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PARIS was officially liberated by the 2nd french armored division under Leclerc.The liberation of PARIS actually started August 19, when the "french forces of the interior" started an uprising. This was important for the french national pride and an important rally point to forget the defeat of 1940.

De Gaulle said it august 25


Why do you wish us to hide the emotion which seizes us all, men and women, who are here, at home, in Paris that stood up to liberate itself and that succeeded in doing this with its own hands?

No! We will not hide this deep and sacred emotion. These are minutes which go beyond each of our poor lives. Paris! Paris outraged! Paris broken! Paris martyred! But Paris liberated! Liberated by itself, liberated by its people with the help of the French armies, with the support and the help of all France, of the France that fights, of the only France, of the real France, of the eternal France!

Since the enemy which held Paris has capitulated into our hands, France returns to Paris, to her home. She returns bloody, but quite resolute. She returns there enlightened by the immense lesson, but more certain than ever of her duties and of her rights.

I speak of her duties first, and I will sum them all up by saying that for now, it is a matter of the duties of war. The enemy is staggering, but he is not beaten yet. He remains on our soil.

It will not even be enough that we have, with the help of our dear and admirable Allies, chased him from our home for us to consider ourselves satisfied after what has happened. We want to enter his territory as is fitting, as victors.

This is why the French vanguard has entered Paris with guns blazing. This is why the great French army from Italy has landed in the south and is advancing rapidly up the Rhône valley. This is why our brave and dear Forces of the interior will arm themselves with modern weapons. It is for this revenge, this vengeance and justice, that we will keep fighting until the final day, until the day of total and complete victory.

This duty of war, all the men who are here and all those who hear us in France know that it demands national unity. We, who have lived the greatest hours of our History, we have nothing else to wish than to show ourselves, up to the end, worthy of France. Long live France!


So, liberating Paris themselves, at least officially, was important for french self-confidence.

It might not matter to you, but, at that time, it did matter to the majority of the french.

I meant mostly Warsaw. The French were lucky enough to be in the west for the self-confindence, Poles had no choice anyway and self-confindence wouldn't have helped them, was Warsaw liberated by themsleves or not.
 
I meant mostly Warsaw. The French were lucky enough to be in the west for the self-confindence, Poles had no choice anyway and self-confindence wouldn't have helped them, was Warsaw liberated by themsleves or not.

Well, Charles de Gaulle had excellent self-confidence. Have you ever seen his face?

17x.jpg


They say he is so smug because he knows the 100th name of God.
 
Funnily enough, Bradley was rather unenthusiastic about Paris uprising, because of strained logistical situation... feeding all these French, while he would prefer to supply pursuit divisions...
 
Funnily enough, Bradley was rather unenthusiastic about Paris uprising, because of strained logistical situation... feeding all these French, while he would prefer to supply pursuit divisions...

Yes, generals often are.
 
I understand that one American division withdrew its advance forces from Paris after driving the Germans from their vicinity and being hailed as heroes by the locals, just so Leclerc and the French troops could then step in as "liberators". By the time the French army showed up for the parade, the fighting was essentially already over. The soldier often needs to bend to the needs and goals of politics, rather than strategy.

As said in numerous posts above, the Soviets were not well prepared at the time to assist the Poles (the existing bridgeheads were not all that close, and would have required a significant push to link up with the city), had no political motivation to do so (the Russians and Poles were on very poor terms, especially after a failed Soviet invasion only a decade or two before, as well as the effects of the M-R Pact), and not a lot of military reason either (the Polish uprising did not seriously affect German operations). Denying UK assistance in the form of supplies was a crystal clear indication that they did not wish the uprising to succeed.

The Poles, on the other hand, were clearly aware of the narrow window of opportunity between the German and Soviet occupations, and hoped to make use of it before it closed again. Unfortunately for them, they had no realistic prospects of success, and even had they succeeded, Stalin would most likely have "liberated" the city from its liberators soon after anyway.
 
There kinda was. Soviets were spread over a 1,000 km front, and had just advanced 500 km in a relatively short period. Vistula was a natural stopping point to allow everyone to catch up and re-set logistics. Crossing over to Warsaw immediately would not necessarily have been a Soviet victory. And even if it was, would have created a bulge and thrown Soviet plans elsewhere on the front into disarray.

While I am not saying there weren't cynical reasons for holding back, those were not the only reasons.

The uprising jumped the gun, alas.

No, actually there wasn't. Admittedly in August the Soviets were overextended and in no shape to continue the offensive, but the situation was much different in September. In September 1944 the Red Army conducted several offensive operations in Poland, including the taking of right-bank part of Warsaw (Praga) and heavy battles at Vistula crossings and bridgeheads such as Magnuszew and Sandomierz. The men and materiel were definitely there to rescue Warsaw, the decision not to do it was entirely political.

Besides, at more or less the same time the Soviets attempted to lent their support to far more remote and isolated rebel group. I mean the Slovaks who rebelled in late summer of 1944. The Soviets were in far worse shape in southern Poland than around Warsaw, yet threw everything they could to relieve the Slovaks. This resulted in the nightmarish battle of Dukla Pass in which the unprepared Soviets forced their way to the south of the main Carpathian chain despite staggering loses.
 
60k casaualties are now staggering losses for a month of fighting on eastern front? :confused:

That wasn't a huge, strategic-level operation on large area. This was forcing a way through narrow mountain pass in a sector of tertiary importance.
 
No, actually there wasn't. Admittedly in August the Soviets were overextended and in no shape to continue the offensive, but the situation was much different in September. In September 1944 the Red Army conducted several offensive operations in Poland, including the taking of right-bank part of Warsaw (Praga) and heavy battles at Vistula crossings and bridgeheads such as Magnuszew and Sandomierz. The men and materiel were definitely there to rescue Warsaw, the decision not to do it was entirely political.

By mid September, when the Soviets eventually seized Praga, the uprising was technically dead.
 
By mid September, when the Soviets eventually seized Praga, the uprising was technically dead.

Best imaginable occasion to step in as liberators.