to assume and speculate, it would not come.

And I didn't say anything about glorious Finnish arms in 1944 changed the balance of power - it was only your own expression. I said, that "torjuntavoitto" (meaning literally repulsing victory) is used in Finnish language while describing the defensive Finnish victories, like Tali-Ihantala, Äyräpää-Vuosalmi, Tienhaara and Ilomantsi. Only torjuntavoitto during the ending phase of the Continuation War caused the Soviet Union to abandon its intentions about occupying Finland while the Soviets hurried to Berlin as priority.

* I must say I dislike the Finnish terminology. It's useful to be clear about which war we're talking about but it's just so one-sided. Pretending that the second war was merely a "continuation" of the first, with just an "interim" between them, projects the idea that it's all a single war as if it wasn't a separate decision to go to war again. Well, it was. And it was specifically a decision to go to war alongside the most evil regime that ever existed.

Well, it is our language, our nation and our history. It is a good existing terminology and description about the events in the Finnish-Soviet theater of the WWII. If the rest of the Europe or other nations weren't interested enough to intervene the Northern happenings back then, why should they give the description about the things in which they weren't involved?

Edit: The title or nomination - the Winter War - was introduced first during the Continuation War, but this nomination was stabilized only later. Other titles of the Winter War are for instance, the Finnish War of 1939-1940 and the Finno-Soviet War of 1939-1940. It's hard to imagine better description for the Interim Peace. It simply describes the short era of "peace" between the Winter War and the Continuation War. In Finnish, the Summer War was first used to describe about the Continuation War, but as the war prolonged that nomination was abandoned. The Soviet historiography describes the Continuation War as the Finnish Front of the Great Patriotic War, which in my opinion is as suitable as the Finnish nomination. The Finnish view is that the era of Interim Peace was very unstable and the threat of a new war existed throughout the period. The Winter War didn't cease the Soviet aggression, a state of war was continued after a year and three months. In this new war, Finland first pursued for the regions it had lost during the Winter War. However, while the war prolonged and in the end it changed its nature to resemble the Finnish survival in the Winter War. The new war was definitely a different war than the Winter War, but the Continuation War was fought for about the same principles as the Winter War.

 

[olm]

I understand the bitterness over the losses in the Winter War but I do not judge this sufficient reason to join forces with pure evil.

That is just some next level hindsight smartassery. At the time those decisions were made Finns had no particular reason to consider Germany to be "pure evil", in fact they were probably more well informed about evil nature of Soviet Union.

 

[bz249]

I tend to say that from pure military considerations alone AND including hindsight neither the Finns nor the Soviets could really deviate much from their IRL actions. Finnland was indeed an unsecured flank for the USSR, and if we add the historic Weserübung from 04/40 then it is even more understandable that they wanted add Finnland to their sphere of influence as long as they can do it. The same is true for 1941, if they could have occupied Finnland without much resistance (just like IRL Iran) it is much more desirable than to keep strong enough forces on the border.
For the Finns, they simply cannot keep enough manpower under arms to defend their 1941 border, thus the only realistic option they had is to attack as long as they have a window of opportunity and reoccupy the much shorter 1939 border, demobilize as much as they can and hope for the best.

 

[Jopa79]

For the Finns, they simply cannot keep enough manpower under arms to defend their 1941 border, thus the only realistic option they had is to attack as long as they have a window of opportunity and reoccupy the much shorter 1939 border, demobilize as much as they can and hope for the best.

Yes, I agree. During the Finnish attacking phase in 1941 Finland sought for the 1939 border, but also the defensive position of three isthmus - White Sea-Onega-Ladoga-Gulf of Finland which would largely shorten the defense line.

The Salpa-line was built during the Interim Peace following the border after the Winter War. It was reinforced and partly occupied in 1944. It was much stronger than the Mannerheim-line, but its sustainability was never tested as the Soviet offensive didn't reach the Salpa-line.

 

[Barsoom]

Now, when you have read the part about the Interim Peace in Manninen's book, it should prove you that a Soviet attack plan (actually two separate plans) to Finland did exist. Those plans were designed after the Winter War and were intended to be implemented in 1941. For instance, in January 1941 the Finnish intelligence observed heavy Soviet movement on the border and a Finnish mobilization was considered to be executed.

The Soviet Union carried out numerous border- and air space violations during the Interim Peace, one of the most severe event was shooting down a Finnish passenger plane, Kaleva.

In the presence of these things, it is quite clear, that the Soviet aggression didn't cease after the Winter War, it hardly is only speculative to assume if a new Soviet invasion would come, rather it would be foolish and childish to assume and speculate, it would not come.

And I didn't say anything about glorious Finnish arms in 1944 changed the balance of power - it was only your own expression. I said, that "torjuntavoitto" (meaning literally repulsing victory) is used in Finnish language while describing the defensive Finnish victories, like Tali-Ihantala, Äyräpää-Vuosalmi, Tienhaara and Ilomantsi. Only torjuntavoitto during the ending phase of the Continuation War caused the Soviet Union to abandon its intentions about occupying Finland while the Soviets hurried to Berlin as priority.



Well, it is our language, our nation and our history. It is a good existing terminology and description about the events in the Finnish-Soviet theater of the WWII. If the rest of the Europe or other nations weren't interested enough to intervene the Northern happenings back then, why should they give the description about the things in which they weren't involved?

Edit: The title or nomination - the Winter War - was introduced first during the Continuation War, but this nomination was stabilized only later. Other titles of the Winter War are for instance, the Finnish War of 1939-1940 and the Finno-Soviet War of 1939-1940. It's hard to imagine better description for the Interim Peace. It simply describes the short era of "peace" between the Winter War and the Continuation War. In Finnish, the Summer War was first used to describe about the Continuation War, but as the war prolonged that nomination was abandoned. The Soviet historiography describes the Continuation War as the Finnish Front of the Great Patriotic War, which in my opinion is as suitable as the Finnish nomination. The Finnish view is that the era of Interim Peace was very unstable and the threat of a new war existed throughout the period. The Winter War didn't cease the Soviet aggression, a state of war was continued after a year and three months. In this new war, Finland first pursued for the regions it had lost during the Winter War. However, while the war prolonged and in the end it changed its nature to resemble the Finnish survival in the Winter War. The new war was definitely a different war than the Winter War, but the Continuation War was fought for about the same principles as the Winter War.

So your response to me saying that operational doctrine is not aggressive intent is to say that it is? Not very convincing.

Yes, I did use the word glorious a bit provocatively. But isn't what you're saying that Finnish military accomplishment changed the cost-balance calculation for the Soviets? Why else would torjuntavoitto change their intentions?

If I understand you correctly, your argument is that something really bad would have happened if Finland had not gone to war again. The first problem with this is that it's counter-factual and thus impossible to prove beyond doubt, the best you can do is to establish that it would have been very likely.

The best way to go about this (I'm trying to be constructive here) is to show evidence for Soviet calculations both before and after. The after is easier, that's what actually happened. But it is important to remember to include it because the evidence for your argument is the difference between the before and after.

So let's start with the after. The so-called Continuation War:
1. was started by Finland;
2. in close cooperation with Nazi Germany;
3. with the goal of regaining the lost territories in West Karelia and possible also gaining East Karelia;
4. did not achieve those goals;
5. involved a Soviet counterattack on Finnish soil, which was halted;
6. (like all wars) cost many lives on both sides;
7. concluded with a period characterized by repeated Soviet probes of Finnish political resolve;
8 and finally a peace that established Finlandization.

Of these 8 points, only the fifth is a clear positive for Finland. This is the one you focus on but let's not forget the others. The first and the second impacted negatively on international support for the country, the third is neutral at best. The fourth also shifts the balance of power towards the SU, which may or may not be canceled out by the fifth. The sixth is a negative and, if I read you correctly, the eighth is as well. The seventh (which is the actual topic of this thread) is a bad experience for the people living through it, but it could be interpreted similarly to the fifth as demonstrating Finnish resolve.

Now let's look at the hypothetical before. Are you projecting an outcome worse than Finlandization? How do you know? What benefit would it have brought the Soviets? What costs could they expect if they tried to implement it? On this last point, I note that the Winter War had already established Finnish defensive strength and resolve so the standard of evidence for the Continuation War is that the second demonstration added to the perception of costs over and above the first. You're very well-informed about Finnish military history but, in my estimation at least, you have not clearly established the criteria by which you judge success.

I also note that the SU faced sanctions after invading Finland in the Winter War, rather ineffective sanctions but it does show some willingness of other states to involve themselves, while after the Continuation War the international community is silent and the US signals support for Finlandization. It seems to me that this works out to lower diplomatic costs afterwards than in the hypothetical before. It would strengthen your argument if you painted a more convincing portrait of the diplomatic environment than you have done so far. It would also help if you put Finnish-Soviet relations more clearly in the broader strategic context, characterized by a looming German-Soviet confrontation in 1941 and an emerging Cold War in 1945. Concerns about other fronts also impact on the question of the costs the Soviets faced if they tried to impose their will on Finland.

That is just some next level hindsight smartassery. At the time those decisions were made Finns had no particular reason to consider Germany to be "pure evil", in fact they were probably more well informed about evil nature of Soviet Union.

I agree that the full extent of the Shoah was not known at this time. But it was known that Nazi Germany persecuted Jews and others, it was known as a brutal and capricious dictatorship, and it had already started its wars of aggression; it is not in question that it was evil. It is always a choice to cooperate with evil, even if the price for it would be (and it isn't certain that it would) suffering evil yourself.

I also agree that Stalin's regime was also evil. One could argue about which one appeared the more evil in 1941. But international attitudes to Finland in 1945 were based on the revealed Nazi atrocities. That's not just my attitude, it's how it worked out in practice. (I take exactly the same stance towards the slave trade that my ancestors engaged in. That it was a widely accepted practice at the time doesn't make it any less of a black page in our history books.)

My biggest objection is that you're simplifying the choices to either working with Hitler or suffering under Stalin. I don't think these were the only options. Neutrality is a thing that exists. So is accommodation. Both policies raise the costs of a potential invasion by the Soviet Union while lowering the benefits. They are very similar to Finlandization in this respect as that policy too lowered the benefit of a direct takeover simply by giving the Soviets much of what they wanted in advance. In my estimate a policy that worked in 1945 cannot be summarily dismissed as unworkable in 1941, that requires a real argument.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

I think the main question is if Finland can manage to give Germany military access and get the tripwire troops of another major power as added security and still avoid entanglement in Germany's aggressive military plans.

While Soviet Union was ultimately the party that shot first, I'd agree with @Barsoom above that Continuation War was functionally started by Finland by it's all too eager act of jumping the German bandwagon. But how feasible would it have been for Finland to balance Germany and Soviet Union against eachother even when the two parties entered war, while still securing Germany as effective guarantor of Finnish independence?

That a guarantor of substance was needed after Winter War is not in my opinion of great doubt, particularly from the perspective of the time. By process of elimination, that came down to Nazi Germany.

 

[Jopa79]

So your response to me saying that operational doctrine is not aggressive intent is to say that it is? Not very convincing.

What I'm trying to say is that there were several actual signs about a new Soviet aggression lying ahead, aimed against Finland throughout the Interim Peace. Why this new Soviet invasion didn't happen was due to the German doings, to include Finland for their plan, Operation Barbarossa. After the Winter War Molotov insisted "free hands" for the Soviet Union to make their will considering Finland, but Germany didn't like those Soviet demands. If Germany had turned its attention elsewhere than to the Soviet Union in Summer 1941, the Soviet Union would had definitely invaded Finland again.

Yes, I did use the word glorious a bit provocatively. But isn't what you're saying that Finnish military accomplishment changed the cost-balance calculation for the Soviets? Why else would torjuntavoitto change their intentions?

It is researched and studied fact. The Red Army had reserved a certain amount of manpower and other military resources (tanks/airplanes/artillery/etc.) for its Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offensive. The purpose of the offensive was to break the Finnish defensive lines throughout the Finno-Soviet theater of the WWII, invade and occupy Finland. However, the Soviet Union depleted the reserved force during the offensive and the fighting reached a stalemate - torjuntavoitto.

If I understand you correctly, your argument is that something really bad would have happened if Finland had not gone to war again. The first problem with this is that it's counter-factual and thus impossible to prove beyond doubt, the best you can do is to establish that it would have been very likely.

Yes, something bad in here is the Soviet occupation of Finland would had happened if Finland not going for another war.

So let's start with the after. The so-called Continuation War:
1. was started by Finland;
2. in close cooperation with Nazi Germany;
3. with the goal of regaining the lost territories in West Karelia and possible also gaining East Karelia;
4. did not achieve those goals;
5. involved a Soviet counterattack on Finnish soil, which was halted;
6. (like all wars) cost many lives on both sides;
7. concluded with a period characterized by repeated Soviet probes of Finnish political resolve;
8 and finally a peace that established Finlandization.

1. This is controversial. German troops were present in Finland and Finnish soil was used by the German Luftwaffe, the Soviet Union started the hostilities by air-raids against Finnish cities and Finland announced about a state-of-war between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, the Finnish Army was grouped in defensive position on the border, waiting the Soviet attack, but after waiting a month and no Soviet offensive, Finland launched its own attack.
2. This I agree.
3.&4. Yes, with minor refinements. West Karelia is correctly the Karelian Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia. The lost regions include also Salla in the Finnish Lapland, the archipelago of Kalastajasaarento on the coast of the Arctic Ocean, Outer Islands on the Gulf of Finland and Hanko Peninsula. The Finnish offensive was carried on beyond the 1939 border, to the East-Karelia and to the Soviet Lapland - others wanted to join these territories to Finland, others considered the gained territories could be used in negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the end, the goal was to retain the Finnish sovereignty among other European nations.
5. I wouldn't say it was only a Soviet counterattack. It was one of the Soviet strategic operations against Germany and its allies during 1944. It was implemented by the Soviet Leningrad and Karelian Fronts. But yes, it was the only Soviet operation halted by Germany or its allies in 1944.
6. Unfortunately, yes.
7.&8. Yes, in brief, that's what happened. Finlandization, however emerged not immediately after the peace, but was a consequence about the Paasikivi-Kekkonen policies starting in 1946.

Now let's look at the hypothetical before. Are you projecting an outcome worse than Finlandization? How do you know? What benefit would it have brought the Soviets? What costs could they expect if they tried to implement it? On this last point, I note that the Winter War had already established Finnish defensive strength and resolve so the standard of evidence for the Continuation War is that the second demonstration added to the perception of costs over and above the first. You're very well-informed about Finnish military history but, in my estimation at least, you have not clearly established the criteria by which you judge success.

Worse than Finlandization would had been a Soviet occupation. While the Baltic States were unable to resist the Soviet aggression during the WWII and accepted the Soviet demands, the Baltic occupation by the Soviet Union happened. Exactly the same would had happened to Finland if not waging war against the Soviet Union during the WWII.

About my judgement of success, like I have said, the Winter War and the Continuation War were different wars, but ultimately both wars were about Finland remaining an independent nation. I find both wars as conflicts which Finland never wanted a part of, but the wars were a must for Finland as the Great Powers policies forced Finland for the both wars. The success was remaining Finland as a sovereign nation.

I also note that the SU faced sanctions after invading Finland in the Winter War, rather ineffective sanctions but it does show some willingness of other states to involve themselves, while after the Continuation War the international community is silent and the US signals support for Finlandization. It seems to me that this works out to lower diplomatic costs afterwards than in the hypothetical before. It would strengthen your argument if you painted a more convincing portrait of the diplomatic environment than you have done so far. It would also help if you put Finnish-Soviet relations more clearly in the broader strategic context, characterized by a looming German-Soviet confrontation in 1941 and an emerging Cold War in 1945. Concerns about other fronts also impact on the question of the costs the Soviets faced if they tried to impose their will on Finland.

The sanction against the Soviet Union after invading Finland in the Winter War was the exclusion of its membership in the League of Nations. I respect the United States' effort during the same war - the Finnish Relief Fund was an American humanitarian aid for Finland. Also Sweden's reaction about the Finnish case during the WWII is admirable and awe-inspiring. While Sweden accepted Finnish refugees - Finnish women and children during the wartime - the value of that aid is priceless.

 

[Barsoom]

What I'm trying to say is that there were several actual signs about a new Soviet aggression lying ahead, aimed against Finland throughout the Interim Peace. Why this new Soviet invasion didn't happen was due to the German doings, to include Finland for their plan, Operation Barbarossa. After the Winter War Molotov insisted "free hands" for the Soviet Union to make their will considering Finland, but Germany didn't like those Soviet demands. If Germany had turned its attention elsewhere than to the Soviet Union in Summer 1941, the Soviet Union would had definitely invaded Finland again.



It is researched and studied fact. The Red Army had reserved a certain amount of manpower and other military resources (tanks/airplanes/artillery/etc.) for its Vyborg-Petrozavodsk offensive. The purpose of the offensive was to break the Finnish defensive lines throughout the Finno-Soviet theater of the WWII, invade and occupy Finland. However, the Soviet Union depleted the reserved force during the offensive and the fighting reached a stalemate - torjuntavoitto.



Yes, something bad in here is the Soviet occupation of Finland would had happened if Finland not going for another war.



1. This is controversial. German troops were present in Finland and Finnish soil was used by the German Luftwaffe, the Soviet Union started the hostilities by air-raids against Finnish cities and Finland announced about a state-of-war between Finland and the Soviet Union. However, the Finnish Army was grouped in defensive position on the border, waiting the Soviet attack, but after waiting a month and no Soviet offensive, Finland launched its own attack.
2. This I agree.
3.&4. Yes, with minor refinements. West Karelia is correctly the Karelian Isthmus and Ladoga Karelia. The lost regions include also Salla in the Finnish Lapland, the archipelago of Kalastajasaarento on the coast of the Arctic Ocean, Outer Islands on the Gulf of Finland and Hanko Peninsula. The Finnish offensive was carried on beyond the 1939 border, to the East-Karelia and to the Soviet Lapland - others wanted to join these territories to Finland, others considered the gained territories could be used in negotiations with the Soviet Union. In the end, the goal was to retain the Finnish sovereignty among other European nations.
5. I wouldn't say it was only a Soviet counterattack. It was one of the Soviet strategic operations against Germany and its allies during 1944. It was implemented by the Soviet Leningrad and Karelian Fronts. But yes, it was the only Soviet operation halted by Germany or its allies in 1944.
6. Unfortunately, yes.
7.&8. Yes, in brief, that's what happened. Finlandization, however emerged not immediately after the peace, but was a consequence about the Paasikivi-Kekkonen policies starting in 1946.



Worse than Finlandization would had been a Soviet occupation. While the Baltic States were unable to resist the Soviet aggression during the WWII and accepted the Soviet demands, the Baltic occupation by the Soviet Union happened. Exactly the same would had happened to Finland if not waging war against the Soviet Union during the WWII.

About my judgement of success, like I have said, the Winter War and the Continuation War were different wars, but ultimately both wars were about Finland remaining an independent nation. I find both wars as conflicts which Finland never wanted a part of, but the wars were a must for Finland as the Great Powers policies forced Finland for the both wars. The success was remaining Finland as a sovereign nation.



The sanction against the Soviet Union after invading Finland in the Winter War was the exclusion of its membership in the League of Nations. I respect the United States' effort during the same war - the Finnish Relief Fund was an American humanitarian aid for Finland. Also Sweden's reaction about the Finnish case during the WWII is admirable and awe-inspiring. While Sweden accepted Finnish refugees - Finnish women and children during the wartime - the value of that aid is priceless.

You keep saying that the Winter War and the Continuation War together preserved Finnish independence but that is missing the point. We agree on the Winter War. That is not in question. The question is about the Continuation War and only the Continuation War. If your argument is that it was necessary, then it alone should have brought a positive result for Finland that wasn't already achieved by the Winter War.

My argument is that the Winter War already established that Finland was a tough nut to crack. This was due to terrain and logistics but also to the skill and tenacity of the Finnish military and to the clear political will of the Finnish people to resist invasion.

So what is that the Continuation War added? In Soviet eyes the war had much the same result as the previous one, namely a limited victory for them that would be very costly to turn into a complete victory. Is your argument perhaps that the Soviets needed confirmation of this before they were willing to believe it? I highly doubt it.

It seems to me that the Continuation War could also have been interpreted by the Kremlin as a sign that Finland would not abide by the terms of a peace treaty. In Soviet eyes this increased the benefit of taking direct control of Finland. I see only one reason how this could be otherwise: if the war convinced the Finns that another attempt at regaining the lost territory would be fruitless and if they displayed their resignation in the years following the war. But such an expression of resignation is the exact opposite of a fighting spirit. So wouldn't this actually lower the perceived cost of taking over Finland?

And if showing resignation is the key, then why couldn't Finland simply signal that during the Interim Peace? (Thus making it not an interim but a real peace, you see how these names trick us?) The answer: they could, they chose not to.

This is what I meant when I wrote that Finland could have accepted defeat. I'm sure it would mean Finlandization 4 years earlier, I'm not at all convinced that the Soviets would have tried to go for more. Not only as the evidence for Soviet aggressive intent is flimsy but you have simply not addressed the political calculation. Finlandization would have lowered the benefits and the Soviets already knew from the Winter War that invasion and occupation would be costly to them, the net gains would be minimal. The occupation and integration of Baltic and Polish territories were taking a lot of effort and a war with Germany was looming, the Kremlin could ill afford taking a risk in Finland at that time. I'm not saying that would have been an easy choice psychologically, I'm saying it was an option.

As you can see from the above I do not take seriously the suggestion that the Soviets started the Continuation War. Finland made an alliance with Germany, invited German troops and planned for a joint invasion of the Soviet Union. Finland also contributed to German offensive mine-laying operations and militarily occupied the Äland Islands when no attack was coming, a clear violation of the treaty. Finnish command thought that the Soviets might attempt a pre-emptive strike that the Finns could defend against on home terrain, which would give them more advantages than starting their offensive right away. But this is an operational decision, the political choice to go to war in the first place was made in Helsinki, not in Moscow.

You are apparently prone to confusing operational doctrine with political decisions. It is the same with your evidence for Soviet aggressive intent, operational doctrine is simply not the right kind of proof. All armies make contingency plans for potential wars and they particularly do so if they are aware that significant factions in the other country favor a war. How you are going to fight a war is not the same as whether you are going to fight it. Unless of course such plans include details about how you're going to disguise yourselves and occupy a radio station in your own territory so you can blame the other side for it, that's pretty good proof of nefarious intent. But you haven't shown any revealing details like that and they aren't in the Manninen book either.

Edit: corrected a typo.

 

[Jopa79]

The question is about the Continuation War and only the Continuation War. If your argument is that it was necessary, then it alone should have brought a positive result for Finland that wasn't already achieved by the Winter War.

The Continuation War was at first a Finnish pursue for the lost territories, it was not thought during the initial phase, that in the end the Continuation War would change its nature to very much resemble the Winter War and the decisive battles were fought almost precisely on the same ground in 1944 than during 1939-1940. Finland entered the Continuation War as an aggressor, but in 1944 she was the defending party.

The Finnish idea to be successful in gaining and keeping the lost territories based on the principle, that Soviet Union would be defeated by the Nazi-Germany or at least the situation for the Soviets would be so weak that the it would be willing to sign a separate peace with Finland and give back the lost regions. Finland didn't enter the war thinking that it would result only a weaker status for the country as it turned to be.

My argument is that the Winter War already established that Finland was a tough nut to crack. This was due to terrain and logistics but also to the skill and tenacity of the Finnish military and to the clear political will of the Finnish people to resist invasion.

So what is that the Continuation War added? In Soviet eyes the war had much the same result as the previous one, namely a limited victory for them that would be very costly to turn into a complete victory. Is your argument perhaps that the Soviets needed confirmation of this before they were willing to believe it? I highly doubt it.

To this above argument of yours, my earlier reply is a valid also. Finland entered in a war of aggression without knowing it would turn into a war of survival. I'm not stating about a Soviet need of 2nd confirmation, there's no point in such a view in my opinion.

It seems to me that the Continuation War could also have been interpreted by the Kremlin as a sign that Finland would not abide by the terms of a peace treaty.

If you are referring the Moscow Peace Treaty 1940, Finland followed the terms of the treaty very carefully, of course until the outbreak of the Continuation War. There was no rule in the peace terms about Finland couldn't improve her relations with other nations.

Finland sought closer and improved relations particularly with Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. Of course, all these Finnish attempts turned to meet serious obstacles either by the Soviet resistance or due to the general dynamics of the current situation during the WWII - with a exception for case of Nazi Germany.

In the case, that you are referring the Moscow Armistice 1944, later ratified in Paris 1947, you should know that Finland is the only country - defeated in the WWI or in the WWII or in later wars - which has met all set terms in the peace treaty, plus paying the immense war reparations. There has been no other country being able to do the same.

if the war convinced the Finns that another attempt at regaining the lost territory would be fruitless and if they displayed their resignation in the years following the war.

I really would like to know, in the actual Finnish situation after the Continuation- and the Lapland War - how could there be another attempt (war) at regaining the lost territory?

After returning Porkkala 1956, there were rumors about Kekkonen negotiating with the Soviet Union about returning also the other lost territories, or at least a part of them, but those rumors were false or the negotiations fruitless.

Why didn't our nation show resignation after occupied by Nazi-Germany, why did you oppose? You are telling that it would be better for the Finns if they just didn't defend their own country during the WWII.

And if showing resignation is the key, then why couldn't Finland simply signal that during the Interim Peace? (Thus making it not an interim but a real peace, you see how these names trick us?) The answer: they could, they chose not to.

You really don't see the fact about the Soviet Union didn't end the hostilities after the Winter War.

This is what I meant when I wrote that Finland could have accepted defeat. I'm sure it would mean Finlandization 4 years earlier, I'm not at all convinced that the Soviets would have tried to go for more. Not only as the evidence for Soviet aggressive intent is flimsy but you have simply not addressed the political calculation. Finlandization would have lowered the benefits and the Soviets already knew from the Winter War that invasion and occupation would be costly to them, the net gains would be minimal. The occupation and integration of Baltic and Polish territories were taking a lot of effort and a war with Germany was looming, the Kremlin could ill afford taking a risk in Finland at that time. I'm not saying that would have been an easy choice psychologically, I'm saying it was an option.

Well, using the same way of thinking, you had also also other options during the WWII.

As you can see from the above I do not take seriously the suggestion that the Soviets started the Continuation War. Finland made an alliance with Germany, invited German troops and planned for a joint invasion of the Soviet Union. Finland also contributed to German offensive mine-laying operations and militarily occupied the Äland Islands when no attack was coming, a clear violation of the treaty. Finnish command thought that the Soviets might attempt a pre-emptive strike that the Finns could defend against on home terrain, which would give them more advantages than starting their offensive right away. But this is an operational decision, the political choice to go to war in the first place was made in Helsinki, not in Moscow.

Yes, you have shown pretty clearly your view of the matter. And yes, Finland made an alliance with Germany, but I wouldn't say the Finns invited German troops, they pretty much just came over the border from Norway and some from Sweden and of course via Gulf of Bothnia, Finland allowed this or had to allow. But you're wrong about a joint invasion of the Soviet Union. The Germans had their own strategic operations, they tried to get the Finns involved into their plans, like the Siege of Leningrad, but Mannerheim refused. Finland had her own war goals and objectives, the enemy was common.

You are apparently prone to confusing operational doctrine with political decisions. It is the same with your evidence for Soviet aggressive intent, operational doctrine is simply not the right kind of proof. All armies make contingency plans for potential wars and they particularly do so if they are aware that significant factions in the other country favor a war. How you are going to fight a war is not the same as whether you are going to fight it. Unless of course such plans include details about how you're going to disguise yourselves and occupy a radio station in your own territory so you can blame the other side for it, that's pretty good proof of nefarious intent. But you haven't shown any revealing details like that and they aren't in the Manninen book either.

You really have the opinion, that sitting still until something hits the fan would be the best option.

 

[Barsoom]

The Continuation War was at first a Finnish pursue for the lost territories, it was not thought during the initial phase, that in the end the Continuation War would change its nature to very much resemble the Winter War and the decisive battles were fought almost precisely on the same ground in 1944 than during 1939-1940. Finland entered the Continuation War as an aggressor, but in 1944 she was the defending party.

The Finnish idea to be successful in gaining and keeping the lost territories based on the principle, that Soviet Union would be defeated by the Nazi-Germany or at least the situation for the Soviets would be so weak that the it would be willing to sign a separate peace with Finland and give back the lost regions. Finland didn't enter the war thinking that it would result only a weaker status for the country as it turned to be.



To this above argument of yours, my earlier reply is a valid also. Finland entered in a war of aggression without knowing it would turn into a war of survival. I'm not stating about a Soviet need of 2nd confirmation, there's no point in such a view in my opinion.



If you are referring the Moscow Peace Treaty 1940, Finland followed the terms of the treaty very carefully, of course until the outbreak of the Continuation War. There was no rule in the peace terms about Finland couldn't improve her relations with other nations.

Finland sought closer and improved relations particularly with Sweden, Norway, the United Kingdom, the Soviet Union and the Third Reich. Of course, all these Finnish attempts turned to meet serious obstacles either by the Soviet resistance or due to the general dynamics of the current situation during the WWII - with a exception for case of Nazi Germany.

In the case, that you are referring the Moscow Armistice 1944, later ratified in Paris 1947, you should know that Finland is the only country - defeated in the WWI or in the WWII or in later wars - which has met all set terms in the peace treaty, plus paying the immense war reparations. There has been no other country being able to do the same.



I really would like to know, in the actual Finnish situation after the Continuation- and the Lapland War - how could there be another attempt (war) at regaining the lost territory?

After returning Porkkala 1956, there were rumors about Kekkonen negotiating with the Soviet Union about returning also the other lost territories, or at least a part of them, but those rumors were false or the negotiations fruitless.

Why didn't our nation show resignation after occupied by Nazi-Germany, why did you oppose? You are telling that it would be better for the Finns if they just didn't defend their own country during the WWII.



You really don't see the fact about the Soviet Union didn't end the hostilities after the Winter War.



Well, using the same way of thinking, you had also also other options during the WWII.


Yes, you have shown pretty clearly your view of the matter. And yes, Finland made an alliance with Germany, but I wouldn't say the Finns invited German troops, they pretty much just came over the border from Norway and some from Sweden and of course via Gulf of Bothnia, Finland allowed this or had to allow. But you're wrong about a joint invasion of the Soviet Union. The Germans had their own strategic operations, they tried to get the Finns involved into their plans, like the Siege of Leningrad, but Mannerheim refused. Finland had her own war goals and objectives, the enemy was common.



You really have the opinion, that sitting still until something hits the fan would be the best option.

You are contradicting yourself. In the first part of your post you acknowledge that the goal of the Continuation War was reconquest but in the latter part you argue again that it was necessary for self-defense to continue as a sovereign country.

But this is the last thing I will say to you about it. It is clear from your childish lasing out about Dutch history that you take it personally and I'm not here to hurt you.

 

[Jopa79]

You are contradicting yourself. In the first part of your post you acknowledge that the goal of the Continuation War was reconquest but in the latter part you argue again that it was necessary for self-defense to continue as a sovereign country.

Yes, the war was for the both matters and you don't seem to understand it.

But this is the last thing I will say to you about it. It is clear from your childish lasing out about Dutch history that you take it personally and I'm not here to hurt you.

To me it seems you know better how we shouldn't and how should do.