What's the plan for Japan if they win the pacific?

[bz249]

And to say that the IJN lost it raison d'etre after Tshusima is equally counterfactual. Japan was an up-and-coming imperial/colonial power, and one that had a significantly enlarged empire after 1918, even if only in distance. It had to keep some level of parity with the other two big powers (UK, USA) in order to protect that colonial empire from any other power.

And the answer is to build a risk fleet in the style of Tirpitz (75% of the US). That really worked well for Imperial Germany too.
But the Hochseeflotte had two advantages as compared to the IJN. It could blockade an important enemy (Russia in the Baltics)... and if their main naval enemies did really play foolish then there is a slight chance that they could do something useful with their (temporary) naval superiority.

Now Japan is in the middle of a power vacuum, their real colonial power is westwards from Japan an no foreign power had a naval base in the proximity. They had the possibility to neglect the navy (mean keep it somewhat bigger than the French/Italian) and strengthen the army instead. Or even better they could strengthen their economy. Of course that would challange their social order so it was not a real option for the ruling class.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

The framing of this debate implies that, by contrast, the US military was not a political agent, which is, to put it lightly, counterfactual. True, it was less of a political actor and by-and-large obeyed the civilian oversight at the end, but it was political to the hilt.

United States Navy was a political agent too. But the difference in scale here is important, wouldn't you agree? Japanese Navy was in far more powerful position to direct their nation's grand strategy than the US one. In practice the Strike South strategy they implemented at start of WW2 was Japanese Navy's own creation, and first started to be iterated upon (though still in vague terms) in the years leading to WW1, the same period in which USN was selected as the Japanese Navy's hypothetical enemy.

And to say that the IJN lost it raison d'etre after Tshusima is equally counterfactual. Japan was an up-and-coming imperial/colonial power, and one that had a significantly enlarged empire after 1918, even if only in distance. It had to keep some level of parity with the other two big powers (UK, USA) in order to protect that colonial empire from any other power. By 1922, the USA basically forced the UK to break the anglo-japanese detente, which means that the IJN now has to keep some deterrent against both, rather than being allied with one against the other. That is not an environment in which you cease shipbuilding. That is an environment in which you build up to your treaty limits and pull out all the tricks (just like everyone else) to circumvent it.

Besides, everyone and their dog was building bigger and bigger ships. Might as well say the same thing about <insert Navy here>. To wit, Russia lost its pacific holdings, yet went on an equal building spree (unfinished because of WWI).

The Washington and London treaties came about for a reason. Everyone was building ships well past any reasonable budget.

This is not really about 1918, in the narrowest sense we are in particular talking about the period 1909-1913 from publishing of Sato Tetsutaro's magnum opus On the History of Imperial Defense to (largely) his 1913 pamphlet calling for the 70% ratio with United States Navy. This period also included the golden period in Japanese Navy's Staff College. At that time Japanese Navy was actually arguing reduction in Japan's present overseas possessions, specifically the Asian continent that was the domain of the Army was to be abandoned for more navalist strategy of advancing across the oceans.

I'll also expand on the raison d'etre since that's a phrase I also used earlier. During the decade leading to Russo-Japanese War Japan's naval construction was grounded to the realities rising from the recent Triple Intervention. On the other hand Japan was building specifically against Russia as they had been the prime mover and had actually occupied former Japanese possessions in China. On the other hand the influential Navy Minister Yamamoto is making very rough estimates on what kind of expeditionary force a league of European powers might deploy in the East Asia, estimating that Britain might deploy 4 battleships, Russia another 4 and then some other naval power acting in concert might add 2 on top of that. From which he then arrived to 6-4 fleet of 6 battleships and 4 armoured cruisers. Only a bit later we are back to Russia though as there is concern what might happen if Russia were to concentrate it's fleet into East Asia (as they eventually did), which then sees the program amended with 2 further armoured cruisers into 6-6 fleet.

Two factors then eliminate this basis for Japanese naval strength. First the alliance with Great Britain makes the idea of intervention of multiple European powers unlikely. Second the near annihilation of Russian Navy in Russo-Japanese War makes Russia almost irrelevant (and I'd add, sets stage for Russian naval rearmament). So Japanese Navy is in vacuum to justify it's budget, and when it's choosing United States it's explicitly acknowledging that United States is not very likely enemy at the moment but reasons instead that it's theoretically the most damaging. So there is shift from more immediate justification to a more abstract one.

 

[Yakman]

I'll take a somewhat contrarian view: the IJN did excellent planning for the Pearl Harbor attack and the expansion into SE Asia and across the Pacific.

But, after that - woof., it went bad quickly The occupation of Attu and Kiska was as smooth as it was pointless. The Midway operation was an over-complicated mess that arrogantly assumed everything would go exactly as expected, with no provision for anything else. Failing to occupy Midway was trivial, losing four fleet carriers and some expert pilots was catastrophic - and avoidable, had less arrogance and more common sense been used.

Guadalcanal saw the Japanese pull out some wonderful tactical wins, fail to capitalize on them, arrogantly under-estimate their opponent and eventually get run out of the area. In the process they lost two valuable capital ships, priceless destroyers, twenty thousand soldiers and took irreplaceable attrition to their air corps. Everything after that was disaster piled upon disaster - the Truk raid, the Marianas Turkey Shoot, the unsuccessful attempt to wreck the Philippine landings, the pointless sacrifice of Yamato.

The United States had a cushion - it could afford to lose men, ships and even territory, for so long as public sentiment favored prosecuting the war the fleet would recover and grow. Japan did not have that cushion - they had to be smart, win big and win on the cheap by forcing the enemy to take losses. Instead, the Japanese failed to learn, failed to adapt, failed to win.

Over and over we see Japanese operational and strategic plans go wrong. We see wasteful dispersion of resources, faulty intelligence, ruinous assumptions. We see bad commanders retained and good ones sidelined. On the American side we see prudence, from the Japanese we see detachment from reality.

So I say that Japan lost because they lost: they simply were not as good at running a war as their opponents. Like the armies of the Confederacy, they got in some hard early licks and then suffered defeat after defeat as their opponent learned how to fight. Whether or not Japan could have won enough battles and cost the Allies enough to make them accept a peace, the fact is that the Japanese Army and Navy were not strong enough, not good enough, to do it.


The victors do not always write the histories: I give you the Lost Cause myth of the American Civil War as one example.

I'd say a big difference between the two is that after Pearl Harbor, the War Department summoned Dwight Eisenhower to Washington and he drafted a plan for how to win the Pacific War. That plan was largely adhered to, acted on, and the war was won.

I'm no expert, but it doesn't appear that the Japanese had a plan beyond invading SE Asia. There was no plan to 'win' the war. There was a hope to win a big battle, but that's not the same thing as winning the war.

 

[Herbert West]

Now Japan is in the middle of a power vacuum, their real colonial power is westwards from Japan an no foreign power had a naval base in the proximity. They had the possibility to neglect the navy (mean keep it somewhat bigger than the French/Italian) and strengthen the army instead. Or even better they could strengthen their economy. Of course that would challange their social order so it was not a real option for the ruling class.

To grow their economy, they needed a captive market, China. To capture that market, they needed to violate all the N-power agreements about China. To be able to secure that violation and challenge anyone who wanted to enforce the agreements, they needed a Navy.

Japan needed an Army to conquer China (and not a very good one at that, and that Army did at least smash nationalist resistance). It needed a really good navy to keep that conquest, though.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

To grow their economy, they needed a captive market, China. To capture that market, they needed to violate all the N-power agreements about China. To be able to secure that violation and challenge anyone who wanted to enforce the agreements, they needed a Navy.

Japan needed an Army to conquer China (and not a very good one at that, and that Army did at least smash nationalist resistance). It needed a really good navy to keep that conquest, though.

If you want to fight western powers over China, then you need a navy to fight the western powers. Also if you want to fight the western powers over Southeast Asia (the alternative plan) you'll also need a navy to fight the western powers. One could conclude that if you want to fight naval war with western powers, one needs a navy of some kind to do it with any kind of success.

If you mean that fighting western powers over anything was necessary for Japan or even successful Japan, then I disagree.

 

[Director]

"on the American side, we see prudence; on the Japanese side we see detachment from reality"

That's one hell of a "victors write history" moment right there

Firstly, I refuse to believe that prudence vs detachment from reality is an apt summary of the Pacific war. I'm no expert on that theater of war but if the western European land theater is anything to go by, the American approach to war is hardly one of 'prudence'. Rather, a slow walking effort that prides itself on finding as many walls to bash their heads against, as possible, and calling that 'generalship'.

Secondly, I think in your dismissal of the Japanese strategic and operational planning, you confuse the political and the military sides of the war. The japanese refusal to accept that the war was unwinnable, and that there were no good opportunities to give battle to the USN, was not a military failure but a political one. You could argue over whether the fault was with the admirals who didn't use strong enough words to explain to the political leaders (the political generals) how bad the situation was, or with the political leaders not asking the right questions / deluding themselves in spite of clear evidence that the situation was hopeless. But you can't blame admirals for planning battles against poor odds when it's a political choice that they must continue to give battle against poor odds, instead of refusing battle against poor odds and hoping that political negotiations can find an end to the war. When faced with terrible odds, and lacking permission to lay down arms, no military will really look good. The only operations that you can plan under such conditions, are forlorn hope type attacks. That the Japanese navy continued to do so speaks volumes about their discipline and their exemplary soldierly spirit. It doesn't say a whole lot about their planning and strategizing abilities.

No, that's my assessment, not a 'victors write the history' moment. Had I asserted that the US Navy did everything right, you'd have a point. But I did not.

I'd also note that I didn't make any reference to the decision to go to war, so please don't try to fault me for something I did not say.

I do maintain that the US and Allied militaries fought the war with prudence. Sometimes that showed itself in operations that were not strictly necessary, and they didn't avoid mistakes. I said in my last post that the Allies had a cushion against error that Japan lacked. But overall, the USA and Allied forces in the Pacific were reasonably and carefully used.

Of course it looked like a slow progression. The Pacific is, what, four times the width of Europe? And amphibious operations require a lot of materiel, a lot of planning, and a buildup of new strength before moving onward. As the Allies got better at it, the pace picked up - from New Guinea to Okinawa in a year and a half is pretty fast.

The Japanese strategically and operationally bungled the Midway and Guadalcanal campaigns. They seem to have had a rigid mindset when it came to planning, and to have failed to acquire or simply ignored intelligence about enemy strength and capabilities. The IJN commanders who did exercise judgement and deviated from the planned mission were, sooner or later, relieved.

Please note I did not 'dismiss' Japanese operational and strategic planning. I did say that they didn't do either as well as their opponents, and that is brought out by battle record. The US Navy learned to fight better, the Japanese seem to have declined as the war went on.

that there were no good opportunities to give battle to the USN,

Coral Sea, Midway, Attu and Kiska, Savo Island, Cape Esperance, First and Second Guadalcanal, Tassafaronga, Empress Augusta Bay, the New Guinea campaign, the Marianas invasion, the three great battles of the Philippines campaign... Really?

I don't disagree with you in thinking that Japan made a catastrophic mistake in seeking a military rather than a diplomatic solution in 1940-41; I've said that in these pages. But I have come to the conclusion that - additionally - the IJN fought the opening moves of the war brilliantly, stumbled badly at Midway and failed to fight the remainder of the war with the same effectiveness - in short, that they lost the war early on because they were outfought, not solely because the USN buried them in ships.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

No, that's my assessment, not a 'victors write the history' moment. Had I asserted that the US Navy did everything right, you'd have a point. But I did not.

I'd also note that I didn't make any reference to the decision to go to war, so please don't try to fault me for something I did not say.

I do maintain that the US and Allied militaries fought the war with prudence. Sometimes that showed itself in operations that were not strictly necessary, and they didn't avoid mistakes. I said in my last post that the Allies had a cushion against error that Japan lacked. But overall, the USA and Allied forces in the Pacific were reasonably and carefully used.

Of course it looked like a slow progression. The Pacific is, what, four times the width of Europe? And amphibious operations require a lot of materiel, a lot of planning, and a buildup of new strength before moving onward. As the Allies got better at it, the pace picked up - from New Guinea to Okinawa in a year and a half is pretty fast.

The Japanese strategically and operationally bungled the Midway and Guadalcanal campaigns. They seem to have had a rigid mindset when it came to planning, and to have failed to acquire or simply ignored intelligence about enemy strength and capabilities. The IJN commanders who did exercise judgement and deviated from the planned mission were, sooner or later, relieved.

Please note I did not 'dismiss' Japanese operational and strategic planning. I did say that they didn't do either as well as their opponents, and that is brought out by battle record. The US Navy learned to fight better, the Japanese seem to have declined as the war went on.


Coral Sea, Midway, Attu and Kiska, Savo Island, Cape Esperance, First and Second Guadalcanal, Tassafaronga, Empress Augusta Bay, the New Guinea campaign, the Marianas invasion, the three great battles of the Philippines campaign... Really?

I don't disagree with you in thinking that Japan made a catastrophic mistake in seeking a military rather than a diplomatic solution in 1940-41; I've said that in these pages. But I have come to the conclusion that - additionally - the IJN fought the opening moves of the war brilliantly, stumbled badly at Midway and failed to fight the remainder of the war with the same effectiveness - in short, that they lost the war early on because they were outfought, not solely because the USN buried them in ships.

Yes

But the ace in the hole, the key to victory, was Rochefort and his code breakers. Knowing when and where Japan was going, knowing what airstrip Yamamoto would be over and when, allowed the USN to allocate its thin resources to the critical point time and again.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

in short, that they lost the war early on because they were outfought, not solely because the USN buried them in ships.

Well they achieved carrier supremacy for a short time over the US in the Pacific after they won a deceisive carrier battle at Santa Cruz and couldnt make any use of it because they where spent. Unlike the US they could not replace what they lost so yes, they been buried in US quantity and quality material of all kind.

 

[Yakman]

i think that the last 4 pages have been an argument about what was the Japanese plan to win a war against the USA.

I think i can sum it up: Japan did not have a plan to win a war against the USA.

 

[Director]

Well they achieved carrier supremacy for a short time over the US in the Pacific after they won a deceisive carrier battle at Santa Cruz and couldnt make any use of it because they where spent. Unlike the US they could not replace what they lost so yes, they been buried in US quantity and quality material of all kind.

Yes, and I agree. But - and you knew there was a 'but' coming - they used bad strategy and operational method after Pearl Harbor.

The naval battle of Santa Cruz may have been a tactical victory for Japan but it was a strategic draw - in a time when a draw meant the status quo, which favored the US, would continue. What Japan needed to do to Guadalcanal was either pull back or go all-in. Instead they dispersed their forces and used half-measures, losing a battle of attrition that in many ways cost them the war.

Japan began the war with a large carrier fleet, good surface warships, excellent aircraft. god tactical weapons and the best combat training and doctrines in the world. They eliminated all meaningful enemy capital ship strength, took what they wanted in SE Asia and the Pacific, and then pretty much lost the war in a year. They lost the war to an enemy who was inferior in numbers and tactical ability in that year, and to an enemy who was also fighting naval wars on other seas.

Japan exercised the Belisarius, or 'offensive-defensive' strategy in 1941-early 1942, taking what they enemy must attack and bleeding him dry when he does. Instead, at Guadalcanal and in New Guinea the Allies tempted the Japanese to over-reach and bled them dry instead,. The Allies fought the Japanese to a standstill in 1942 with inferior numbers and, arguably, inferior doctrine and equipment.

That argues, to me, that the Japanese were very good at executing a detailed plan against minimal opposition in early 1942 but were not as operationally and strategically competent as the Allies after that.

 

[bz249]

Japan exercised the Belisarius, or 'offensive-defensive' strategy in 1941-early 1942, taking what they enemy must attack and bleeding him dry when he does. Instead, at Guadalcanal and in New Guinea the Allies tempted the Japanese to over-reach and bled them dry instead,

The problem with that a.) Belisarius had a professional cavalry army against an infantry-based levy army b.) there are strategic positions (cities, fords, crossroads) on the ground, but a lagoon is just a lagoon.

Guadalcanal is as good as it can be, since the USN was not prepared (took the chance to fight nevertheless) was drawn away from its logistical base, hence could not come in force and it is no surprise that it was the last time the Japanese gave a good fight.

 

[Jopa79]

Japan did not have a plan to win a war against the USA.

”I can run wild for the first six to twelve months of a war with the United States and the United Kingdom. After that, I have no expectation of success.” - Isoroku Yamamoto

 

[Yakman]

The problem with that a.) Belisarius had a professional cavalry army against an infantry-based levy army b.) there are strategic positions (cities, fords, crossroads) on the ground, but a lagoon is just a lagoon.

Guadalcanal is as good as it can be, since the USN was not prepared (took the chance to fight nevertheless) was drawn away from its logistical base, hence could not come in force and it is no surprise that it was the last time the Japanese gave a good fight.

? The Japanese had several chances to ruin the USN's day after Guadalcanal. That they did not wasn't for a lack of capacity to do so.

 

[Rubidium]

On the subject of "victors write history," I'd note that my understanding is that modern Japanese historiography is generally harsher on Japanese military planning/strategy than American historiography has traditionally been.

American historiography has traditionally tended to focus on "near-run things" and the heroic actions of a few brave men, the "Miracle at Midway," etc. and of course American military decision-making. Japanese military historiography has been much more focused on the broader systemic issues with Japanese military planning (the fascination with overly complicated, inflexible plans, the failure to accurately assess enemy strength and intentions, the dysfunctional nature of the military command structure, etc.).

But the broader issue that the US could and did produce more ships in a year than the Japanese did during the entire war is ultimately impossible to surmount.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

On the subject of "victors write history," I'd note that my understanding is that modern Japanese historiography is generally harsher on Japanese military planning/strategy than American historiography has traditionally been.

American historiography has traditionally tended to focus on "near-run things" and the heroic actions of a few brave men, the "Miracle at Midway," etc. and of course American military decision-making. Japanese military historiography has been much more focused on the broader systemic issues with Japanese military planning (the fascination with overly complicated, inflexible plans, the failure to accurately assess enemy strength and intentions, the dysfunctional nature of the military command structure, etc.).

But the broader issue that the US could and did produce more ships in a year than the Japanese did during the entire war is ultimately impossible to surmount.

This is my impression as well. Also compare Yamamoto's lionization in America vs. Hara Tameichi's "Yamamoto should have had a desk job" (though to be fair he admits he is going after the sacrosanct).

 

[Director]

Western media in general is prone to the condense the war to Nimitz's gamble at Midway, American code-breaking and American production. That's a Cliff-notes version that leaves out, oh, 90% of the story.

Lionizing the opposing commander is a more-or-less common thing; it lets you play down defeats ("He is Rommel') while playing up your victories over them.

The problem with that a.) Belisarius had a professional cavalry army against an infantry-based levy army

I didn't think I would have to explain that the type of military force you use is mostly independent of the strategy you employ.
Likewise, the geography and military situation controls much of strategy and operations: naval strategists from Nelson to Nimitz would be astounded to hear that a 'lagoon is just a lagoon'. The geography of the Solomons was a key determinate.

There are roughly four combinations of strategic options:
1) offensive/offensive - offensive strategic and operational forward movement; Entente forces on the Western Front in 1918, and Barbarossa
2) defensive/offensive - standing on the defense but using counter-attacks to limit or reverse enemy advances ; von Manstein's Backhand, and the Soviets at Kursk
3 offensive/defensive - advancing to key positions and then letting the enemy exhaust himself in attacking them; campaigns of Belisarius, and Guadalcanal
4) defensive/defensive - standing on the defensive strategically and operationally with no forward movement or counterattack; Nationalist China for the bulk of WW2

These are not usually found in a pure state but mixed; armed forces move from one to another as a campaign or war progresses.

Belisarius is renowned for the third type, which he employed with great effect against Goths and Vandals and Arabs alike. The key points are that you have to be able to bait the enemy into attacking where, when and how you want, and of course you have to be able to win the battles.

So - that's why I call the American Guadalcanal campaign a strategy in the style of Belisarius. That, and the American heavy cataphract bow-armed cavalry

 

[Kovax]

I would have to say that Japan's best bet on what do do after they won in the Pacific would have been to breed a lot more of the Alien Space Bats that gained them the victory.

As long as the American public was willing to continue the war and suffer the inevitable casualties, there was very little that Japan could have done to win. The difference in industrial capability was just FAR too great for any kind of outright military victory. The attack on PH pretty much guaranteed that the public was going to be willing to suffer quite a bit to satisfy "honor" before it lost interest in continuing any further. Japan's odds of pulling off a diplomatic negotiated "win" to keep the US from getting involved in China would have been substantially better if it had waited for the US to declare war on it, rather than the reverse.

 

[Jopa79]

I've always thought the most interesting 'alternate ww2' scenario would be if the Japanese UK alliance doesn't break down and the Allies of 1940 are more confident in supporting Finland against the Soviet Union, leading to an Axis made up of Germany, Italy, USSR versus UK, Japan, Free France and Finland bankrolled by a neutral USA with China being a swing state mess.

I've been surprised that I've never seen a mod focused on this. I guess the lack of an interesting naval campaign narrows the interest.

...no, no, no...can't you remember? We are your worst enemies. A one little Nazilandia in the north?

Your country likes to help Finland in 1939. The poor, little European backwards nation. The country without money, but wait, they still pay their loan due for the US...in further payment. During war-time? (in video, 1:36-2:11).

Due to the happenings, the US, your country is very sorry, that Finland loses the war and Finland has to evacuate nearly 15% of the population and all the land the evacuees present, nearly 14% of the Finnish land area.

One year and a half goes on. Situation changes. Now, Germany wants a war with the Soviet Union....wait a minute...there's also Finland....what, excuse me, what country? Oh, Finland...and they want their land back which they lost for the Soviets in the Winter War. Well, the Finns are now the bad-guys because they have the common enemy with Germany, the Soviet Union.

Oh, well...what are we, the Americans going to do? I don't know...let's just give our weapons to the Soviet Union and the European Marshall Plan goes to Sweden, oh yeah, that country suffers a lot.

I have forgotten already, was it Vinland, or Finland....I don't know...anyway, it's just wilderness and nothing comes from there. They only lost their land and they allied with the Nazis. Let's give them nothing. Let us also be very certain....just give Stalin the permission to bomb the Finnish Capital. Was it Hilsinki, Hulsinki, Helsinki? Maybe Hellsinki...aa...just can't remember.

 

[JodelDiplom]

Let us also be very certain....just give Stalin the permission to bomb the Finnish Capital. Was it Hilsinki, Hulsinki, Helsinki? Maybe Hellsinki...aa...just can't remember.

The name was Hellstinky?

 

[Jopa79]

The name was Hellstinky?

Oh, yes...that was it. Now, let us find that nest of evils on the map and guide the Red Star aircraft to bomb that city for good.