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Reza Khan

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Jeje esperabais que pusiera un monografico de esos ehh pillines :D

Pues no, este tema lo abro para ver si podeis el que sepa sobre Venecia y tal poner por aqui lo que sabe. Necesito informacion de la Serenisima, y como que me falta.

A ver si alguien puede ayudarme.
 
La Wikipedia yanqui tiene una serie de artículos muy completos sobre Venecia, tanto la ciudad como la historia de la República. Trae la lista completa de Dux, por ejemplo.

http://www.veniceworld.com/

http://www.boglewood.com/timeline/

Cualquier guía turística.

Éste libro es de referencia, a ver si lo pillo:

8493119474+.jpg


Historia de Venecia, de John Julius Norwich.
 
Muchas gracias. ;)
 
Enoch Root said:
Éste libro es de referencia, a ver si lo pillo:

8493119474+.jpg


Historia de Venecia, de John Julius Norwich.
Yo lo tengo y lo he leido. No está mal, aunque a veces parece un catálogo de dogos y arquitectura, y contiene algún que otro error serio.

Si necesitas saber algo en concreto, puedes preguntar.

Si lees en Inglés, yo hice una excelente (modestia aparte) serie de artículos sobre la historia de Venecia con especial enfasis en las guerras del XV al XVII a los que te podría poner links, o simplemente repostearlos aquí para mayor comodidad. Eso sí, no me pidais que los traduzca. :p
 
Fodoron said:
Si lees en Inglés, yo hice una excelente (modestia aparte) serie de artículos sobre la historia de Venecia con especial enfasis en las guerras del XV al XVII a los que te podría poner links, o simplemente repostearlos aquí para mayor comodidad. Eso sí, no me pidais que los traduzca. :p

Links quiero; esos artículos prometen. :cool:
 
Fodoron said:
Yo lo tengo y lo he leido. No está mal, aunque a veces parece un catálogo de dogos y arquitectura, y contiene algún que otro error serio.

¿Y es recomendable?. Cuando lo vi pensé en comprarmelo, la Serenísima es un tema que me ha interesado bastante (es lo que tiene ser de Medieval y Moderna :p ), pero lo caro de su precio me echó para atrás...
 
Puesto que los hice para un AAR, los voy a modificar ligeramente, quitándoles los aspectos del juego, y poniéndolos en situación. Tendreis que disculpar que salte al inglés cuando llegue a partes que ya tengo escritas.

Introducción: La primera guerra Veneto Turca

La historia comienza en 1416 (tres años antes de EU2). Venecia era poderosa y orgullosa y Bizancio decadente pero con aureola de eternidad.

En el mar Egeo, los intereses de Génova estaban en retroceso, y los de Venecia en ascenso. Más que conquistar territorio y añadirlo a la República, lo que se hacía era prestar ayuda militar a las poderosas familias Venecianas para que se hicieran con el control de las estaciones comerciales cuya riqueza beneficiaba a ambos. La situación desembocaba en rampante piratería en dichos mares, ejercida con igual entusiasmo por católicos, ortodoxos y musulmanes.

Los Turcos, recuperados de la humillante derrota a manos de Timur, no terminaron las subsiguientes luchas por el poder hasta 1413, año de la ascensión de Mehmet. Ahora iban a recuperar el tiempo perdido.

Hay quien dice que la primera guerra entre Venicia y el Imperio Otomano fue en 1416, pero la mayoría opinamos que fue una mera escaramuza naval. Las cosas fueron más o menos así:

La recien creada armada Otomana estaba aún muy verde, pero en parte por el problema que suponía la piratería cristiana y en parte por sus innegables ambiciones expansionistas, decidió castigar a los piratas y a sus refugios, muchos de ellos posesiones privadas de poderosos nobles Venecianos. La isla de Euboea, importante posesión Veneciana fue tambien atacada. Venecia respondió enviando una flota al mando del almirante Pietro Loredano. Éste se enfrentó a la armada Turca el 29 de Mayo de 1416 en los Dardanelos, cerca de Gallípoli (Gelibolu), inflingiéndoles una tremenda derrota que puso fin a las expediciones Turcas.

Los Turcos se dedicaron con fuerza a darles de palos a los Bizantinos. Hasta la muerte de Mehmet en 1421, que sería sucedido por su hijo Murad II.

En Bizancio, el partido de la paz, liderado por el viejo emperador Manuel II, aconsejó a su hijo Juan, que ya estaba al mando debido a la avanzada edad de su padre, que apaciguara a Murad. Juan, cabeza del partido de la guerra, decidió en cambio apoyar al hermano de Murad, Mustafá, en su lucha contra éste.

After defeating his brother, Murad ended the peace agreement and from June to September of 1421 set siege Constantinople for the second time. He had to lift the siege, but with his army, he then crushed the recently rebuilt wall of the Hexamilion (six miles) at the Isthmus of Corinth and devastated the Morea and Mytra in 1422. Then he turned north and attacked Thessalonike in Macedonia. Andronikus Palaiologus, second son of Manuel and despot of Thessalonike could not lift the blockade of the port, and from the walls of the city contemplated how the turkish armies ravage the countryside unimpeded. Constantinople was trying to reach a new vassalage agreement with Murad and could not send forces to defend Thessalonike.

1423Thessa2.jpg

Desperate, Andronikus contacted the Bailo (Venetian delegate) of Euboea (Ionia) and offered the city of Thessalonike on behalf of his people to the Serenissima Repubblica de Venetia. The thessalonicans already knew what it was like to live under turkish rule, since the city was returned to byzantine rule in 1403 after 15 years of occupation. They were the first to experience the new turkish policy of devsirme, the obligatory levy of tribute-children extracted from christians. Andronikus, diseased with lepra, wished to enter a monastic rule. Emperor Manuel, paralyzed and almost dead after a stroke on October of last year (1422), agreed to the sale of the city, since the empire could no longer defend it. The Archbishop of Thessalonike, Symeon, did not oppose as long as Venice agreed to not send any latin priest and respect the clergy privileges.

Acceptance of Thessalonike by Venice meant war between the Serenissima and the Ottoman Empire.

1423Thessa.jpg

The 13 of September, 1423, Venice occupied Thessalonike, initiating the first Turkish-Venetian war, that would end on May 1430 when Thessalonike surrendered to Murad after only a 3 day siege. It is said the thessalonicans were not too hapy with the venetian rule, since they did create troubles and did not solve any of the city problems.
 
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Trencavel said:
¿Y es recomendable?. Cuando lo vi pensé en comprarmelo, la Serenísima es un tema que me ha interesado bastante (es lo que tiene ser de Medieval y Moderna :p ), pero lo caro de su precio me echó para atrás...
Hombre. Yo sí lo recomiendo. Es un muy buen libro sobre Venecia, pero si te interesa el tema no debería ser el único.
 
Me interesa mucho la epoca que va desde 1600 a 1700.
 
Reza Khan said:
Me interesa mucho la epoca que va desde 1600 a 1700.
Vaya. Lo que yo tengo no pasa de la guerra de Gradisca (1616) :(
 
Ordenémoslo un poco que antes va la guerra con Milán.

No os preocupeis si los posts al principio son un poco esquemáticos y poco elaborados. Va cogiendo fuerza, y las guerras italianas, en especial la de la liga de Cambrai que a punto estuvo de eliminar del mapa a Venecia, están mucho mejor. Ánimo a los lectores.

Capítulo Primero: La guerra con Milán (1425-1427)

El cruel y paranoico Filippo María Visconti, Duque de Milán, se las apañó para rehacer el ducado de su padre ayudado por los condottieri Piccinino, Carmagnola y Sforza.

180px-Filippo_Maria_Visconti.jpg


La ambición que le había llevado a recuperar la Lombardía, sin embargo le impulsó a tratar de apoderarse de la Romagna, comenzando por Forli, al sur de Bologna, donde era tutor del joven huerfano heredero Tebaldo Ordelaffi.

Eso era meter los pies en el jardín de Florencia, que respondió con una guerra en la que no les fue muy bien, dada la renovada capacidad militar de Milán. Ante la posibilidad de que Florencia cayera en manos de Visconti, Venecia decidió entrar en la guerra de su lado.

The successful campaigns of Philippo Maria Visconti of Milan had Venice worried. Florence was being defeated battle after battle, Zagonara, Val di Lamone, Rapallo, Anghiari. Doge Foscari wanted the war, but the council was doubtful because they feared an alliance between Visconti and Sigismund of Hungary. Finally the desperate Florentines sent Venice a plead that was also a threat: "When we refused to help Genoa, she made Visconti her Lord. If you refuse to help us, we will make him King." This threat, plus the defection of count Carmagnola, who claimed that he could defeat Visconti's armies, turned the scale to the doge's position. The Florentine League was concluded and Carmagnola was made "Capitano Generale della genti di terra" of Venetian forces.

En Venecia gobernaba por entonces el Dogo Francesco Foscari, también un ambicioso territorialista que soñaba con las hazañas del viejo Dogo Enrico Dandolo, que aún ciego dirigió a los Venecianos en la caída de Constantinopla de 1204.

Visconti cometió el error de menospreciar a Carmagnola, a quien puso por debajo de Piccinino. Carmagnola se pasó entonces con armas y bagajes al servicio de los Venecianos, que lo recibieron con los brazos abiertos y le cubrieron de dinero y títulos. Tenían ahora un general que conocía con exactitud al ejercito milanés y a sus generales, y que tenía cuentas pendientes que saldar con Piccinino. Sin embargo Carmagnola jugaba a dos barajas, quizá pensano en algún futuro cambio de bando. Un juego que los despiadados venecianos no estaban dispuestos a financiar ni tolerar.

The battle of Maclodio.

After the fall of Brescia in the hands of Venice in 1426, Milan and Venice were unable to sign a peace treaty and hostilities continued. On the 12th of October 1427 at Maclodio, the Venetian mercenary army, formed by a coalition of Venice, Ferrara, Mantua, Monferrato and Savoy was directed by Gianfrancesco Gonzaga and Niccolo da Tolentino under the general command of Carmagnola. It amounted to 18,000 cavalry and 8,000 infantry. The milanese mercenary army was formed by 12,000 cavalry and 6,000 infantry under the direction of Francesco Sforza, Niccolo Piccinino, Agnolo della Pergola and Guido Torello under general command of Carlo Malatesta. Almost all the military talent in Italy at that time was present in the battle. As it happened at the siege of Brescia, Carmagnola won the day. Reputedly he hide crossbowmen in carts and swarmed the milanese charging army with arrows, using the surprise to his advantage. After the battle, over ten thousand milanese mercenaries were made prisoners, while the rest succeeded in crossing the river Oglio, where inexplicably Carmagnola refused to pursue them and destroy them. Furthermore, Carmagnola released most of the prisoners after the battle. Obviously the venetians were not pleased with his conduct.

Several reasons have been given for Carmagnola's conduct after the battle. Some say that the other members of the league only wanted to check Visconti's rapid expansion, but were equally alarmed by the agressive policy of Venice. After the battle, the allies would have firmly opposed pressing the advantage the venetians were getting. Others blame the inactivity of Carmagnola on the treason suffered at the onset of the battle, when the Savoyans changed sides thinking that the milanese were going to win. Although this defection did not change the result of the battle, it was rewarded by Visconti by giving his daughter in marriage to Amadeo VIII of Savoy, with a dowry in territory, Vercelli and Biella. But the most popular explanation is that Carmagnola was pursuing his own interests. He did not want to defeat his former patron severely because it would had two negative effects, on one side eliminating a possible future employer and on the other side it would have made him less necessary to his venetian employers. Those were the dangers of employing the mercenary condottieri.

Il Conte Carmagnola

Los aficionados a la literatura quizá encuentren placer en la lectura de "Il Conte Carmagnola" by Alessandro Manzoni, tragedia teatral donde narra estos episodios. Esta es la traducción del fragmento sobre la batalla de Maclodio por William Dean Howells:

"In the Carmagnola, the action extends from the moment when the Venetian Senate, at war with the Duke of Milan, places its armies under the command of the count, who is a soldier of fortune and has formerly been in the service of the Duke. The Senate sends two commissioners into his camp to represent the state there, and to be spies upon his conduct. This was a somewhat clumsy contrivance of the Republic to give a patriotic character to its armies, which were often recruited from mercenaries and generaled by them; and, of course, the hireling leaders must always have chafed under the surveillance. After the battle of Maclodio, in which the Venetian mercenaries defeated the Milanese, the victors, according to the custom of their trade, began to free their comrades of the other side whom they had taken prisoners."

CHORUS.

On the right hand a trumpet is sounding,
On the left hand a trumpet replying,
The field upon all sides resounding
With the trampling of foot and of horse.
Yonder flashes a flag; yonder flying
Through the still air a bannerol glances;
Here a squadron embattled advances,
There another that threatens its course.

The space 'twixt the foes now beneath them
Is hid, and on swords the sword ringeth;
In the hearts of each other they sheathe them;
Blood runs, they redouble their blows.
Who are these? To our fair fields what bringeth
To make war upon us, this stranger?
Which is he that hath sworn to avenge her,
The land of his birth, on her foes?

They are all of one land and one nation,
One speech; and the foreigner names them
All brothers, of one generation;
In each visage their kindred is seen;
This land is the mother that claims them,
This land that their life blood is steeping,
That God, from all other lands keeping,
Set the seas and the mountains between.

Ah, which drew the first blade among them
To strike at the heart of his brother?
What wrong, or what insult hath stung them
To wipe out what stain, or to die?
They know not; to slay one another
They come in a cause none hath told them;
A chief that was purchased hath sold them;
They combat for him, nor ask why.

Oh, disaster, disaster, disaster!
With the slain the earth's hidden already;
With blood reeks the whole plain, and vaster
And fiercer the strife than before!
But along the ranks, rent and unsteady,
Many waver--they yield, they are flying!
With the last hope of victory dying
The love of life rises again.

At the feet of the foe they fall trembling,
And yield life and sword to his keeping;
In the shouts of the victors assembling,
The moans of the dying are drowned.
All around I hear cries of rejoicing;
The temples are decked; the song swelleth
From the hearts of the fratricides, voicing
Praise and thanks that are hateful to God.​

"At the tent of the great condottiere. Count Carmagnola is speaking with one of the Commissioners of the Venetian Republic, when the other suddenly enters:"

Comm. 1: My lord, if instantly you haste not to prevent it, treachery shameless and bold will be accomplished, making our victory vain, as't partly hath already.

Count: How now?

Comm. 1: The prisoners leave the camp in troops! The leaders and the soldiers vie together to set them free; and nothing can restrain them saving command of yours.

Count: Command of mine?

Comm. 1: You hesitate to give it?

Count: 'T is a use, this, of the war, you know. It is so sweet to pardon when we conquer; and their hate is quickly turned to friendship in the hearts that throb beneath the steel. Ah, do not seek to take this noble privilege from those who risked their lives for your sake, and to-day are generous because valiant yesterday.

Comm. 1: Let him be generous who fights for himself, my lord! But these--and it rests upon their honor-- Have fought at our expense, and unto us belong the prisoners.

Count: You may well think so, doubtless, but those who met them front to front, who felt their blows, and fought so hard to lay their bleeding hands upon them, they will not so easily believe it.

Comm. 1: And is this a joust for pleasure then? And doth not Venice conquer to keep? And shall her victory be all in vain?

Count: Already I have heard it, and I must hear that word again? 'Tis bitter; importunate it comes upon me, like an insect that, driven once away, returns to buzz about my face.... The victory is in vain! The field is heaped with corpses; scattered wide, and broken, are the rest--a most flourishing army, with which, if it were still united, and it were mine, mine truly, I'd engage to overrun all Italy! Every design of the enemy baffled; even the hope of harm taken away from him; and from my hand hardly escaped, and glad of their escape, four captains against whom but yesterday it were a boast to show resistance; vanished half of the dread of those great names; in us doubled the daring that the foe has lost; the whole choice of the war now in our hands; and ours the lands they've left--is't nothing?
Think you that they will go back to the Duke, those prisoners; and that they love "him", or care more for "him" than "you"? that they have fought in "his" behalf? Nay, they have combatted because a sovereign voice within the heart of men that follow any banner cries, "Combat and conquer!" they have lost and so are set at liberty; they'll sell themselves-- O, such is now the soldier!--to the first that seeks to buy them--Buy them; they are yours!

Comm. 1: When we paid those that were to fight with them, we then believed ourselves to have purchased them.

Comm. 2: My lord, Venice confides in you; in you She sees a son; and all that to her good and to her glory can redound, expects shall be done by you.

Count: Everything I can.

Comm. 2: And what can you not do upon this field?

Count: The thing you ask. An ancient use, a use dear to the soldier, I can not violate.

Comm. 2: You, whom no one resists, on whom so promptly every will follows, so that none can say, whether for love or fear it yield itself; you, in this camp, you are not able, you, to make a law, and to enforce it?

Count: I said I could not; now I rather say, I "will" not! No further words; with friends this hath been ever my ancient custom; satisfy at once and gladly all just prayers, and for all other refuse them openly and promptly. Soldier!

Comm. 1: Nay--what is your purpose?

Count: You will see anon.
[To a soldier who enters] How many prisoners still remain?

Soldier: I think, my lord, four hundred.

Count: Call them hither--call the bravest of them--those you meet the first; send them here quickly. [Exit soldier]

[The prisoners enter]

Count: Who was it, that made you prisoners?

Prisoner: We were the last to give our arms up. All the rest were taken or put to flight, and for a few brief moments the evil fortune of the battle weighed on us alone. At last you made a sign that we should draw nigh to your banner,--we alone not conquered, relics of the lost.

Count: You are those? I am very glad, my friends, to see you again, and I can testify that you fought bravely; and if so much valor were not betrayed, and if a captain equal unto yourselves had led you, it had been no pleasant thing to stand before you.

Prisoner: And now shall it be our misfortune to have yielded only to you, my lord? And they that found a conqueror less glorious, shall they find more courtesy in him? In vain, we asked our freedom of your soldiers--no one durst dispose of us without your own assent, but all did promise it. "O, if you can, show yourselves to the Count," they said. "Be sure, he'll not embitter fortune to the vanquished; An ancient courtesy of war will never be ta'en away by him; he would have been rather the first to have invented it."

Count: [To the Commissioners] You hear them, lords? Well, then, what do you say? What would you do, you?
[To the prisoners] Heaven forbid that any should think more highly than myself of me! You are all free, my friends; farewell! Go, follow your fortune, and if e'er again it lead you under a banner that's adverse to mine, why, we shall see each other.
[To the Commissioners] I never will be merciful to your foes till I have conquered them.

La paz fue firmada poco después de la batalla de Maclodio, y Venecia logró su última gran expansión.

VeniceConquests.jpg


En este mapa se puede apreciar la gran porción de territorio ganada por Venecia en esta guerra, que llevó sus fronteras casi hasta las puertas de Milán. Son los territorios de Brescia y Bérgamo, marcadas en el mapa con la fecha de 1428, en que se firmó el tratado de paz que las reconocía como Venecianas.
-------------------------------------------​

El juicio de Carmagnola

The first Venetian campaign had ended in the acquisition of Brescia and the Bresciano by Venetian troops, but not by Carmagnola. He had no sooner brought his forces under Brescia than he asked leave to retire for his health to the Baths of Abano; and his conduct from the very first roused suspicions. The second campaign gave Bergamo to the victorious Republic. But the suspicions of Venice were increased by finding that the Duke of Milan was in communication with Carmagnola and was prepared to conclude a peace through him as intermediary, suspicions confirmed by the dilatory conduct of their general after the victory at Maclodio (1427), when nothing lay between him and Milan. At the opening of the third campaign against Visconti, the Republic endeavoured to rouse their general to vigorous action by raising his emoluments and promising him immense fiefs including the lordship of Milan, if he would only crush the Duke and take his capital. But it was to the interest of Carmagnola, as indeed to all other soldiers of fortune, to make the operations last as long as possible, to avoid decisive operations, and to liberate all prisoners quickly. At the same time Carmagnola was perpetually receiving messengers from Visconti, who offered him great rewards if he would abandon the Venetians. The general trifled with his past as with his present employers, believing in his foolish vanity that he held the fate of both in his hand. But the Venetians were dangerous masters to trifle with, and when they at last lost all patience, the Council of Ten determined to bring him to justice. Summoned to Venice to discuss future operations on the 29th of March 1432, he came without suspicion. He was received with marked honour. His suite was told that the general stayed to dine with the Doge and that they might go home. The Doge sent to excuse himself from receiving the Count on the score of indisposition. Carmagnola turned to go down to his gondola. In the lower arcade of the palace he was arrested and hurried to prison. He was brought to trial for treason against the republic.

El tribunal condenó a Carmagnola a ser ejecutado públicamente por decapitación en la mañana del 5 de Mayo de 1432 en la plaza de San Marcos. No cabe duda de que fue un ejemplo para sus otros condottieri de que la Serenísima no permitía veleidades de aquellos que estaban a su servicio.
 
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Capítulo Segundo: La segunda guerra Veneto-Turca (1463-1479)

The Venetian admiral had looked on unmoved while the Turks took Lesbos, but their attack, later that same year, on the republic's colonies at Lepanto and in Argos brought the war party in Venice into power. Pius II, though under no illusions about the nature of the new Venetian zeal for a crusade, thought the moment had arrived for it. Venice, at last, had been persuaded by events that the only way of salvation for a Christian state was to defeat and destroy for ever the Turkish forces.

On the day fixed, June 18, 1464, after a great ceremony in St. Peter's, Pius II left the city for Ancona, the port of assembly. He was already an old man, broken with years of gout and stone. The intense heat tried him further. It took him a month to reach Ancona, and by this time he was seriously ill. In the port all was confusion, crowded with Spanish and French crusaders -- all of the poorest class -- unorganised, leaderless and at daggers drawn. As August came in, and the temperature mounted, the plague broke out. The papal fleet had been delayed in its voyage from Pisa, and of course there was not a sign of any vessel from Venice. A new attempt by the cardinals began, to persuade the Pope to abandon the expedition and to return to Rome. But he held firm to his resolve to sacrifice himself utterly, and tortured now by new anxieties as to the loyalty of Venice as well as by his fiendish bodily pain, Pius II slowly came to his end, with the disgusted among his cardinals occupied only with chances and prospects in the conclave that could not now be far off. The 12 August 1464 the Venetian fleet formed by just 12 galleys and leaded by the reluctant Doge Cristoforo Moro arrived to Ancona, where should have met the army and the papal fleet. But the Papal State had made available only 8 galleys, the army was not there, and Pious II was already dying.

The night before the feast of Our Lady's Assumption, the pope died. The next day, the 15 August, the Venetian fleet returned to Venice. But the Turkish wanted more than the conquest of the Morea alone. Mehmet II had fielded an army of 60.000 men and 300 ships. Venice tried to hold in check the invasion by building 137 towers and sending reinforcements to the isthmus of Corinto. Simultaneously the arsenal worked non stop in the construction of new ships. An ineffectual maritime war was prosecuted for the next six years (1464-9). Venetians tried to assassinate Mehmet fourteen times. By 1468 Mehmed II had annexed the Anatolian territory of Karaman. In 1469 the Turkish raids arrived to Istria. And then the great blow to Venetian power was struck.

Negroponte.jpg

At the beginning of June 1470 a fleet of 108 large galleys and nearly 200 small sail, commanded by Mahmud, set sail for the Euripus, and by land Mehmet himself led an army probably numbering about 80,000. The usual size of his armies seems to have been from 80,000 to 100,000. The Sultan had resolved to rob Venice of her most valuable station, the strong fort of Chalcis or Egripos (which the Latins further corrupted to Negroponte, with an allusion to the bridge which connected it with the mainland). Against this great double armament Venice had nothing ready to oppose but the strength of the well-provisioned city's walls, the resolution of the inhabitants, and thirty-five galleys which were in the Aegean under Nicolo da Canale. This captain could not venture to guard the Straits against the far superior squadron; but, had he remained hard by, he might, it was thought, have effectually impeded Mohammad's construction of a bridge of boats from the mainland to the shore of the island. But he sailed away to beat up reinforcements in Crete. The siege operations lasted for four weeks. In a final storm Mohammad, apparently aided by treachery, took the city in the teeth of a desperate defence (July 12). All the Italians who survived the conflict were executed, the Venetian bailo Paolo Erizzo was sawed in half; the Greeks were enslaved. At this crisis Canal covered himself with shame. He had returned to the Euripus; his small squadron was within sight of the city; the garrison was signalling to him; and he made no effort to save the place. If he had broken the boat-bridge, as Hunyady had done at Belgrade, he would probably have rescued Negroponte; it was his plainest duty to try. Furthermore he disembarked some troops in such chaotic manner that they had to retreat with further loss of lives, leaving behind numerous prisoners, like Capitano Girolamo Longo that was impaled and Giovanni Tron, that was also sawed in two. Venice punished Canal for his faineance to exile to Portogruaro. After the fall of its bulwark, the whole island of Euboea passed into Turkish hands.

Euboea.jpg

The event created in the West little less consternation than the fall of Constantinople itself. Pope Sixtus IV (who succeeded in 1471), in conjunction with Ferdinand of Naples, accomplished something more considerable than the western powers had yet done. They sent a number of galleys to join Pietro Mocenigo, an able seaman whom Venice had chosen captain of her fleet. Also, a new avenue was opened with the alliance to Uzun Hasan. In 1471 Persian ruler Uzun Hasan (white sheep) invaded Anatolia and the next year joined the alliance with Venice, Cyprus, and the Knights of Rhodes, pillaging the city of Tokat. Mehmed gathered his Turkish army of perhaps a hundred thousand and defeated the Persian forces at Bashkent, causing Uzun Hasan to make peace. After having faced the Persian threat, the Crimea became a vassal state of the Ottomans in 1475. At Samos in 1472 Mocenigo commanded 85 vessels, of which 48 were furnished by Venice and her dependencies, 18 by the Pope, 17 by Ferdinand, and 2 by Rhodes: an armament notable as the greatest that the combination of Christian powers at this time achieved. The Venetian admiral who had taken on board a number of Albanian stradioti conducted a war of raids with skill, swooping down and plundering Passagio, a trading-town over against Chios; burning Smyrna; pillaging the quays of Satalia, then a mart of the oriental spice-trade; helping the royal house of Cyprus. One brilliant feat was wrought by a Sicilian, who venturing into the Dardanelles with six companions fired the Turkish arsenal of Gallipoli, and expiated his daring by a cruel death. Such warfare was highly agreeable to the mercenaries who were paid on the system of receiving a part of the booty; but it was hopelessly ineffectual, and Venice recognised that war must be waged by land. The scene was shifted to Albania, where Scanderbeg's legacy had fallen to Venice. Here all turned on the possession of Scodra (Scutari), the key of Albania, which had the same kind of strategic significance as Negroponte or Acrocorinth. The Sultan was determined to secure it, and Sulayman, governor of Rumelia, laid siege to it in 1474. He was repelled by its brave defender Antonio Loredano; and the stress of need which the inhabitants endured was shown, the moment the siege was raised, by their general rush for the gates to quench their thirst in the waters of the Bojana. In 1477 the Turks renewed their designs in this quarter by besieging Kroja, and at the same time their light cavalry (akindje) harassed Venice in the north by overrunning Friuli. The garrison of Kroja, reduced to eating their dogs and receiving no aid from Venice, submitted in the ensuing year, and Mehmet advanced to the second siege of Scodra. The Venetian republic was hard pressed. In these days its yearly revenue did not touch 100,000 ducats; nor could the Venetians at this moment expect aid from other powers; Ferdinand of Naples was actually intriguing with the Turk, and Friuli was exposed to the inroads of the infidels from Bosnia; the plague was raging in the lagoons. Unable to relieve Scodra, Venice resolved to make peace and consented to hard conditions, resigning Scodra and Kroja, Negroponte, Lemnos and the Mainote district in Laconia. She agreed to pay a yearly sum of 10,000 ducats for free commerce in the Ottoman dominions, and recovered the right of keeping as before a Bailo (consul) at Constantinople (January, 1479).

Venice, who had always intrigued and fought only for her convenience, found herself paid with the same coin. She was left alone to fight the Ottomans and was heavily defeated. Some of the Italian cities actually behaved as allies of the Turks. The only highlight of the war from the Venetian side, the conquest of the city of Smyrna, was subsequently painted by Veronese and remains immortalized on the ceiling of the Hall of the Consiglio Maggiore.

Mehmet II, was encouraged by his raids in Friule and Istria and knew that Italy was in no conditions to oppose him. His dream of becoming the emperor of Rome was at hand. Soon Italy was going to feel his wrath, and when Venice refused to fight Mehmet again, she will be accused of connivence with the Turk.
 
Un articulíto sobre los Stradioti, la caballería ligera Albano-Bizantina que tanto éxito tuvo primero contra los turcos y después contra franceses e italianos:

STRADIOTI: BALKAN MERCENARIES IN FIFTEENTH AND SIXTEENTH CENTURY ITALY

Copied from an article by Nicholas C. J. Pappas

The stradioti, mounted troops of Albanian and Greek origin who initially entered Venetian military service during the Republic's wars with the Ottoman Empire in the fifteenth century, were among pioneers of light cavalry tactics in European armies in the early modern era. These warriors, who had previously served Byzantine and Albanian rulers, initially found asylum and employment in the Venetian strongholds of Napoli di Romagna, Corone, Modone, and Malvasia in the Peloponnesus. Later they were also stationed in Venetian holdings at Trau, Sibenico, Castellonuovo, and Zara in Dalmatia, and the islands of Corfu, Zante, Cephalonia, Crete and Cyprus. They were also introduced into Italy by the Venetians in the 1470's and participated in wars in Italy through much of the 16th century, not only for Venice, but also for other employers. It was in these wars that the stradioti made an impact on warfare in Italy and the west, chiefly by their style of fighting and tactics. The stradioti were armed and fought as light cavalry in a manner that developed from warfare among Byzantine, Slavic, Albanian and Ottoman forces. They carried spear, a long saber, mace, and were attired in a mixture of oriental, Byzantine and western military garb. They also seemed to have carried a type of eared dagger, which saw wide use in Italy. The stradioti are reputed to have introduced this dagger into western Europe, which came to be known generally as an estradiot. The stradioti continued the Balkan traditions of cavalry warfare, which used hit-and-run attacks, ambushes, feigned retreats, counterattacks and other tactics little known to western armies of the time.

According to most sources the stradioti wore little or no armor. If they did, it was usually padded linen tunics or shirts of chain mail. Contemporary authors indicate that they were attired and armored like the Turks except that they wore no turban. Since there was much intermingling of military styles, tactics, garb, and weaponry in the Balkans in the 14th and 15th centuries, it is difficult to say what aspects of weaponry; armor and attire were adopted from or lent to the Ottoman Turks. This writer believes it is safe to say that the stradioti were armed and attired in a mixture of Balkan and Turkish styles. There is no doubt that they later adopted some western arms and garb the longer they remained in service in Western Europe and in the Venetian-held areas of the Balkans and the Levant.

Most modern, as well as a good number of early authors have indicated that the stradioti were Albanian. This is true to a certain extent but has to be qualified. A Greek author made a study of the names of stradioti found in the most extensive documentary collection of materials dealing with the stradioti and found that some 80% of the names were of Albanian origin, while the rest were of Greek origin, particularly those of officers, such as Palaiologos, Spandounios, Laskaris, Rhalles, Comnenos, Psendakis, Maniatis, Spyliotis, Alexopoulos, Psaris, Zacharopoulos, Klirakopoulos, Kondomitis, etc. Others seemed to be of South Slavic origin, such Soimiris, Vlastimiris, and Voicha.

The albanians had settled in southern Greece through the encouragement of the Byzantine Despots of the Morea, Theodore I Palaiologos (1384-1407) and Theodore II Palaiologos (1407-1443). They served as military colonists in the Peloponnesus in the attempt of the Despotate, an appanage of the moribund Byzantine Empire, to survive the expansion of the Ottoman Empire in the Balkans. With the demise of the Byzantine state in 1453 and the dissolution of the Despotate of the Morea through civil war in the 1450's and 1460's, more and more of the Albanian and Greek stradioti found refuge and employment with the Venetians. The Venetians increasingly used them as troops in their conflicts with the Ottomans in Greece and the Levant in the second half of the 15th and throughout the 16th century.

stradiotto.jpg

In time the Venetians introduced some of these stradioti into their forces in Italy. Three factors probably played a role in the extensive use of these troops by the Venetians. One important factor was that there was an abundance of these troops. The small Venetian holdings in Greece could not employ the large number of refugee stradioti that sought asylum and employment. By the end of the 15th century some stradioti companies were transferred and reassigned to the Venetian-held Ionian Islands of Corfu, Cephalonia, and Zante. Soon afterwards, other stradioti were sent to Italy, to the Venetian-Ottoman border in Friuli, and to the Dalmatian holdings of Sebenico (Sibenik), Spalato (Split), Zara (Zadar), Trogir, and Bocca di Cattaro (Kotor). As the Venetians lost one stronghold on the mainland Greece after the other in the Veneto-Turkish conflicts of first half of the 16th century, more and more military colonists resettled on the Ionian Islands, Dalmatia and Italy. One Greek writer has estimated that the number of Albanian and Greek stradioti that settled in Venetian territories and in Italy reached 4500 men, together with their families they numbered about 15,500. If one includes those settled in Southern Italy and Sicily, the numbers reach about 25,000.

A second factor in the widespread employment of stradioti by the Venetian Republic was economy. The pay of the stradioti was lower, than western mercenaries, be they Italians, Swiss, Germans or others. The stradioti were not mercenaries in the strictest sense, they were refugees who maintained themselves and their families in exile by their skill at arms. Wherever they were garrisoned or deployed, they brought their families and settled them at or near their place of duty. Indeed the stradioti seemed to appreciate honors and privileges over pay. The stradioti actually sought out favors in the form of parades and titles, and the frugal Venetian government was only too glad to oblige them. This is evidenced by the titles their leaders accumulated and the sentiments expressed in the poems, both in Greek and Italian, which dealt with their exploits. They also appreciated the right to practice their religion, the Greek rite, be it Orthodox or Uniate. The stradioti were instrumental in the founding of Greek Churches in Venice, Naples and the towns of Dalmatia.

The third factor in the Venetian preference in employing stradioti was the troops' unorthodox tactics and methods of fighting, which could be utilized in different ways. The stradioti's light cavalry tactics matched those of Ottoman sipahi (feudal) and akinci (irregular) cavalry, which made them an asset to Venice in the garrisons of its Balkan and Levantine possessions, where they were maintained well after the 16th century. In Italy and elsewhere in Western Europe they proved to be useful in scouting reconnaissance, and in raiding forces in disarray or retreat. However the style and conduct of the stradioti was criticized, according to some Venetian officials, they were "Anti-Christian, perfidious, born thieves and potential traitors..." and "...so disobedient that they can do us no good."

The most notorious example of their reputed unreliability was in the crucial battle of Fornovo of 1494 in which they wasted their tactical advantage by looting the French baggage train. The battle of Fornovo was not a victory for Venice and its allies but rather a serious turning point in Italian history.

Nevertheless in subsequent campaigns the stradioti impressed the Venetians and their adversaries with their tactics, which included repeated attacks and disengagement, which enticed opposing forces to pursue. Enemy forces would lose formation and become even more vulnerable to the stradioti attacks. Opponents would have to deploy infantry armed with arquebus, or artillery in defense against the stradioti.

Other states also discovered these tactical assets and began to wean away stradioti from Venetian service by better pay or conditions of service. According to Comines and others, France under Louis XII recruited some 2000 stradioti in 1497; some two years after French forces in Italy encountered them at Fornovo. Among the French they were known as estradiots and argoulets. The use of the two names has led some historians to consider that there were two separate corps of light cavalry in service to the French king. However it seems that the two terms were initially interchangeable, and only later indicated separate forces. Some historians have identified the term argoulet with the Greek argetes or Argive, because it seems that a significant number of troops who went over to the French service originally came from Napoli di Romagna (Nauplion) on the Argive plain near the ancient Greek city of Argos. The French maintained a corps of light cavalry known as estradiots or argoulets until the reign of Henry III.

Naples, Spain and the Habsburgs not only in Italy, but also in Germany and the Netherlands used stradioti. Among those who distinguished themselves in Habsburg service and became knights of the Holy Roman Empire were the captains Iakovos Diassorinos, Georgios Bastas, the Brothers Vasilikos, and the redoubtable Merkourios Bouas. Bouas was given titles by the Venetians and French as well. Henry VIII also employed Stradioti in France and England, notably under the captains Thomas Buas of Argos, Theodore Luchisi, and Antonios Stesinos. The former was named colonel and commander of stradioti in Henry's service at Calais. There is also some evidence that Greeks served as cavalrymen, together with Serbs, in the Muscovite armies in the late 16th and early 17th century, during the notorious "Time of Troubles."

By the end of the 16th century, however, Western armies had formed their own light cavalry units and relied less and less upon the stradioti.

italy_stradioto.jpg


Stradioto Italiano​
 
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Tras la paliza recibida en la segunda guerra con los Turcos, Venecia iba a tratar de compensar las pérdidas abusando de sus pequeños vecinos en el Norte de Italia.

Fue un terrible error. La guerra contra Visconti había sido aceptada porque a éste se le veía como peor agresor. Pero en el momento en que Venecia parecía posicionarse como el principal poder Italiano, los demás (Nápoles, el Papado, Milán y Florencia) se unieron en su contra, y cuando ambos bandos se encontraron sin capacidad para derrotar decisivamente al contrario, empezaron a coquetear con llamar a las potencias extranjeras (Francia, España y el Imperio) a su lado. Esa estrategia resultó letal para los italianos, que caerían bajo control extranjero durante 200 años.

Capítulo Tercero: La guerra de Ferrara (1481-1484)

1. Antecedents

After the fall of Constantinople the Turkish advance was steadily continued both south and east. Athens surrendered to the Turks in 1457; so did Sinope and Trebizond; and the loss of the Morea in 1462 brought them into immediate collision with the Republic. Venice perfectly understood that a struggle for her possessions in the Levant was inevitable sooner or later; she therefore gladly embraced Pope Pius II's proposals for a crusade. But the lamentable failure of the undertaking, and the Pope's death at Ancona, left the Republic to carry on, single-handed, a war she had undertaken on the promise and in the expectation of European support. Antonio Michiel, a Venetian merchant resident in Constantinople, had warned his government, in 1466, that the Sultan was mustering large forces. "I take it the fleet will number two hundred sail," he says, "and every one here thinks Negroponte its object." He continues in a note of serious warning that matters must not be treated lightly to the deceiving of themselves. The Turk has a way of exaggerating the enemy's strength and arming regardless of expense. Venice had better do the same. This was in 1466; three years later the blow was ready to fall, and again Venice received warning through another merchant, Piero Dolfino, resident in Chios. Let the government, he wrote, fortify its places in the Levant and lose no time about it; " on this depends the safety of the State, for Negroponte once lost the rest of the Levant is in peril."

The prophecy of Doge Tommaso Mocenigo finally was going to be fulfilled. Venice, exhausted by the drain of the land wars against Visconti, was unwilling to face another and more terrible campaign by sea unless she was forced to do so. She endeavoured to open negotiations at Constantinople on the pretext that she was acting in the name of Hungary. But in 1470 Negroponte fell. The War had already cost considerably over a million ducats, and the government was reduced to suspending either two-thirds or a half of all official salaries which were over twenty-five ducats per annum. In spite of this she rejected, as extravagant, terms of peace offered her in 1476; and faced the struggle once more. Scutari was attacked by the Sultan in person, who, in his determination to enter the town, blew besieged and besiegers alike to pieces before his siege guns. But the Republic could not hold out for ever unaided; Scutari was at the last extremity; a large army was rumoured to be on its way to attack Friuli. Venice was forced to recognise the facts, and in 1479 she proposed terms of peace. Scutari, and all Venetian possessions in the Morea were ceded to the Turk. Venice agreed to pay ten thousand ducats a year for the privileges of trading, and one hundred thousand in two years, as a war indemnity; and received permission to keep an Agent (Bailo) in Constantinople.

The Peace of 1479 marks an epoch in the history of Venetian relations with the East, and indicates a return to her original policy of peaceable dealings, whenever possible, with the Turk.

In truth, the Republic had every reason to complain of the conduct of Europe. After sixteen years of continuous warfare, which she had undertaken on the strength of European promises, Venice concluded a ruinous peace, by which she lost a part of her Levantine possessions and was reduced to the position of a tributary. Yet instantly all Europe criticised her for her perfidy to the Christian faith, and the princes of Italy professed to believe that Venice had abandoned the Turkish War, merely in order to devote herself to the extension of her power on the mainland. Had she received any support from Europe or Italy, she would never have closed the War with such a balance against herself. In truth the Republic was too exhausted to continue the struggle. It was not her fault that, the year after the conclusion of the Peace, Italy and all Europe were alarmed by the news that the Turks had seized Otranto. This was the inevitable result of the withdrawal of Venice from the struggle,-a withdrawal in its turn due to lack of any support from Italy or Europe. When invited by the Pope to join an Italian league against the Turk, Venice, mindful of the results which had followed on her acceptance of the last papal invitation, replied that she had made peace with the Sultan, and confirmed the suspicion that she was in secret understanding with the Turk. Her next step emphasised the further suspicion that her object in coming to terms with the Turk had been to allow herself a free hand to extend in Italy.

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Pope Sixtus IV, Francesco della Rovera with four of his "nephews". The one on his knees is not a family member. The second from the left in blue is Girolamo Riario, who was involved in the Pazzi conspiration that almost killed Lorenzo de Medici, and now was going to be at the center of the war of Ferrara. He wanted to be a prince, but was a terrible army commander. Cardinal Giuliano della Rovera is second from the right.
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Venice always tried to off-set the loses with new gains. The rise of the Ottomans ment a double reduction in oriental trade income. Firstly because Venice was losing her colonies to the Turks, some of them very profitable, and secondly because they were never capable of obtaining the good trade conditions that they had previously enjoyed. While the spice trade through Cairo was still very important, the Black Sea trade became less and less profitable, even with the expulsion of the Genoese from Jaffa. Little by little Venice was coming to depend more and more from her recently acquired Terra Ferma possessions. After her painful defeat by the Ottomans, Venice needed both reassurance and gains. Her small southern neighbour, Ercole d'Este, could not have chosen a worse moment to start provoking the winged lion.

2. The war of Ferrara.

In 1481 the Signoria ordered the attack on the Duchy of Ferrara on the ground that the Duke Ercole was infringing a Venetian monopoly, eight centuries old, by the erection of salt-pans at the mouth of the Po. Ercole d'Este, Duke (previously Marquis) of Ferrara had felt a lot more secure in crossing his long-time friends, the Venetians, because he had the support of his father-in-law Ferrante of Naples and had dared also to push some boundaries issues with Venice. Ferrante was Venice enemy, and the Signoria was worried that her neighbour and former ally Ferrara was falling into his arms. Only this time Venice was encouraged and supported by Pope Sixtus IV (the builder of the Sixtine Chapel), who wanted Ferrara for his nephew Girolamo Riario. Pope Sixtus IV, Francesco della Rovera, was one of the most nepotist popes in history. He had several nephews, some of them it is said were his true image. But the desires of the Pope and Venice would not go unchallenged. As part of the territory of Ferrara lay between the Venetian frontier and Ravenna, the rest of Italy thought that Venice desired to unite her possessions in that direction by the acquisition of Ferrara. Immediately, Galeazzo Sforza, Duke of Milan, Lorenzo de Medici, lord of Firenza, and Ferrante I, King of Naples, came in support of Ercole d'Este, Duke of Ferrara, against Venice and the Pope. The war was popular with the Venetians at first, trying to shake off the recent defeat against the Ottoman Empire. The Venetian army and the papal forces under command of Roberto Malatesta routed the Neapolitan army of Ferrante's son Alfonso II, Duke of Calabria at Campo Morto in August 1482.

malatesta.jpg


Roberto Malatesta, Lord of Rimini at his wedding with Elisabetta da Montefeltro in 1475 (Fiesta popular de recreación histórica en Rimini)
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But Malatesta died soon after the victory, and the Pope started having the worse part against Naples in the South, while Venice happily continued her conquests in the North. Sixtus was then convinced by his nephew, the cardinal Giuliano della Rovera, to make peace with Ferrante because the war was only beneficial to Venice. The incident of Otranto had convinced everybody that Venice was in collusion with the Turks, and the Republic was generally despised for her success of the last decades in Italy, and her cold, mercantilistic character. The Pope asked the successful Venetians to stop the war and return everything they had conquered, and when they refused he placed an interdict on the Serenissima. The interdict forbade any Christian ceremony and sacrament, but did not separate the interdicted from the Christian community as the excommunication. The Venetians ignored the interdiction and the Pope joined Naples, Florence, Milan, Padua and Ferrara in attacking Venice. Although the war entered a positional campaign with no big battles, it started to be a heavy burden on Venice, now under direct attack and with the Terra Ferma being ravaged by Alfonso and Ercole. To try to drive Alfonso out, the Venetian fleet took the Apulian port of Gallipoli at heavy cost. The strain on both treasury and private purses soon became insupportable, and no success crowned the Venetian arms. The distressed condition of the Republic is described by Malipiero. Payment of the interest on the funds was partially suspended; the shops on the Rialto were mortgaged; private plate, and jewellery compulsorily called in; salaries cut down. The revenue from the mainland was falling off. The arsenal was nearly empty. Famine and plague were at the door. " We shall be forced to sue for peace and restore all we have gained."

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The city of Rovigo and the Polesine, marked in red. Not much to justify 3 years of all-out war and a lot of resentment for the future.
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Malipiero was partially right. Venice was forced to sue for peace, but not till she had taken the ruinous step (which other Italian princes took before and after her) of suggesting to the French that they should make good their claims on certain Italian provinces, -Charles VIII his claim on Naples, the Duke of Orleans his claims on Milan. But two factors were to play in Venice advantage. Ferrara and Florence were even more exhausted by the war, and Ludovico il Moro and Alfonso, Duke of Calabria, were at odds, because Alfonso's daughter Isabella was engaged to the legitimate Duke of Milan, Gian Galeazzo, and both Ludovico and Alfonso wanted to take control of the Duchy. Venice diplomacy was successful in attracting Ludovico first and convincing Alfonso later, with the result that peace was concluded at Bagnolo in 1484. The small states, Mantua, Ferrara and Parma paid the bill, and were stripped of their conquests. Ercole was forced to cede to Venice the city of Rovigo and the Polesine, a small adjacent area in the Po, while Venice returned Gallipoli to Naples. The Pope was outraged that the peace was so favorable to Venice, while ignoring his nephew's aspirations, but he died, expediting the way for the peace.

1484conquests.jpg


The territorial gains of Venice in the XIII to XV centuries. The expansion was over.
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But the invitations to the King of France and the Duke of Orleans from Venice, and later from the shaky Ludovico of Milan, and from the Pope and Naples to the Kings of Spain, and the Emperor, were to prove fatal to all Italian princes, as events were soon to demonstrate. The five Great Powers of Italy, Venice, Milan, Florence, the Pope and Naples, were able to hold their own against each other, but the moment the more potent ultramontane sovereigns appeared upon the scene, nominally in support of one or other of the Italian States, really in pursuit of their own aggrandisement, the balance was irretrievably upset. More damming for Venice was that she had extracted the wrong lesson from the war of Ferrara. The truth was that militarily she had failed, and diplomatically she was hated by all the rest of Italians, and everyone of them would be happy to see her fall, wether to the Turk or to the King of France or even the Emperor. But to her own eyes, she had stood against all Italy and prevailed. Instead of learning that militarily she had everything to lose and nothing to gain, Venice was to engage in more territorial expansions in Italy, putting herself in mortal danger.
 
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Enoch Root said:
La Wikipedia yanqui tiene una serie de artículos muy completos sobre Venecia, tanto la ciudad como la historia de la República. Trae la lista completa de Dux, por ejemplo.

http://www.veniceworld.com/

http://www.boglewood.com/timeline/

Cualquier guía turística.

Éste libro es de referencia, a ver si lo pillo:

8493119474+.jpg


Historia de Venecia, de John Julius Norwich.

El libro está bastante bien para comenzar a conocer a la Serenísima y en español no hay muchos libros más (si alguien conoce alguno que esté a la venta que lo diga please).

Sin embargo, aparte de algunas críticas que ya se han hecho al libro, yo diría que es demasiado pro-veneciano, parece que la república nunca hizo nada malo o que todo lo que hacía era justificable. Se nota que está hecho por un inglés acostumbrado a justificar las atrocidades y expolios de su país :rolleyes: .
 
Michel el Vasco said:
El libro está bastante bien para comenzar a conocer a la Serenísima y en español no hay muchos libros más (si alguien conoce alguno que esté a la venta que lo diga please).
Cierto. En español no hay nada más que elegir.

La editorial complutense tiene un libro:

LAS MUJERES EN LA VENECIA DEL SIGLO XVIII
Élisabeth Ravoux-Rallo (Editorial Complutense, S.A. )
Price:14,42 €
ISBN: 8474916240.
252 p. : il. ; 21x15 cm. - 1ª ed., 1ª imp. (05/2001).

0210010.jpg


Obviamente bastante especializado, aunque interesante.

El delicioso,

LAS PIEDRAS DE VENECIA
John Ruskin (Colegio Oficial de Aparejadores y Arquitectos Técnicos de Murcia)
Price:43,75 €
ISBN: 8489882134.
512 p. : il. col. y n. ; 25x18 cm.

es esencialmente inencontrable (y tiene más arte que historia).

En Inglés sí hay bastantes:

- Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of a Myth
by Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan

- Venice, A Maritime Republic
by Frederic Chapin Lane

- Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797
by John Jeffries Martin, Dennis Romano (Editors)

- Venice: Lion City
by Garry Wills

Y por supuesto como fuente primaria la Historia de Venecia, de Pietro Bembo (1551), que está a punto de ser editada por vez primera en Inglés.
 
Fodoron said:
Cierto. En español no hay nada más que elegir.

La editorial complutense tiene un libro:

LAS MUJERES EN LA VENECIA DEL SIGLO XVIII
Élisabeth Ravoux-Rallo (Editorial Complutense, S.A. )
Price:14,42 €
ISBN: 8474916240.
252 p. : il. ; 21x15 cm. - 1ª ed., 1ª imp. (05/2001).

0210010.jpg


Obviamente bastante especializado, aunque interesante.

El delicioso,

LAS PIEDRAS DE VENECIA
John Ruskin (Colegio Oficial de Aparejadores y Arquitectos Técnicos de Murcia)
Price:43,75 €
ISBN: 8489882134.
512 p. : il. col. y n. ; 25x18 cm.

es esencialmente inencontrable (y tiene más arte que historia).

En Inglés sí hay bastantes:

- Venice Triumphant: The Horizons of a Myth
by Elisabeth Crouzet-Pavan

- Venice, A Maritime Republic
by Frederic Chapin Lane

- Venice Reconsidered: The History and Civilization of an Italian City-State, 1297-1797
by John Jeffries Martin, Dennis Romano (Editors)

- Venice: Lion City
by Garry Wills

Y por supuesto como fuente primaria la Historia de Venecia, de Pietro Bembo (1551), que está a punto de ser editada por vez primera en Inglés.

Es curioso que una potencia tan importante en la época más gloriosa de España y con la que tuvimos tantas y tan complejas relaciones sea tan desconocida aquí y se haya estudiado tan poco.

A los ingleses Venecia en cambio les fascina, tanto por su arte y cultura como por el parecido que ven a su historia con la de Inglaterra (potencia marítima y comercial que siendo una pequeña islita conquistó un imperio, tierra inconquistable a menos que se derrote a su flota antes, etc...).
 
Michel el Vasco said:
Es curioso que una potencia tan importante en la época más gloriosa de España y con la que tuvimos tantas y tan complejas relaciones sea tan desconocida aquí y se haya estudiado tan poco.

A los ingleses Venecia en cambio les fascina, tanto por su arte y cultura como por el parecido que ven a su historia con la de Inglaterra (potencia marítima y comercial que siendo una pequeña islita conquistó un imperio, tierra inconquistable a menos que se derrote a su flota antes, etc...).
Pues sí.

Pero yo creo que lo de los ingleses con Venecia es romanticismo puro. Despues de que Byron fuera a Venecia, durante todo el XIX y buena parte del XX, todo joven de fortuna debía visitar Venecia. ¿Recuerdas en la serie Retorno a Brideshead como van a Venecia?

200px-Brideshead_Revisited_.jpg


Normal que tengan una pájara con Venecia.
 
Fodoron said:
Hombre. Yo sí lo recomiendo. Es un muy buen libro sobre Venecia, pero si te interesa el tema no debería ser el único.

Si único no lo sería, pero la mayoría que encuentro pues es lo típico, sobre el comercio medieval-moderno mediterráneos con la importancia veneciana, el sistema italiano de Ciudades-Estado, las guerras del XVI por el control de Italia,... Pero pocos centrados únicamente en la historia de Venecia, asi que si lo recomiendas (y me fio, de momento, de ti, jejeje) lo adquiriré cuando pueda.

Gracias por la recomendación ;)
 
Capítulo Cuarto: La adquisición de Chipre (1489)

En 1489 tuvo lugar un hecho que los venecianos todavía celebran. La adquisición de Chipre. Varias décadas de esfuerzos dieron resultado.

Los venecianos son sospechosos de haber envenenado a Jacques II Lusignan, para que la corona pasara a manos de su esposa, la veneciana Caterina Cornaro.

Hubo un complot de los catalanes residentes en la isla para entregar a la joven viuda y la próspera isla al rey de Nápoles, que fracasó. Los venecianos decidieron entonces forzar la abdicación de Caterina Cornaro en la Signoria. Se hizo en Venecia con gran pompa y circumstancia, y Chipre pasó a ser parte de Venecia de forma pacífica.

Aquí están algunas de las fotos que encontré sobre la recreación del magno acontecimiento:

1489CornaroHayez.jpg


Cuadro de Francesco Hayez (1791-1882), que representa la entrevista entre el senador Giorgio Cornaro y su hermana Caterina en la que la convence de abdicar en la República.
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barbarigo.jpg


El dogo Agostino Barbarigo, que se apuntó el tanto.
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cornarovassillacchi.jpg


"El desembarco de Caterina Cornaro en Venecia", del artista de Milos, Antonion Vassilacchi (alias Aliense, 1556-1629), que fue contemporáneo de El Greco, y vivió en Venecia casi toda su vida.
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moderndoge.jpg


Otro "retrato" del Dogo Agostino Barbarigo.
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modernCornaro.jpg


Cuatro embajadores (Siria, Persia, Egipto y Turquía) escoltan junto a ocho camareras a Caterina Cornaro, que se sienta en una silla de mano llevada por ocho esclavos moros.
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ModernCornaro2.jpg




cornarodonation.jpg


Bajorelieve del monumento funerario de Caterina Cornaro en la iglesia de San Salvatore.
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ModernCornaro3.jpg


La procesión completa. Las doncellas, los cuatro embajadores, el capitano della mare y el escuadrón de Schiavoni, saliendo de la basílica de San Marcos.
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