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1) didn't know that

2) The problem is to get these resources over to Japan and the final products (say: weapons, food etc) back to the fighting area. USA would probably try a USSR first strategy since Japan with USSR support is the same for the allies as a GB with the chance of Russian attack for Hitler: a dangerous gamble, probably not worth trying and a major defeat if it fails.

3) Sure, possible. But after their first gamble for the big thing failed, Japan will stick to near-future goals I think. Of course, I don't know much about Japanese philosophy.
 
Originally posted by SoleSurvivor
3) Sure, possible. But after their first gamble for the big thing failed, Japan will stick to near-future goals I think. Of course, I don't know much about Japanese philosophy.

You might want to consider just how many Japanese senior officers really accepted the war was lost-and who had the greatest influence on government. If "the voice of the Crane" hadn't spoken, they wouldn't have surrendered. Moreover Japanese philosophy is immaterial to the Soviet point of view/actions.


As for the USA leaving Japan alone-it may be the sensible option, but after nearly four years of fighting, not an entirely likely one-a good portion of the American war machine is geared or gearing up for just such an option. For the Soviets, moreover, enlisting Japanese support is a "no risk, no loss" option-if it doesn't work as a diversion, they haven't actually lost anything, and if it does, the rewards are potentially immense.
 
I really wonder what the Jap air force would fly given they have the capacity to build or import modern aircraft... soviet design or this experimental jet fighter that looks similar to Me 262 (forgot name)

Definately not the outdated zero
 
Even if the western Allies had become involved in a war against the Soviets, mightn't they have used their first two atomic bombs on Japan anyway, since this would end the war in the Pacific theatre and allow them to concentrate all of their forces against the Soviets. Also, what effect would this demonstration have on the Soviet Union? Could there have been a negotiated peace in which Stalin agrees to withdraw from eastern Europe in order to avoid being nuked?
 
The question is whether a new ally, possibly, (the Soviets) would counterbalance the morale effects of the bomb among the Japanese government and High Command. Considering the difficulties the Japanese had in making the decision to surrender, I consider that to be an extremely finely balanced point.

As for the chances of a negotiated peace with Stalin, it really depends on our assessment of his rationality at this stage (since there is the opinion among historians that he went off the rails some time before he died in the Fifties) or his, erm, "bloody-mindedness". I suspect at least one bomb would have to be used on the USSR or on Soviet held territory to push the decision one way or the other.
 
Reply to Sean9898:


I do not doubt Soviet air designs to be the equal of allied. The Stumovich statistic is a little misleading as it had the most Panzer targets to destroy.

Rightiyo – compared to the Allied. But compared to German planes, those had even more targets, yet the didn’t score as much as the Shturmovich.


Not on the Western, or Desert Fronts during daylight. I agree the allies would not unleash their tank killers without superiority either, and yes that does lead to the sticky problem of either defending or counter attacking Russian tanks.

While the Allies had air supremacy in the later stages of the desert war, air superiority was contested for most of the campaign AFAIK.


Do you have any recommendations for books concerning the air war over the eastern front?
When would you decide total air superiority to be gained in the east?

Apart from the Black Cross/Red Stars series there’s very little literature on the air war in the East, so...
The Soviets – like the Germans – could achieve air superiority in any chosen sector of the front during 1943. By late 1943 I would say that they generally had air superiority along the Eastern front and by 1944 air supremacy. But those are more or less SWAG’s (Stupid Wild Ass Guess) :)


The timing of the destruction of Luftwaffe defense correlates to the introduction of Mustangs, so presumably Mustangs+Air Raids=reduction in Luftwaffe + increased bombing effectiveness. Could this not be replicated on the eastern front by the US air force beginning it's campaign against railways?

Dunno. They would face more fighters, and they would have considerably less time to destroy the Red Airforce than they had against the Luftwaffe, so I don’t find it likely. Besides: weren’t railway attacks mostly carried out by the medium bombers like the Mitchells and Invaders, while the heavies were reserved for area attacks?


Again, we have the problem of deciding the outcome of escorted daylight bombing and applying it to the Eastern Front. Probably an impossible task.

I still think we can make an educated guess. Since it took the Allies 1 1/2 years to gain air supremacy, and since they would face a considerably larger fighter strength if they were up against the Red Airforce, you need another variable in the equation that strongly favours the Allies to achieve the same result. I fail to see such what such a variable could possibly be. Definitely not proficiency, technology and numbers, and what else would really have the same effect?


Rostock and Lubeck had no industrial value to the war effort, neither did Dresden. They were all defended by AA and Luftwaffe. Had Germany chosen to only defend their industrial centers then they could have concentrated even more firepower on those targets while ignoring unimportant population centers.

Hitler had made a political commitment to protect the Germans cities from bombings, so there wasn’t much of a choice. Besides, even though I got no numbers on the air defence of Dresden, I would be surprised if there was the same amount of AA as around important industrial cities. It seems the Germans were quite surprised and shocked that anyone would bomb the city.


But would your people stand for it? This is not the same as shooting people trying to flee Moscow, this is the callous disregard for your entire urban population.

Wasn’t callous disregard for the population one of Stalins characteristics?


Check Hague 1927 XI; Defended targets may be attacked. The placement of a single AA batery, or a single platoon of soldiers in Dresden is enough to allow Naval bombardment.

Hague does not mention aircraft, thus speculation can be made as to whether air attack might be an extension of the naval bombardment or ground attack clauses. However, had the powers wanted to outlaw strategic bombing, they would have ratified the 1927?? treaty which expressly contained those provisions.

I think the keyword here is "target". While attacks against undefended military/industrial installations were prohibited, attacks against such defended installations were not. That does not mean that a city WITHOUT such installations was a legal target just because it was defended.

Whether the powers would have ratified the mentioned treaty or not obviously depends on the political climate of the time. Luftwaffe regulations actually prohibited area/city bombings, and as I mentioned: the source I have read claims that such bombings were prohibited in the US Airforce as well following the rules of ground warfare as laid out by the Hague Convention.

Regards,

EoE
 
Reply to Agelastus

Well, since the only logical reaction for the Soviets given a western attack, considering how they are organised, is a massive counter-offensive, your objection doesn't have much of a leg to stand on. Particularly as this offensive is the "make-or-break" moment for the Soviets in my position.

So since the reaction to an Allied attack would be a counter-attack, it’s really the Soviets who are attacking the Allies? Now THAT’s a twisted kind of logic, but whatever... :D


Secondly, given the situation, either side would almost assuredly achieve strategic surprise-I don't believe the west really expected a Soviet attack any more than the Soviets really expected a western attack-so tactical surprise is really all we can consider here. You'll note I only mentioned a drive as far as the Vistula in an earlier post.

Honestly, and I definitely don’t mean this as any kind of offence, but I am confused here. You claim that both sides could get a strategic surprise (I kinda disagree, but that’s beside the point), yet you say that we can only consider a tactical surprise. Now which is it? And how long do you think it would take the Soviets to recover from the initial surprise and shock of an Allied attack?


As for the sources for my claim re. Russian manpower, the passage I've read actually says "We now discover that the Russians ran out of men and women in 1944, and had to take large numbers of personnel from the factories to fill the ranks. Only because Germany was going down faster could Russia afford to do this." As for the original source I'm not 100% sure, but I suspect it's A Seaton "The Russo-German War, 1941-1945"-which, unfortunately, is out of print! Actually, I'm not actually 50% sure of the source-oops.

Sorry, I’m unfamiliar with Seaton, but I would like to point out that two of the most respected scholars on the Eastern Front: Alan Clark and David M. Glantz make no mention of it. A look at Amazon also reveals that Seatons work seems to be a bit controversial. You can check that out yourself at:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/A...0/sr=2-3/ref=aps_sr_b_1_3/104-8811206-9903913

Regards,

EoE
 
Reply to swilhelm73:

Well first of all, a signficant anti-Soviet partisan force would cause a world of hurt for Soviet units trying to fight there even if the majority of the populace supported them. Remember Vietnam?

Terrain. That’s an all-important factor for partisan operations. Yugoslavia had mountains, The Soviet Union had the Pripjet Marshes, Vietnam had a jungle. Poland has none of that – at least not to a degree that could support large-scale partisan operations.


Given time and lack of outside support partisans can be defeated - but they prove hard to defeat when they have an independent source of supply: Vietnam - USSR, Spain - UK, Afghanistan - US, etc

And how do you propose such support to arrive in Poland in any significant numbers? The only way is in the constrained waters of the Baltic against Soviet air attacks, and that is not a military operation, but a flight of fantasy.


In actual history the anti-communists did have at least temporary success against the Soviets in Eastern Europe later on...what if the Soviets for some reason couldn't send large numbers of troops just to occupy Hungary and Czechoslovakia?

I fail to think of any credible reason. You might also want to remember that the risings in East Germany, Poland, Hungary and Czechoslovakia were all put down without any major military effort.


I think the big sell out was at Yalta. Though even then Stalin agreed to hold elections, right?

How would the Poles be happier with the Russians than with the allies, btw? Russia after all fought a war with them in 39 - and the communists in Poland were told not to bother the Germans until the Germans sneak attacked Russia...maybe you are right but this would suprise me...

I know there wasn’t (and isn’t?) any love lost between the Russians and the Poles, but by 1945 the leading powers in Poland were Communists, and the nationalist hopes and been more or less destroyed by the Allies and the Yalta agreement. So being liberated by the Soviets, betrayed by the Allies and with a Communist leadership, I can’t really see why the Poles should rise and were they should get the weapons and support from.


Well I would point you to Wilson's 14 points in WWI and the reason France and Britain declared war on Germany in 1939...

Wilson’s points were done during or after the war. They were not the reason why the US declared war on Germany. Democracy and self-determination for Eastern Europe were also not the reasons why France and Britain declared war on Germany in 1939. It was simply a question of stopping Hitler, not of going on any crusade for worldwide democracy.


But the Germans lost all three of those battles - of course the Soviets would not surrender! Further the Germans were surprised by the Soviet winter offensives and made a number of mistakes in their strategic planning in regards to holding fast vs ordered retreat.

EXACTLY! The Germans lost the war because they failed to take their military objectives. So what would the military objectives of the Allies have to be in order to ensure that they win the war?


Now, what if the allies had Guderian and Mannstein (both survived the war?) as advisors on Russian tactics?

As for war aims I'm guessing a push to the theoritical Ukranian/Russian border and the destruction of a good deal of the Soviet army.

So, the Allies would have to destroy the bulk of the Soviet army and then advance to the Ukranian/Russian border leaving the Soviet Union in control of its political center, its industry and most of its resources? That would ensure, that they could raise no troops and continue the fight you know.

I also fail to see how the Allies should be able to destroy the bulk of the Soviet Union given their numerical inferiority and their lack of experience with large-scale mobile operations on the scale of the Eastern Front.


The Soviets may not be forced to surrender, but if the allies can make it that far my guess is that American Industrial might has already decided the war. Sure the supply situation is difficult but that is were the allies were strongest.

If an Allied attack could not lead to a conclusion of the war with an Soviet surrender, it’s not exactly a sound, military idea is it? The Vietnam war shows quite clearly what can happen when military operations are conducted without any overall purpose or military grand strategy.

Regards,

EoE
 
Reply to Maur13

Eh, first you say that people didn't know '30 famine but knew of Jalta and Teheran...

Eh, no. I am saying that the Soviet population had very little knowledge of the millions killed by Stalin, and I am saying the London-based Polish government in exile knew the results of the Yalta and Teheran conference.


The opposite is true, famine hapenned HERE, so people knew it by experience, by stories told. Only communists believed what was written in Pravda. And believe me, there weren't many communist in Poland in '40.

Hold it. I’m getting confused here. I am not talking about any famine taking place in Poland. I was taking about Soviets being deported to Siberia or killed.

I do not have any knowledge about how the ordinary Soviet population viewed news printed in the Pravda, therefore I cannot say whether they trusted them or not. If you have any information showing that the Soviet population of the 30s did not, I would be happy to read it. Besides my point was that the killings were not announced in the Pravda, so since they weren’t mentioned, who cares who believed the paper? That’s hardly the issue.

I do not have any information on the number of Communists in Poland in 1940 (do you?), but I fail to see the relevance as well. After all we are talking 1945 here, when there were plenty of Communists as well as a well equipped and Communist lead Polish army.


There were large Polish army fighting alongside Soviet, but it was only because they hadn't any choice. Yes, some felt betrayed by Western Allies, but that doesn't mean that they loved Soviets. Especially after the liberation, which in fact was more like conquest.

So they were forced into the Polish army. Sounds intriguing. Do you have any more information on how the Polish army was recruited?


Though Polish Home Army suffered very heavy losses during "Storm" plan (Warsaw uprising mainly-yes, we all know that Soviets watched Warsaw population slaugter from right bank of Vistula), it was still strong force, effectively allied with the West. This, combined with allied airforce makes supplying Soviet armies in Germany almost impossible, since they relied mainly on rail transport, easy to cripple.

The Polish Home Army was effectively crippled in 1945 and the remnants were quickly disbanded and imprisoned by the Soviets, so there would be no crippling of rail transport.

Besides, and I know you’ll hate to hear this, the Warsaw uprising and the resulting tragedy can just as well be blamed on very poor planning from the Home Army leadership.


Please, don't say anything more about situation in Poland, you clearly have no idea what are you speaking of

I sincerely hope you are kidding, in which case I’ll better grin :D

Regards,

EoE
 
Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
Reply to Agelastus
So since the reaction to an Allied attack would be a counter-attack, it’s really the Soviets who are attacking the Allies? Now THAT’s a twisted kind of logic, but whatever... :D

Honestly, and I definitely don’t mean this as any kind of offence, but I am confused here. You claim that both sides could get a strategic surprise (I kinda disagree, but that’s beside the point), yet you say that we can only consider a tactical surprise. Now which is it? And how long do you think it would take the Soviets to recover from the initial surprise and shock of an Allied attack?

Sorry, I’m unfamiliar with Seaton, but I would like to point out that two of the most respected scholars on the Eastern Front: Alan Clark and David M. Glantz make no mention of it. A look at Amazon also reveals that Seatons work seems to be a bit controversial. You can check that out yourself at:

http://www.amazon.com/exec/obidos/A...0/sr=2-3/ref=aps_sr_b_1_3/104-8811206-9903913

Regards,

EoE

(I) That's not what I said at all-justification is not even really being discussed here. What I was talking about was the only possible response for the Soviet army as configured in 1945, which was clearly not defensively oriented. It's the defeat of this attack/counterattack which would decide the outcome of the initial stages of the war, not the initial Allied offensive which, although it could probably push the Russians back with the aid of Allied airpower and, perhaps, the use of nuclear weapons, would not have, apart from possibly Patton, the command mentality to create situations whereby sufficient numbers of Soviet troops/divisions could be surrounded and destroyed.

(II) Guess I should reread what I write a bit closer-I actually meant to say that there was little hope of strategic surprise because both sides were already on a war footing, whereas tactical surprise was achievable because of political considerations. Dispute my definitions of the various types of surprise if you like. There's a few words missing from my post-my apologies that you couldn't put them in yourself!:D

(III) Interesting reviews. I did say I wasn't certain it was from him, and I'm going to have difficulty checking it quickly, obviously enough. But, despite those reviews, an alleged pro=Nazi bias doesn't invalidate the possible validity of any such figures quoted since they don't seem to be amenable as ammunition to an apologist for either side. I wish HB would pop up again, he might be able to get us the details,anecdotes, or sources for this.
 
Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
Rightiyo – compared to the Allied. But compared to German planes, those had even more targets, yet the didn’t score as much as the Shturmovich.
Did the Germans use anti-tank rocket armed fighter/bombers? German anti-tank air was light years behind Soviet.

While the Allies had air supremacy in the later stages of the desert war, air superiority was contested for most of the campaign AFAIK.
El Alamein began the period of allied supremacy.
Dunno. They would face more fighters, and they would have considerably less time to destroy the Red Airforce than they had against the Luftwaffe, so I don’t find it likely. Besides: weren’t railway attacks mostly carried out by the medium bombers like the Mitchells and Invaders, while the heavies were reserved for area attacks?
The problem is that if we take allied air strategy from 1942 as the baseline then you are correct, the allies do not have a couple of years to achieve supremacy. However, if you look at the destruction of the Luftwaffe from the time the Mustang then it's a much shorter path.
I still think we can make an educated guess. Since it took the Allies 1 1/2 years to gain air supremacy, and since they would face a considerably larger fighter strength if they were up against the Red Airforce, you need another variable in the equation that strongly favours the Allies to achieve the same result. I fail to see such what such a variable could possibly be. Definitely not proficiency, technology and numbers, and what else would really have the same effect?
Despite your assertion that Stalin will ignore his non-industrialized cities I would be shocked if that was the case. He therefore has to disperse his fighters to defend those cities from escorted daytime bombers. There appears no defense to night-time bombing, unless you have any info of radar equipped Soviet nightfighters.

It did not take 1 1/2 years to destroy the Luftwaffe, it was done in a matter of months once the bombers were escorted
Wasn’t callous disregard for the population one of Stalins characteristics?
If you do not make an attempt to protect your civilians during wartime, what exactly are you fighting for?
I think the keyword here is "target". While attacks against undefended military/industrial installations were prohibited, attacks against such defended installations were not. That does not mean that a city WITHOUT such installations was a legal target just because it was defended.

Whether the powers would have ratified the mentioned treaty or not obviously depends on the political climate of the time. Luftwaffe regulations actually prohibited area/city bombings, and as I mentioned: the source I have read claims that such bombings were prohibited in the US Airforce as well following the rules of ground warfare as laid out by the Hague Convention.
No allied airmen or planners were tried for war crimes. I could not find any of the 22 convicted German war criminals who were convicted solely of strategic warfare.

Why should air warfare follow Hague Rule ground warfare? There is no relevant international treaty banning the strategic bombing of cities.
 
It is easy to claim the Luftwaffe destruction "within months" but you forget details that distinguish this case from the Soviet case.

1) Though Germany had superior planes, they weren't produced in time and thus the allies faced mostly older planes.

2) It is a difference if you can kill single planes with whole squads or meet an equal opposition.

3) A lot of the late war German fighter pilots weren't really well trained. (of course some aces had survived until then) The soviets had at least more average front experience

4) Face it, The Luftwaffe had already exhausted itself when flying against the B17 without protection. Though a lot of B17 were shot down these fights often resulted in injured flying personal and serverly damaged machines. A Me 110 isn't really a match for a heavy bomber. Thus, the P51 faced an already weakened enemy. The 1945 Germans didn't really weaken the Soviet airforce in a comparable amount.

5) German aircraft production often was delayed because transport capacity for production had to be transferred for other operations as for example shifting troops from the east to the west or italy.
Soviet air production isn't affected that much by front movements. Further, soviet productions isn't in range of allied bombing missions both escorted and unescorted.

6) Luftwaffe fought on several fronts consuming both fighters, pilots and spare parts. Pilots who shifted front had to familiarize with new flying conditions and planes had to be refitted.

The soviet can concentrate on one front.

7)
 
Originally posted by sean9898

Did the Germans use anti-tank rocket armed fighter/bombers? German anti-tank air was light years behind Soviet.


El Alamein began the period of allied supremacy.

The problem is that if we take allied air strategy from 1942 as the baseline then you are correct, the allies do not have a couple of years to achieve supremacy. However, if you look at the destruction of the Luftwaffe from the time the Mustang then it's a much shorter path.

Despite your assertion that Stalin will ignore his non-industrialized cities I would be shocked if that was the case. He therefore has to disperse his fighters to defend those cities from escorted daytime bombers. There appears no defense to night-time bombing, unless you have any info of radar equipped Soviet nightfighters.

It did not take 1 1/2 years to destroy the Luftwaffe, it was done in a matter of months once the bombers were escorted

If you do not make an attempt to protect your civilians during wartime, what exactly are you fighting for?

No allied airmen or planners were tried for war crimes. I could not find any of the 22 convicted German war criminals who were convicted solely of strategic warfare.

Why should air warfare follow Hague Rule ground warfare? There is no relevant international treaty banning the strategic bombing of cities.

Sorry for the late reply. I'm getting buried in a s...load of work. Anyway, here's a quickie:

AFAIK the Stuka G-model is generally acknowledged to be an extremely effective tank-killer with its 30mm automatic gun. The problem was of course that it wasn't effective in the face of Soviet fighters.

The Allied attack the 23rd of October 1942 may have heralded air superiority, but IMHO genuine air supremacy was not achieved until later. Anyway, El Alamein was in the later stage of the desert war.

If you choose to count the Allied effort to subdue the Luftwaffe from the point in time, when their effort was effective, then you're right. It could be argued though that it's not normally the way you'd judge a campaign.

Prepare for a shock then: Stalin generally ignored the sufferings of his population. He killed 30 million, you know. Anyway, dispersion of fighters is not necessarily a logical step in the face of strategic bombing, he might as well concentrate along the border or important industrial centers. Nightime-bombing would have no effect on Soviet air strength, but would just kill more civilians - nothing else. It is extremely difficult to get any information on Soviet radar during WWII, but I doubt they had none. Anyway, here's an interesting bit of trivia: the Soviets had a very succesfull night-fighter unit called the night-witches that was manned by female pilots. It seems they initially earned their laurels in the Caucasian campaign.

Of course no Allies were tried in the Nuremberg Trial - that isn't really surprising is it? Actually I have no knowledge of any Allied officer or serviceman who tried on claims of war crimes. That definitely doesn't mean there were none. While none of the 22 convicted Germans were convicted SOLELY on grounds of strategic warfare, it was still part of the accusations.

I didn't make the rules you know :) It seems air warfare followed the same rules as ground warfare since there were specific regulations of air warfare. There was only the Hague Convention.

Regards,

Holger
 
Originally posted by SoleSurvivor
It is easy to claim the Luftwaffe destruction "within months" but you forget details that distinguish this case from the Soviet case.

1) Though Germany had superior planes, they weren't produced in time and thus the allies faced mostly older planes.

2) It is a difference if you can kill single planes with whole squads or meet an equal opposition.

3) A lot of the late war German fighter pilots weren't really well trained. (of course some aces had survived until then) The soviets had at least more average front experience

4) Face it, The Luftwaffe had already exhausted itself when flying against the B17 without protection. Though a lot of B17 were shot down these fights often resulted in injured flying personal and serverly damaged machines. A Me 110 isn't really a match for a heavy bomber. Thus, the P51 faced an already weakened enemy. The 1945 Germans didn't really weaken the Soviet airforce in a comparable amount.

5) German aircraft production often was delayed because transport capacity for production had to be transferred for other operations as for example shifting troops from the east to the west or italy.
Soviet air production isn't affected that much by front movements. Further, soviet productions isn't in range of allied bombing missions both escorted and unescorted.

6) Luftwaffe fought on several fronts consuming both fighters, pilots and spare parts. Pilots who shifted front had to familiarize with new flying conditions and planes had to be refitted.

The soviet can concentrate on one front.

7)

Will you ever say something I can disagree with? - I think not. :D

Regards,

EoE
 
Originally posted by Emperor of Europe
Sorry for the late reply. I'm getting buried in a s...load of work. Anyway, here's a quickie:
Thats not acceptable :)
AFAIK the Stuka G-model is generally acknowledged to be an extremely effective tank-killer with its 30mm automatic gun. The problem was of course that it wasn't effective in the face of Soviet fighters.
Yes, as you've pointed out the Kamakaze oops Stuka pilots had some trouble in staying aloft. Any ideas why the Germans didn't use their other airframes as a tank killer. Didn't they possess a decent 2 engined fighter which might have been more suitable?
The Allied attack the 23rd of October 1942 may have heralded air superiority, but IMHO genuine air supremacy was not achieved until later. Anyway, El Alamein was in the later stage of the desert war.
Monty was nothing if not thorough, he assembled a ridiculous ratio of aircraft, somthing approaching 10:1 at the battle.
If you choose to count the Allied effort to subdue the Luftwaffe from the point in time, when their effort was effective, then you're right. It could be argued though that it's not normally the way you'd judge a campaign.
I don't think that in 1942 the allied bombing campaign was designed to destroy the Luftwaffe. There may have been a vague justification that attacks on factories and workers may have slowed airframe production, but it certainly was not intended to be a battle of attrition against the Luftwaffe. Sending unescorted daylight bombers may have sounded like a good idea at the time, but the idea was that formation bombing would protect the platforms, not attack the Luftwaffe. Likewise, sending fighters achieved a by-product of Luftwaffe destruction, again not the intended goal of bombing.
Prepare for a shock then: Stalin generally ignored the sufferings of his population. He killed 30 million
And I thought the Russians were the good guys :) Transportation and liquidation of undesirables is different to ignoring a number of Soviet cities ceasing to exist. I'm not sure the allied pilots would be the only group hated if raids continued, some of that anger might turn against the Kremlin.

Stalin did divert resources to the relief of Leningrad, including civilian rations. Using your logic, wouldn't he have just let the civilian non-workers starve? There was also a limited evacuation of women and children from the city when the ice over Ladoga thawed. Wouldn't an uncaring dictator simply have left them there?
you know. Anyway, dispersion of fighters is not necessarily a logical step in the face of strategic bombing, he might as well concentrate along the border or important industrial centers.
I thought there were no industrial centers. From the outset of any Eastern war the Urals would be out of range, European Russia, the Baltic and Ploesti would be the target areas. There's also a possibility of striking at the Caucus oil fields, though I'm not sure there existed sufficient bases within range.

It's hard, if not impossible to build a wall against bombers. Otherwise the Germans would have simply built a chain of airfields around the border. As well as border interception, some method of tying airbases to cities would have to be implemented.
Nightime-bombing would have no effect on Soviet air strength, but would just kill more civilians - nothing else. It is extremely difficult to get any information on Soviet radar during WWII, but I doubt they had none. Anyway, here's an interesting bit of trivia: the Soviets had a very succesfull night-fighter unit called the night-witches that was manned by female pilots. It seems they initially earned their laurels in the Caucasian campaign.
I'm sure the Russians had radar, not sure they had aircraft mounted radar. One of the night witch regiments flew bi-plane bombers, they used to glide over German positions and bomb them. The fighter regiments flew Yak-1s not the best plane for high altitude interception.
Of course no Allies were tried in the Nuremberg Trial - that isn't really surprising is it? Actually I have no knowledge of any Allied officer or serviceman who tried on claims of war crimes. That definitely doesn't mean there were none. While none of the 22 convicted Germans were convicted SOLELY on grounds of strategic warfare, it was still part of the accusations.
The only mention of strategic bombing I could find in the charges pertains to Leningrad. I scanned the counts a couple of times, so I could have missed something:
"In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over 172,000 persons, including over 20,000 persons who were killed in the city of Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings"

Nothing about London, Warsaw or Rotterdam. Doenitz was charged with waging unrestricted sea warfare, but Goering had no mention of any specific charges of strategic bombing. The embarrasment of convicting Doenitz of "crimes" the US navy copied in their submarine war against Japan led to him receiving a relatively light sentence of only ten years.

OT but.....this judgment is quite ironic:
Ribbentrop participated in a meeting of 6th June, 1944, at which it was agreed to start a programme under which Allied aviators carrying out machine gun attacks on the civilian population should be lynched
Unsurprisingly, no mention was made of the "merits" of strafing civilians
I didn't make the rules you know :) It seems air warfare followed the same rules as ground warfare since there were specific regulations of air warfare. There was only the Hague Convention.
There is no binding precedent that air warfare is covered by Hague ground rule. While it may be theoreticaly possible there is certainly justification for treating air war as covered by naval bombardment, or being totally outside the Hague jurisdiction.
 
Originally posted by sean9898

Yes, as you've pointed out the Kamakaze oops Stuka pilots had some trouble in staying aloft. Any ideas why the Germans didn't use their other airframes as a tank killer. Didn't they possess a decent 2 engined fighter which might have been more suitable?

Monty was nothing if not thorough, he assembled a ridiculous ratio of aircraft, somthing approaching 10:1 at the battle.

I don't think that in 1942 the allied bombing campaign was designed to destroy the Luftwaffe. There may have been a vague justification that attacks on factories and workers may have slowed airframe production, but it certainly was not intended to be a battle of attrition against the Luftwaffe. Sending unescorted daylight bombers may have sounded like a good idea at the time, but the idea was that formation bombing would protect the platforms, not attack the Luftwaffe. Likewise, sending fighters achieved a by-product of Luftwaffe destruction, again not the intended goal of bombing.

And I thought the Russians were the good guys :) Transportation and liquidation of undesirables is different to ignoring a number of Soviet cities ceasing to exist. I'm not sure the allied pilots would be the only group hated if raids continued, some of that anger might turn against the Kremlin.

Stalin did divert resources to the relief of Leningrad, including civilian rations. Using your logic, wouldn't he have just let the civilian non-workers starve? There was also a limited evacuation of women and children from the city when the ice over Ladoga thawed. Wouldn't an uncaring dictator simply have left them there?

I thought there were no industrial centers. From the outset of any Eastern war the Urals would be out of range, European Russia, the Baltic and Ploesti would be the target areas. There's also a possibility of striking at the Caucus oil fields, though I'm not sure there existed sufficient bases within range.

It's hard, if not impossible to build a wall against bombers. Otherwise the Germans would have simply built a chain of airfields around the border. As well as border interception, some method of tying airbases to cities would have to be implemented.

I'm sure the Russians had radar, not sure they had aircraft mounted radar. One of the night witch regiments flew bi-plane bombers, they used to glide over German positions and bomb them. The fighter regiments flew Yak-1s not the best plane for high altitude interception.

The only mention of strategic bombing I could find in the charges pertains to Leningrad. I scanned the counts a couple of times, so I could have missed something:
"In the Leningrad region there were shot and tortured over 172,000 persons, including over 20,000 persons who were killed in the city of Leningrad by the barbarous artillery barrage and the bombings"

Nothing about London, Warsaw or Rotterdam. Doenitz was charged with waging unrestricted sea warfare, but Goering had no mention of any specific charges of strategic bombing. The embarrasment of convicting Doenitz of "crimes" the US navy copied in their submarine war against Japan led to him receiving a relatively light sentence of only ten years.

OT but.....this judgment is quite ironic:
Ribbentrop participated in a meeting of 6th June, 1944, at which it was agreed to start a programme under which Allied aviators carrying out machine gun attacks on the civilian population should be lynched
Unsurprisingly, no mention was made of the "merits" of strafing civilians

There is no binding precedent that air warfare is covered by Hague ground rule. While it may be theoreticaly possible there is certainly justification for treating air war as covered by naval bombardment, or being totally outside the Hague jurisdiction.

Sorry, I'm not an aircraft engineer :) But I still got a guess: first of all, the Germans had no other divebomber design AFAIK- the stress of a dive attack simply demands a stronger airframe. A close air support platform also needs to be especially protected from ground fire, so it requires a special design. My guess is, that the Germans simply had no other available design that could be compared to the cheap and unsophisticated Stuka.

At El Alamein Monty had a 3:1 superiority if we are generous: 220,000 men vs. 108,000. 900+ planes vs. 345 etc. Until then there had been air parity. Now the Allies had air superiority, but they still had not air supremacy.

You're right. The strategic bombing campaign was not initially planned as a means to destroy the Luftwaffe. But later on it was one of its aims to drag the Luftwaffe out to fight and to destroy it. IMHO it was the only substantial contribution of the air campaign, but let's not go there :)

Most evidence we have of Russians in war shows us, that they can withstand considerable sufferings, and that they adversity makes them rally around the flag. The only episode in history, were that wasn't the case, was during the later stages of WWI. But consider that the Czar system was tremendously more hated (and had been so for centuries) than the Communist system, that had just shown that it could fight and win against the worst enemy Russia had ever faced. I think city bombings would make the population hate the enemy - not the government. BTW: has city bombing ever worked the other way around?

Stalin diverted resources to Leningrad to keep Leningrad in the war. Not because he cared for the fate of individuals.

You're right, there are no industrial centers. As I said: it was a quickie. What I meant was that Stalin might protect important centers like those of politic, but that he probably wouldn't care whether Kharkov was razed to the ground for the 5th time 5 years.

We simply do not agree about the diversion strategy. A better approach would be to deploy fighters along avenues of approach. If you tied fighters to a city, you effectively tie them to an environment were they cannot fight (due to AA) and were it is to late to fight since the bombers probably would have dropped their bombs already.

As for the Nuremberg Tribunal look at these two quotes:

"The Tribunal distinguished between the Allied aerial assaults on Berlin, Dresden, Hamburg, Cologne and other German cities and the Nazi's killing of civilians. These bombings were in reprisal for the German attacks on London, Coventry, Rotterdam, and other Allied cities. Even if the bombings had not been acts of reprisal, "there still is no parallelism between an act of legitimate warfare, namely the bombing of a city, with a concomitant loss of civilian life, and the premeditated killing of all members of certain categories of the civilian population in occupied territory." Fn265

"The Court also rejected the contention that the defendants were being prosecuted for the type of conduct which had been engaged in by the Allies. The judges failed to find a single instance in which the Allied forces had executed a reprisal prisoner. Nor did the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki and the aerial raids against Dresden modify the rules of modern warfare and legitimize the Nazi's reprisal policies. These bombings were in response to the Reich's illegal aerial attacks on Rotterdam, Warsaw, Belgrade, Coventry, and Pearl Harbor. The Court observed that the Germans may not violate the law of war, invite retaliation, and then credibly claim that the standards governing the conduct of war were altered." Fn388

So the German air attacks were "illegal aerial attacks on Rotterdam, Warsaw, Belgrade, Coventry, and Pearl Harbor(sic!", while the Allied attacks were in response to those attacks (reprisals), but even if they had not been it was an "act of legitimate warfare, namely the bombing of a city". Illegal or legitimate - even the court seems to have had a hard time finding a common ground. No wonder, we can't.

The only reason why I am stating that air warfare was regulated by the Hague Convention is, that a source I have read on the US bombing campaign an legal issues before, during and after the war, states quite clearly that it was the common perception the US airforce that the Hague Convention indeed laid of air warfare rules as well.

Regards,

EoE