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Sunforged General

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Nov 8, 2017
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Do you think the Warsaw Uprising could have been successful in 1944 if the Soviets wouldn't have been dicks and actually supported the uprising? Considering that when the uprising started, the Soviets were practically in the outskirts of Warsaw. If so, what does this mean for Germany, do the Soviets get across the entire vistula river faster and put them on course to Berlin sooner than what happened historically?
 
Soviets could indeed help the Uprising. They could send in enough troops there (with possible slight losses) to help Warsaw to at least hold out and maybe make Nazis to give up on recapturing the city, retreating from it instead of smashing the Uprising. There weren't really much military reasons that prevented it.
But of course from political POV Soviets had no desire for Poland to free itself. In that case, they would handle legitimacy to exiled government and AK - kind of like happened in France. What happened is that Nazis stomped them, they decisively lost and their only possible liberator remained USSR along with AL (Armiya Lyudova), thus giving communists decisive credit for liberating Poland.
do the Soviets get across the entire vistula river faster and put them on course to Berlin sooner than what happened historically?
Doubt it. Capturing and holding city is one thing, but they weren't indeed ready to push frontier like that. Maybe they could attack a bit sooner, but not much. The key issue was political and Soviets just didn't do anything for Uprising, which is not great... but then again, Uprising counting on Soviets was also a bad decision (unless they were lied to by Soviets deliberately). They should have counted more on possibility of Soviets screwing with them
 
Soviets could indeed help the Uprising. They could send in enough troops there (with possible slight losses) to help Warsaw to at least hold out and maybe make Nazis to give up on recapturing the city, retreating from it instead of smashing the Uprising. There weren't really much military reasons that prevented it.
But of course from political POV Soviets had no desire for Poland to free itself. In that case, they would handle legitimacy to exiled government and AK - kind of like happened in France. What happened is that Nazis stomped them, they decisively lost and their only possible liberator remained USSR along with AL (Armiya Lyudova), thus giving communists decisive credit for liberating Poland.

Doubt it. Capturing and holding city is one thing, but they weren't indeed ready to push frontier like that. Maybe they could attack a bit sooner, but not much. The key issue was political and Soviets just didn't do anything for Uprising, which is not great... but then again, Uprising counting on Soviets was also a bad decision (unless they were lied to by Soviets deliberately). They should have counted more on possibility of Soviets screwing with them
Radio broadcasts from Moscow did indeed call on the people of Warsaw to rise up against the Germans as the Soviet armies approached the city. Stalin did the poles dirty.
 
Stalin did the poles dirty.
I am not a fan of Soviets, but in this instance Poles were the ones who made main mistake. The fact Soviets provoked it or didn't support them is just Poles who failed to have full understanding of situation (with Soviet help). This is not like in case of 1939, with USSR effectively backstabbing Poland, but it was now a choice of USSR to not be active, which is mostly only morally bad. Uprising in theory could wait until Soviets start forcing Vistula and actively assault front line, especially because Uprising wasn't done by USSR's friends.
 
I am not a fan of Soviets, but in this instance Poles were the ones who made main mistake. The fact Soviets provoked it or didn't support them is just Poles who failed to have full understanding of situation (with Soviet help). This is not like in case of 1939, with USSR effectively backstabbing Poland, but it was now a choice of USSR to not be active, which is mostly only morally bad. Uprising in theory could wait until Soviets start forcing Vistula and actively assault front line, especially because Uprising wasn't done by USSR's friends.
I wouldn't call 1939 a backstabbing. It was more for preventing Germans from taking the whole Poland (which included territory Poland took after collapse of Russian Empire), it wouldn't be nice. This is what you get for having irresponsibly nationalistic government.
As for uprising, having Germans dealt with those people was the best possible decision considering thier bluntly hostile policy and rhetorics. They'd took all the glory to themselves and made a lot of trouble after the war, that's a no-no.
 
There weren't really much military reasons that prevented it.

There kinda was. Soviets were spread over a 1,000 km front, and had just advanced 500 km in a relatively short period. Vistula was a natural stopping point to allow everyone to catch up and re-set logistics. Crossing over to Warsaw immediately would not necessarily have been a Soviet victory. And even if it was, would have created a bulge and thrown Soviet plans elsewhere on the front into disarray.

While I am not saying there weren't cynical reasons for holding back, those were not the only reasons.

The uprising jumped the gun, alas.
 
I wouldn't call 1939 a backstabbing. It was more for preventing Germans from taking the whole Poland
Except for the fact that Soviets actively enabled partition.
which included territory Poland took after collapse of Russian Empire
Poland was a part of Russian Empire... Moreover, it argued that it only restored it's territory prior to partition (which probably also wasn't nice).
This is what you get for having irresponsibly nationalistic government.
Dunno about exact wording, but yes, their inner and foreign policy did it to them.
They'd took all the glory to themselves and made a lot of trouble after the war, that's a no-no.
Regardless if they were stupid, smart, good or bad it was the best solution for Soviets because they weren't Red.
And they should have known.

There kinda was. Soviets were spread over a 1,000 km front, and had just advanced 500 km in a relatively short period. Vistula was a natural stopping point to allow everyone to catch up and re-set logistics. Crossing over to Warsaw immediately would not necessarily have been a Soviet victory. And even if it was, would have created a bulge and thrown Soviet plans elsewhere on the front into disarray.

While I am not saying there weren't cynical reasons for holding back, those were not the only reasons.

The uprising jumped the gun, alas.
Agreed. I just point out that Soviets would quite often do it (like assaulting Kiev before anniversary of October Revolution), so it wasn't a thing that would truly stop them if they wanted. Not that they had any reason to want it though.

The question is that political reasoning probably was main one, and the question is why Uprising really jumped the gun and if they believed in Soviets... or fatally miscalculated.
 
No. The Soviets could have helped the Warsaw Uprising but given relations between the Prewar Polish Government and the Soviet Union it was never going to happen. Operation Tempest was deliberately organised so that the Polish Home army could liberate Poland without the Soviets as much as possible which would allow Poland the ability in the Post war period to have a government with a much freer hand when dealing with the Soviets. Any idea that the Soviets would actually genuinely try to help them ignores the surrounding political and military situation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wouldn't have a possible hostile neighbour on their western Border again lest they were to find themselves in the same situation as 1941. The Poles didn't jump any kind of gun on the issue. They struck in Warsaw at the only opportunity they had when they might have been able to make a difference. The Soviet at the end of a supply train that left their ability to move in and suppress the Poles as they had a Lviv more difficult and the Germans reeling after the Soviet Offensive. The only problem is that the Soviet hadn't managed to wreck enough of the German army during their westward offensive which left the German army strong enough to react to the uprising. The Home army took their chance but the dice came up poorly. Any suggestion of the Soviets helping Warsaw seriously is a joke. Stalin had no intention of allowing a free Polish state after the last 25 years of history so he didn't.
 
No. The Soviets could have helped the Warsaw Uprising but given relations between the Prewar Polish Government and the Soviet Union it was never going to happen. Operation Tempest was deliberately organised so that the Polish Home army could liberate Poland without the Soviets as much as possible which would allow Poland the ability in the Post war period to have a government with a much freer hand when dealing with the Soviets. Any idea that the Soviets would actually genuinely try to help them ignores the surrounding political and military situation of the Soviet Union. The Soviet Union wouldn't have a possible hostile neighbour on their western Border again lest they were to find themselves in the same situation as 1941. The Poles didn't jump any kind of gun on the issue. They struck in Warsaw at the only opportunity they had when they might have been able to make a difference. The Soviet at the end of a supply train that left their ability to move in and suppress the Poles as they had a Lviv more difficult and the Germans reeling after the Soviet Offensive. The only problem is that the Soviet hadn't managed to wreck enough of the German army during their westward offensive which left the German army strong enough to react to the uprising. The Home army took their chance but the dice came up poorly. Any suggestion of the Soviets helping Warsaw seriously is a joke. Stalin had no intention of allowing a free Polish state after the last 25 years of history so he didn't.

Agree with you and let us not forget that now Stalin had the chance to have the Polish resistance who was suported by the western allies crushed by the Germans.This EVIL BASTARD had already killed a great deal of the Polish officers corps and inteligentsia in Katyn.
 
I wouldn't call 1939 a backstabbing. It was more for preventing Germans from taking the whole Poland (which included territory Poland took after collapse of Russian Empire), it wouldn't be nice. This is what you get for having irresponsibly nationalistic government.
As for uprising, having Germans dealt with those people was the best possible decision considering thier bluntly hostile policy and rhetorics. They'd took all the glory to themselves and made a lot of trouble after the war, that's a no-no.

Ever heard about the R-M Pact? :rolleyes:

Back to the topic.
Of course, the Soviets had no interest to help AK in the uprising, which strategical goal was actually clearly anti-Soviet in the first case. They were also pretty extended in their supply train after the last offensive. Moreover, the German successfully counter attacked near Warsaw in the eve of the uprising.
There was no point for the Soviets to keep and defend the bridgehead when their perspective for the next offensive should be counted in months.
AK never controlled the whole city during the uprising, main communication axis were successfully defended by the Germans, especially those leading to the bridges on Vistula river.
On the other hand, it doesn't change the fact, that in 1944 both Poland and the USSR were avctually ALLIES. But the Soviets even banned British planes, trying to bring some supplies, to land on their airfields...
Anyway, the decision of AK's HQ was nothing else than the utter blunder, their incompetence in all measures: strategic, military, tactical or logistical, is just terryfing. They all should be sued and convicted, or better doomed to oblivion, not placed on monuments or street name plates...
 
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To me a lot of the narrative around the Warsaw Uprising and the Soviets is based on a notion that the Germans were basically incapable of serious resistance from mid-1944 onward.

Which discounts a wealth of experience like the stiff resistance around Budapest, the Balaton Offensive, the counter-attacks in Silesia, and the Oder-Neisse offensive, where the Soviets again used a river line to stop, reorganise, and secure the flanks before proceeding.

The Soviets were scared of screw-ups and of flying headfirst into German counterattacks, as they had done umpteen times over the previous years.
 
Not only Abdul is right in saying the uprising jumped the gun, the decision maker knew this at that time that they are making bad military decision because of non-military reasons.

The capture wouldn't matter militarily. Vistula (as was usual Soviet doctrine) was forced on the march, to the south.

There were some attempts to reinforce the uprising (by Polish Army fighting alongside Soviets). It was rather hard, as alluded above. And in any case, the Home Army plan about acting as a owners and government was a pipe dream due to this:

Both Soviets and Home Army were enemies and they knew it. Things like Moscow Radio baiting Poles to uprising is in this context silly. So is treating the situation as if they were allies.

They were not. Barely co-belligerents.
 
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Actually, the Soviets allready had bridgeheads across the Vistula.

In the wake of the successful Operation Bagration, the 1st Belorussian Front managed to secure two bridgeheads west of the Vistula river between 27 July and 4 August 1944.[4] The Soviet forces remained inactive during the failed Warsaw uprising that started on 1 August, though their frontline was not far from the insurgents. The 1st Ukrainian Front captured an additional large bridgehead at Sandomierz (known as the Baranow bridgehead in German accounts), some 200 km south of Warsaw, during the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vistula–Oder_Offensive

The reason for not helping the Armia Krajowa was political.
The Armia Krajowa was all that stood in the way of Stalin controlling Poland after the war. If the Germans took care of this problem for him, the better.
Therefore, no intervention.
 
Actually, the Soviets allready had bridgeheads across the Vistula.

In the wake of the successful Operation Bagration, the 1st Belorussian Front managed to secure two bridgeheads west of the Vistula river between 27 July and 4 August 1944.[4] The Soviet forces remained inactive during the failed Warsaw uprising that started on 1 August, though their frontline was not far from the insurgents. The 1st Ukrainian Front captured an additional large bridgehead at Sandomierz (known as the Baranow bridgehead in German accounts), some 200 km south of Warsaw, during the Lvov–Sandomierz Offensive

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Vistula–Oder_Offensive

The reason for not helping the Armia Krajowa was political.
The Armia Krajowa was all that stood in the way of Stalin controlling Poland after the war. If the Germans took care of this problem for him, the better.
Therefore, no intervention.

And the Germans contained them there. The Soviets tried and failed to break out of those bridgeheads (Non-Wiki).

I don't see the ease you seem to be suggesting.

As the non-Wiki reference points out, the Warsaw uprising failed "after only a few hours". No bridges, no strongpoints taken, pretty quickly contained. After that, merely a slaughter.

It would have required a concerted offensive, which the Soviets were not prepared and likely to fail. The Polish resistance forces inside Warsaw could do nothing to help Soviets. The uprising didn't even tie up many German forces or apparently affect German operations.
 
Pithorr said

"Of course, the Soviets had no interest to help AK in the uprising, which strategical goal was actually clearly anti-Soviet in the first case. They were also pretty extended in their supply train after the last offensive. Moreover, the German successfully counter attacked near Warsaw in the eve of the uprising.
There was no point for the Soviets to keep and defend the bridgehead when their perspective for the next offensive should be counted in months."

As said, the soviets allready had bridgeheads. They did not try to break out after they failed. They planned to use them for the next offensive.

The Armia Krajowa did control Warzaw on the western side of the river. Theoretically, another bridgehead would have been possible. But the Soviets never tried.

You say
It would have required a concerted offensive, which the Soviets were not prepared and likely to fail.

The question is, why didn´t they try anyway? Just because they were not prepared? Or did it have political reasons? Fact is, the Soviets did not do a thing. The only units that tried to help were polish troops serving in the soviet army. I am certain that the soviets could have mustered enough troops to get into contact with the Armia Krajowa. They did not want to.

had the Polish Home Army triumphed, the Polish government-in-exile would have had legitimacy to continue the pre-war government in Poland, rendering the post-war Polish-communists regime invalid and likely rejected in all of the pre-war Polish areas thus far liberated by the Red Army (the news of planned Warsaw Uprising is likely one of the reason of speeding up the installation of communist regime on 22 July 1944 in Lublin). Also the destruction of the main Polish resistance forces by the Germans was of direct benefit to Soviet Union, since it significantly weakened any potential Polish opposition to planned (and already started) Soviet occupation. Halting the advance and taking Warsaw in January 1945 enabled the Soviets to say they "liberated" Warsaw.

If the Soviets would have supported the uprising when it started, It probably would have resulted in the liberation of Warzaw. But there were political reasons for not doing so.
 
As said, the soviets allready had bridgeheads. They did not try to break out after they failed. They planned to use them for the next offensive.

According to non-Wiki, they did try to expand & break out of bridgeheads and were repulsed.

The question is, why didn´t they try anyway? Just because they were not prepared? Or did it have political reasons? Fact is, the Soviets did not do a thing. The only units that tried to help were polish troops serving in the soviet army. I am certain that the soviets could have mustered enough troops to get into contact with the Armia Krajowa. They did not want to.

AK didn't get in contact with Soviets either. The whole thing was screw up from the start.

had the Polish Home Army triumphed,

Which they wouldn't have, in any conceivable scenario. You cannot throw unarmed kids at troops and hope to succeed.

the Polish government-in-exile would have had legitimacy to continue the pre-war government in Poland,

Polish government-in-exile would have been fuggered whatever happened with the Warsaw Rising.

Whether the Soviets entered then or months later wouldn't make a difference on the political front - the Soviets would have liberated Warsaw in both scenarios.

rendering the post-war Polish-communists regime invalid

Invalid by whom? You think suddenly Stalin would have agreed to that?

and likely rejected in all of the pre-war Polish areas thus far liberated by the Red Army

By whom? Whose opinion do you think matters here?

Also the destruction of the main Polish resistance forces by the Germans was of direct benefit to Soviet Union, since it significantly weakened any potential Polish opposition to planned (and already started) Soviet occupation.

True. Which makes starting this whole uprising an even bigger miscalculation by the Polish home government.

Halting the advance and taking Warsaw in January 1945 enabled the Soviets to say they "liberated" Warsaw.

They would have said it if they liberated it in August or September 1944 or any other time.

If the Soviets would have supported the uprising when it started, It probably would have resulted in the liberation of Warzaw. But there were political reasons for not doing so.

And so, apparently, you also admit the Soviets would have liberated Warsaw then?

So let's get the gist of your argument:

(1) You don't want the Soviets to liberate Warsaw.
(2) You chide the Soviets for not liberating Warsaw.
 
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Pithorr said

"Of course, the Soviets had no interest to help AK in the uprising, which strategical goal was actually clearly anti-Soviet in the first case. They were also pretty extended in their supply train after the last offensive. Moreover, the German successfully counter attacked near Warsaw in the eve of the uprising.
There was no point for the Soviets to keep and defend the bridgehead when their perspective for the next offensive should be counted in months."

As said, the soviets allready had bridgeheads. They did not try to break out after they failed. They planned to use them for the next offensive.

The Armia Krajowa did control Warzaw on the western side of the river. Theoretically, another bridgehead would have been possible. But the Soviets never tried.

As I said before, AK didn't control Warsaw in any moment of the uprising.
Here is a map:
Powstanie_Warszawskie.png

Which is een not entirely precise. Because Al. Jerozolimskie (main W-E axis) were always under German control for the whole uprising.




The question is, why didn´t they try anyway? Just because they were not prepared? Or did it have political reasons? Fact is, the Soviets did not do a thing. The only units that tried to help were polish troops serving in the soviet army. I am certain that the soviets could have mustered enough troops to get into contact with the Armia Krajowa. They did not want to.

had the Polish Home Army triumphed, the Polish government-in-exile would have had legitimacy to continue the pre-war government in Poland, rendering the post-war Polish-communists regime invalid and likely rejected in all of the pre-war Polish areas thus far liberated by the Red Army (the news of planned Warsaw Uprising is likely one of the reason of speeding up the installation of communist regime on 22 July 1944 in Lublin). Also the destruction of the main Polish resistance forces by the Germans was of direct benefit to Soviet Union, since it significantly weakened any potential Polish opposition to planned (and already started) Soviet occupation. Halting the advance and taking Warsaw in January 1945 enabled the Soviets to say they "liberated" Warsaw.

If the Soviets would have supported the uprising when it started, It probably would have resulted in the liberation of Warzaw. But there were political reasons for not doing so.

What do you think, would it have mattered who "liberated" Warsaw when the Russians came with 3 million soldiers on Polish soil :rolleyes:
 
Back to the beginning
Do you think the Warsaw Uprising could have been successful in 1944 if the Soviets wouldn't have been dicks and actually supported the uprising?

Could they have supported the uprising? probably, considering they were not that far away. If they would have poured Resources into it, probably.
But as said, there were political reasons for not doing so.

Considering that when the uprising started, the Soviets were practically in the outskirts of Warsaw. If so, what does this mean for Germany, do the Soviets get across the entire vistula river faster and put them on course to Berlin sooner than what happened historically?
No, since the soviets were already across the river in different places, as i pointed out earlier. So, no need for another bridgehead. The soviets were also mostly at the end of their supply lines. So, no, supporting the Armia Krajowa would not have speeded up the advance on Berlin.

What do you think, would it have mattered who "liberated" Warsaw when the Russians came with 3 million soldiers on Polish soil :rolleyes:

It would have mattered to the polish. Same as it mattered to the french when it came to liberating Paris.

So let's get the gist of your argument:

(1) You don't want the Soviets to liberate Warsaw.
(2) You chide the Soviets for not liberating Warsaw.

no, and no! You should read my text again, since you obviously haven´t understood a single thing of what i was talking about.
 
It would have mattered to the polish. Same as it mattered to the french when it came to liberating Paris.

But France was really liberated by the British/Americans, while Poland actually conquested by the Russians. It really didn't matter who seized the capital.
And for sure not worth 200.000 civil casualties and lost the whole generation of the best youth. Plus that capital levelled to the ground in the end.
 
PARIS was officially liberated by the 2nd french armored division under Leclerc.The liberation of PARIS actually started August 19, when the "french forces of the interior" started an uprising. This was important for the french national pride and an important rally point to forget the defeat of 1940.

De Gaulle said it august 25


Why do you wish us to hide the emotion which seizes us all, men and women, who are here, at home, in Paris that stood up to liberate itself and that succeeded in doing this with its own hands?

No! We will not hide this deep and sacred emotion. These are minutes which go beyond each of our poor lives. Paris! Paris outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the French armies, with the support and the help of all France, of the France that fights, of the only France, of the real France, of the eternal France!

Since the enemy which held Paris has capitulated into our hands, France returns to Paris, to her home. She returns bloody, but quite resolute. She returns there enlightened by the immense lesson, but more certain than ever of her duties and of her rights.

I speak of her duties first, and I will sum them all up by saying that for now, it is a matter of the duties of war. The enemy is staggering, but he is not beaten yet. He remains on our soil.

It will not even be enough that we have, with the help of our dear and admirable Allies, chased him from our home for us to consider ourselves satisfied after what has happened. We want to enter his territory as is fitting, as victors.

This is why the French vanguard has entered Paris with guns blazing. This is why the great French army from Italy has landed in the south and is advancing rapidly up the Rhône valley. This is why our brave and dear Forces of the interior will arm themselves with modern weapons. It is for this revenge, this vengeance and justice, that we will keep fighting until the final day, until the day of total and complete victory.

This duty of war, all the men who are here and all those who hear us in France know that it demands national unity. We, who have lived the greatest hours of our History, we have nothing else to wish than to show ourselves, up to the end, worthy of France. Long live France!


So, liberating Paris themselves, at least officially, was important for french self-confidence.

It might not matter to you, but, at that time, it did matter to the majority of the french.