Did they really withhold tanks on D-Day because Hitler was sleeping?

[Andre Bolkonsky]

That reminds me of a Normandy story.

On June 15, USS Texas received intelligence a German force was massing just beyond range of her 14” naval rifles. The captain flooded the blister tanks on one side of the ship, listing to one side, adding 5 degrees of arc to her range, and absolutely hammering the German formation before it could begin its assault.

 

[Premu]

I saw another video recently about D-Day from the German perspective, what they knew on the day and in the days afterwards. Puts things better into perspective. I guess when you spend your whole life watching and reading about D-Day with hindsight on your side, with the precise knowledge of all the planning and the main objectives behind it, it's easy to forget that the Germans only knew what they knew from the chaotic and frantic reports coming in.

I don't need to guess what the allies are doing - their exact plan is burned into my brain from decades of watching documentaries, reading about it and playing games. The Germans on the other hand do need to guess. They need to wait a suitable amount of time, collect reports of how the frontlines have evolved, look at all of their information (some of which may be faulty), and try to deduce what the hell is going on.

I am quite confident now though that the reason the Germans didn't smash the allies with Tanks WASN'T because Hitler was asleep and his aides were too scared to wake him up. Probably more of a combination of:

1. Is this the main attack?

2. What about that other enormous buildup of armies ready to hit Calais? (the fake army the allies created to fool Germany)

3. Railways are all broken because of the French resistance. Bloody French, they ruined France they did!

4. All our trucks full of fuel and spare parts for the tanks get air striked if they try to move in daylight.

5. We can't replace these vital machines easily, we must be absolutely 100% certain we're using them to attack at the right time in the right place where they will have the most effect.

And so forth.

Agreed - we shouldn't forget that generals have only a pretty vague picture of the enemy forces. Often they don't even know the state and the position of all their own troops. Saying a decision was bad without knowing why this decision was made is playing hindsight warrior.

 

[mork77]

The german tanks of Panzergruppe West were und direct orders of Hitler ( Führervorbehalt). This meant that their use was only possible if Hitler gave his ok.

The german reaction to Overlord was chaotic. organized resistance only happened on a local level. The 7th Army was only informed 0120 on June 6th. Even then, nobody believed this to be the major invasion, which was expected at the Pas de Calais. Organized reaction higher up in the chain of command only began to take form during june 6th, with the landings already underway.

At 0400, Blumentritt ( Chief of Staff OB West) phoned Jodl 0400 on june 6 to get Control over the Panzergruppe West, but Jodl said that Hitler did not want to use his reserves this early. This did not change for a further 12 hours.

Actually, i do not think it would have mattered that much.
The Allies had total air supremacy over the western front. The Divisions mostly had to be transported by rail, via a rail system which had been heavily damaged because of the "Transportation plan", coordinated strikes against the rails system in Western Europe.
Roads were also under constant attack, resulting in none of the divisions being capable of a coordinated attack.

So, i do not think that these 12 hours mattered.

The only counterattack that posed some form of a danger to the allied plans was the attack of the 21st Panzer Division during june 6th. This division was not part of the Panzergruppe West but under Rommels command and already close to Caen before the Allies landed. And even this attack in the end had no chance of succeeding.

Basically, the Allies were soundly ashore on June 7th. 160 000 troops had crossed the channel on D-Day. After that, the breakout was only a matter of time.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

That reminds me of a Normandy story.

On June 15, USS Texas received intelligence a German force was massing just beyond range of her 14” naval rifles. The captain flooded the blister tanks on one side of the ship, listing to one side, adding 5 degrees of arc to her range, and absolutely hammering the German formation before it could begin its assault.

Legend says she flooded her torpedo blisters which may or may not give her such a list. Also if anything she fired at static targets and not a German formation assemmbling outside her range.
Its a nice story tho.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Legend says she flooded her torpedo blisters which wont give her such a list. Also if anything she fired at static targets and not a German formation assemmbling outside her range.
Its a nice story tho.

2 degrees, not 5.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

2 degrees, not 5.

Mmm thats more likely.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

I have an excellent map showing fleet dispositions and firing targets during OPERATION NEPTUNE, but it will not translate to the forum bluescreen . . . .

This is it, a page on the USS Texas website about halfway down

I post this there as an appetizer, but it is much easier to read on the website.

 

[Acheron]

Among other things, she [USS Texas] fired upon snipers and machine gun nests hidden in a defile just off the beach. [...] That evening, she bombarded a German mortar battery that had been shelling the beach.

 

[Antediluvian Monster]

That listing thing is an old trick. Togo used it to bombard Port Arthur for one.

 

[Rubidium]

It is interesting that Rommel once said German need to beat the Allies on the beach and prevent landing, the first 24 hours is crucial. How about giving 2 tanks to each local beach. It seems that there was no Germans tank on the beach on any movies.

Worth noting: the Allies in 1944 (especially the Americans) had vastly more experience dealing with opposed landings than the Germans had with opposing landings.

As others have suggested, sending your irreplaceable armor into easy range for naval fire support is an excellent way to lose said armor.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Worth noting: the Allies in 1944 (especially the Americans) had vastly more experience dealing with opposed landings than the Germans had with opposing landings.

As others have suggested, sending your irreplaceable armor into easy range for naval fire support is an excellent way to lose said armor.

Very true.

 

[AjayAlcos]

I have an excellent map showing fleet dispositions and firing targets during OPERATION NEPTUNE, but it will not translate to the forum bluescreen . . . .

This is it, a page on the USS Texas website about halfway down

I post this there as an appetizer, but it is much easier to read on the website.

*My eyes*

 

[bz249]

That was France's strategy in 1940. While an idea that I wouldn't mind seeing simulated/gamed out, in theory the beach fortifications should be able to give that level of defensive firepower for much less investment and without sacrificing your Mobile reserves.

The French did it for two reasons: part of their tanks simply lacked the mobility to do anything else than this (downto FT-17) the other reason was that they cannot move their units coherently so armor arrived to the front when the crew/machine shop was ready with the repairs (thus here one there two).

 

[MCMartel]

I've been watching a lot of documentaries about Op. Overlord what with it being the 75th anniversary of D-Day and all that. The one thing I keep hearing is that, on the day, German tanks didn't leap into action immediately because Hitler was sleeping and none of his staff/aides had the courage to wake him up. Is this really true? The Germans had been planning the defence against the allies for over a year, they knew something huge was coming and it was of the utmost importance to them to throw the allies back into the sea so that they could focus their efforts entirely on Russia. It was probably the single most important thing at that time for the Germans. What little hope they had left of winning the war (or at least coming to some kind of terms with the allies) utterly hinged on stopping the allies opening up another large front in the west. If they opened up that third way of attack then it was lost for Germany. Even Hitler must have known that.

Also, whatever else you could say about Hitler, I've never heard about him being the type of dude who would have his aides shot for waking him to tell him that the most important event in their war at that point needs his immediate attention.

It just doesn't add up. Is there another reason the tanks didn't swing into action immediately? Like, maybe the skies were swarming with allied fighter bombers and they knew that moving in daylight in columns would be dumb and do them no good whatsoever? Or maybe their commanders were holding them back because they suspected the initial landings were a diversion and they didn't want to get bogged down when the real landings came?

1. It likely had little to do with Hitler sleeping.
2. There are lots of answers to why they didn't put all their tanks in. Basically, they had 2 armored divisions, and if they lost those, that's sort of it in western france, German industry was something of a shitshow for most of the war (and before) so they had to be careful with what they had. There was a fear that if they committed everything and lost it, there goes France. It's ambiguous if it was the right decision. On one hand, troops are vulnerable on the beach because they lack cover and are deploying, on the other hand, the closer to the beach the attack is, the more vulnerable you are to naval gunfire and short-range airpower, so it's not a sure thing that it was a bad decision either.

 

[DukeDayve]

1. It likely had little to do with Hitler sleeping.
2. There are lots of answers to why they didn't put all their tanks in. Basically, they had 2 armored divisions, and if they lost those, that's sort of it in western france, German industry was something of a shitshow for most of the war (and before) so they had to be careful with what they had. There was a fear that if they committed everything and lost it, there goes France. It's ambiguous if it was the right decision. On one hand, troops are vulnerable on the beach because they lack cover and are deploying, on the other hand, the closer to the beach the attack is, the more vulnerable you are to naval gunfire and short-range airpower, so it's not a sure thing that it was a bad decision either.

Yeah, I think they probably made the right decision to not commit them immediately. They believed the main attack was coming elsewhere along the coast (where they may have committed them, had that other invasion not been a total hoax).

 

[Easy-Kill]

Basically, they had 2 armored divisions, and if they lost those, that's sort of it in western france, German industry was something of a shitshow for most of the war (and before) so they had to be careful with what they had.

I don't know whether you are referring to 2 armoured Divisions in the immediate beach area, or to Normandy, or France as a whole. However, the battles around Normandy were the largest concentration of panzer forces since Kursk and the largest that there would be for the remainder of the war. Yes, on D-Day they were spread around the region but it certainly wasn't 2 divisions that would be it for France.

Yes, German industry was struggling to meet its demand, but that struggle wasn't in the production of tanks and fighting vehicles. That struggle was principally in the armaments and supplies necessary to deploy and maintain them, but not the vehicles themselves.

As for whether it would make a difference, the Allied planning had already dictated that it wouldn't. The airborne deployments would have greatly hampered the rapid deployment of armoured forces and allied air forces would and did hamper movement. Short of camping the tanks just behind the sea wall, there isn't much that could be done there.

 

[Acheron]

As for whether it would make a difference, the Allied planning had already dictated that it wouldn't. The airborne deployments would have greatly hampered the rapid deployment of armoured forces and allied air forces would and did hamper movement. Short of camping the tanks just behind the sea wall, there isn't much that could be done there.

Of course, some groups are in love with the myth that had the reserved been deployed, they would have (for some reason) come at a critical juncture and somehow managed to defeat the forces at Omaha Beach which somehow would have doomed the allied landing. Anyone else had the dubious joy of receiving such insights?

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

Of course, some groups are in love with the myth that had the reserved been deployed, they would have (for some reason) come at a critical juncture and somehow managed to defeat the forces at Omaha Beach which somehow would have doomed the allied landing. Anyone else had the dubious joy of receiving such insights?

Which actually isnt impossible, just unlikely.
D-Day wasnt a forgone conclusion. It was the result of carefull planing and Omaha was on the verge of disaster(caused ironically by planing failure) saved by the bravery of individual soldiers.
All the tanks moving at once instead of the historical piecemeal approach could have the allies calling off the operation.

 

[Acheron]

Which actually isnt impossible, just unlikely.
D-Day wasnt a forgone conclusion. It was the result of carefull planing and Omaha was on the verge of disaster(caused ironically by planing failure) saved by the bravery of individual soldiers.

Agreed, though I would argue, once the operation started, it was very unlikely that the allies would loose, for they had planned and prepared very well. In fact, do we know more about the plans for D-Day? Like, did the allies rely on making all beaches or did they have contingency plans in case some beach assault failed?

All the tanks moving at once instead of the historical piecemeal approach could have the allies calling off the operation.

Which German (hypothetical) armored counter assault are we talking about here? One on the day of the attack would have to fight through the airborne units to get to the beaches and require to correctly identify the allied main efforts, plus, only the tanks in the immediate area would be available.
Later attacks, with the reserves from elsewhere, would be in a race against time, as more and more allied troops poured onto the continent, concentrating the force would eat up more precious time and increase attrition from allies air forces I'd wager.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

I talk about an instant movement of the tank divisions towards the beaches including the kitchen sink.

Airpower is overated in their ability to stop tanks.
Most tanks from the division which immediatly moved got destroyed/disabled by ships.