Why did the Portuguese Colonial Empire Persist

[soda7777777]

Im curious as to why the Portguese Empire, specially their holdings in Africa lasted as long as it did. They're empire was clearly a racial based one, with blacks in the bottom, so I don't ubdeunders why they didn't face the same amount of external pressure that states like Rhodesia or South Africa did during the Cold War.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

De facto but not de jure.

The Portuguese colonies were quite different from Rhodesia or South Africa.

Portuguese "settlers" were very recent arrivals, and usually rather poor themselves. Most of them stayed in cities or towns. If they moved to the countryside, it was as tavern-keepers and minor farmers. There never was quite particularly large settler farms, with attendant displacements or removals. Land was not as much an issue - or rather, there was land competition, but it was relatively petty quarrels of white peasant vs. black peasant.

Labor conscription - virtual slavery - was the big bad thing, although much of it was geared to serve big companies. But this was abolished in 1961. There was also no "apartheid" or racial segregation dogma - the "Lusotropicalism" ideology idealized the mixing of races and miscegination. This was more imagination than fact, but it had a kernel of truth. Remaining legal differences between Europeans & Africans were eliminated at the same time (c.1961-62), and full citizenship and civil rights granted to all. This fed into a relentless government propaganda, ongoing since the early 1950s, that the colonies were not colonies, but just overseas provinces of the same multi-continental, multi-racial country, and that everyone, black or white, was a full citizen of Portugal (never mind that citizenship & civil rights meant practically nothing under the totalitarian Salazar regime; but at least the theory was nice.) The last decade and a half also saw massive investment and rapid economic development, making it seem that things were not so bad.

But most importantly, white settlers had next-to-no political power. Administration was exercised entirely from Lisbon. And the relatively recent arrivals meant there was not a body of local white colonists, deeply rooted and galvanized, demanding local power or trying to exercise dominance. The settlers weren't particularly attached to the land or determined to fight it out - they had come as state-sponsored immigrants on the promise of modestly higher incomes, and were willing to leave as quickly as they arrived.

As for criticism, they did face a strong amount of external pressure. Not sure why you imagine they didn't.

 

[soda7777777]

I guess my point about external pressure relates to how it seems like they weren't forced into giving up their empire like the British or French after the Second World War. I realize that's in large part because of the war itself, but I would think there would have been more done by the US to turn Portugal into a pariah state.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

I guess my point about external pressure relates to how it seems like they weren't forced into giving up their empire like the British or French after the Second World War. I realize that's in large part because of the war itself, but I would think there would have been more done by the US to turn Portugal into a pariah state.

Not sure where you get the impression that anybody was "forced" to give up their colonial empire by an outside power. Unless you count the Japanese. Britain & France lost their empires from inside pressure, not outside. US had no role in decolonization.

As far as turning Portugal into a pariah state, JFK tried - which is more than most.

 

[Yakman]

Not sure where you get the impression that anybody was "forced" to give up their colonial empire by an outside power. Unless you count the Japanese. Britain & France lost their empires from inside pressure, not outside. US had no role in decolonization.

As far as turning Portugal into a pariah state, JFK tried - which is more than most.

the dutch lost their empire in Indonesia, in part, due to American interference, iirc.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

the dutch lost their empire in Indonesia, in part, due to American interference, iirc.

Dutch never really got Indonesia back from the Japanese. The Japanese had prepared Indonesia for independence in 1945. It was the British who took up the effort of trying to recover it on behalf of the Dutch, but never managed to get more than half, and ended up brokering a ceasefire and independence deal. Dutch wouldn't have had a word in the matter otherwise.

 

[Henry IX]

I guess my point about external pressure relates to how it seems like they weren't forced into giving up their empire like the British or French after the Second World War. I realize that's in large part because of the war itself, but I would think there would have been more done by the US to turn Portugal into a pariah state.

Some of this is related to the Cold War. The Salazar regime may have been a bunch of brutal fascists but they were at least anti-commie which was really all that was required in the late 50s to keep America on your side (or at least tolerant towards you).

 

[Avernite]

Dutch never really got Indonesia back from the Japanese. The Japanese had prepared Indonesia for independence in 1945. It was the British who took up the effort of trying to recover it on behalf of the Dutch, but never managed to get more than half, and ended up brokering a ceasefire and independence deal. Dutch wouldn't have had a word in the matter otherwise.

That's not a full counter to his point, though.

Just because the British helped in the recovery of large parts of Indonesia for the Dutch does not mean the Americans didn't help get us out again. By the time of the final (foreign-brokered) independence agreement, the Indonesian Republic had been forcibly reverted to a guerilla in the provinces with control of large swathes of countryside, but it was no longer a truly functioning state (of course for large parts, especially of Java, the Dutch administration wasn't a functioning state either).

And at least for New Guinea, the link is even clearer, since that was more or lesss safely Dutch when foreign pressure enforced it being given to Indonesia.

 

[th3freakie]

Im curious as to why the Portguese Empire, specially their holdings in Africa lasted as long as it did. They're empire was clearly a racial based one, with blacks in the bottom, so I don't ubdeunders why they didn't face the same amount of external pressure that states like Rhodesia or South Africa did during the Cold War.

Beside the stuff that Abdul mentioned, I'll just point out that the Portuguese State, having been present in the coasts for longer than others, had more time to establish itself in that region. And even so, the empire in Africa didn't last that much longer before it had to dive into a 13 year old colonial war just to hold the colonies overseas provinces. It did face pressure too, both visible through diplomacy and embargos, and less visible through military support for the terrorists insurgents liberation movements it was fighting.

 

[DoomBunny]

In most cases of decolonization, the imperial power either left willingly because the writing was on the wall (i.e., India, Malaya), left after a change in domestic politics (i.e., French Algeria) or was kicked out by a stronger force (i.e., French Indochina). The Salazar regime wasn't leaving willingly, and the guerrillas (like most African movements) weren't up to much besides killing civilians and being incompetent.

As far as external pressure goes, Portugal was very much the first domino to fall from the colonial holdouts; once Portugal went in 1975, then the pressure could really be stepped up on Rhodesia. In terms of diplomatic pressure, you have to remember it was the Cold War, that Portugal had European holdings and was a legally recognized entity, and that international pressure can only go so far before exhausting diplomatic means.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

Some of this is related to the Cold War. The Salazar regime may have been a bunch of brutal fascists but they were at least anti-commie which was really all that was required in the late 50s to keep America on your side (or at least tolerant towards you).

You're assuming too much. US had next-to-no opinion on colonialism in the 1940s or 1950s. Indeed, the UN General Assembly had no opinion about colonialism until 1960. JFK was the really first US president to say something about it. But he was playing catch-up - "Winds of Change" and all that was already in gear. The impetus for the US to decide on a stand was when decolonization was already well underway and the Soviets had taken an active position first.

Yes, there is a natural tendency of the US not to criticize its NATO allies. But that's not really what was holding it back before JFK. It frankly didn't care. It was outside of its sphere of interest. Colonialism was regarded as an internal matter for European states, and the US stayed out of it. The US never tried to weigh in on British India or French Algeria or whatnot. Much, as I am sure, it didn't want foreign countries commenting on its own internal race policies or problems, or its own adventures in the Americas.

When it could have cared - in the aftermath of WWII, on the ruins of the Japanese empire - it didn't say anything. The US, as the lead victor in the Pacific, could have pulled rank and taken lead on the matter. But no, it stood back as the British & French went about reimposing themselves on Burma, Malaya, Indochina, Indonesia, etc., and even allowed itself to be implicated in the re-colonialization effort by association.

So what you're really talking about is a narrower thirteen-year window - 1961-1974 - when the US was actually forced to take a position. And the US took a position - and a relatively strong one - against Portugal. At least JFK did. LBJ & Nixon had bigger problems on their plate.

 

[th3freakie]

Don't forget that pressure, condemnation, boycott and other such things were not the exclusive of states. There was civil society awareness of the colonial war, and it translated into action. Although commenting on how much and how strong I'll leave to people who were alive back then.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

the guerrillas (like most African movements) weren't up to much besides killing civilians and being incompetent.

Still can't mention Africans without derogatory remarks huh?

Anyway, that's false.

 

[pithorr]

Some of this is related to the Cold War. The Salazar regime may have been a bunch of brutal fascists but they were at least anti-commie which was really all that was required in the late 50s to keep America on your side (or at least tolerant towards you).

I think Salazar was rather a mild fascist (or even rather more the Catholic fundamentalist ). However, any authocratic regime is usually better in dealing with an internal pressure...

 

[DoomBunny]

Still can't mention Africans without derogatory remarks huh?

No, what gives you that idea?

Anyway, that's false.

I mean, it's not. Combat effectiveness in these groups tends to be very low.

 

[Herbert West]

I mean, it's not. Combat effectiveness in these groups tends to be very low.

Luckily, combat effectiveness is very low on the list of priorities for any insurgent. Or have you learnt nothing from <insert random COIN conflict>?.

 

[DoomBunny]

Luckily, combat effectiveness is very low on the list of priorities for any insurgent. Or have you learnt nothing from <insert random COIN conflict>?.

And how far do insurgencies get without effective insurgents?

Combat effectiveness is important to any use of force; in the guerrilla case one is actively trying to offset a deficiency of effectiveness through different methodology, but this does not mean one will succeed with a completely ineffective force. See, for example, the number of insurgencies that have been defeated (or made little headway) over the years.

It is also important to have a degree of combat effectiveness so that guerrilla forces may transition to conventional warfare if necessary. Conventional battle is the only option if the enemy cannot be defeated through purely guerrilla based erosion of his political willpower, and in cases where domestic opposition also exists, may be necessary even if a foreign power is persuaded to retreat.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

I mean, it's not. Combat effectiveness in these groups tends to be very low.

The Portuguese army was defeated in Guinea-Bissau, and rebels controlled nearly all the country.

In Angola, things were more confusing as it was riven by Cold War meddling, but rebels still fought the Portuguese army to a stalemate and were undermining it by attrition.

Only in Mozambique were the rebels in retreat when 1974 rolled around.

 

[DoomBunny]

The Portuguese army was defeated in Guinea-Bissau, and rebels controlled nearly all the country.

In Angola, things were more confusing as it was riven by Cold War meddling, but rebels still fought the Portuguese army to a stalemate and were undermining it by attrition.

Only in Mozambique were the rebels in retreat when 1974 rolled around.

They were stuck in the hinterland until the Portuguese regime fell.

 

[Abdul Goatherd]

They were stuck in the hinterland until the Portuguese regime fell.

So? Littoral cities are easily resupplied strongpoints. Unless you got a navy, you can't cut it off. Any siege of a littoral city is doomed to fail. Basic War 101.