Soviet was preparing for war very early, unlike the West. The "inflated numbers' is nothing special, compare to the tank productions later: 58000 T34 of 2 model are made.
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Compared to later war figures, no. But by 1941 very few tank designs in the world had been produced past even the thousand unit mark. The Soviets had already broken that figure several times, but with the BTs, T-26s, T-38s etc, which were good for their time but near useless by 1941.
Meanwhile, the Germans had by that stage amassed a pretty large number of modern medium tanks, which had been properly combat tested.
The heavily produced Soviet BT series wasn't totally useless, although they were not up to the same standards as the Panzer III. They had excellent speed and decent cross-country capability, the armor wasn't absolutely awful, and the 45mm main gun was at least "adequate". Poor training (many tank gunners had only ever fired three or four rounds in training), limited communication (only the command model had a radio, unlike the T-34s which all had radios - usually non-functional), a 2-man turret, and obsolete doctrines (often leaving them unsupported) turned those somewhat borderline armored units into little more than a row of coffins when confronted with German AT guns. The T-26, on the other hand, was already an ancient relic, and was only acceptable in the role of a semi-mobile pillbox, but the Soviets had thousands of them, and used them.
Retiring the obsolete T-26 and spending more training time on a smaller number of tank crewmen for the BT-7 and new T-34 (only introduced as a "stopgap" design until a "final" one could be developed), might have provided a more effective armored force overall, rather than trying to swamp the Germans by the sheer number of slow and pathetic T-26s, and only half-training a larger number of crews who very likely wouldn't live to see a second combat.
Remember that the Panzer III was originally fielded with a 37mm gun, and up until the start of Barbarossa, only a relatively small portion of them had been produced with the 50mm "medium barrel" L43 (43 = ratio of barrel length to bore diameter). The longer 50mm L60 gun had not yet been added. The Panzer IVs, as well as the StuG IIIs, still had the short-barrel 75L24(?) gun for delivering HE rounds, not the 75L48 anti-tank gun that was just being introduced with the F2 and G models, and were no more effective against armor than the Panzer IIIs. The Panzer II was still being used in fairly sizable quantities, with a 20mm auto-loading gun poorly suited for use against armored targets, and vulnerable even to portable AT rifles (which the Soviets fielded in quantity). Most, but not all, of the feeble Panzer I models had already been converted into either self-propelled artillery or armored munitions carriers.
Even with the 37mm guns on the Panzer 3s and 38(t)s, most German armour could still offer pretty surefire penetration against basically any Soviet tank except for the T-34 and the heavies. The Panzer 2's 20mm would also have been sufficient in theory for dealing with many Soviet recon tanks, and even some of the earlier BT models in service.
Of course, the Soviet 45mm guns on the BTs and even the T-26s were dangerous, particularly for their time, but I would guess that with their probable advantages in training, maneuverability, visibility, comms, and experience, the Germans were far more likely to land the first shot.
Bear in mind that only a small percentage of tank kills are the result of tank-versus-tank combat. Most occur due to anti-tank guns, with losses from artillery and air attacks falling closer to kills by other tanks. The early 45mm Soviet tank guns were reasonably effective against most of the German tanks, but were insufficient in their most common roles of providing infantry support and performing breakthroughs, mainly due to poor HE performance. While Soviet metallurgy was cutting edge, the Germans held a commanding lead in explosives technology, and were able to produce decent 50mm HE rounds. That same technological advantage also affected Germany's 75mm guns later in the war, while the UK and Americans had difficulties with producing a stable 76mm HE round that matched the performance of their lower velocity 75mm gun, leading to a mix of 75mm and 76mm armed tanks.
The primary failure of the BT series of tanks was the 2-man turret, which left the tank essentially blind to all but the current target while the commander was busy assisting with the main gun. When combined with the lack of infantry support in many operations, in addition to the lack of radios in all but the command variant, it meant that the whole formation was critically vulnerable to flanking maneuvers or attacks from other angles while engaged to the front. The Germans were well aware of that, and exploited it to the hilt. Throw in lack of actual live-fire training for the gunners (meaning that the Germans almost always got the first shot, whether from a tank or an AT gun) and you have a recipe for disaster, only partly the fault of the vehicle itself. The early T-34 suffered from most of the same issues, including the 2-man turret, but had sufficient armor protection to often survive the initial shot and actually shoot back.
Tank versus tank battles were not one of the critical deciding factors in the outcome of the war.
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An of course operational losses, the side who controlled the battlefield could collect their own lightly/moderately damaged vehicles and/or loot what the enemy left there. This affected the Soviets quite seriously during the Blitzkrieg phase, especially in combination with the successfully cauldroned units (where quite a few serviceable stuff have to be written off).
Picture having insufficient ammo allocated to your company, a shortage of food, medicine, and other essential supplies, and only limited training time with the actual equipment you're supposed to use. Then the supply lines are cut, so you won't get more, but orders are to attack with all possible effort in direction X. Instead of breaking out to the rear, hopefully to friendly lines, you're ordered to head deeper into enemy territory, directly into the teeth of the waiting guns. What do you think is going to happen?
In the one pocket battle, Soviet trains continued to send supply trains straight into an enemy-occupied supply depot for over a week after the pocket was surrounded and the depot taken by the Germans. The coordination between various Soviet service branches and divisions was below abysmal. It's bad enough when the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing, but when the fingers on the same hand aren't talking to each other, it's a disaster. In many cases, the left hand didn't know what the left hand was doing, either.
It's said that people learn best from their own mistakes, so the Soviets may have been attempting to become geniuses overnight by making as many mistakes as possible....or maybe the idea of promoting primarily on the basis of political reliability isn't entirely sufficient.
In the one pocket battle, Soviet trains continued to send supply trains straight into an enemy-occupied supply depot for over a week after the pocket was surrounded and the depot taken by the Germans. The coordination between various Soviet service branches and divisions was below abysmal. It's bad enough when the left hand doesn't know what the right hand is doing, but when the fingers on the same hand aren't talking to each other, it's a disaster. In many cases, the left hand didn't know what the left hand was doing, either.
It's said that people learn best from their own mistakes, so the Soviets may have been attempting to become geniuses overnight by making as many mistakes as possible....or maybe the idea of promoting primarily on the basis of political reliability isn't entirely sufficient.
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short answer, no, and no!
longer answer
1. Napoleon. Napoleon left moscow and started to retreat October the 19th. So, technically, he had failed to achieve his goals before the winter began.
2. The german army had planned to defeat the sowjets in 6-8 weeks. However, this did not materialize. Technically, the original plan of Barbarossa had already failed in August 1941 when the Germans could no longer advance all along the front but had to choose where to advance.
about the weather.
The winter in Russia IS cold! that is a known fact today, and it was known back then. Actually, the January of 1940 was the coldest january in moscow in a long time, 6 months BEFORE the german attack started. So, even though the winter of 1941/42 was much below the average winter temperatures, it was common knowledge that winters could and would be cold.
You cannot take the weather out of the equation. It would be like asking "Would Rommel have taken Egypt if Egypt and Libya had a european climate without deserts and 250 highways?" or "would the Romans have lost in 9 AD if Germania would not have been covered in forests?".
summary: the winter made it worse, but it was not the main reason for the defeat, neither 1812 nor 1941.
longer answer
1. Napoleon. Napoleon left moscow and started to retreat October the 19th. So, technically, he had failed to achieve his goals before the winter began.
2. The german army had planned to defeat the sowjets in 6-8 weeks. However, this did not materialize. Technically, the original plan of Barbarossa had already failed in August 1941 when the Germans could no longer advance all along the front but had to choose where to advance.
about the weather.
The winter in Russia IS cold! that is a known fact today, and it was known back then. Actually, the January of 1940 was the coldest january in moscow in a long time, 6 months BEFORE the german attack started. So, even though the winter of 1941/42 was much below the average winter temperatures, it was common knowledge that winters could and would be cold.
You cannot take the weather out of the equation. It would be like asking "Would Rommel have taken Egypt if Egypt and Libya had a european climate without deserts and 250 highways?" or "would the Romans have lost in 9 AD if Germania would not have been covered in forests?".
summary: the winter made it worse, but it was not the main reason for the defeat, neither 1812 nor 1941.
If Napoleon was defeated by General Winter, it is because he so mismanaged his campaign as to be caught 600 miles from the nearest friendly base, with no supplies and with the intervening countryside stripped and burned.
If Hitler was defeated by General Winter, it is because he mismanaged the preparations for war. The German army lacked fuel, appropriate logistical support and - most of all - adequate intelligence of the size of the Soviet armies and the Soviet ability to rebuild them.
If Hitler was defeated by General Winter, it is because he mismanaged the preparations for war. The German army lacked fuel, appropriate logistical support and - most of all - adequate intelligence of the size of the Soviet armies and the Soviet ability to rebuild them.
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I tend to agree, but the logistical problems are intertwined with climatic issues in both cases. It is impossible to separate the two.
As has been documented on this particular subforum numerous times by professionals far more skilled in military logistics than I, the German invasion of Russia was a carefully planned gambit that required Germany to knock out Russia in one fell swoop and wrap it all up in six weeks as she had done to Poland, France and the Low Countries. It was a risk, but the attack was mandated 'from above' with or without peace with Britain.
Every victory up to this point for the 3rd Reich was based on deception, and that was their only hope here by performing what SD refers to as 'The Greatest Deception in History' and achieving strategic surprise on the Russian Front. However, they bounced at Moscow because Zhukov and his boys were waiting and the German command was thrown into disarray as the counter-attack started because they hit the end of the tether on November 27 but kept moving.
After that point, the cream of Germany's infantry froze to death in the snow, as did Napoleon's, in such legendary fashion that became a running joke for decades to come. Germany keeps fighting a land war, the Nazi hierarchy shifts gears from military to an economic victory utilizing more 'spiritual' forms of warfare.
The Russian Army is still a primary factor, but disregard General Winter at your own peril as every other invading power has done. Trying to remove effect of winter weather from either army and their logistical tether is dangerous, and I rather suspect the next power to enter Russia will encounter exactly the same problem.
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There are only two periods where outsiders dominated the "heartlands" of what is modern Russia. The Varangians/Vikings/Scandinavians for a time, and the Mongols coming from the east. It's a lot harder to invade and control than the lack of obvious "natural borders" would suggest. The climate is part of that.
Both directly and indirectly, because the very same climatic issues contributed to this population density map:
The Russian heartland is separated by ~500-1000 km sparsely populated area from the rest of Europe. This migth not be such an obvious barrier as the mighty Alps, but similarly effective.
Varangians barely settled foot in modern Russia though. At best they dominated Novgorod and Ilmen, but never the heartland of modern Russia. Even if we include Volga trade routes.
Same for all nomads - they rarely came to the heartland above Ryazan and never really dominated it. Destruction of Vladimir and Ryazan was the only exception.
Climate influenced it, but the major reason was that... that area there was simply outskirts at the time. Which granted it a chance to develop, unlike other areas where wars raged on, and become heartlands of modern Russia.
1929 map and earlier disagree with you.
1930 pop density of Europe:
The only major obstacle is the Polesian Marshes which is indeed the major geographic divide. And it is also why all major wars and invasions went through two routes: northern one, through Smolensk, north to marshes, and through the south. However, this never really was that major obstacle.
There was no sparsely populated "belt" dividing Russia from rest of Europe. Nor Moscow mattered THAT much until later in XXth century.
Thank for the clarification.
On the other: the Russian heartland is however the Volga Basin or am I false with that too?
I would consider it being Central Federal District + Saint Petersburg and the provinces connecting to it and Estonia (Novgorod-Ilmenian area essentially). That's a subjective opinion however. What I did want to point out is that there is no "belt of sparsely populated land". The depopulation of the rural communities and smaller towns happened with massive growth of Moscow, massive urbanization (including various internal migrations) and economic issues of the regions within Central Federal district along with competition from other regions of Russia often offering cheaper labour or logistically being closer to major ports and such, driving up internal migration. Failure of industry in some of the smaller towns also contributed to migrations to the major urban centers instead of smaller towns and rural area.
However, around times of WWII the "low population density" wasn't the issue. Probably even under Napoleon it wasn't that bad, he just needed to take a big bigger route around Polesian Marshes since they used to be bigger.
@Andre Bolkonsky - I see it more as a matter of timing, in that the bad planning, intelligence and execution made it impossible to deal with the weather issues satisfactorily. But, had the other issues been correctly addressed, the winter would have been an inconvenience rather than a catastrophe.
In other words, the winter was not something the French and Germans could not cope with - it was something they had to cope with after screwing up by the numbers in sterling fashion.
In other words, the winter was not something the French and Germans could not cope with - it was something they had to cope with after screwing up by the numbers in sterling fashion.
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The plan was to take the Russian cities and spend the winter in warm and cozy quarters, not stand out in the snow a few dozen miles short of their goals. Hitler played a game of robbing Peter to pay Paul, by stripping its transportation production of essential materials to divert them to military equipment, and trading machine tools and manufacturing expertise to Russia for raw materials, in order to produce the war materials necessary to defeat France. Hitler then needed to defeat Russia before many of those same machine tools and manufacturing lessons could be used to build the army necessary to defeat Germany, but his army could not do so without the transportation assets that had been grossly neglected. The war effort was essentially a dead end in fall of '41 when the Soviets didn't collapse like the proverbial "house of cards" as anticipated, and the winter just put a few more nails in the coffin. By that point, Germany's narrow window of opportunity (whether real or only perceived) was already closing, and the Soviets were just going to keep getting stronger.
I wonder, even if conditions had been better, how hard would it have been for the Wehrmacht to take Moscow? Reaching it is one thing, but taking it another. From my limited knowledge, German high command was very skilled at the operational art of war, that is concentrating their forces (Schwerpunkt), disrupting enemy lines, etc., thus the great success during Barbarossa. However, urban fighting takes away many of their advantages. Doesn't Stalingrad kinda show that the German army lost a lot of advantages when engaging in urban warfare?
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