Why the Graf Zeppelin?

[Jopa79]

Well, at least I presented a theory that how the GZ could be used. Others have been pretty quiet with their ideas

 

[olm]

Well, at least I presented a theory that how the GZ could be used. Others have been pretty quiet with their ideas

Obviously it can be used various ways. Japanese even used their carriers as suicidal baits in Battle of Leyte Gulf, to draw enemy attention and give battleships a chance to reach their target. It's just that practically all uses one can find for GZ are very low value compared to its cost.

 

[Jopa79]

However, I doubt Germany built the GZ only to make it a suicidal bait (although, in the end, it met a nearly similar fate).

If the GZ is completed and Germany decides to try get it past Kattegat and Skagerak (or via Kiel canal) to the North Sea and further, it will face the same risks and threats which made Churchill to abandon the Catherine.

 

[nwinther]

Germany had no design experience with warships from 1917 or so up to the late 1920s. The naval architects were retired or dead. Operational officers with no design experience were driving requirements with no knowledge of what was possible or practical. You can see this effect in the terrible destroyers, awful light cruisers, grossly overblown heavy cruisers and bloated battleships.

Britain had a lot of experience designing warships and used inputs both from an engineering staff and from men with operational experience. France designed its ships almost completely by the engineering team with little input from seagoing officers (and the result shows - lots of clever designs and not much practical, workable equipment). Germany went the other way, with operational officers submitting a wish-list the engineers had to fulfill. That resulted in a lot of cool stuff (like extremely high-pressure steam engines) that was put into production before it was tested and ready. As a result the German ships looked sleek and capable but the engineering plants were band-aided and the anti-aircraft armament had serious issues.

Before 1935, Germany was living under the Versailles Treaty and was not permitted capital ships, carriers or even aircraft. After 1935, the emphasis was on big prestige ships (High Seas Fleet II, Hitler Boogaloo!). German naval strategy prioritizes the Baltic, where the Luftwaffe has bases, and raiding on the high seas. If you are going to build a balanced surface fleet to challenge Britain (and if Britain is going to sit idly by and build nothing while you do) then carriers would be useful for sea control in the North Sea.

News Flash: Britain is never, never, never going to permit a German buildup without building more than Germany can. Control of the North Sea or Atlantic will never pass to Germany while one Briton can cock a pistol and build a raft. So... why do you need a carrier? Because the 'Cool Kids' are building carriers and we want one, too. There just is not much practical justification.

It was always obvious that the Luftwaffe wasn't playing ball with anyone - that's how we get the Hermann Goering Division. But the Luftwaffe was politically active and thoroughly Nazi, while the Navy was apolitical and mostly not-Nazi. The Navy was never going to get anything from the Luftwaffe, even if that meant inefficiency and defeat.




Germany wasn't even permitted to have military aircraft until 1935. Yes, they had been cheating on the treaty... but there's a lot of benefit to having a large formal organization that operates legally and in the open. I think you are correct in assuming that building a carrier before 1935 would be... highly questionable. It certainly would be pointless, since there would be no aircraft for it.

We should also keep in mind that the aircraft of 1932-5 are not the aircraft of 1942-5. Biplanes are still around, engines are comparatively small and weak. Aside from a few Douhet-disciples and Mitchell-boosters, airpower is thought to be mostly useful for reconnaissance, or shooting down enemy reconnaissance.

Germany and Italy had independent air forces who would not permit their navies to control any aircraft. Britain had fought and refought that issue, eventually returning some control to the navy but absolutely sabotaging the design and production of modern, efficient naval aircraft. Only the US and Japan gave control of naval aircraft to the navy.

One last point. If Germany has a carrier, what can she use it for? The German navy was tasked with control of the Baltic, guarding convoys from Norway and raiding into the Atlantic. I've covered before why you don't take a carrier raiding, but in brief: Atlantic weather is bad for flight ops, surface ships did get within gun range of a carrier, fuel and aviation gasoline are scarce and by 1941 the life expectancy of a German warship in the Atlantic is short.

They built light cruisers in 1925 and heavy cruisers in 1929. 1925... that's a 6 year gap. Surely, someone knew something. I don't think it would be terribly difficult to locate the old prints of the Bayern and go from there.
They also managed to design and build a number of submarines (wonder why you didn't mention them?) of which they weren't even allowed to have any, not to mention developing new tactics and doctrines for these.

Anyway, I'm not talking about GZ or anything else having any impact on the war as a whole.
I'm wondering why they went for the most expensive solution seemingly without even trying to build a floating airfield just for practice, let alone a converted cruiser/merchant ship. Even if you were aiming at prestige-projects there would be plenty of ressources to convert a merchantman and try out some concepts of which they have absolutely zero experience (as opposed to cruisers, battleships and submarines of which there is some/plenty of knowhow).

 

[nwinther]

Was Germany even allowed to build an aircraft carrier in the interim years? Up until around 1936(?) they were still restricted by the Versailles treaty to a small navy with undersized guns and low tonnages. If you can't build an escort carrier of little or no immediate military value unless you scrap a militarily useful ship to free up the tonnage, you're not likely to do so for "educational" purposes only.

Several pre-war and early war vessels were built in direct violation of the naval treaties (others by drastically understating their intended tonnages), after Hitler felt that nobody would dare to push the issue to its ultimate conclusion. By then, it was too late to build an escort carrier first, before designing a fleet carrier utilizing the experience from the first vessel. Basically, no time for "trial and error", so Germany jumped directly to the "error" stage.

No they weren't allowed. But the whole Plan Z was depending on a war post 1945. So 9 years before you needed a full-scale carrier. And crashing for a full-scale carrier once it's too late, well just use the resources for something else entirely (other ships, tanks whatever).

Even with restrictions, you could make a carrier platform on something floatable and try out some stuff. Or so I would suppose.

 

[Director]

@nwinther - Check out the light cruisers Germany built in the 20's - they are direct copies of cruisers from WW1 and were relegated to training-only roles by the 30s. Compare them to the ships Britain is building at the same time.

The Deutschland class is a special case, born of the tight strictures of the Versailles Treaty. But in essence they are pre-World War One armored cruisers - slower than other cruisers, very heavily armed and lightly armored. The fate of Graf Spee shows what happens to a raider that takes even moderate damage - so after Admiral Scheer comes home, the armored ships are judged too slow and fragile for effective operations and don't have much of a war record.

It was a good idea - just not good enough when Britain can match your cruisers three or four or more to one. Still, given the Treaty, it was probably the best use Germany could have made of the tonnage allowed. Good for 1920, however, does not mean good for 1940; in my opinion, American, British, French and Italian Treaty cruisers of the same vintage aged better.

Germany was not permitted to build submarines until the 1935 naval treaty with Britain. Most of what they did build were small coastal boats - decent designs, but nothing special. Compare them to British, American and Italian boats of the same vintage. I didn't discuss subs because we were talking about carriers and their uses, which has to include surface escorts.


Converting a merchantman isn't going to get you anywhere toward developing a carrier wing. You can maybe launch aircraft from it, if you have a catapult, but unless it makes 21-24 knots you cannot launch and recover aircraft without a stiff breeze over the deck. You don't need a floating airfield - you need something that can move, preferably 27-30 knots, which the Germans would know from watching British, American and Japanese carriers. That means, at best, converting a liner, and to get a more efficient ship you need a purpose-built warship.

Germany loses the shackles of the Versailles Treaty in 1935. That gives them a 4 to 10 year window to build a fleet before war breaks out (actual war date versus when Hitler was telling his chiefs to expect it). Track one: you convert a merchant ship (12-24 months), try to beg aircraft from Goering, start training, start building a real carrier (or converting a liner) and get a useful carrier six years in. Track two: you build a purpose-built ship in four years and try to get aircraft.

Track two is not only faster, it is a program you can justify to your political bosses.

There's a reason why France, Russia, Italy and Germany didn't convert a merchantman into a carrier, and that is because the usefulness of such a ship is very limited, even for training.

 

[nwinther]

@nwinther - Check out the light cruisers Germany built in the 20's - they are direct copies of cruisers from WW1 and were relegated to training-only roles by the 30s. Compare them to the ships Britain is building at the same time.

The Deutschland class is a special case, born of the tight strictures of the Versailles Treaty. But in essence they are pre-World War One armored cruisers - slower than other cruisers, very heavily armed and lightly armored. The fate of Graf Spee shows what happens to a raider that takes even moderate damage - so after Admiral Scheer comes home, the armored ships are judged too slow and fragile for effective operations and don't have much of a war record.

It was a good idea - just not good enough when Britain can match your cruisers three or four or more to one. Still, given the Treaty, it was probably the best use Germany could have made of the tonnage allowed. Good for 1920, however, does not mean good for 1940; in my opinion, American, British, French and Italian Treaty cruisers of the same vintage aged better.

Germany was not permitted to build submarines until the 1935 naval treaty with Britain. Most of what they did build were small coastal boats - decent designs, but nothing special. Compare them to British, American and Italian boats of the same vintage. I didn't discuss subs because we were talking about carriers and their uses, which has to include surface escorts.


Converting a merchantman isn't going to get you anywhere toward developing a carrier wing. You can maybe launch aircraft from it, if you have a catapult, but unless it makes 21-24 knots you cannot launch and recover aircraft without a stiff breeze over the deck. You don't need a floating airfield - you need something that can move, preferably 27-30 knots, which the Germans would know from watching British, American and Japanese carriers. That means, at best, converting a liner, and to get a more efficient ship you need a purpose-built warship.

Germany loses the shackles of the Versailles Treaty in 1935. That gives them a 4 to 10 year window to build a fleet before war breaks out (actual war date versus when Hitler was telling his chiefs to expect it). Track one: you convert a merchant ship (12-24 months), try to beg aircraft from Goering, start training, start building a real carrier (or converting a liner) and get a useful carrier six years in. Track two: you build a purpose-built ship in four years and try to get aircraft.

Track two is not only faster, it is a program you can justify to your political bosses.

There's a reason why France, Russia, Italy and Germany didn't convert a merchantman into a carrier, and that is because the usefulness of such a ship is very limited, even for training.

Two things
1) I'm not suggesting that Germany would be able to use a converted ship in any battle-role, or that it would result in anything else than historical fact: That Germany never put to sea an operational carrier. Not sure who you are debating.
My interest is solely the process - why Germany went for a full-scale carrier with zero experience, rather than a (number of) experimental platform(s) before ordering something the size of a battleship.


2) You said no one had any experience. I say someone did. Even if they are copies of older ships, some expertise is retained/developed in regards to ship-building. So there's that. I would expect the same attempts at gaining expertise with an entirely new class of ships.

Now, Plan Z aims for 1945 as war-start. This could be the argument for why they for some reason decide NOT to make test-platforms: GZ IS the Test platform, because there's another 5 years to build the next generation of carriers, the next three carriers ordered will have issues ironed out during construction, or, being copies of Japanese carriers, there is no need for testing.
In any case, it seems like the most expensive solution.

 

[olm]

Large carrier may have been seen as the best way to convince Hitler to coerce Luftwaffe into providing planes.

The most clever play I can come up with, would have been doing what Japanese did with Hiyo, that is to have passenger liner designed from ground up to be suitable for carrier conversion the moment a need arises. Wouldn't be the best carrier ever, but could be made operational far faster than building one from scratch.

 

[Director]

My interest is solely the process - why Germany went for a full-scale carrier with zero experience, rather than a (number of) experimental platform(s) before ordering something the size of a battleship.

Time and money.

The victors of WW2 had decades to convert and build small carriers, had uncompleted or otherwise unusable large hulls they could turn into carriers in the 1920s. They then abandoned the small and slow early trial vessels - Vindictive was re-converted to a cruiser, Langley used as a transport, Hosho was placed in reserve.

There were seven naval powers, of varying strength: Great Britain, the US, Japan, France, Italy, Germany and Russia. The first four built carriers. The first three had an ongoing fleet air arm. All of them found their initial small (or slow, or both) carriers were inefficient for any purpose past transport. Except for Japan trying to game the Treaty with a really small carrier, none of the carrier navies built small carriers until wartime.

So if you are Germany, do you follow their failed path or do you cut straight to the thing they did that worked? If you are entering the car manufacturing market, you don't offer the Model T as your first car. You tool up for the most modern vehicle you can design. It's quicker than recapitulating auto history, and cheaper.

I am sorry if I haven't explained this well. I feel I've been repeating myself for three responses now, so I'll stop.

 

[Director]

You said no one had any experience. I say someone did.

Well, obviously there was someone they trusted to draw up blueprints - probably the last aging cadre of the Kaiser and Tirpitz. But there was not the staff of experienced designers who powered the naval race before the Great War, of the sort who designed warships in Britain, the US, France, Japan and Italy in the Treaty era. The German ships of the 20s are virtual copies of Great War designs, made (I think) by a few of the Kaiser's design staff at the end of their working life. The ships from the 30s manage to do the same things as their foreign counterparts but on 50% more tonnage, with systems that sound spiffy but don't actually work in service. That, I think, is a mark of inexperience... you can't just take civilian ship designers, add some navy officers and turn out a good warship design... at least, Germany didn't.

There was no work on warships from perhaps 1916 to the early 1920s, and people do not stay at their jobs when they are not getting paid. People move on to other things - civilian engineering if they can find it, retirement or death if that comes. To produce efficient, effective warships you need a well-educated, well-trained and experienced design staff. To keep those men and give them experience, you need work - and Germany built only a handful of warships from 1916 to 1935.

That's not just my opinion, but that of the naval historians I've read. I invite you to do your own reading and draw your own conclusions.

 

[Rubidium]

Well, at least I presented a theory that how the GZ could be used. Others have been pretty quiet with their ideas

To be fair, that's because it's hard to come up with a reasonable use case for the Graf Spee.

In a world where Germany somehow becomes a serious blue water naval power (as opposed to being in practice completely outclassed and bottled up by the British and later American navies), it might have a role as part of a fleet. Assume the British are somehow forced to surrender (and "assume the British are somehow forced to surrender" is a weakness that a lot of German war planning had), and it might support a renewed German empire in the post-war world.

In the real world, it was always going to be a white elephant with little practical use during the actual World War II. Which is one reason why it kept slipping in priority as the war dragged on and other needs for those resources kept cropping up.

If you view it as a bureaucratic boondoggle to ensure more funding and influence for the navy, rather than as a serious weapon of war, it all makes a lot more sense. Something big and exciting, that could be used to justify more spending. And of course, if the purpose is "big, flashy thing to get the Fuhrer's attention" rather than "actual, practical military design," then you can skip the preliminary experimental steps, and go straight for the biggest, coolest design you can, as that's most likely to spark his interest.

And of course, it's not as if even modern, experienced navies don't make decisions for political reasons as well. I'm reminded of Churchill's quip about the pre-WWI budgeting process: "The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight." Or Admiral Rickover's explanation for why the Cold War USN moved away from its historic practice of naming submarines after fish and instead naming them after cities or states: "Fish don't vote."

 

[Director]

To be fair, that's because it's hard to come up with a reasonable use case for the Graf Spee.

Um - Wrong Graf.

It is also possible that Germany was building ships without having a clear strategic plan for how they were to be used. I think it is possible that construction of Graf Zeppelin was intended as an opening wedge to pry some aircraft away from Goering and the Luftwaffe - not its sole purpose, but inter-departmental warfare among the Nazi armed forces was Byzantine, and getting Hitler to authorize a carrier while pointing the blame for no air group at Goering would be good play.

The effort spent converting Europa and Seydlitz to carriers tells me the German admiralty must have had some intended use for the ships... of course, we have perfect hindsight and the added advantage of knowing what both sides would do. It wasn't apparent in 1939 that aircraft would make raiding cruises by capital ships into one-way trips.

I've been looking back over some information on Graf Zeppelin and it seems to me that she was under construction for an unusually long time. Laid down basically at New Year of 1936, she should have been ready for working up in three years, but instead she was only 'mostly' complete when the Kriegsmarine got decimated in the Norwegian campaign in 1940. There does seem to have been an effort to get an air group together, but I assume that was broken up when war was declared.

I am just really surprised that Germany couldn't complete the ship by September of 1939, but given that they were building four fast battleships plus cruisers and destroyers, maybe they just didn't have the materials and support staff?

33,000 tons is in the ballpark for a US Lexington and 50% bigger than a British Illustrious, while having an air wing smaller than either. Admittedly, she had a lot of 4.1" AA guns and some deck armor, but... as with other Kriegsmarine ships, I have to wonder what they were using that tonnage for.

 

[Jopa79]

I've been looking back over some information on Graf Zeppelin and it seems to me that she was under construction for an unusually long time. Laid down basically at New Year of 1936, she should have been ready for working up in three years, but instead she was only 'mostly' complete when the Kriegsmarine got decimated in the Norwegian campaign in 1940. There does seem to have been an effort to get an air group together, but I assume that was broken up when war was declared.

I am just really surprised that Germany couldn't complete the ship by September of 1939, but given that they were building four fast battleships plus cruisers and destroyers, maybe they just didn't have the materials and support staff?

I very much agree. Graf Zeppelin should have been finished, I say, by 1942, at the latest.

But I think this is where Germany's limitations in terms of how it was able to develop its navy, priorities and secondary goals come into play. To my knowledge, the Kriegsmarine, under Erich Raeder, favored more the surface ships. But Raeder's replacement, follower, Karl Dönitz supported more the U-Boat project.

The Kriegsmarine didn't have the readiness to do the both strong, moreover, even when going to war, it was clearly behind its enemies in the number and capabilities of surface ships. It was quite easy to estimate that it would not be able to challenge the Allies in the next few years, e.g. from their archenemy, England. That is why one can assess, or at least ask questions, why Germany maintained its surface vessel construction program as it did.

I think, Dönitz was right, when selecting the U-Boat program the priority.

The delay in the schedules, was at least partly due to the fact that with this limited ability, Germany itself made it even more incapable, while changing the priorities all the time.

 

[Jopa79]

To be fair, that's because it's hard to come up with a reasonable use case for the Graf Spee.

In a world where Germany somehow becomes a serious blue water naval power (as opposed to being in practice completely outclassed and bottled up by the British and later American navies), it might have a role as part of a fleet. Assume the British are somehow forced to surrender (and "assume the British are somehow forced to surrender" is a weakness that a lot of German war planning had), and it might support a renewed German empire in the post-war world.

In the real world, it was always going to be a white elephant with little practical use during the actual World War II. Which is one reason why it kept slipping in priority as the war dragged on and other needs for those resources kept cropping up.

If you view it as a bureaucratic boondoggle to ensure more funding and influence for the navy, rather than as a serious weapon of war, it all makes a lot more sense. Something big and exciting, that could be used to justify more spending. And of course, if the purpose is "big, flashy thing to get the Fuhrer's attention" rather than "actual, practical military design," then you can skip the preliminary experimental steps, and go straight for the biggest, coolest design you can, as that's most likely to spark his interest.

And of course, it's not as if even modern, experienced navies don't make decisions for political reasons as well. I'm reminded of Churchill's quip about the pre-WWI budgeting process: "The Admiralty had demanded six ships; the economists offered four; and we finally compromised on eight." Or Admiral Rickover's explanation for why the Cold War USN moved away from its historic practice of naming submarines after fish and instead naming them after cities or states: "Fish don't vote."

To be fair, Sir, the value of my proposal does not decrease for the reasons you mentioned. This thread is, "Why the Graf Zeppelin?" I have given my own assessment of how it could have been used.

Criticizing my theory is of course allowed, but it doesn't remove the fact that no one else here has presented their own theory, or an alternative way of using the GZ.

It is also part of the principles of criticism that an alternative should be presented instead, I think you are not saying that.

The fact that one just go round and round about the matter, of course telling facts, but without presenting any other purpose does not make my theory bad.

 

[Rubidium]

To be fair, Sir, the value of my proposal does not decrease for the reasons you mentioned. This thread is, "Why the Graf Zeppelin?" I have given my own assessment of how it could have been used.

Criticizing my theory is of course allowed, but it doesn't remove the fact that no one else here has presented their own theory, or an alternative way of using the GZ.

It is also part of the principles of criticism that an alternative should be presented instead, I think you are not saying that.

The fact that one just go round and round about the matter, of course telling facts, but without presenting any other purpose does not make my theory bad.

So, my argument is that coming up with a use for the Graf Zeppelin [I can't believe I wrote Graf Spee before; sorry] is besides the point. Usability in war or to develop a serious carrier tradition wasn't her purpose.

Her purpose was to improve the position of the Kriegsmarine in the internal Nazi political struggles for funding, prestige, and influence. For that purpose, an overengineered, largely impractical carrier was far more useful than a Langley-style testbed. Hitler wants his unstoppable military now, not in a couple of decades of experimentation, so if you want funding, you'd better pretend that you are making an unstoppable military weapon, or else risk losing your budget (and possibly get redeployed somewhere you might get shot at).

Now, it's perfectly fair to argue that prioritizing internal power struggles over victory over the external enemy was a mistake, but the Graf Zeppelin is hardly the only example of that. The US ended up adopting a two-pronged offensive strategy for the Pacific War largely to separate Nimitz and MacArthur before they strangled each other, the Imperial Japanese Army and Navy seemed to spend more time fighting the other service than they did the Allies, and the pre-war British struggles over the Fleet Air Arm are well known.

To the extent she had a military (as opposed to a political) purpose, it's more for the post-war period. In a scenario where the Germans somehow beat the UK (and again, the inability to beat the UK is something that the Germans pretty much had to ignore or their entire plan would fall apart), a larger blue water fleet might have some use to keep the defeated UK honest, to protect international trade, and to eventually pose a threat to the US (who Hitler viewed as a potential threat). Certainly that is the argument the Kriegsmarine would make to justify budget increases, and the Graf Zeppelin would presumably fit into that post-war fleet. Whether such a fleet would be feasible is a separate question, but the Nazis frequently made overoptimistic plans in that respect.

It's also worth remembering that nobody pre-WWII really had a good idea of how best to use carriers. The idea that they were effective anti-ship weapons in their own right (as opposed to essentially scouts and support vessels for the main battlefleet) isn't really even realized by the major naval powers at the time the Graf Zeppelin was being designed, much less in the Kriegsmarine's doctrine. Instead, she would have been merely an escort for the larger German battlefleet that was never built. Which is reflected in the lower priority that was given to her construction, and why she kept being pushed back as other projects were prioritized.

TL/DR: Her purpose was to be a weapon in internal German political struggles, and more broadly to be part of a much larger German fleet than was ever built in the period in question. As such, she was poorly suited to the actual conflict that Germany found herself in, but that's not really the point. If she had somehow been completed before the war, she might have been of some use supporting the invasion of Norway, and would then probably have ended up like the Tirpitz: basically bait for Allied bombing missions to keep them from targetting more useful things.

 

[CV10]

If I can be a bit sarcastic, a built and operationally ready Graf Zeppelin, complete with an air group, might also have had the role of spur for the Royal Navy to demand that the Fleet Air Arm be provided with a...less eccentric...assortment of fighter aircraft.

Then again, the industrial and organizational issues surrounding aircraft procurement that plagued the Fleet Air Arm likely would not have been changed by a single German aircraft carrier.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

If she is finished and operational in 1939 she would have put even further pressure to the stretched British convoy system. Same with Bismark and Tirpitz. A year later and she is not of much use, same with Bismark and Tirpitz

 

[Director]

@Graf Zeppelin - That's an interesting and subtle point, regarding the 'shelf-life' of German capital ships. I spent a lot of time in years past thinking about why German surface warships were initially very successful as raiders, and then very suddenly... not.

Part of the answer (just my opinion) is that it took the Royal Navy a little time to develop the operational expertise and infrastructure they needed. But one thing changes most in that short period of time between Scharnhorst and Gneisenau sinking Glorious on June 8, 1940 and the loss of Bismarck on May 26, 1941: remote reconnaissance by aircraft and by radar.

Glorious was unable (for whatever reason) to make use of her air group, and Britain was not able to vector fast surface combatants into the area, so despite some damage the German ships got home safely. Bismarck got clean away after the Denmark Strait action, only to be spotted by a flying boat, tracked by British radar (in fact she was not, but she thought she was), attacked repeatedly by carrier aircraft and - finally - mission-killed by aircraft so that British warships could catch and finish her.

Absent that spotting by a flying boat, Bismarck probably gets to France. Absent her admiral's long-winded radio traffic, she might or might not be intercepted. Absent the carrier attacks, Bismarck likely gets to safety. But increasing numbers and ability of Allied aircraft completely end any chance of successful commerce raiding in the Atlantic by surface ships after Bismarck goes down. It's the same reason the Allies and Japanese never tried commerce raiding in the Pacific: after 1941, aircraft can mission-kill (or sink) any warship you send out, or keep you spotted until their warships can get to yours... and Bismarck alone may out-weighs and has more value than the Allied merchant ships lost to surface warships by that date.

So surface-raiding after spring of 1941 isn't just risky, it becomes absolutely a way to lose assets for no gain unless you can find an area where the Allies do not have or cannot get much use from aircraft - hence the redeployment of German assets to Norway.

(Caveat: I think the Japanese paid some attention to converting merchant ships into armed cruisers, but I don't think they had any success with them).

 

[Rubidium]

There's also the broader increasing use of convoys (a submarine can potentially attack an escorted convoy and escape, whereas a commerce raider is going to have to deal with the escorts somehow or other) which limits the effectiveness of surface raiders. Sure, a battleship like Bismarck can probably deal with the DDs/DDEs that make up most normal convoy escorts, but your generic commerce raider can't, and every sortie with a capital ship like the Bismarck puts it at risk of loss.

You also have the development of various other forms of detection beyond aircraft (HF/DF, which the Germans knew about, and Enigma/etc., which they didn't).

 

[olm]

Part of the problem for European Axis was that their own air forces ability to effectively support such naval operations was very low. Cooperation between their navies and air forces was terrible, fighters lacked range, and naval warfare tactics were step or two behind innovators like Japanese. Base some IJNAF Zeros and Bettys trained with torpedo attacks to Brittany, and suddenly naval warfare math in the region would look a bit different. Bismarck's wreck is closer to Brest than Prince of Wales' to Saigon from where Japanese attacked it.