Simple answer:
There is usually just two sources of legitimacy, the book and the sword, and in both aspects, the eunuch estate as a whole can never pose a real challenge towards the landed gentry.
In terns of the book, it is hardly possible for eunuchs to gain stronger ideological influence than the Confucian scholar officials unless with the favor of the emperor. In terms of the sword, castrated men who never receive military training were just not good warriors (unlike the Mamluks).
The issue of late Imperial China (Ming, Qing) is that there is only one single enormous estate, the landed gentry. They owned land, which is the ultimate source of wealth in China's agricultural economy, thus can keep snowballing by purchasing more land over generations. On the other hand, they controlled the empire's ideology and administration, so there is no one, except perhaps the emperor, who can stop them from snowballing.
Indeed, there are also military estates like hereditary nobles, garrison officials and non-Han Chinese militants. However, their power were usually marginalized and monitored by scholar officials.
So the major challenge for an ambitious emperor is to balance the influence of the landed gentry. This is done by stirring up conflicts among different fractions of scholar officials, as well as by promoting other estates against them. The eunuchs are the most simple option, as they can neither accumulate land over generations, nor they receive military training that allows them to challenge the emperor's rule (so they are different from the Mamluks).
In general, the eunuch estate as a whole is in a weak position as compared to the scholar officials. There were just individual powerful eunuchs, gaining political influence and widespread connections, whose authority cannot be inherited.
Yes they may block some reforms, but they really don't have that much interest in doing so as compared to the landed gentry.
If an individual eunuch managed to gain enough wealth that allows him to challenge the gentry (which is highly unlikely), in most of the case, he will pursue to purchase more land, adopt a son and make him one of the landed gentries, rather than to challenge the existing gentry estate. If he gains military power and influence, then he will probably depose the existing emperor and proclaim himself the new one.
Fun fact: the founder of the Jaunpur Sultanate, Malik Sarwar, was an eunuch. Instead of establishing an eunuch republic or a strong eunuch regency behind the Delhi Sultanate, he
decided to adopt a son and establish his dynasty. Who cares about the welfare of other eunuchs, afterall?
I generally agree with the core opinions of the esteemed
@GeneralNoob GeneralNoob,
@zeruosi, and
@Carcossa Castile, but I personally have some objections.
I. Here are my differing opinions:
First, regarding the statement
I have a different view. In fact, I find it rather odd, because your (
@GeneralNoob GeneralNoob) view in the first half of the sentence is clearly not the so-called “Ottoman decline thesis” that was popular before last century, yet the perspective on military matters does not seem to be that of the “Transformation” (although I do not entirely agree with this ambitious new academic paradigm, it is evidently better than the old one). The Ottoman state in the eighteenth century was certainly not in decline, but its military failures during this period cannot be entirely attributed to what you call “ janissaries” (in fact, a more appropriate term would be “yeniçer,” as they are part of the Kapıkulu Ocağı). One might even say that the reasons for the failure of the empire’s reforms (not only military) are more complex. First, the so-called military decline of the Kapıkulu Ocağı and the other Askerleri (note that they were not merely soldiers but also included, in theory, other personnel providing military services) was due partly to logistical reasons such as deficiencies in military equipment and partly to the often insufficient duration of professional Kapıkulu training (by convention they were supposed to train for six years, but at that time they were frequently forced into warfare after less than three years, still in their apprenticeship stage). Second, as you also mentioned, although Ottoman economic policies were indeed flexible and practically oriented, the economy was fragile and not robust, and the empire’s infrastructure was also poor, which restricted the state’s investment in and development of its military; third—and most importantly—the yeniçeri were dissatisfied with the formation of a modern army (interestingly, their name literally means “modern army”), and these dissenters were not only those who held the status of Askerleri and were nominally registered as yeniçeri, but also citizens engaged in non-military occupations such as handicrafts. Moreover, as current scholars maintain, these so-called military reforms failed for reasons beyond those mentioned. In fact, these reforms were typically endorsed and implemented only by the faction represented by the Grand Vizier appointed within the Ottoman Sultan’s government, the Bāb-ı Ālī, while other factions, citizens, Ulama, and Sheikhs often held different reform opinions and quarreled among themselves. Interestingly, at that time the Ottoman Empire was in what some historians call the “Second Empire” phase; in this period the Sultan himself did not possess the so-called supreme authority (in fact, he never did) and was more akin to the position of the UK’s Charles III, so they were frequently forced to suspend or alter these plans due to conflicting reform views, as well as pressing social, economic, and military setbacks.
Next is the statement
“I am not familiar enough with China, but I know that eunuchs as a faction were a similar problem as the janissaries in the 18th century. It is not even a never-before-heard story either. The Mamluks had the same fate post late 14th century.”
In fact, this surprised me even more. First, the sentence “It is not even a never-before-heard story either. The Mamluks had the same fate post late 14th century” is rather odd, because the so-called “Mamlukization of the Mamluk Sultanate” did not occur at the end of the 14th century. For example, before 1412, former slaves in the army only occasionally ascended to the sultanate, whereas after that, the position of Sultan was almost always held by Mamluks (between 1412 and the end of the regime in 1517, 14 out of 20 sultans were former military slaves, while in the earlier period, among 24 sultans, 18 were descendants of previous sultans and never had a slave background). According to recent Mamluk historiography, it is more like “as the state grew, the merit principle based on administrative and military abilities became increasingly important, which in turn fostered a need to explain the priority of these principles by justifying [Mamluk] legitimacy on the same merit basis.” Therefore, “at the end of the 14th century, the sons of the rulers seemed to be considered eligible for succession because of their bloodline, but by the end of the 15th century, such bloodline actually caused them to lose their legitimacy for succession.” That is, after 1412 and the eventual collapse of the Sultan al-Ẓāhir Barqūq dynasty’s plan (1382–1412)—the emblematic event of this phenomenon being the public execution of a Sultan in Damascus in 412—the political elite of central Syria–Egypt experienced a rupture in the traditional model of dynastic state formation. This traditional model was challenged in an unprecedented manner, giving rise to an alternative ideal of state authority that transcended the authority of individual families and the notion of a dynasty’s supreme status. In other words, the ruling families gradually became the focal point for power and resources, which fostered a national consciousness and led the groups participating in this political order to no longer be loyal to any particular royal family but rather to the political order itself. This emergence of a political order concept centered around a new narrative of legitimacy and its distinctiveness—accompanied by the bureaucratic service demands of new agents and institutions to reproduce it—is what this article refers to as the “Mamlukization” of the Mamluk Sultanate.
Next is the even more erroneous claim that
“castrated men who never receive military training were just not good warriors (unlike the Mamluks)”;
I feel I must state one thing:
the Mamluks were not castrated! In fact, the Mamluk state even had to station eunuchs (usually Ethiopians) in the barracks and schools to supervise, in order to prevent some Mamluk apprentices from sexually assaulting other apprentices. Furthermore, there were quite a number of the Mamluks’ descendants (usually referred to as Awlad Al-Nas, meaning “the children of the people”); although they theoretically could not inherit Mamluk status, they could pursue other professions and scholarly works (indeed, many Mamluks were also involved in academic endeavors) and exert influence. Research on them can be found in that [perhaps not very well-known] work
Mamluk Descendants In Search for the Awlad Al-Nas and other related papers.
II. Finally, here is my endorsement of the two outstanding opinions:
- The so-called decline of the Ottomans and the Ming is a rather complex situation and is not necessarily entirely related to being too large and unable to adapt to changes in the world. In fact, modern historians are still studying this issue, and they often marvel, “How could they (Imperial China/中华帝国, Osmanlı İmparatorluğu, Ῥωμαίων Πολιτεία, and Sacrum Imperium Romanum) have lasted for so long?”
- “Eunuchs have never been a social class.” I completely agree with this point. In fact, they are more like a special power group, just as one cannot consider the people of color in the court of Friedrich August I der Starke as an independent class (see the first article “Zwischen Sklaverei und Exotismus: People of Colour am Hof Augusts des Starken (r. 1694-1733) und Christiane Eberhardines (r. 1694-1727)” in the book Im Schatten der Macht: Subalterne Körper an Frühneuzeitlichen Fürstenhöfen); at best, they can only be regarded as a part of a larger group. Similarly, most regimes in Imperial Chinese history (including the Ming) were like this; their eunuchs did not wield the so-called “pen and sword,” nor were they responsible for production and economic operations as “farmers and merchants.” In truth, what were they more like? They were more akin to the eunuchs and servants employed by the Roman state (including the Republic, the Roman Principate, and the Byzantine period) and the “Great Kings” of the Iranian Bronze Age (forgive my use of this term): they were extensions of their master’s will, with their power largely derived from what was conferred by their master and hardly transferable by personal choice as a hereditary legacy to another person of the same occupation (just as the Patriarch of Constantinople could be arbitrarily removed by the Byzantine emperor), and they did not have heirs in the usual sense. In fact, even the Karaağalar (the chief eunuch of the Ottoman harem) and other black or white eunuchs of the highly powerful Ottoman Empire are hard to be regarded as a class, not to mention that the eunuchs attached to imperial power in Byzantium (although they could hold military positions—which seems somewhat better than in Imperial China, where they more often appeared as agents or harem staff) were even more formidable than the eunuchs of Imperial China (of course, we should note that the power of eunuchs in the early Ottoman Empire was actually not great).