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The IS-2 frontal armor was 120mm thick sloped at 60 degrees. Trying to shoot through it is equivalent to 240mm due to the slope. Thats technically thicker than the King Tigers frontal armor, and we know for a fact the 90mm could not penetrate that. Bringing up Cold war Patton tanks is irrelevant, they used futuristic cold war ammo not available in WW2. Here is the schematics for the IS-2 showing 120mm armor at 60 degree angle. https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/IS-1_and_IS-2#/media/File:IS-2_scheme_of_armour.jpg
Mathematically, it is stronger than the Tiger IIs 150mm at a 50 degree angle.

According to the article text the 60 degree slope was 100mm just like T-54 production versions. The turret is much more weakly protected as well with exposed flat surface only 120mm thick.

The "futuristic" ammo was an early heat shell used in Vietnam (and obsolescent by then) rated to penetrate around 190mm @0 degrees.

As for Aluminum, basic research shows Russia is the worlds 2nd largest producer of Aluminum. America is 13th place, Canada 3d place. Russia had this massive amount even during WW2. If we take paradox interactive at their worth in research, they start the USSR off with 133 aluminum in HOI IV in 1936, I dont know how much that is in real life, but in game, I've never run out of aluminum, even if I spam aircraft.

I'm talking about period production, not modern or the intentionally distorted history of HoI4 where US is specifically and intentionally gimped in it's resource snd industrial potential. I don't have the books at hand at the moment, but I looked at the issue at some depth in 2016-17 and played a part in getting Japanese/SEA production increased in HoI4 (they actually had larger peak production than Soviets IIRC). But the takeaway for US was that if the devs felt like it then sky was the limit, few thousands of units would be justifiable for US.
 
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According to the article text the 60 degree slope was 100mm just like T-54 production versions. The turret is much more weakly protected as well with exposed flat surface only 120mm thick.

The "futuristic" ammo was an early heat shell used in Vietnam rated to penetrate around 190mm @0 degrees.



I'm talking about period production, not modern or the intentionally distorted history of HoI4 where US is specifically and intentionally gimped in it's resource snd industrial potential. I don't have the books at hand at the moment, but I looked at the issue at some depth in 2016-17 and played a part in getting Japanese/SEA production increased (they actually had larger peak production than Soviets IIRC). But the takeaway for US was that if the devs felt like it then sky was the limit, few thousands of units would be justifiable for US.
On the Schematics for the IS-2 model 1944, we see a 100(120)mm. What this means according to my research is that the armor was 120mm cast armor, but the soviets listed it as 100mm, because cast armor is weaker than rolled homogeneous armor used by most tanks, by approximately 10-15%. Toward the end of the war, the Soviets started using high hardness cast armor, so the IS-2s in producing in 1945 would have been ones with 120mm thick frontal plates, and with Steel nearly equivalent in strength to rolled homogeneous armor. Mathematically, the total protection of the IS-2 frontal hull armor for a model produced in 1945 would be about equivalent or slightly stronger than a Tiger IIs frontal armor. As for the turret armor, yes the turret cheeks were only 100mm, but the turret center was 100mm+a 60mm gun mantle, for a total thickness of 160mm, and rolled homogeneous armor was used on the turret. The 90mm gun can penetrate the turret of the IS-2, but only at mid to close range, while it cannot penetrate the frontal hull at all. The IS-2s 122mm gun can penetrate the Perishing's armor at any range.

For the aluminum, I reiterate that the USSR only needed lend lease because the Germans occupied much of western Russia. But in 1945, the Soviets have full control of their land and resources, they would have full access to their aluminum, which are some of the largest deposits of aluminum/Bauxite in the world.
 
On the Schematics for the IS-2 model 1944, we see a 100(120)mm. What this means according to my research is that the armor was 120mm cast armor, but the soviets listed it as 100mm, because cast armor is weaker than rolled homogeneous armor used by most tanks, by approximately 10-15%. Toward the end of the war, the Soviets started using high hardness cast armor, so the IS-2s in producing in 1945 would have been ones with 120mm thick frontal plates, and with Steel nearly equivalent in strength to rolled homogeneous armor. Mathematically, the total protection of the IS-2 frontal hull armor for a model produced in 1945 would be about equivalent or slightly stronger than a Tiger IIs frontal armor. As for the turret armor, yes the turret cheeks were only 100mm, but the turret center was 100mm+a 60mm gun mantle, for a total thickness of 160mm, and rolled homogeneous armor was used on the turret. The 90mm gun can penetrate the turret of the IS-2, but only at mid to close range, while it cannot penetrate the frontal hull at all. The IS-2s 122mm gun can penetrate the Perishing's armor at any range.

Sounds reasonable on account of armour thickness. I still think you are underappreciating the US gun and perhaps omitting that a new generation of AP ammo was introduced for it. With the T33* AP the 90mm M3 was fully equal to Soviet 100-122mm guns, and again with the HVAP it was at least as powerful as the 88mm/71 (and could definitely destroy a JS-2 from any range with a turret hit).

*According to Rexford's & Bird'd book, capable of penetrating 164mm@1500m.

For the aluminum, I reiterate that the USSR only needed lend lease because the Germans occupied much of western Russia. But in 1945, the Soviets have full control of their land and resources, they would have full access to their aluminum, which are some of the largest deposits of aluminum/Bauxite in the world.

Deposits don't matter that much here. Germans had very extensive deposits and completely fizzed out on expansion of their aluminium production. Aluminium has been described as electricity intensive resource, so you also need cheap and readily available power to refine it..

And the difference here isn't small, we are talking about a full order of magnitude. Soviet production barely took a hit in '41 and then slowly inched upwards, already catching up in 1943, so I don't think we can put the Germans at fault for the demand.

Anyway I found a link to the 1938-44 report, page 18 for aluminum: http://pubs.bgs.ac.uk/publications.html?pubID=B02927
 
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For the aluminum, I reiterate that the USSR only needed lend lease because the Germans occupied much of western Russia. But in 1945, the Soviets have full control of their land and resources, they would have full access to their aluminum, which are some of the largest deposits of aluminum/Bauxite in the world.

You are vastly underestimating the difficulty of turning aluminium ore (which is in heaps all over the world) into actual workable aluminium. As Antedilluvian Monster (great username btw) said, it requires a lot of electricity and water. It's quite sophisticated process. Besides, the whole industry was in its infancy in the pre-WW2 years (global production in 1940 was 800 000 tons, compared to the 60 000 000 tons for today acording to wiki). See here. Page 149 of the document. The table has data until 1940, the USSR was a very small player globally.

When I get home, I'll post some more data for further years from Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, it has great tabels for a bunch of raw materials and finished goods, including aluminium. You'll see the disparity is ridicilous, USSR wasn't playing in the same league as the USA - hell, I would say it was playing a whole different game. Give me a couple of hours.

Edit: I was too slow it would seem. Still, US and USSR aren't even close regarding aluminium production.
 
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In the event of a war breaking out over Eastern Europe, the first thing the Allies would do is pardon and re-equip any Germans who wanted to help turn back the Russian invasion. They would get a fair number of experienced officers and men that way. Even though the German manpower pool was at least as drained as the Russian, it would be a significant boost to immediate combat power.

To start that sort of war you'd really need Stalin to launch an offensive against the West. Anything smaller, like one US general causing a 'shots fired' incident, would be squashed and resolved diplomatically. The US was focused on the Pacific and everyone else in the Allied camp focused on peace and reconstruction; there was a recognition that handing over Eastern Europe to the Russians was not ideal but no appetite to continue combat operations and take millions of more casualties over it.

The Allies greatest problem was supply, especially petroleum products. The Soviet's greatest problem was also getting supplies forward to their troops, but those men are more accustomed to doing without than their Western counterparts. With whatever remains of the armies of Germany, Italy and the minor eastern nations switching over to the Allied side (an assumption not perhaps founded on fact) I think the Allies could blunt or just withdraw before a Soviet offensive, wait for it to reach its stop line and then grind it down and throw it back. Since no-one is really ready for another all-out war in Europe, the diplomats would get busy, secure some concessions in each direction and hang whoever started it and/or was convenient.

Don't forget it wasn't just Patton but Churchill who explored the possibility of going after the Soviets, to the same conclusion: no way to get anything of strategic value and not much way to achieve success without massive casualties, and a serious risk of defeat.



Just my opinion here:

Patton was an officer of the old-Army type, born and raised in the South and coming from a military family. While his interests included horses and shooting, they also included books, military history and biography, and modern armored warfare. His public persona was 'carefree, confident, hell-for-leather, blunt and bluff' but the man was not ignorant. He foresaw the possibility of a German counter-offensive in the winter of 1944 and had his staff prepare contingency plans, which other generals like Eisenhower did not. I would not describe him as an intellectual, but his letters to his wife contain many references to the books he was reading or had read. So - a bit narrow in focus, perhaps, but not unintelligent.

The great preoccupation for Allied corps and army-level generals on the Western Front was how to get to Berlin first, or at least ahead of the Russians. That was the driving force behind Montgomery's 'Market-Garden' fiasco and a central concern for Patton, whose plans were denied. Added to the luster of being the first into the enemy capital (remember the pull of Rome on Allied strategy after Salerno, and its effects on Anzio) would be the professional pride of getting there ahead of the Russians. From that it is a short leap to think about planning for contingencies... the US had prepared plans for war with Britain; I'm sure the man who saw the 'Battle of the Bulge' coming would have thought about what his troops should do if attacked.

It would be obvious to anyone in 1944-45 that the only two powers left standing who had a substantial military economy and who could field a sizable army were the US and the USSR - Britain was exhausted, France, Germany and Italy in ruins and Japan shortly to go under. And it would be entirely in character for an officer like Patton, who relished leading men in combat, to propose extending the current war to the biggest opponent available. But any serious attempt by him to start a new, intramural war would have been stopped by his subordinates, scuttled by his superiors (Bradley and Eisenhower), unsupported by Montgomery and Britain, and stamped out by the diplomats.

So... was Patton ignorant? No. An old-school officer of the American-Southern-Junker type, perhaps, interested in riding and shooting and women. Brash and blunt and swaggering in public, more sensitive in private (as shown by his letters to his wife). Well-read in military matters, a gifted strategic thinker and a good combat leader. Narrow, not stupid; enjoying being a general of a mighty army on a great crusade but no fool; engaging in a bit of rough talk - 'that guy over there, think I could take him? What about that guy' - but not crazy. Strategic minded - 'one of us will run the world after this is over; us or the Russians?' - but not rash enough to go against his orders and start something on his own.

George Marshall looked for officers who were cheerful, confident and competent - in other words, men who could deal with whatever situation they found without complaint, lead their troops confidently and deliver results. Patton, despite his breakdown mid-war (which the Army was willing to treat and ignore until a reporter made it front-page news) was one of those.

Baseball player Ernie Banks once said, 'Hey fellows - it's a nice day; let's play two!' George Patton was in his element at a great moment in history; he knew it wans't going to happen but he couldn't resist saying, 'Let's play two!'
 
Yes, but that was (for the most part) before Soviet troops occupied German territory. And it was especially an anti-Nazi movement aiming to liberate Germany from Nazism. In the scenario above this is already accomplished (and the movement most likely dissolved which happened according to wiki in November '45 - this depends of course how "immediate" the US would have attacked).
If the Americans can snuggle up to the ex Nazis then so can the Russians.

Russians used to greatly admire Prussia and its ways, before WW2. Basically, Russians used to think that any item from Germany was inherently superior to anything made in Russia, and that Russia should for its own good try to emulate as many German social concepts as the specifically Russian conditions allowed.

It wouldn't take much (in the scenario of Operation Unthinkable) to make Stalin think "oh crap the allies are attacking me, I will lose unless I get the fearsome Germans to fight on my side, and I will do anything
it takes to achieve that."

I don't think Stalin would have hesitated to offer the Germans a sweet political deal in exchange for their support. Something like, we let the NKFD re-organize the German armed forces without any interference, and we let them write the program for what Germany's political and social system should be after the war without forcing any kind of communism or socialism on them. He even encourages them to reembrace the old style authoritarian Prussian ideals, which the western allies are so vehemently opposed to. The former German political leaders (non-nazi ones) like mayors, state ministers, etc all get released from POW camps, prison or house arrest or whatever, and Stalin puts them back in charge of administering the part of Germany that he controls. All collectivization efforts cease immediately. Walter Ulbricht and his gang of Moscow exiles would be scooped up and put onto a train back to Moscow. The Poles are told to stop evicting Germans from Silesia Pomerania, and the Soviet eviction of civilians from east Prussia ceases as well.

This would basically remove all the ideological problems that the German leaders could have with the idea of fighting alongside the Soviets who only just defeated them. Whether the Germans line up with Stalin or with the Allies would then only boil down to a question of who they think will be the more likely side to win.
 
Still a little confused as to how anyone believes the Allies can win a situation like this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victo...File:Allied_army_positions_on_10_May_1945.png

With 10 allied armies vs 46 Soviet armies, not to mention if the Allies attack they have to attack over the Elbe river, giving the Soviets the defenders advantage. This map shows the Allies have no strategic reserves, if the Soviets crush them on the Front lines, the allies have no armies in the rear to back them up, while the Soviets have tons and tons of reserve armies.
 
You are vastly underestimating the difficulty of turning aluminium ore (which is in heaps all over the world) into actual workable aluminium. As Antedilluvian Monster (great username btw) said, it requires a lot of electricity and water. It's quite sophisticated process. Besides, the whole industry was in its infancy in the pre-WW2 years (global production in 1940 was 800 000 tons, compared to the 60 000 000 tons for today acording to wiki). See here. Page 149 of the document. The table has data until 1940, the USSR was a very small player globally.

When I get home, I'll post some more data for further years from Wages of Destruction by Adam Tooze, it has great tabels for a bunch of raw materials and finished goods, including aluminium. You'll see the disparity is ridicilous, USSR wasn't playing in the same league as the USA - hell, I would say it was playing a whole different game. Give me a couple of hours.

Edit: I was too slow it would seem. Still, US and USSR aren't even close regarding aluminium production.
Perhaps I'm not an expert on aluminum production, but I'd like to point out that after the first 2 five year plans, the USSR was the second most industrious nation on the planet. Germany only temporarily surpassed them again when they captured the industries of France, Western Poland, Denmark, Norway, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Suffice to say, that the USSR had all the aluminum it needed for its military aircraft production, and the USA's surplus of aluminum is of little use to them, since their factories were already producing Aircraft at maximum capacity, more aluminum does not magically give them the ability to produce more aircraft.
 
Very true.

The West does not truly appreciate the genius of the Soviet air factories. Look at the brilliant airplane they built by themselves, the Tupelov Tu-4. Very advanced for its time, revolutionary. A credit to Soviet air science.

And Soviet plane made of Stalinium, very strong plane. Good plane. No western bullet can penetrate steel reinforced with the conviction of the People.

It takes a truly great power to make a plane like that. Right, Comrade?
 
App
Very true.

The West does not truly appreciate the genius of the Soviet air factories. Look at the brilliant airplane they built by themselves, the Tupelov Tu-4. Very advanced for its time, revolutionary. A credit to Soviet air science.

It takes a truly great power to make a plane like that. Right, Comrade?
Try the Petlyakov Pe-8, a truly home grown Soviet long range bomber from the 30s. Something Germany never could hope to match, or even copy, apparently. As Germany never even got far enough to deploy strategic bombers.
 
App

Try the Petlyakov Pe-8, a truly home grown Soviet long range bomber from the 30s. Something Germany never could hope to match, or even copy, apparently. As Germany never even got far enough to deploy strategic bombers.

Yes. Great and Powerful Soviet Union built 93 4-engine heavy bombers during WWII. Very impressive.

In Detroit, they called that 'Tuesday'.

Seriously, one Ford plant alone produces 1 B-24 an hour. That is not all the bomber plants, that is just one of them.
 
Yes. Great and Powerful Soviet Union built 93 4-engine heavy bombers during WWII. Very impressive.

In Detroit, they called that 'Tuesday'.
Better than Germany, who couldn't even build 1. But really, what does it matter in the context of this threat, America did not field a bomber that could fly to the Ural mountains and attack Soviet industry. So in this war, Americans bombers are worth nothing.
 
Still a little confused as to how anyone believes the Allies can win a situation like this.

https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Victo...File:Allied_army_positions_on_10_May_1945.png

With 10 allied armies vs 46 Soviet armies, not to mention if the Allies attack they have to attack over the Elbe river, giving the Soviets the defenders advantage. This map shows the Allies have no strategic reserves, if the Soviets crush them on the Front lines, the allies have no armies in the rear to back them up, while the Soviets have tons and tons of reserve armies.
Maybe check how many men and equipment each of the 10 allied armies and each of the 46 soviet armies represent ?
 
Better than Germany, who couldn't even build 1. But really, what does it matter in the context of this threat, America did not field a bomber that could fly to the Ural mountains and attack Soviet industry. So in this war, Americans bombers are worth nothing.
No, but they did field a bomber that was just out of range of the Urals, and the British still had a huge fleet of Lancaster's which could hit the Urals. The allies don't need to hit the Urals, they can hit the infrastructure in between and prevent any 'industry' from having its effects felt this side of Moscow.
 
No, but they did field a bomber that was just out of range of the Urals, and the British still had a huge fleet of Lancaster's which could hit the Urals. The allies don't need to hit the Urals, they can hit the infrastructure in between and prevent any 'industry' from having its effects felt this side of Moscow.
The Lancaster cannot fly from France or Western Germany to the Ural mountains and back. It would have to be a one way trip. Losing 100% of bombers you send out might be an impossible strategy to maintain. Bombing infrastructure is possible, but fixing railroad tracks can be done cheaper than it costs to make the bombs used to bomb them. And it can be done overnight. Fixing railroad tracks was seen to be possible literally overnight.
 
delightful

What I love about this forum is that by having opinions from around the world you learn things you might not otherwise.

For example, on BBC today there is an article on young Russians fed on propaganda aggrandizing Stalins military record while totally bypassing his legacy of tyranny and misery. The result is young Russians now truly admire a man who has been seen as a pariah by the entire world since the end of the war.

I can’t imagine a more perfect expalanation for this sun forged philosophy.
 
Perhaps I'm not an expert on aluminum production, but I'd like to point out that after the first 2 five year plans, the USSR was the second most industrious nation on the planet. Germany only temporarily surpassed them again when they captured the industries of France, Western Poland, Denmark, Norway, Austria and Czechoslovakia. Suffice to say, that the USSR had all the aluminum it needed for its military aircraft production, and the USA's surplus of aluminum is of little use to them, since their factories were already producing Aircraft at maximum capacity, more aluminum does not magically give them the ability to produce more aircraft.

I'm not sure what you point is. That the USSR is second most industrial state in the world (not sure what that means to you, which metrics are relevant, but whatever) doesn't change the fact that its aluminium production was on the level of Switzerland or Norway, not on the level of USA, UK or Germany.

USSR hat all the aluminium ore it needed, but not the smelting capacity. Building up the smelting capacitry takes time and investments, leaving the aircraft production with a shortage in the short term. Let's make a super-broad generalized back-of-the-napkin calculation. USSR produced cca 20% more aircraft per year than Germany per year between 1942 and 1944 (source Tooze, Wages of Destruction, table 17 on page 641). USSR also produced only about one third of refined aluminium compared to Germany (source here, page 18, courtesy of Antilleduvian Monster) However, while Germany had to be self-sufficient in regards to aluminium, USSR could (and did) import a LOT from USA through Lend-Lease. From our dirty calculation, it seems that USSR aircraft production relied from two thirds on imported aluminium (if an average Soviet and German plane takes same amount of aluminium and ther plane production is similar, while their aluminium production is vastly different, soviet aluminium shortfall has to be covered by imports). When imports stop, for example during a war with the exporter like we postulate in the thread, the Soviet airframe production must inevitably (barring stockpiles and reallocations of raw materials, of course) be cut down by two thirds until domestic production comes online.

Germany needed about ten years of buildup and investmens to get to the raw aluminium production level, where the USSR would need to be to feed its aircraft industry from domestic sources (sauce Tooze again, table A2, pages 680 and 681). Could it be done faster? Dunno, probably. But not in a couple of months, the project of that magnitude would take years. Which still leaves Soviet aircraft production with bleak short term perspective, if it had to cope with wartime production levels without imports from the USA.
 
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The Lancaster cannot fly from France or Western Germany to the Ural mountains and back.
Stop making things up. At the end of the war, the Avro Lancaster was capable of achieving 4000km with a half bomb load. The B29 was capable of much more.