What if France had actually extended the Maginot line

[Sunforged General]

All the way to the English Channel. What does Germany do? Attempt to punch their way through some of the strongest fortifications in human history, or invade Switzerland and get trapped in the mountain passes of death full of Swiss snipers. Can you see any way Germany defeats France in this scenario? From what I understand, France and Britain had the long term advantage since they had more than ample resources from their colonial empires, while Germany was always low on natural resources.

 

[bz249]

Since one of the purposes of the Maginot-line was to channel the German assault towards Belgium (shorter frontline, Belgium joins the Allies) that's not really strategically clever.

Moreover the Maginot-line was not meant to be unpenetrable. It was build because France lacked the border fortifacations at the 1920 border. The Maginot-line a.) provided protection against a sneak attack b.) in case of a major war gave France enough time to complete its mobilization.

Extending to the Channel (even if the terrain would have allowed it) helped for neither of these goals.

 

[pithorr]

Well, if not even to the very Channel, they could extend it along Ardennes at least, especially bearing in mind that, technically, they left this area unguarded

 

[Acheron]

"He who defends everything defends nothing." Even with fortifications, concentration of attacking force would have forced a breakthrough. French high command was IMHO just too plain incompetent.

 

[Avernite]

Well, if not even to the very Channel, they could extend it along Ardennes at least, especially bearing in mind that, technically, they left this area unguarded

The French did have a plan for defending the Ardennes route at some point, which consisted of lesser fortifications (in place historically) and a reserve army placed behind those fortifications. Those two together would have held against anything thrown through the Ardennes roads, as it simply couldn't sustain a large buildup. This idea seems sensible to me as it put these reserves in a spot unlikely to be attacked yet able to be redeployed into Belgium quickly, and the Ardennes really were no logistic highway.

The problem was that said reserve army was redirected, and so the fortifications had to hold out alone. The only thing bigger fortifications would have done is redirect said reserve army into forts, making the French army and command even less able to respond to events (and making the Breda variant even less possible), but making the Sedan option for Germany impossible.

Now, as it were, the French command got to react to some extent and botched it by directing reserves to a different place (some say too far north of the German attack, some say too far south; probably the basic issue is that they were redirected defensively so the Germans got to pick the precise thrust) where they did nothing useful, rather than to make up for the shortfall in the Sedan sector, but this is not the same as the area being unguarded. It became fairly unguarded when the defences in place were routed through perceived lack of reinforcement and massive Luftwaffe attacks, but as Acheron implies, the Germans could have disintegrated almost any single division in their path (and practically did, further north along the Dutch Waterlinie, as well).

 

[demanvanwezel]

another thing you'd get is that they'd make it clear that in case of a german invasion the belgians would stand alone as such they might as well give in inmediatly instead of futtily attempting to resist the germans (sort of like denmark did)

also the maginot line was expensive and ultimatly detrimental to the french army (they used draftees in the construction instead of training them to lower the price) and that's for the relatively short and straight german border, construcing diagonally along the belgian border would mean more then doubling the line

also and somebody correct me if I'm wrong, I think that the belgian border isn't suited for defensive positions like the vosges are

 

[Mder1]

Going through Switzerland to get to France is not as bad as you make it out to be. The Jura is the only thing that is a partial hindrance, you can simply ignore the Alps if your only goal is a way to France.

 

[pithorr]

Going through Switzerland to get to France is not as bad as you make it out to be. The Jura is the only thing that is a partial hindrance, you can simply ignore the Alps if your only goal is a way to France.

OK, and when you arrive to Frnace, you will find out that you are in the middle of nowhere

 

[Kovax]

The expense of building the Maginot defenses all the way to the sea would have meant far less money available for the military. Germany proved that the Maginot Line itself wasn't impenetrable, attacking and actually breaching it in at least one spot, with modest forces only intended to create a distraction. Since there was no follow-up force to exploit the breach, it didn't play into the bigger picture, but shows that the Germans could have simply gone through the line if no other option were to present itself and France had fewer forces to defend that line.

A defensive fortification is a force multiplier, but ultimately useless if there's not enough force to multiply. Throwing insane amounts of money into a fortification at the expense of sufficient force to actually USE the fortifications to their advantage would have made it relatively easy for Germany.

Compare that to Trump's wall: a modest barrier makes life a lot simpler for the border patrol, and allows them to do more with less manpower. It might even pay for itself over time. An extravagant wall that diverts large amounts of funding from the border patrol runs the risk of actually reducing security. Some "middle ground" is called for. France went for the Concrete Wall Deluxe, and much of it was already obsolete by the time it was completed, with firing positions designed for anti-tank guns which were incapable of piercing the newer generation of armor, for example. In the long run, it ended up simply diverting the attack to a relatively undefended sector, because France couldn't afford to construct more, and it would have alienated Belgium by leaving them exposed to Germany with no assistance from the French troops sitting behind their wall. How many more tanks and guns could France have fielded, and how many more men trained for combat, with the funds wasted on over-building that barricade? How many LESS would they have had with an extended wall? A barrier was a good idea, an epic construction project that practically bankrupted the country was uncalled for.

 

[Acheron]

the french army (they used draftees in the construction instead of training them to lower the price) and that's for the relatively short and straight german border, construcing diagonally along the belgian border would mean more then doubling the line

Another problem of the Line, it made France a suspect ally to Eastern European nations which were not protected by it. The Line enticed France to hide behind it, whatever happened on the other side of Germany. I understand that the Wehrmacht had very little in the way of troops opposing France during the Polish campaign, no?

 

[demanvanwezel]

Another problem of the Line, it made France a suspect ally to Eastern European nations which were not protected by it. The Line enticed France to hide behind it, whatever happened on the other side of Germany. I understand that the Wehrmacht had very little in the way of troops opposing France during the Polish campaign, no?

22 divisions apparantly but only 100 artillery pieces and almost no air support, considering that the french and british had about a 100 divisions they wouldn't have held

 

[pithorr]

22 divisions apparantly but only 100 artillery pieces and almost no air support, considering that the french and british had about a 100 divisions they wouldn't have held

You know, impenetrable mighty Siegfried Line... Unlike Maginot Line, it would have worked fine I suppose...

 

[Avernite]

22 divisions apparantly but only 100 artillery pieces and almost no air support, considering that the french and british had about a 100 divisions they wouldn't have held

If more than a handful of those 100 divisions had been able to execute an offensive, then maybe. But most French divisions weren't ready for that, and most of the British divisions were not yet in France.

 

[Acheron]

If more than a handful of those 100 divisions had been able to execute an offensive, then maybe. But most French divisions weren't ready for that, and most of the British divisions were not yet in France.

In how far were the French units unprepared to take the offensive? In war, it can be better to seize an opportunity even when not fully prepared, then finish your preparations and see the moment has passed. While you prepare, the enemy is unlikely to hold still.

 

[Avernite]

In how far were the French units unprepared to take the offensive? In war, it can be better to seize an opportunity even when not fully prepared, then finish your preparations and see the moment has passed. While you prepare, the enemy is unlikely to hold still.

Sure, and the French were preparing to seize the moment.

They just had counted on a lot more time to seize it in; if you expect to have 3 months to seize the moment (and maybe even more) you plan to seize it in 1.5/2 months at best, not in the 2 weeks needed to score a success in WW2.

 

[Acheron]

Sure, and the French were preparing to seize the moment.

They just had counted on a lot more time to seize it in; if you expect to have 3 months to seize the moment (and maybe even more) you plan to seize it in 1.5/2 months at best, not in the 2 weeks needed to score a success in WW2.

Did France really expect Poland to hold out 3 months all alone against the brunt of the German army?

 

[Avernite]

Did France really expect Poland to hold out 3 months all alone against the brunt of the German army?

Wiki suggests so, and that the Poles themselves expected to hold for 6.

Of course, the Germans' pace of operations and the addition of the Soviets made that vastly too optimistic.

 

[Kovax]

Poland was never even given the opportunity to properly mobilize. The Germans hit the airfields, then started damaging bridges, rails, communications lines, and major intersections, leaving Poland's already minimal infrastructure simply incapable of supporting a rapid mobilization anywhere near the front. By the time many of the reservists reached their units, the Germans were already there ahead of them. The pace of operations staggered the world. Then the Soviets invaded from the opposite side, against the token Polish forces remaining to hold that front. As said, Poland expected to hold for 6 months, France expected a more pessimistic 3 months, but nobody had any clue that it would be all but over in only 2 weeks.

Besides, France did do a brief sortie into German territory against the mostly ill-equipped German reservists stationed on the front, but it was into a relatively empty patch of land with no easy exits to any militarily relevant targets, so they withdrew and waited.

 

[Acheron]

Of course, the Germans' pace of operations and the addition of the Soviets made that vastly too optimistic.

Poland was never even given the opportunity to properly mobilize. The Germans hit the airfields, then started damaging bridges, rails, communications lines, and major intersections, leaving Poland's already minimal infrastructure simply incapable of supporting a rapid mobilization anywhere near the front. By the time many of the reservists reached their units, the Germans were already there ahead of them. The pace of operations staggered the world. Then the Soviets invaded from the opposite side, against the token Polish forces remaining to hold that front. As said, Poland expected to hold for 6 months, France expected a more pessimistic 3 months, but nobody had any clue that it would be all but over in only 2 weeks.

Question: by September 1939 the writing was pretty much on the wall, that Germany invaded Poland should not have dropped monocles anywhere. Wasn't the German army fully mobilized? If so, why weren't the allied armies fully mobilized? WWI came to pass because once one empire mobilized, everyone one did, too, because everyone knew that time was critical.

 

[demanvanwezel]

Poland was never even given the opportunity to properly mobilize. The Germans hit the airfields, then started damaging bridges, rails, communications lines, and major intersections, leaving Poland's already minimal infrastructure simply incapable of supporting a rapid mobilization anywhere near the front. By the time many of the reservists reached their units, the Germans were already there ahead of them. The pace of operations staggered the world. Then the Soviets invaded from the opposite side, against the token Polish forces remaining to hold that front. As said, Poland expected to hold for 6 months, France expected a more pessimistic 3 months, but nobody had any clue that it would be all but over in only 2 weeks.

Besides, France did do a brief sortie into German territory against the mostly ill-equipped German reservists stationed on the front, but it was into a relatively empty patch of land with no easy exits to any militarily relevant targets, so they withdrew and waited.

the french lost 2000 men in that sortie for some 650 germans, attempting to use a forest which was mined as staging ground isn't a smart move