Still sacrificing a regiment to capture some radar seems like a harsh exchange to me, even for Brits sacrificing Canadian ground troops for the sake of English pilots.
You make a valid point, the entire operation was mourned as a defeat while lionizing the military participants. It was a great propaganda victory for the Reich. Based on the published version of events, you could not be more correct and comparing this to a 'victory' along the lines of Montgomery blowing the Allied advance is very understandable.
However, there is another side of the story. von Rundstedt put it best when he said both the Germans and the Allies would analyze every aspect of this operation, and the Allies would learn much from this and would not make the same mistakes twice.
Militarily, it became a laboratory over what to expect when the real invasion began. The positives were it convinced the Germans a landing over open beaches without a harbor could not be made. Per Mountbatten (a man I truly do not like merely because his son is so loathsome) OPERATION JUBILEE proved to the British a landing supported by artificial harbors would be very feasible and is when the Mulberry projects began. Key personnel were released into the French backfield with support and expertise for the Resistance.
Covertly, American Rangers who had been training in Scotland with several attached OSS killers handled the radar technicians to extricate and document what could be seized (The OSS men and Ranger commanders were specifically given covert orders to kill the radar technicians if everything went south). In part, the radar equipment, documentation, and photographs were sent to MIT in Boston to the Rad Lab, out of which even further countermeasures were developed to affect Wurzburg such as enhancements to dispersion techniques regarding Chaff/Window, Jostle, Piperack, and Mandel.
What I failed to mention was Ian Fleming (yes, that Ian Fleming) and 30 Commando grabbed one of the new 4-rotor Enigma Machines (Shark) and turned it over to Bletchley Park.
In the end, during the fighting withdrawal, a subsequent and coordinated attack of specific targets by fighter-bombers covered up the use of carefully placed demolitions by the spec-ops teams, concealing the loss of equipment to the Germans.
Consider it a gambit in chess. It will not be the first time, and far from the last, innocent people die for a covert mission not having any clue what they were doing or what they had actually achieved. Losses were dreadful both to ground and air personnel. To the spymasters, it was a worthy trade; the value to the air campaign alone - as this is specifically a thread about air combat - seems to be very valuable even before the recovery of a working Enigma. However, feel free to make your own appraisal.
P.S. Why on this forum does von Rundstedt's name show as misspelled? Someone should look at that.