You mean he was in charge of Operation Barbarossa ?
I assume you meant the largest naval invasion in history, Operation Neptune.
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I assume you meant the largest naval invasion in history, Operation Neptune.
I admit him in as a to-be statesman
As far as i know he also opposed the nuclear bombings which in itself earns him my admiration.
Good, then we can include all future and past statesmen who lived during WW2:I admit him in as a to-be statesman
- Nelson Mandela
- Salvador Allende
- Olof Palme
Good, then we can include all future and past statesmen who lived during WW2:
- Nelson Mandela
- Salvador Allende
- Olof Palme
If those had considerable effects on WW2 then yes
John Maynard Keynes - fought the economic battle for his country despite appalling personal health.
I'd rate George Marshall above Eisenhower if we are simply discussing WW2 statesmen. Eisenhower's role in managing the political tensions in the Allied command should not be understated (the most important part of his job was more diplomatic in nature than strictly military after all), but ultimately Marshall was the one drawing up US grand strategy during and immediately after the war. Him and Stalin had by far the most impact on the post-war order in Europe. By comparison, Charles De Gaulle and most of the other statesmen were merely tagging along.
I'd rate Stalin above either Marshal or Eisenhower though in importance, for obvious reasons.
I'd rate Stalin above either Marshal or Eisenhower though in importance, for obvious reasons.
Admittedly, Operation Neptune posed a whole host of technical difficulties that Barbarossa simply did not. The overall difficulties were obviously more pressing in the latter for strategic reasons, but Neptune planners had to launch a type of offensive that effectively had never been launched before (a massive multi-pronged combined arms naval invasion) with followup involving a whole host of completely untested technologies.You mean he was in charge of Operation Barbarossa ?
I assume you meant the largest naval invasion in history, Operation Neptune.
The strategies and the tactics used in Operation Neptune were tested (and based on the results improvements were made) two years earlier, in Operation Jubilee, August 1942. Known also as the Dieppe Raid, the Allied assault against the German occupied port of Dieppe in France was an Allied failure. This combined arms invasion was a bloody fiasco for the Allies, showing them to not to hope invading France for a long time. The Allied forces in Dieppe lost over 50% of the total manpower in killed, wounded or captured, the Royal Air Force failed to lure the Luftwaffe into an open battle and the Royal Navy lost most of its landing craft used in the operation. The original Allied objectives in Operation Jubilee included seizing and holding a major port-town for a short period (both, to prove it was possible and gather intelligence), destroying the coastal defences in this sector, boosting the morale and stability, demonstrating the firm commitment of the UK to open a second front in Europe - none of these objectives were met, contrarily doubts were raised against the military leadership of the UK due the usage and sacrificing the British Commonwealth troops rather than UK troops during the operation. The events in Dieppe highly influenced the Allied preparations for the Operation Torch and the Normandy landings.
Some of the lessons and consequences the Allies learned in Dieppe, the failure of the Churchill-tanks in the Operation Jubilee led to the development of various British amphibious vehicles to give protect and cover for the British engineers in their tasks in future invasion operations, the creation of the Tactical Air Force to support major ground operations, also the previous Allied belief that a seizure of a major port was essential in opening a second front was made obsolete - the Dieppe Raid demonstrated that the amount of the damage for a port by the bombardment to take it, would render its use as a port afterwards - this led to the development of the Mulberry -ports, prefabricated harbors.
After Dieppe failure the Allies had a kind of What Not To Do In Amphibious Operations -manual. It laid the framework for the Operation Torch and the Operation Neptune. Dieppe showed for the Allies the basic needs and requirements for a successful amphibious operation:
- the need for artillery support + aerial bombing
- a sustained element of surprise
- the need of proper intelligence concerning the enemy fortifications
- the avoidance of a direct frontal attack on a defended port city
- the need for proper re-embarkation craft
I agree it was by all means a major undertaking.
The keyword was however largest military operation in history how Yakman claimed.
I agree with much of your sentiment, but there seems to be an unhealthy dose of spin, and some outright false-truths here.
In the first instance, only 33 landing craft were lost in the operation. I am struggling to find an exact number, but there were 9 Landing Ship Infantry, each with between 10 and 20 landing craft. Even at the lower number, 33 lost out of 90 isnt exactly most, and at a strategic level it was almost inconsequential.
As for why the choice was Canadian troops, this was down to a number of reasons. In the first instance, the vast majority of the British troops that had been raised up until 1941 were deployed in North Africa, Burma, the Middle East and various other theatres. At this time, British troops were favoured as they had predominantly been formed around Territorial units, whose order of battle and organisation was well established. That is, they were better organised to fight. Canadian troops had a tremendous reputation, but they were considered to be less well trained and thus kept in the UK for more training. Therefore, they were probably the best trained units in the area of operations able to undertake such a mission. Furthermore, the Canadians actively relished the chance to engage and prove that they were capable of independent brigade level operations.
While Dieppe was a tactical failure, it was an operational draw and strategic success. As you note, it provided the Allies with important information regarding German defenses. It further gave the British an opportunity to capture the 4 rotor enigma machine (if O'Keefe's research is to be believed). So I am sorry, it was not Malice that pushed the British to use Canadian troops, nor were the British seen as incompetent following the operation (rather, it was the Canadian Batallion level command that was seen as concerning).
Sorry, my mistake. By oversight and generalizing too much I used a false word, most...instead it should rather be...the Royal Navy lost much of its landing craft...or...the Royal Navy losses were very high. The exact number is 28%, it's not meaning the most, but it is a high number in losses, or in casualties.
Yes, I agree. The Dieppe Raid began in optimism. The size of the Canadian Army in the UK continued its growth in manpower, but only some had seen true action, or combat, to be exact, the Canadians hadn't seen action since the Japanese victory in Hong Kong, late in 1941. Many of them were eager and had a desire to see combat - keen to tell their English girlfriends true stories from the war and being heroes of the front. Also, the Canadian commanders and the generals learned the Dieppe battle plan and accepted it - but nobody knew, it would come by a terrible cost, one of the darkest chapters in the Canadian military history.
I don't see how Dieppe was an operational draw? Any battle what's not happening is an operational draw, so this would had happened even without Dieppe, without wasting the resources and the human lives. The Dieppe Raid would come with a disastrous ending - it was clear from the very beginning, the planning was poor, the Allied assault was carried out almost in total blindness. The German garrison in the port town was 2 000 of men and they were heavily fortified and well armed. With a landing force of 6 000 men the Allied objective was to test the new tactics - the amphibious warfare and combined arms. The Royal Air Force should had drawn the Luftwaffe attention, while the landing force carried on its mission, to capture the city of Dieppe, destroy the nearby German airfield and German HQs, take German officers as POWs and blow up Dieppe radar station. After all this, the landing force should return to the beach, embark the ships and sail back to England. This doesn't sound realistic in my opinion, especially when the Allied radio broadcasts had previously informed about this forthcoming military operation in Dieppe sector. During their desperate moment in the Finnish Civil War the Red Guard soldiers stated - But, it looked so easy on the map. The same comes in true with Operation Jubilee, a bold and ambitious plan backed by the courage of inexperienced rookies. The Dieppe Raid happened for two reasons, first the British desperately wanted the intelligence, they wanted to show their commitment for the Allied cause and improve their military skills and capabilities, secondly the Canadians were willing to carry out the operation. Without these Allied interests Dieppe wouldn't never happened. Yes, the British got the intelligence, so the operation came with this piece of information. But this information came in form, do not do this in war, surely, there was other means and resources to determine this. Was this conclusion and information so major and great worth that it covered the casualties, nearly 4 000 of men and their suffering, I cannot answer, but I bet that the contemporaries, the injured party could reply clearly.
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That's a weird definition of "draw", unless you mean it as "Draw-n and quartered"So was ww2 for Germany
Germany was better off after each lost World war so no.That's a weird definition of "draw", unless you mean it in the context of "Draw-ed and quartered"
But the point was how hollow and easy such a statement is.