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Question: by September 1939 the writing was pretty much on the wall, that Germany invaded Poland should not have dropped monocles anywhere. Wasn't the German army fully mobilized? If so, why weren't the allied armies fully mobilized? WWI came to pass because once one empire mobilized, everyone one did, too, because everyone knew that time was critical.

Actually, the Allies were forcing Poland several times to delay mobilization to "not challenge Hitler"...
Ultimately, it was announced only on 30th August with the date of mobilization on 31st August. And yes, it was a major blow for Poland's ability to defend.
 
Question: by September 1939 the writing was pretty much on the wall, that Germany invaded Poland should not have dropped monocles anywhere. Wasn't the German army fully mobilized? If so, why weren't the allied armies fully mobilized? WWI came to pass because once one empire mobilized, everyone one did, too, because everyone knew that time was critical.
It's also the context of the mobilisation - in the 1936-39 period, Germany expanded its ability to produce war material at a huge rate, spending around 25% of its GDP on military projects (North Korea levels of crazy). All of this came at the expense of the civilian sector which the western Allies were not willing to compete with.

What is telling is that this lack of investment in the civilian sector ultimately undermined its ability to wage war, with the peak of German offensive strength realised in mid 1941. After this,, the civilian economy simply couldn't keep up.
 
What is telling is that this lack of investment in the civilian sector ultimately undermined its ability to wage war, with the peak of German offensive strength realised in mid 1941. After this,, the civilian economy simply couldn't keep up.
When you divert steel from locomotive and truck manufacture to making guns and ammunition, don't be surprised if your transportation assets aren't up to the task of driving deep into Russia a few years later. Also, don't be surprised when the huge but backwards country you're trading tools and machinery to, for the raw materials to build up your war machine, decides to use those tools and machinery to build up its own even bigger war machine. Germany was gambling on knocking the western allies out of the war and turning on Russia before Russia became too strong to defeat, and lost that gamble.
 
When you divert steel from locomotive and truck manufacture to making guns and ammunition, don't be surprised if your transportation assets aren't up to the task of driving deep into Russia a few years later. Also, don't be surprised when the huge but backwards country you're trading tools and machinery to, for the raw materials to build up your war machine, decides to use those tools and machinery to build up its own even bigger war machine. Germany was gambling on knocking the western allies out of the war and turning on Russia before Russia became too strong to defeat, and lost that gamble.
There was also the expectation of being able to better industrialise conquered territories. For example, aircraft factories in France produced only aaround a hundred aircraft per month in 1941. Compared to the thousands that the UK was purchasing even before lend-lease.

I often wonder if the German leadership truly appreciated the economic disparity facing them.
 
Unlikely. Self-styled warriors have usually only disdain for mundane and pedestrian tasks like logistics.

The Nazis proved fairly astute and creative economic managers given the mass of constraints that the German economy was working under. Hitler realised that the German economy was hopelessly outmatched and attempted to use operational means to reverse the terrible strategic position of Germany. During the Battle of France it looked like that might work.

However, the Wehrmacht had an official policy that logistics was not an acceptable reason not to make a tactically or operationally sensible decision. This is a sensible seeming idea - many bad/cowardly commanders use logistics as an excuse to not act when they should ("we can't attack now, there are not enough shells in the stockpile...") but it proved a disastrous policy in the Soviet Union.
 
The Nazis proved fairly astute and creative economic managers given the mass of constraints that the German economy was working under. Hitler realised that the German economy was hopelessly outmatched and attempted to use operational means to reverse the terrible strategic position of Germany. During the Battle of France it looked like that might work.
Well, even if you are the one who is outmatching the enemy, using operational means to your benefit is still called for to avoid undue casualties. You just don't need to take ever more desperate gambles.
However, the Wehrmacht had an official policy that logistics was not an acceptable reason not to make a tactically or operationally sensible decision. This is a sensible seeming idea - many bad/cowardly commanders use logistics as an excuse to not act when they should ("we can't attack now, there are not enough shells in the stockpile...") but it proved a disastrous policy in the Soviet Union.
Yeah, there is a line between accepting calculated risks, like unsatisfactory ammunition stockpiles, and flat out ignoring logistics, to the point where you are screwed even if you win. In the Soviet Union, the Wehrmacht crossed the line in a rocket jet.
 
Since one of the purposes of the Maginot-line was to channel the German assault towards Belgium (shorter frontline, Belgium joins the Allies) that's not really strategically clever.

Moreover the Maginot-line was not meant to be unpenetrable. It was build because France lacked the border fortifacations at the 1920 border. The Maginot-line a.) provided protection against a sneak attack b.) in case of a major war gave France enough time to complete its mobilization.

Extending to the Channel (even if the terrain would have allowed it) helped for neither of these goals.
The Maginot line was designed to "not allow a hostile army to pass through the areas it defended." Ouvrage Schoenenbourg for example was struck with " The inventory of German ordnance fired against Schoenenbourg was assessed after the armistice, and found to comprise 160 aerial bombs, 50 42 cm shells, 33 28 cm shells, and approximately 3000 smaller projectiles,[22] the most ammunition used against any fortification in France. Schoenenbourg fired during this period in support of nearby casemates, not seriously affected by the bombardments." The Germans fired 50 420mm shells at this french maginot fort, thats battleship caliber guns, and they did no damage. The Germans would not have a means of penetrating an extended maginot line until 1941 at the earliest when their super guns were finished. But by that point the French and British would have built up superior forces to what the Germans could muster. By 1940 for example the British alone were already outproducing Germany in aircraft. The French had more tanks (thus more tank production capacity than Germany).
 
The Sedan area was fortified as part of the Maginot line with several powerful blockhouses. Whilst there were no fortresses such as were found in some sections of the Maginot Line, it was fortified. Given that the area the Germans breached off the march, with minimal artillery, was a series of fortified structures with overlapping fields of fire protected by a large river, I doubt more and stronger fortifications would have helped much. Once you have a competency gap the size of the one between the Germany and the Allies in 1940 there is no simple solution that could have saved France (other than the unhelpful 'suck less').
 
The Sedan area was fortified as part of the Maginot line with several powerful blockhouses. Whilst there were no fortresses such as were found in some sections of the Maginot Line, it was fortified. Given that the area the Germans breached off the march, with minimal artillery, was a series of fortified structures with overlapping fields of fire protected by a large river, I doubt more and stronger fortifications would have helped much. Once you have a competency gap the size of the one between the Germany and the Allies in 1940 there is no simple solution that could have saved France (other than the unhelpful 'suck less').
To be fair, the Fortresses that the Sedan area was missing, called gros ouvrages, were the strongest part of the Maginot line. They had considerable artillery batteries and were virtually impervious to artillery and aerial bombs. Such fortresses, which were able to cover each other with Artillery fire, would likely have halted the German attack near Sedan until reinforcements could arrive. Another thing to note is equipment wise, the Nazis were not superior to the allies. The Allies had better tanks, the Matilda II and Char B1 each were superior to any Nazi tank in armor or firepower. The French and British had more trucks. Artillery, and tanks. The allies also had a massive advantage in the sea, the British navy was the strongest in the world, and the French navy was also superior to the German or Italian navies. Luck, more than anything else, helped the Nazis beat the Allies.
 
To be fair, the Fortresses that the Sedan area was missing, called gros ouvrages, were the strongest part of the Maginot line. They had considerable artillery batteries and were virtually impervious to artillery and aerial bombs. Such fortresses, which were able to cover each other with Artillery fire, would likely have halted the German attack near Sedan until reinforcements could arrive. Another thing to note is equipment wise, the Nazis were not superior to the allies. The Allies had better tanks, the Matilda II and Char B1 each were superior to any Nazi tank in armor or firepower. The French and British had more trucks. Artillery, and tanks. The allies also had a massive advantage in the sea, the British navy was the strongest in the world, and the French navy was also superior to the German or Italian navies. Luck, more than anything else, helped the Nazis beat the Allies.
Materially they were more or less equivalent in 1940, but the Germans had by far the better trained and better led force. It was not surprising and certainly not down to luck that they outmaneuvered the allied forces in France and Belgium.

Also what on earth does the naval situation have to do with the topic of the maginot line. o_O Why does every WW2 thread degenerate into generalities and incoherent rambling by page 2.
 
Materially they were more or less equivalent in 1940, but the Germans had by far the better trained and better led force. It was not surprising and certainly not down to luck that they outmaneuvered the allied forces in France and Belgium.

Also what on earth does the naval situation have to do with the topic of the maginot line. o_O Why does every WW2 thread degenerate into generalities and incoherent rambling by page 2.
Oh I dont know, it couldn't be the fact that the British Blockade in the sea is arguably what caused Germany to lose during WW1. Having control of the sea again in WW2 is very important, and it is relevant to the topic of "what would happen if France extended the maginot line" since its still a debate on what would happen to the course of the war, which the British blockade also affects.

Also it was entirely due to luck the Nazis won the battle of France. Their original plan was a rehash of the Schlieffen Plan. Something the French were entirely prepared for, it was only when the Mechelen incident, a german plane with an german officer crashed in Belgium with important documents, happened and Nazi documents about their plans fell into allied hands that Hitler and his top command changed their plans to the Manstein Plan, which was something the French were not prepared for. That is luck. Had the plane not crashed, the Schlieffen Plan would have been used, and the French would have been ready for it.
 
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I would place luck second, behind allied incompetence. Some of the stories told of the Fall of France are outright frightening.
Considering the German original plan was a variant of the Schlieffen Plan, something the French were entirely prepared for, and the Nazis only changed this plan due to a plane crash in Belgium with a German officer who had documents about this plan on him which fell into allied hands, forcing Hitler to change the plan to the Manstein plan, something the french were not ready for. Yes my friend that is luck, if that plane crash didnt happen, Hitler would use the Schlieffen Plan, and the French would be very ready for it.
 
As said, I am willing to give luck a big role, I just think it takes second place to French high command incompetence. Just because a new plan was adopted does not excuse their performance, especially since they should have known that the Germans would not reenact the Schlieffen plan, precisely because of the plane crash that dropped the plans for it into their laps.
 
As said, I am willing to give luck a big role, I just think it takes second place to French high command incompetence. Just because a new plan was adopted does not excuse their performance, especially since they should have known that the Germans would not reenact the Schlieffen plan, precisely because of the plane crash that dropped the plans for it into their laps.
Hindsight is always 20/20. But I do not consider Maurice Gamelin or his staff to have been incompetent. "Gamelin was viewed as a man with significant intellectual ability. He was respected, even in Germany, for his intelligence and "subtle mind". He also had a good track record as a officer during WWI. Even a intelligent, experienced man can make critical mistakes when he doesnt know what the hell is happening.
 
Hindsight is always 20/20. But I do not consider Maurice Gamelin or his staff to have been incompetent. "Gamelin was viewed as a man with significant intellectual ability. He was respected, even in Germany, for his intelligence and "subtle mind". He also had a good track record as a officer during WWI. Even a intelligent, experienced man can make critical mistakes when he doesnt know what the hell is happening.
Well, Gamelin was incompetent, but dismissing him in the middle of the crisis, when each hour was crucial, was just a sabotage. And Weygand was even worse.
 
Considering the German original plan was a variant of the Schlieffen Plan, something the French were entirely prepared for, and the Nazis only changed this plan due to a plane crash in Belgium with a German officer who had documents about this plan on him which fell into allied hands, forcing Hitler to change the plan to the Manstein plan, something the french were not ready for. Yes my friend that is luck, if that plane crash didnt happen, Hitler would use the Schlieffen Plan, and the French would be very ready for it.
Given the actual historical performance, I'm not sure we can just conclude the French were prepared for the Schlieffen plan. They had anticipated it, yes, but it wouldn't surprise me if they'd botch that too; whatever they were gonna set up on the Dyle might well have been penetrated and then destroyed just as readily as the defences at Sedan or Eben-Emael.
 
One can point out plenty of statistics, such as France having more tanks than Germany, including many that were considerably better armored, or that the naval situation was one-sided against the Axis, but the abysmal performance of the French officer corps in the opening days of the invasion basically threw everything into chaos. It reads like a "How to Lose a War" tutorial. The speed at which German advances were made, new plans drawn up and orders given, and the next leap forward began, really outpaced the French leaderships' ability to respond. The French combat doctrines were hopelessly out of date, geared for a trench war that wasn't going to happen, while Germany had trained its officers for a completely new pace of warfare.

In addition, French mobilization often depended on civilian transport, sometimes with two different military units depending on the same assets sufficient for only one or the other. French armor, while powerful for time, was mostly distributed in small groups or pairs in direct support of the infantry, other than a couple of independent armored formations which were out of position, but gave a good showing when they were actually used. The French and UK navies, despite their long-term effectiveness at blockading Germany, could play no part in halting the advance of a German land army across France. Simple numbers of men and equipment really don't show the disparity in effectiveness, otherwise Germany would have been stopped cold within a matter of days, leading to a short war.
 
Maybe I have gotten it wrong, but my impression was that French botched it by not keeping adequate reserves, so then Germans achieved a breakthrough it was not possible to mount a serious counter-attack.