Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
That gives you Soviet production numbers for 1942 until the first 4 month of 1945 of 101,200 that went to one front and not two like the Allied planes.
My apologies, I will have to do some research into actual deployed squadrons in 1945. Will get back when I have some figures.
I wrote is in response to your post about how excellent the Allied planes are. My point was, that Soviet plane design evidently not lacked behind the Allies, and that the Korean war showed that quite clearly. The planes that fought there were on the drawing board in 1945, so it’s highly relevant for the comparative state of the airforces.
I don't think it's relevant. Drawing board planes are not going to be fighting in 1945. The air war is going to be fought with the same planes used in the war.
Yes, a Shturmovich needed fighter cover just as every other bomber type aircraft. What’s the point?
The point is that until one side erodes enough fighters from the other side, tank killers and other tactical bombers are either going to be grounded, or destroyed. Refer to the Battle of Britain for the result of sending tactical bombers in daylight over contested air space.
So the Allies and the Soviets had air supremacy over their fronts in 1944. How does that make the Soviet airforce appear weaker?
The Soviets were unable to dominate the skies in the way the allies could during the late stages of the desert war, and over Europe. Does this have any relevance to a possible clash in the east? Possibly, either the allies are in for a shock with Russian planes strongly contesting air superiority, or they will effectively repeat their previous success.
Shooting down Ju-87’s in droves of course. What else should cause their losses, and why else should the aircraft be deemed outdated for the Eastern front?
Then why, in the name of God did the Germans continue to use them?
As I said: the reduction of German rail transport took place in the face of a beaten Luftwaffe and within range of Allied fighters. A comparable reduction of Soviet rail transport would take place in the face of a full-strength Red Airforce and the Allied planes would have to penetrate far deeper into enemy territory. So losses would be far greater and results smaller due to the low concentration of rail in Eastern Europe.
They don't have to penetrate all the way to Moscow. I said before, withing range of a Mustang. The US air force had been taking catastrophic losses for 18 months over Germany, shouldn't we suppose that they will send escorted bombers to hit railway infrastructure since discovering that this was more effective than industrial bombing. The 8th airforce sustained "acceptable losses" which saner commanders might describe as catastrophic, would they not repeat this commitment in Russia?
What benefit was it to the Allied war effort to kill 60,000 women, children and old men in Dresden? It just boosted the German will to continue the fight, nothing else.
I don't want to argue Dresden again, we have had this discussion.
Anyway, let’s say the Allied night bombers (Brits) actually penetrated Soviet airspace and bombed a Soviet city within range...What happens? Approximately 40,000 or so women, children and old men die. Nothing else. There’s no industry in Minsk or anything else. Why should the Soviet high command care for one second that 40,000 more had died?
Then why did the Germans feel the need to protect their cities? Why have AA in Rostock and Dresden. Do you believe that Russia will not try to protect their citizens? Are communists less worried about civilian depopulation than fascists?
Soviet AA production was approximately one sixth of German production. I do not presume a lot of AA guns to be present around Minsk for the very simply reason, that there’s nothing valuable to protect in Minsk for the Soviet high command.
So, in the face of city firebombing you assume that Stalin will simply ignore it, not attempt to concentrate AA around known targets, and not divert any industrial or military personnel to the protection of Soviet citizens?
Tell that to the Luftwaffe officers who were accused at the Nuremberg Trials for the bombings of Rotterdam, Warsaw and London.
Air warfare was under the rules of ground warfare, which was regulated by the Hague Convention. Under those quite vague rule, the legal ground for strategic bombing was shaky. Morally it was totally unacceptable as pointed out by the bishop of Canterbury during WWII.
I did not know of any officers who were convicted of bombing cities. If they were, then their convictions were a sham.
Air warfare was not under the Hague convention of 1907. IIRC another convention in 1927 I think the Hague, did specifically outlaw city bombing, but was not ratified by any nation.
The closest to outlawing city attacks is a clause which limits naval bombardment, Hague 1907 Section IX: Those rules permitted the legal bombardment of workshops...plants useful to the enemy war effort...defended locations...undefended locations if the local authorities did not agree to remove all facilities of military production. So, by defending their cities with AA and flak Germany made them legal targets for Naval bombardment. If you wish to stretch Hague's naval clauses to air warfare, then stretch the exceptions as well.
Why does an air war over Soviet held territory allow the Allies to have temporary air superiority? That would require the Allies to win that air war – preferably quite decisively. I am still not convinced that they will gain that decisive victory.
I concede the point in the abscence of reliable air deployment figures.
Sorry, I’m confused
Will they reduce it’s effectiveness or will they destroy it before the weather changes?
Even a best case scenario for the allies will not destroy the Red Air force, there is too much space in Russia to disperse surviving formations, and production output is good enough to replace losses. However, the allies might attrite the Red Air Force enough to ensure it to be innefective by September.
