What if Germany Won at Stalingrad? - Britain's Global Empire Could Crumble

[Director]

@Jimboy93 - I think you have to look back at Hitler's military experience, in World War One, at the military history of the first two years of World War Two, and at his political theories.

Despite some successes, Tsarist Russia began to fall apart in 1917, allowing German (and Austrian) armies to move east almost at will in 1917-18. Hitler could not believe a Communist government could long survive, much less prosper (and he was joined in that by pretty much all of the leaders of the West). By 1941, Germany (and Hitler) had begun to kinda believe their own press releases - that Germany had invented a new type of warfare, and was unstoppable.

The collapse of France - still viewed as a first-rank military power - set off shack waves in Britain and the US. Political leaders were not sure that Britain could hold out, and when Germany invaded the Soviet Union, US and British military leaders assumed the USSR would fall in months.

They understood what mechanized/motorized warfare could do - but they did not properly appreciate what it could not do. And almost no-one knew how much the USSR had industrialized, and how much of that industrial growth was poured into military production. Also sharply discounted was the ability of Soviet leaders to persuade/compel/motivate the citizenry to mobilize against the invaders.

The war in the east was really decided in 1941. Germany went for a knockout against what they thought was a fragile opponent. (Their intelligence on the Soviets was as bad as their operational logistics). Germany did not get the knockout, and the Soviets just kept coming back.

I think the all-out Caucasus plunge of 1942 was an error, and I think the failure of the 1943 small offensive at Kursk was a clear indicator that Germany had lost the ability to strike great strategic blows. Absolutely doomed to failure? No, my lord, for the horse may somehow learn to sing. But... by the time 1942 rolls around, the Soviets are counter-attacking, the US is in the war and the allies have already declared they will only accept unconditional surrender, so Germany's strategic options have painfully narrowed.


Imagine you make $100,000 dollars a year and have run up debts of a million dollars. The loan shark offers you two choices - a long and painful death now, or a poker game. You can win enough to pay off your debts, but if you lose another $250,000 then you will be tortured to death along with everyone you love.

Do you play? Yes, because your choices are certain death or a miracle, and at at worst you get to play for time. In my opinion, that's Germany in 1942.

 

[newtlord]

That means the offensive in 1942 and 1943 were completely desperate attempts and doomed to failure. Hitler had put all his eggs in one basket in 1941 and believed that if Moscow was quickly captured, the Soviet Union would collapse. How did he come up with the idea? Napoleon tried the same thing and was completely defeated.

As I understand it, Moscow wasn't the original plan. The idea was to completely annihilate the Russian army in the field, at which point the Germans figured that Russia would have no choice but to surrender. Of course, Russia turned out to have a bigger army and more reserves than the Germans had counted on, so this plan turned out not to be possible.

 

[Director]

@newtlord - as I understand it, the German army did annihilate the Soviet army in the field, partly by mechanized drives to pocket entire armies, and partly because Stalin refused permission for formations to fall back.

The issue was that the Germans did not have good intelligence on how many reserve divisions could be fielded and equipped - and they probably would not have believed the numbers if they had seen them.

I think the entire pre-war Soviet army was counted as destroyed before the Germans re-started toward Moscow. They were bewildered that they were facing as many divisions then as they had when the war started.


There was a strategic disconnect: Hitler wanted to make the main offensive in the south, to capture resources. The Army staff drew up Barbarossa with the main thrust in the center, at the rail and communications hub of Moscow. Yes, they wanted (and expected) to destroy the Soviets early - see also, Napoleon's invasion of Russia in 1812 LOL. The Army used a conventional approach: destroy the enemy army and the land is yours.

Some time in the fall and winter of 1941 Hitler essentially set himself over the general staff and mandated strategy from that point on. He was seriously upset that the army had concentrated on the center when he had ordered the main thrust in the south.

 

[cpreston5]

It's probably also relevant that the Russian army in WW1 suffered from terrible shortages of all types of equipment. It could never effectively leverage it's large population because it's industrial base could simply not sustain a proportionally large army.

It would have seemed ridiculous to think that the USSR could not only field a massive army (with all the additional heavy equipment needed for modern warfare by 1941) but could also rapidly rebuild it back up to its original strength. Even after the loss of millions of rifles and tens of thousands of planes, tanks, guns, etc.

Also, to think that morale would hold up in such circumstances.

A single huge disaster like Kiev, Minsk or the encirclements in front of Moscow would have probably brought Russia to the point of military and political collapse in WW1. The USSR took several of them and was still fighting.

 

[nwinther]

As I see it, there are very few points in history where Germany could have won WW2 and pretty much none of them are through sheer military force.

However, many an outcome has been decided with a pen rather than a gun. If, for some reason, Churchill is kept from the cabinet (or even have been temporarily indisposed) the situation in the last week of May 1940 could have gone in Halifax' favour and a peace sought out. A capture of the BEF in those same days could have sealed the deal further. (This scenario opens up a wonderful ripple of "What-if"'s because it'd "reset" France as a pro-German "independent" nation as well as give Hitler a number of options (No naval blockade could redefine his approach to Soviet Union, US would stay isolationist for some time etc.)).

Another game-changer, if not war-winner, is Stalin following through with his peace-feelers in 41-42 (provided Hitler was willing to play ball).

Aside from those two, I don't see any situation where Germany could actually win the war.

 

[Director]

@nwinther - I don't really disagree, but I thought a fuller explanation might help.

If the Germans wipe out the Dunkirk pocket and Halifax accepts the Prime Minister's job - both possible but not likely - then there is still the factor of Hitler.

The goal of his strategy was to avoid being cut off from resources, as had happened in WW1. He believed the resources Germany needed were to be found to the east, and that all German effort must be either in preparation for the assault, or devoted to the attack itself. Everything from 1933 or so onward is aimed at war with the Soviets. Having started down the road of conquest in 1939, he can't afford to stop until he owns the resources, and the longer the war goes on the better prepared the Allies are.

Now, the problem with autarky (self-sufficiency) is that, of the three Axis powers, none have anything like self-sufficiency in food, minerals and energy: there is no oil in Europe, Japan or China. Germans were on short food and coal rations even before the war began, and though large areas and populations were conquered from 1939-1943, not enough food and energy was available for the German military and workforce (nevermind anyone else), war production demanded a bigger workforce (with many men in the military). Hitler and his ministers never could square the circle, so even though the Allied blockade was not effective as in WW1, in five years of war the wheels simply came off the German economy. Even before Overlord and the destruction of Army Group Center, Germany was collapsing.

The powers that did have autarky were all on the Allied side: the US and USSR by domestic production and Britain through global trade. Economically, you could not have set up a greater economic mismatch and still involved the seven major powers. It is three powers who can only win a short war, taking on three larger economies that are self-sufficient, and who will be stronger the longer the war goes on.


If therefore we assume that Britain is decisively beaten on the continent and Halifax does pursue Mussolini's offer of peace negotiations - and if the terms are acceptable and can be signed without the British government being thrown out - then Hitler has a vast need for food, raw materials and oil, and a fixed idea of attacking Russia. He can get oil by trading with the Soviets (so long as they are at peace) or by trading with Britain and the US. However, he has very little to offer in trade - before the war, Germany tight-roped over bankruptcy in order to go all-out on weapons production and the civilian economy was squeezed dry.

Conservative elements in the UK and US are strongly anti-communist, and it is not certain that Halifax would be as... flexible as Churchill about joining with the Soviets. But Roosevelt, Stalin and whoever leads Britain will know that ceding control of all of Europe to one power (other than themselves) is unacceptable; for Britain and the USSR, it is existential. At the very least, they will institute Lend-Lease to the USSR when Hitler attacks; at best they will goad Germany into declaring war on them and, having longer to prepare, fight the war to a finish pretty much as we know it.

One knock-on effect might be that peace between the UK and Germany enables the UK to bring its full weight against Japan in 1941, and gives them a large veteran army and air force to use when war in Europe heats back up.


If Stalin and Hitler declare a truce, I can't see that it would last past the next campaigning season. Both sides would see it as nothing more than a ploy to let them get better prepared... And a peace with the UK in 1940 falls, I fear, into the same category of being as short and insincere as the Republican peace of 1802. Hitler is playing for mastery of Eurasia and all of its resources, and the longer he waits, the fewer resources he will have. The UK, US and the USSR will know they cannot permit one power to rule Europe. Sooner or later, one side has to go down, and thus I can't see a truce becoming permanent.


For anyone who has played Risk, there comes a moment where you have a gigantic army stack and you either have to take your enemy out and secure the border, or watch his counter-attack roll you back and end you. That's Germany from 1939 - one big pile of chips and Europe at stake, against three enemies who get lots more chips every year than you do. The only question is whether you can end them before your chips run out.

 

[nwinther]

@nwinther - I don't really disagree, but I thought a fuller explanation might help.

The powers that did have autarky were all on the Allied side: the US and USSR by domestic production and Britain through global trade. Economically, you could not have set up a greater economic mismatch and still involved the seven major powers. It is three powers who can only win a short war, taking on three larger economies that are self-sufficient, and who will be stronger the longer the war goes on.

If therefore we assume that Britain is decisively beaten on the continent and Halifax does pursue Mussolini's offer of peace negotiations - and if the terms are acceptable and can be signed without the British government being thrown out - then Hitler has a vast need for food, raw materials and oil, and a fixed idea of attacking Russia. He can get oil by trading with the Soviets (so long as they are at peace) or by trading with Britain and the US. However, he has very little to offer in trade - before the war, Germany tight-roped over bankruptcy in order to go all-out on weapons production and the civilian economy was squeezed dry.

Conservative elements in the UK and US are strongly anti-communist, and it is not certain that Halifax would be as... flexible as Churchill about joining with the Soviets. But Roosevelt, Stalin and whoever leads Britain will know that ceding control of all of Europe to one power (other than themselves) is unacceptable; for Britain and the USSR, it is existential. At the very least, they will institute Lend-Lease to the USSR when Hitler attacks; at best they will goad Germany into declaring war on them and, having longer to prepare, fight the war to a finish pretty much as we know it.

As I said there's a ripple of What-if's. What happens with Italy (Is Mussolini satisfied with being the great peace-maker and just cultivate his colony in Ethiopia or..? And how will German-French-British relations pan out? Germany is far from self-sufficient, but can French and British relations help him? Could he be able to create a united force against USSR, maybe over Finland? Drum up something where France and UK guarantee oil etc. if Germany bears the brunt of the offence? Obviously this couldn't happen in 12 months (UK would be reluctant to support German expansion) but Hitler would possibly also be in less of a hurry. Plus a million other things can happen.

 

[Director]

@nwinther - I'd never say never; "the horse may learn to sing". But there are, I think, some things that work against a true peace in 1940.

- First, as I said, Hitler is Hell-bent on having (and winning) a war with Russia, despite everyone else being against it. After conquering the Ancient Enemy (France), he has total political power and unbounded self-confidence. As he lives, Barbarossa is going to happen.

- Second, nobody on planet Earth trusts Hitler to keep his word, or any signed agreement, with the examples of 1936-40 in front of them. This is true of Halifax, who seems to have been pursuing peace talks mostly as a play for time. It's true of Stalin, who is backing away from the trade deals of the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact.

- Third, while there's a lot of Western hatred and fear of the Communists, they are a potential threat while Nazi Germany is a clear and present danger. UK diplomacy has always favored finding continental allies (even former enemies like France and Russia) to counter a European hegemon, whether Louis XIV, Napoleon or Bismarck and Kaiser Bill. Now it is Hitler's turn to be the enemy... I can't see that any peace is going to hold against that pull.

- Fourth, if Germany waits, the USSR fortifies Poland and Soviet power grows. Germany feeds her people in 1941 and 42 on grain stolen from the Ukraine, so if Hitler waits, there is a real chance the jury-rigged, overstrained German economy crashes.


The UK and US may trade with Germany, shipping food and oil in exchange for... looted gold? I'm not clear on what Germany would have to trade with in 1940. Diplomatic outreach between the US, UK and USSR is going to occur, if only because they all need friends and because Japan (or Germany, or both) is almost certain to jump at one or all of them.

When peace comes, and travel resumes, and the truth of Nazi rule at home and in the conquered territories comes out, it is going to be hard for powers who have already embargoed Japan, not to do the same to Germany. That means the food and oil Germany needs to keep her own people from starving come from... where, exactly?

Resources are the Achilles heel of Germany, Italy and Japan, and good diplomacy presses on weak points.

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So what I think would have to happen is: after defeating France in 1940, Hitler dies and the Nazis are overthrown (why exactly? This is peak popularity time for them). There will be no Barbarossa in 1941. Germany's new, enlightened leaders rescind all of the Nazi laws for the Jews, rescind all of the crippling economic policies, idle the armaments factories, demobilize the armies, resume making consumer products, restore France, the Netherlands, Belgium, Denmark, Norway and Poland as friendly puppet-states... and get thrown out of power, because the laws for the Jews, the prosperity of militarization and the conquests of Europe are the popular parts of Nazi rule.

If Hitler dies, Germany gets Goering, at least temporarily. I can't see Goering ordering Barbarossa... but I also can't see him dealing effectively with the economic crises brought on by half a decade of forced-draft militarization and conquest, imminent shortages of food and oil, and no trust or respect overseas.

Real history is almost all made up of unlikely events, but with each What If, I believe the chances of a good outcome get smaller and smaller. I can't rule out anything, but - given Hitler's situation and personality, I don't think there could be a lasting peace, for the reasons I've given above.

 

[Holmes]

WSC and the Cabinet rejected 16 peace offers during 40/41. They were variation of the following"
“ total cessation of the war in the West. Germany would evacuate all of France except Alsace and Lorraine, which would remain German. It would evacuate Holland and Belgium, retaining Luxembourg. It would evacuate Norway and Denmark." In short, Hitler offered to withdraw from Western Europe, except for the two French provinces and Luxembourg Luxembourg was never a French province, but an independent state of ethnically German origin, in return for which Great Britain would agree to assume an attitude of benevolent neutrality towards Germany as it unfolded its plans in Eastern Europe. In addition, the Führer was ready to withdraw from Yugoslavia and Greece. German troops would be evacuated from the Mediterranean generally, and Hitler would use his good offices to arrange a settlement of the Mediterranean conflict between Britain and Italy.

No belligerent or neutral country would be entitled to demand reparations from any other country, he specified. The proposal contained many other points, including plans for plebiscites and population exchanges where these might be necessitated by shifts in population that has resulted from the military action in Western Europe and the Balkans. But the versions circulating in authoritative circles all agree on the basic points outlined above … Hess emphasized that his Leader "would not quibble over details -- Britain could practically write its own peace terms.”

AH had met his match, WSC was as ruthless as he was, WSC was for war to the death and held that view before Dunkirk, during Dunkirk when he asked the JCS will we win if we lose the entire BEF?, and they said, yes PM, we will and, and continued to hold that the Nazis were going into the dustbin of history, after Dunkirk.

 

[pithorr]

@nwinther
If Stalin and Hitler declare a truce, I can't see that it would last past the next campaigning season. Both sides would see it as nothing more than a ploy to let them get better prepared... And a peace with the UK in 1940 falls, I fear, into the same category of being as short and insincere as the Republican peace of 1802. Hitler is playing for mastery of Eurasia and all of its resources, and the longer he waits, the fewer resources he will have. The UK, US and the USSR will know they cannot permit one power to rule Europe. Sooner or later, one side has to go down, and thus I can't see a truce becoming permanent.


For anyone who has played Risk, there comes a moment where you have a gigantic army stack and you either have to take your enemy out and secure the border, or watch his counter-attack roll you back and end you. That's Germany from 1939 - one big pile of chips and Europe at stake, against three enemies who get lots more chips every year than you do. The only question is whether you can end them before your chips run out.

It depends on the type of the truce. If it was like the Brest-Litovsk one, with for instance the entire Ukraine, together with its endless food resources and the most important Soviet heavy industry district, occupied for good by Germany, it might strategically tip the scales in Germany's favour. Also in means of self-sufficiency, even facing the Royal Navy blockade in the high sees.

 

[Director]

It depends on the type of the truce. If it was like the Brest-Litovsk one, with for instance the entire Ukraine, together with its endless food resources and the most important Soviet heavy industry district, occupied for good by Germany, it might strategically tip the scales in Germany's favour. Also in means of self-sufficiency, even facing the Royal Navy blockade in the high sees.

Yes, I agree, and I've said before that the RN blockade was mostly ineffective in WW2. Where we might disagree is over the length of the peace. If Stalin was willing to legitimize those conquests, then his own survival could be at risk. Certainly none of the Soviets would view it as more than a chance to draw breath, train troops and get ready for a renewal. I could see both sides agreeing to a truce, but not a permanent peace.

How long did the Treaty of Brest-Litovsk hold... six months? A year?

The Germans would probably not want a permanent peace, either. Hitler might want to demobilize some of the army and get them back into farming and industry, but those vast acres would have to be garrisoned, defenses have to be built, transport improved. Oil - the sine qua non of mobile warfare - still has to be found somewhere. And lurking behind it all is a Soviet military machine that the Germans have now learned to grudgingly respect, getting stronger and better every day.

Germany needs to build up its fighter squadrons and land defenses in the west, as well as stop the US and UK from taking North Africa and Sicily. The pressure to demobilize or relocate units from the 'quiet' eastern front is going to be immense and the need to fan troops out across the Ukraine and Poland, instead of concentrating them at the front, will be irresistible. The necessity of striking the Soviets while they perhaps still successfully can, will drive Germany to resume the war.

One other factor is the increasing value of the Red Orchestra spy ring. By 1943, Stalin has good intelligence on what the Germans are going to do, when, where and using which units. One good hard 'stop' like Kursk changes the vector of the eastern front, I think... and a surprise Soviet offensive while the Germans are spread out on garrison duty could see a serious German reverse. Operation Uranus at Stalingrad is proof it can be done.

Given Hitler's personality, Stalin's personality, and the oil in the Caucasus, I'd bet on a short peace terminated before either side is really ready. My money would be on the Soviets, having only one front with no distractions and excellent intelligence about Axis plans, to come out ahead.

 

[CV10]

I'll throw in a new variable. What happens if one of the Allied political leaders dies between 1940-1942? Does that effect the calculus at all? In general, I'm not a big fan of labelling historical actors as indispensable, but in the time frame we're looking at, it might actually be the case.

UK: I suppose it depends on when Churchill would be killed off. If it's the spring or summer of 1940, that might change things. The pro-war faction of the government was by no means unshakable, and whoever ends up replacing Churchill might not be from it. If it's Anthony Eden or Clement Attlee, I think the war goes on largely as before, with some of Churchill's ideas about invading in peripheral spots going away. If it's Halifax, we've already speculated about that a bit.

USA: If it's 1940, then Cactus Jack Garner becomes president, if it's 1941, then it's Henry Wallace. I honestly don't know enough about Garner's foreign policy ideas to say if they would help or hurt. He was a fiscal conservative who opposed New Deal policies and deficit spending (described as a "a labor baiting, whiskey drinking, evil old man"), so he might not be inclined to support Lend-Lease. Nor would he have Roosevelt's personal diplomatic skills, and that might lead to more suspicion with the Soviets and the British. Nor would he be someone to look to for a grand vision of the postwar order.

Wallace was...Wallace. A decent man, agronomist, and a loyal FDR supporter. Progressive domestic agenda, but not really someone I think would have done well with the foreign policy and commander-in-chief parts of the job. He'd do lend lease and back the Soviet Union, but I'm not sure he'd make an effective wartime leader.

Anyone's guess as to who would be best. Isolationism is fatal and if Garner goes isolationist, Wallace would be better. If Garner backs the Allies, he'd be better I think...maybe...

USSR: Honestly no idea what happens if Stalin dies. I'm sure someone tries to take over, but the question is who? And can they hold everything together?

 

[The Russian Empire]

USSR: Honestly no idea what happens if Stalin dies. I'm sure someone tries to take over, but the question is who? And can they hold everything together?

You are looking at a level of palace intrigue not seen in the USSR since the 1920s, as although most of the Old Bolsheviks and earlier Communist leadership were either dead, in exile, or politically neutralized, a number of Stalin-adjacent figures were in prime positions to succeed him. Most likely, Vyacheslav Molotov is near the top of that list, but he was more of an organizer and administrator and lacked charisma and the ruthlessness required to survive, hence why he was done away with in 1953.

Lavrentiy Beria is another obvious choice as the dreaded head of the NKVD who had emerged unscathed after the purges of his predecessors Yagoda and Yezhov, but he had only come into the role in late 1938 and furthermore held heterodox views (at least by 1953) and was viewed with disdain and fear by most of the party apparatus. He is more likely to unite people against him than for him, which is what happened in 1953 after over a decade at the highest echelons of power. With control over the NKVD and the NKVD's Dzerzhinsky motorized division garrisoned outside of Moscow, he could either be a kingmaker or make a bold bid for power himself.

Georgy Malenkov, somewhat of a Martin Bormann-type figure, was a Stalin protege and had significant influence over CPSU personnel as head of the party's Cadres Directorate, but had a negligible public profile, little connection to the military, and would be more likely to back his friend Molotov.

Andrei Zhdanov, the head of the Leningrad Party organization, was removed from Moscow but greatly influenced the party's propaganda and ideological framework. Alas, unlike the candidates mentioned above, he did not have direct ties to Stalin's power base in Moscow. He's in the same basket as people like Nikolai Voznesensky, Lazar Kaganovich (more influential, admittedly), and Nikolai Bulganin, in my opinion.

In sum, I think you're likely to see a period of collective leadership under the auspices of the Politburo, but I think there are far too many variables to really pinpoint who can hold things together. Molotov is probably the most likely successor, but we haven't even considered the role of the Red Army, which, although kneecapped by the various purges over the years, still could marshal figures like Kliment Voroshilov, although Stalin was careful to ensure that no military figure had much political influence. I doubt a civil war is realistic, but the political knife fight would be intense.

"Emperors are necessarily wretched men since only their assassination can convince the public that the conspiracies against their lives are real." - Suetonius, quoting Domitian