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I was originally going to post this reply in the thread where this conversation started, but since it is supposed to be about Podcat's Twitter teasers, and indeed someone already requested the conversation be moved elsewhere, I am making a new thread for this instead. The post is as follows:
Call me what you like, I maintain my position. This is an area of history where Russia's actions all point to one thing: the fact that the Russian objective was the total conquest of Finland. In this they failed in two wars, three when you include 1918, when Lenin armed and incited Finnish Reds in to rebellion against the lawful Finnish government, in a policy that he exercised in all breakaway territories of the Russian Empire, about half of which as a consequence of this policy fell back under Russian control. Those that lied on the periphery of the West generally succeeded in breaking away.
I forgot to mention the Terijoki government, a Russian puppet state comprised of Finnish communists who fled Finland in 1918, which, like @Rashie pointed out, was created to replace the regime in Helsinki. Throughout the Winter War almost until the very end, Russia did not recognise the actual government of Finland, instead only "negotiating" with their puppet government under Otto Wille Kuusinen.
Stalin had in mind for Finland the same fate he decided for the Baltic States. Had Finland accepted Russian demands in the fall of 1939, like the Baltic States did, the "Winter War" would simply have come in the summer of 1940, the same time Stalin launched coups d'état in the Baltic States and the latter's people "voluntarily voted" to join the "happy family of Soviet socialist nations". In such a scenario Finland would have been much weaker: a part of her main defence line on the Karelian Isthmus (what became known as the Mannerheim-line) would have already been ceded to the Russians as per their demands in the fall of 1939, rendering most of it useless, the Russian base in the Hanko Peninsula would've provided a beachhead into inner Finland, there would have been no "General Winter" to assist the Finns, and finally there would have been no threat of Franco-British intervention that IRL made Stalin put a temporary halt to his attempt at the conquest of Finland, ending the Winter War in March 1940.
Btw a word about the Hanko Peninsula here: The Russians had been wanting to lease this territory since 1938 (first under the so-called "Yartsev negotiations"), but it was something Finland could not agree to (where as the country was open about some concessions elsewhere), as it would have provided, like already stated above, a beachhead for a land invasion into the inner parts of the country (Hanko is 116km from Helsinki, for instance). The Russians supposedly needed this territory for a naval base to secure the Gulf of Finland from enemy ships, but once they actually got it after the Winter War, they stationed it with two full divisions of infantry, a battalion of tanks and at least 60 fighters (the airfield the Russians built in Hanko was too short for bombers, but was being extended in 1941 to accommodate them). Such a heavy complement was clearly meant for ground operations as well, particularly with a battalion of tanks. After the Continuation War they didn't even keep Hanko, choosing to take Porkkala instead, a mere 30km from Helsinki, putting the capital in range of regular artillery guns.
As I already noted in my previous post, Stalin never gave up his plans to conquer Finland, not until after WW2 anyway, and throughout 1940-41 Russia kept breaking the peace treaty that ended the Winter War, as well as meddling into Finnish internal affairs, while also putting tremendous external pressure on the country. The Karelo-Finnish SSR was founded for this purpose, and Kuusinen put in charge of it. He did not get to be the "leader" of Soviet Finland (of course the real leader would in any case have been Stalin, as SSRs had no real autonomy in this time), but he got most of the territory Finland ceded in the Moscow Peace Treaty. This was only meant as a temporary arrangement, until the rest of Finland could be incorporated.
Operation Kilpapurjehdus (Regatta) was conducted to militarise the Åland Islands to prevent a Russian landing there. This was a necessary violation of the Åland convention in face of a neighbor who obviously did not give a wooden nickel about treaties (Russia had violated the Treaty of Tartu, the Russo-Finnish non-aggression pact, the Treaty of Moscow, etc.). Finland garrisoning Åland could not really harm Russia, where as the Russians getting a presence there would've been catastrophic to Finland. Actually the Russians did not even sign the 1921 convention, and the whole demilitarisation issue was more related to relations between Finland and Sweden, and those between the Swedish-speaking population of Åland and the rest of Finland. This of course was no legitimate excuse to start a war against Finland anyway, and indeed the reason for Russian hostilities in June 1941 lie elsewhere: mainly in them greatly overestimating their own strength and not expecting the huge losses they would suffer later in the first months of Barbarossa.
As for German troops in Finland, they were under strict orders not to cross the border or fly attacks against Russia unless the latter starts hostilities against Finland first, or unless the Russians cross the border with a sizable force (IIRC this was defined to be at least battalion-size EDIT: company-size or an armoured formation, as noted in the list below). These orders were not violated, and the first German hostilities against Russia from Finnish soil took place a bit before noon June 25th, well after the Russians had first opened fire on the Finns days before.
In the past I have written a list here on the forums of the various combat actions and the like, as well as their diplomatic consequences, that took place between Russia and Finland in the first days of the Continuation War. Here is that list now:
22.6.1941:
-6:05am: Russian planes bomb Finnish coastal battleships, gunboat Uusimaa and a mine barge in the Turku archipelago.
-6:15am: Russian planes bomb the coastal fortress of Älskäri in the Turku archipelago.
-6:45am: Russian planes bomb transport ships at Korppoo.
-6:50 or 7:55am: Russian artillery from Hanko fire at the islands of Porsö and Storholm, as well as on targets on the mainland.
-7:38-9:06am: Finnish submarines lay mines off the coast of Russian-occupied Estonia.
-8:15am: Finnish naval command gets permission to return fire.
-The Russian Northern Fleet and 14th Army are given orders to bomb targets in the Petsamo and Kirkkoniemi areas.
-Russian fire from across the border in the USSR against Finnish border guards at Hirsilampi (14km east of Imatra). The source doesn't specify which kind of fire, but given the range, I assume shelling.
-Russian artillery fire several dozen shells from Pummanki at Kalastajasaarento (territory ceded in 1940) against a Finnish vessel.
The Finnish foreign minister Witting issued a protest to the Russian ambassador, minister Orlov, inquiring the reason for these hostilities. Minister Orlov promised to ask the Russian government for an explanation, but such an explanation was never delivered.
Furthermore, the Finnish foreign ministry issued a bulletin reaffirming Finnish neutrality, and added that Finland would defend herself if attacked. The bulletin was received in both Moscow and Berlin. After this, just to be sure the bulletin was received, the foreign ministry repeated it twice.
A note to the Russian ambassador in Helsinki was also issued. The ambassador refused to receive it, claiming no such attacks had taken place.
German units in Finland are under strict orders not to cross the border unless Russia crosses the Finnish border with a force larger than a company, or with armoured forces.
23.6.-24.6.1941:
-Russian planes intrude Finnish air space and perform bombing runs on Finnish troops and reconnaissance on towns and cities for the upcoming Russian bomber offensive.
-Germany requests Finland to give permission to bomb Russia from Finnish soil. Permission is considered but not yet given.
-Russia pulls its ambassador out of Finland.
25.6.1941:
-12:00am: Finland gives Germany permission to operate aircraft from Finnish soil to attack Russia.
-4:00am: ~500 Russian planes bomb towns, cities and industrial centres throughout the country, mostly in Southern and Central Finland. Practically all targets are exclusively civilian in nature.
This time Finnish interceptors are allowed to scramble and end up shooting down 27 planes without losses.
-The Finnish government states to the parliament that the country has been once again been plunged into war.
-11:00am-12:00pm: The first German attacks on Russia from Finnish soil: Stukas bomb the Murmansk railroad line.
26.6.1941:
-Finland officially declares to once again be at war with Russia
Finnish troops remain in defensive positions until July-August.
Call me what you like, I maintain my position. This is an area of history where Russia's actions all point to one thing: the fact that the Russian objective was the total conquest of Finland. In this they failed in two wars, three when you include 1918, when Lenin armed and incited Finnish Reds in to rebellion against the lawful Finnish government, in a policy that he exercised in all breakaway territories of the Russian Empire, about half of which as a consequence of this policy fell back under Russian control. Those that lied on the periphery of the West generally succeeded in breaking away.
I forgot to mention the Terijoki government, a Russian puppet state comprised of Finnish communists who fled Finland in 1918, which, like @Rashie pointed out, was created to replace the regime in Helsinki. Throughout the Winter War almost until the very end, Russia did not recognise the actual government of Finland, instead only "negotiating" with their puppet government under Otto Wille Kuusinen.
Stalin had in mind for Finland the same fate he decided for the Baltic States. Had Finland accepted Russian demands in the fall of 1939, like the Baltic States did, the "Winter War" would simply have come in the summer of 1940, the same time Stalin launched coups d'état in the Baltic States and the latter's people "voluntarily voted" to join the "happy family of Soviet socialist nations". In such a scenario Finland would have been much weaker: a part of her main defence line on the Karelian Isthmus (what became known as the Mannerheim-line) would have already been ceded to the Russians as per their demands in the fall of 1939, rendering most of it useless, the Russian base in the Hanko Peninsula would've provided a beachhead into inner Finland, there would have been no "General Winter" to assist the Finns, and finally there would have been no threat of Franco-British intervention that IRL made Stalin put a temporary halt to his attempt at the conquest of Finland, ending the Winter War in March 1940.
Btw a word about the Hanko Peninsula here: The Russians had been wanting to lease this territory since 1938 (first under the so-called "Yartsev negotiations"), but it was something Finland could not agree to (where as the country was open about some concessions elsewhere), as it would have provided, like already stated above, a beachhead for a land invasion into the inner parts of the country (Hanko is 116km from Helsinki, for instance). The Russians supposedly needed this territory for a naval base to secure the Gulf of Finland from enemy ships, but once they actually got it after the Winter War, they stationed it with two full divisions of infantry, a battalion of tanks and at least 60 fighters (the airfield the Russians built in Hanko was too short for bombers, but was being extended in 1941 to accommodate them). Such a heavy complement was clearly meant for ground operations as well, particularly with a battalion of tanks. After the Continuation War they didn't even keep Hanko, choosing to take Porkkala instead, a mere 30km from Helsinki, putting the capital in range of regular artillery guns.
As I already noted in my previous post, Stalin never gave up his plans to conquer Finland, not until after WW2 anyway, and throughout 1940-41 Russia kept breaking the peace treaty that ended the Winter War, as well as meddling into Finnish internal affairs, while also putting tremendous external pressure on the country. The Karelo-Finnish SSR was founded for this purpose, and Kuusinen put in charge of it. He did not get to be the "leader" of Soviet Finland (of course the real leader would in any case have been Stalin, as SSRs had no real autonomy in this time), but he got most of the territory Finland ceded in the Moscow Peace Treaty. This was only meant as a temporary arrangement, until the rest of Finland could be incorporated.
Operation Kilpapurjehdus (Regatta) was conducted to militarise the Åland Islands to prevent a Russian landing there. This was a necessary violation of the Åland convention in face of a neighbor who obviously did not give a wooden nickel about treaties (Russia had violated the Treaty of Tartu, the Russo-Finnish non-aggression pact, the Treaty of Moscow, etc.). Finland garrisoning Åland could not really harm Russia, where as the Russians getting a presence there would've been catastrophic to Finland. Actually the Russians did not even sign the 1921 convention, and the whole demilitarisation issue was more related to relations between Finland and Sweden, and those between the Swedish-speaking population of Åland and the rest of Finland. This of course was no legitimate excuse to start a war against Finland anyway, and indeed the reason for Russian hostilities in June 1941 lie elsewhere: mainly in them greatly overestimating their own strength and not expecting the huge losses they would suffer later in the first months of Barbarossa.
As for German troops in Finland, they were under strict orders not to cross the border or fly attacks against Russia unless the latter starts hostilities against Finland first, or unless the Russians cross the border with a sizable force (
In the past I have written a list here on the forums of the various combat actions and the like, as well as their diplomatic consequences, that took place between Russia and Finland in the first days of the Continuation War. Here is that list now:
22.6.1941:
-6:05am: Russian planes bomb Finnish coastal battleships, gunboat Uusimaa and a mine barge in the Turku archipelago.
-6:15am: Russian planes bomb the coastal fortress of Älskäri in the Turku archipelago.
-6:45am: Russian planes bomb transport ships at Korppoo.
-6:50 or 7:55am: Russian artillery from Hanko fire at the islands of Porsö and Storholm, as well as on targets on the mainland.
-7:38-9:06am: Finnish submarines lay mines off the coast of Russian-occupied Estonia.
-8:15am: Finnish naval command gets permission to return fire.
-The Russian Northern Fleet and 14th Army are given orders to bomb targets in the Petsamo and Kirkkoniemi areas.
-Russian fire from across the border in the USSR against Finnish border guards at Hirsilampi (14km east of Imatra). The source doesn't specify which kind of fire, but given the range, I assume shelling.
-Russian artillery fire several dozen shells from Pummanki at Kalastajasaarento (territory ceded in 1940) against a Finnish vessel.
The Finnish foreign minister Witting issued a protest to the Russian ambassador, minister Orlov, inquiring the reason for these hostilities. Minister Orlov promised to ask the Russian government for an explanation, but such an explanation was never delivered.
Furthermore, the Finnish foreign ministry issued a bulletin reaffirming Finnish neutrality, and added that Finland would defend herself if attacked. The bulletin was received in both Moscow and Berlin. After this, just to be sure the bulletin was received, the foreign ministry repeated it twice.
A note to the Russian ambassador in Helsinki was also issued. The ambassador refused to receive it, claiming no such attacks had taken place.
German units in Finland are under strict orders not to cross the border unless Russia crosses the Finnish border with a force larger than a company, or with armoured forces.
23.6.-24.6.1941:
-Russian planes intrude Finnish air space and perform bombing runs on Finnish troops and reconnaissance on towns and cities for the upcoming Russian bomber offensive.
-Germany requests Finland to give permission to bomb Russia from Finnish soil. Permission is considered but not yet given.
-Russia pulls its ambassador out of Finland.
25.6.1941:
-12:00am: Finland gives Germany permission to operate aircraft from Finnish soil to attack Russia.
-4:00am: ~500 Russian planes bomb towns, cities and industrial centres throughout the country, mostly in Southern and Central Finland. Practically all targets are exclusively civilian in nature.
This time Finnish interceptors are allowed to scramble and end up shooting down 27 planes without losses.
-The Finnish government states to the parliament that the country has been once again been plunged into war.
-11:00am-12:00pm: The first German attacks on Russia from Finnish soil: Stukas bomb the Murmansk railroad line.
26.6.1941:
-Finland officially declares to once again be at war with Russia
Finnish troops remain in defensive positions until July-August.
Last edited:
just checked the wiki:
-----------------
Events June 21-24 [ edit | edit code ]
In 1987, the Finnish historian Mauno Jokipia, in his work Finland on the Road to War, analyzed the Soviet-Finnish relations of 1939-1941 and came to the conclusion that the initiative to drag Finland into the war against the USSR on the German side belongs to a narrow circle of Finnish military and politicians , who considered such a development of events to be the only acceptable in the current complex geopolitical situation [63] .
The implementation of Hitler’s Barbarossa plan began in the northern Baltic on the evening of June 21 , when 7 German mine loaders based in Finnish ports exposed two minefields in the Gulf of Finland [61] . In the middle of the day, June 22, on one of the installed mines, the Soviet cargo and passenger steamship Ruhno was blown up and sunk. [62] These minefields were ultimately able to lock up the Soviet Baltic fleet in the eastern Gulf of Finland. Later that evening, German bombers, flying along the Gulf of Finland, mined the harbor of Leningrad ( Kronstadt raid ) and the Neva. On the way back, the aircraft refueled at the Finnish airfield in Utti [63] .
The location of Finnish, German and Soviet troops at the beginning of the war.
On the morning of the same day, German troops stationed in Norway occupied Petsamo. The concentration of German troops began on the border with the USSR [63] . At the beginning of the war, Finland did not allow German troops to launch a ground attack from its territory, and German units in the Petsamo and Salla areas were forced to refrain from crossing the border. There were only occasional skirmishes between the Soviet and Finnish border guards.
At 4:30 on June 22 Finnish troops under the guise of fighting ships, crossed the border of territorial waters, began landing on the Aland Islands ( Eng. ) , Which were the demilitarized zone . At about 6 a.m., Soviet bombers appeared in the Aland Islands area and tried to bombard the Finnish battleships Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen , a gunboat , also Fort Alskar [64] . On the same day, three Finnish submarinesset mines off the Estonian coast, and their commanders had permission to attack Soviet ships “in the event of favorable conditions for an attack” [63] .
At 7:05 a.m., Finnish naval vessels were attacked by Soviet aircraft near Fr. Sottung of the Åland archipelago. At 7 hours and 15 minutes, bombs fell on Alskar fort, located between Turku and Åland , and at 7 hours and 45 minutes four aircraft struck Finnish transports near Korpo (Kogro) [54] .
On June 23, 16 Finnish volunteer saboteurs recruited by German major Scheller were landed from two German Heinkel He 115 seaplanes starting from Oulujärvi , not far from the locks of the White Sea-Baltic Canal . According to the Finns, the volunteers were dressed in German uniforms and had German weapons, since the Finnish General Staff did not want to have anything to do with sabotage. The saboteurs were supposed to blow up the locks, but because of the enhanced security they were not able to do this [63] .
At first, the USSR tried to prevent Finland from entering the war through diplomatic methods: on June 23, USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov called in a Finnish Charge d'Affaires Hünninen and asked him what Hitler’s speech of June 22, which spoke about German , meant troops that "in alliance with the Finnish comrades ... protect the Finnish land", but Hünninen could not give an answer. Then Molotov demanded that Finland clearly define its position - whether it is on the side of Germany or adheres to neutrality [60] [63] . Border guards were ordered to open fire only after the start of the Finnish attack [60] .
On June 24, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Ground Forces sent an order to the representative of the German command at the headquarters of the Finnish army, which said that Finland should prepare for the start of the operation east of Lake Ladoga [65] .
On the same day, the Soviet embassy was evacuated from Helsinki [66] .
June 25-30 raids [ edit | edit code ]
Burnt Soviet plane and its pilot. Utti , Lake Haukkajärvi , 07.21.1941
In the early morning of June 25, Soviet aviation forces led by the commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District A. A. Novikov launched an air operation against Finland and launched air strikes on Finnish territory, mainly on Luftwaffe bases [60] , using about 300[ specify ] bombers [67] . During the reflection of the raids that day, 26 Soviet bombers were shot down, and from the Finnish side, “casualties in people, not to mention material damage, were great” [50] . Novikov’s memoirs indicate that on the first day of the operation, Soviet aircraft destroyed 41 enemy aircraft. The operation lasted six days, during which 39 airfields in Finland were hit. According to the Soviet command, 130 aircraft were destroyed in air battles and on the ground, which forced Finnish and German aircraft to be pulled to distant rear bases and limited their maneuver [68]. According to Finnish archival data, the raid on June 25-30 did not cause significant military damage: only 12-15 aircraft of the Finnish Air Force received various injuries. At the same time, significant[ what? ] civilian objects suffered losses and destruction - the cities of Southern and Middle Finland were bombed, for which several series of raids were made, including Turku (4 waves), Helsinki , [69] Kotka , Rovaniemi , Pori . One of the oldest architectural monuments in Finland, Abo Castle [70] [71], was seriously damaged . Many bombs were incendiary - termite [72] .
The number of bombing sites on June 25 allowed the Air Force to suggest that such massive raids require a multi-week study[ source not specified 3000 days ] . For example, in Turku, a power station, port, docks, and an airfield were explored as targets. In this regard, Finnish politicians and historians believe that the purpose of the Soviet bombing was cities, not airfields [67] [73] . The raid had the opposite effect on public opinion in Finland and predetermined the further actions of the Finnish leadership [63] . Western historians consider this raid as ineffective in the military sense and a gross political mistake [60] .
A session of the Finnish parliament was scheduled for June 25 , at which, according to Mannerheim’s memoirs , Prime Minister Rangell was supposed to make a statement about Finland’s neutrality in the Soviet-German conflict, but the Soviet bombings gave him a reason to declare that Finland was again in a state of defensive war with THE USSR. However, the troops were forbidden to cross the border until 24:00 07/28/1941 [50] . On June 25, Prime Minister Rungell in parliament, and President Ryti the next day in a radio message [74] stated that the country had been attacked and in fact at war.
-----------------
Events June 21-24 [ edit | edit code ]
In 1987, the Finnish historian Mauno Jokipia, in his work Finland on the Road to War, analyzed the Soviet-Finnish relations of 1939-1941 and came to the conclusion that the initiative to drag Finland into the war against the USSR on the German side belongs to a narrow circle of Finnish military and politicians , who considered such a development of events to be the only acceptable in the current complex geopolitical situation [63] .
The implementation of Hitler’s Barbarossa plan began in the northern Baltic on the evening of June 21 , when 7 German mine loaders based in Finnish ports exposed two minefields in the Gulf of Finland [61] . In the middle of the day, June 22, on one of the installed mines, the Soviet cargo and passenger steamship Ruhno was blown up and sunk. [62] These minefields were ultimately able to lock up the Soviet Baltic fleet in the eastern Gulf of Finland. Later that evening, German bombers, flying along the Gulf of Finland, mined the harbor of Leningrad ( Kronstadt raid ) and the Neva. On the way back, the aircraft refueled at the Finnish airfield in Utti [63] .
The location of Finnish, German and Soviet troops at the beginning of the war.
On the morning of the same day, German troops stationed in Norway occupied Petsamo. The concentration of German troops began on the border with the USSR [63] . At the beginning of the war, Finland did not allow German troops to launch a ground attack from its territory, and German units in the Petsamo and Salla areas were forced to refrain from crossing the border. There were only occasional skirmishes between the Soviet and Finnish border guards.
At 4:30 on June 22 Finnish troops under the guise of fighting ships, crossed the border of territorial waters, began landing on the Aland Islands ( Eng. ) , Which were the demilitarized zone . At about 6 a.m., Soviet bombers appeared in the Aland Islands area and tried to bombard the Finnish battleships Väinämöinen and Ilmarinen , a gunboat , also Fort Alskar [64] . On the same day, three Finnish submarinesset mines off the Estonian coast, and their commanders had permission to attack Soviet ships “in the event of favorable conditions for an attack” [63] .
At 7:05 a.m., Finnish naval vessels were attacked by Soviet aircraft near Fr. Sottung of the Åland archipelago. At 7 hours and 15 minutes, bombs fell on Alskar fort, located between Turku and Åland , and at 7 hours and 45 minutes four aircraft struck Finnish transports near Korpo (Kogro) [54] .
On June 23, 16 Finnish volunteer saboteurs recruited by German major Scheller were landed from two German Heinkel He 115 seaplanes starting from Oulujärvi , not far from the locks of the White Sea-Baltic Canal . According to the Finns, the volunteers were dressed in German uniforms and had German weapons, since the Finnish General Staff did not want to have anything to do with sabotage. The saboteurs were supposed to blow up the locks, but because of the enhanced security they were not able to do this [63] .
At first, the USSR tried to prevent Finland from entering the war through diplomatic methods: on June 23, USSR People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs V.M. Molotov called in a Finnish Charge d'Affaires Hünninen and asked him what Hitler’s speech of June 22, which spoke about German , meant troops that "in alliance with the Finnish comrades ... protect the Finnish land", but Hünninen could not give an answer. Then Molotov demanded that Finland clearly define its position - whether it is on the side of Germany or adheres to neutrality [60] [63] . Border guards were ordered to open fire only after the start of the Finnish attack [60] .
On June 24, the Commander-in-Chief of the German Ground Forces sent an order to the representative of the German command at the headquarters of the Finnish army, which said that Finland should prepare for the start of the operation east of Lake Ladoga [65] .
On the same day, the Soviet embassy was evacuated from Helsinki [66] .
June 25-30 raids [ edit | edit code ]
Burnt Soviet plane and its pilot. Utti , Lake Haukkajärvi , 07.21.1941
In the early morning of June 25, Soviet aviation forces led by the commander of the Air Force of the Leningrad Military District A. A. Novikov launched an air operation against Finland and launched air strikes on Finnish territory, mainly on Luftwaffe bases [60] , using about 300[ specify ] bombers [67] . During the reflection of the raids that day, 26 Soviet bombers were shot down, and from the Finnish side, “casualties in people, not to mention material damage, were great” [50] . Novikov’s memoirs indicate that on the first day of the operation, Soviet aircraft destroyed 41 enemy aircraft. The operation lasted six days, during which 39 airfields in Finland were hit. According to the Soviet command, 130 aircraft were destroyed in air battles and on the ground, which forced Finnish and German aircraft to be pulled to distant rear bases and limited their maneuver [68]. According to Finnish archival data, the raid on June 25-30 did not cause significant military damage: only 12-15 aircraft of the Finnish Air Force received various injuries. At the same time, significant[ what? ] civilian objects suffered losses and destruction - the cities of Southern and Middle Finland were bombed, for which several series of raids were made, including Turku (4 waves), Helsinki , [69] Kotka , Rovaniemi , Pori . One of the oldest architectural monuments in Finland, Abo Castle [70] [71], was seriously damaged . Many bombs were incendiary - termite [72] .
The number of bombing sites on June 25 allowed the Air Force to suggest that such massive raids require a multi-week study[ source not specified 3000 days ] . For example, in Turku, a power station, port, docks, and an airfield were explored as targets. In this regard, Finnish politicians and historians believe that the purpose of the Soviet bombing was cities, not airfields [67] [73] . The raid had the opposite effect on public opinion in Finland and predetermined the further actions of the Finnish leadership [63] . Western historians consider this raid as ineffective in the military sense and a gross political mistake [60] .
A session of the Finnish parliament was scheduled for June 25 , at which, according to Mannerheim’s memoirs , Prime Minister Rangell was supposed to make a statement about Finland’s neutrality in the Soviet-German conflict, but the Soviet bombings gave him a reason to declare that Finland was again in a state of defensive war with THE USSR. However, the troops were forbidden to cross the border until 24:00 07/28/1941 [50] . On June 25, Prime Minister Rungell in parliament, and President Ryti the next day in a radio message [74] stated that the country had been attacked and in fact at war.
It's painfully obvious to anyone who has studied the subject outside only Soviet sources that the Soviets wanted to institute regime change in Finland at the very least and turn the country into something like Mongolia, if not absorb it directly into the USSR like Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania. The Finns' limited involvement in WWII after the winter war clearly indicates they just wanted to regain their lost territory. If it came down to it, would they have gone for more? There's no clear evidence either way, but it's hardly like the USSR was innocent. Anyone who thinks they are, I again point to Estonia, Latvia, and Lithuania, not to mention Poland and Romania.
in hoi2 the winter war and continuation war was very well scripted. Hoi4 without a continuation war cant said thats a proper representation of eastern front.
It was already pointed out that saying "that is obvious" is just not enough and is opposite of constructive discussion. All those things are speculations nothing more. This thread does not contain a single reference to prove anthing about intentions of the soviets.
Yeah, sure. In case of Finnland where they stopped - it is clear that they only wanted that land. In case of soviets where they stopped and what they claimed - clearly they wanted more just failed to do so, because you know evil communists.
That is just childish
Correct. To keep them as secret as possible, talks about arms deals and troop transit rights with the Germans were kept known only to a few key persons until quite late (IIRC until June 1941, 2-3 weeks before the start of the war). This was also largely because the Germans insisted extreme secrecy, for example arms trades where the Germans delivered the Finns captured materiel were organised in a very, almost overly elaborate way, in order to conceal it from the Russians. Keep in mind that at the time Germany still had its "alliance" with Russia. The Germans also insisted on negotiating directly with Mannerheim, instead of through the proper channels (e.g. through the president).
This however does not mean they weren't the correct choices. Rebuffing the Germans would've led to another Finland alone vs the USSR type of situation, à la Winter War, with Germany likely occupying some parts of Northern Finland, primarily Petsamo, to ensure a supply of nickel (the German forces in Norway had plans to occupy Petsamo in case Finland rejected German overtures). The Germans also stressed that if Finland refuses, they will attack through the country anyway and also position forces in the south, which would've turned the whole country into a battlefield.
Don't think I've heard about this, didn't find anything either with a quick search. But could be possible the Germans did some shenanigans like that in their jurisdiction (Northern Finland).
All the sources I've found on this have stated that Finns did not return fire at the time, but were shelled by Russians from across the border.
Yes, and with them they took as many bicycles in trucks as they could fit in them, quite a peculiarity.
This part of his speech goes like this:
"German people!
At this moment, an attack unprecedented in the history of the world in its extent and size has begun. With Finnish comrades, the victors of Narvik stand by the Arctic Sea. German divisions, under the command of the conqueror of Norway, together with the heroes of Finland’s freedom and their marshal, defend Finnish soil."
Full speech: https://research.calvin.edu/german-propaganda-archive/hitler4.htm
False, or at least had already opened fire, and I doubt they did so without orders.
Yeah this part is pure state propaganda. Kind of sad to see it on the Russian Wikipedia page, when tons of information disproving it has been openly available since the actual events almost 80 years ago.
Firstly, not a single airfield was even hit on the 25th, if I recall correctly there was a single bomb the next day on the 26th that landed on a runway of the Turku airport. That's literally the extent of the VVS's (Soviet Air Force) "great air operation" against "Luftwaffe bases". The 500-aircraft-strong VVS offensive was targeted against towns and cities throughout the south of the country.
Secondly, regarding the losses: On the 25th of June, 27 VVS planes were confirmed shot down by FAF (Finnish Air Force) aircraft, without Finnish losses. The VVS commanders of course made grandiose and sadly false claims, such as the ones in the quote. I remember reading that one report commented how an entire squadron of Finnish Bf109s had been destroyed on the ground. Remarkable, considering Finland did not even possess this aircraft type before March 1943!
Thirdly, and in this I may actually be wrong, but I don't think I am, I don't think there even were any Luftwaffe combat aircraft stationed in Southern Finland (as in, the "Finnish zone"). I can try to check this later though, if you'd like.
Finally, I'd also like to note that the source labelled as "[60]" in the Russian Wikipedia article claims a bunch of this propaganda as fact. Not saying that necessarily discredits the whole source, just noting there are some quite significant errors in it.
Regarding the German planes flying from East Prussia to drop mines in the Gulf of Finland, then refueling in Finland and immediately taking off afterwards to return to base in East Prussia, that probably happened and is something I should include in that list I quoted myself on from a post over a year ago (actually I think I wrote the list itself several years ago for an even earlier post, but I digress). After I've verified it to the best of my abilities, of course. Also the order for the Finnish submarines to go lay mines was I think issued already on the previous day, on the 21st of June.
I'm not pretending that Finland wouldn't have joined the war even if Russia didn't fire the first shot: she likely would have and Germany would've likely forced her hand anyway, even if she wanted to stay out. Like I already said before, Germany would've in such a case attacked through Finland anyway, including in the south which IRL did not happen due to Finnish forces being there. It was assumed in Finland that Russia very likely will fire the first shot, based on her past behaviour, which she did. This fact was used in newsreels and speeches and such, yes, but the Continuation War was in general by the Finnish leadership and people viewed as a defensive war, separate of that of Germany's war of conquest. This is the main reason Finnish troops were halted were they were; in terrain that was from a military point of view ideal to defend. This is a major factor in why Finland did not attack Leningrad, or even partake in its siege (excluding General Talvela's project of trying to disrupt the Leningrad supply line over Lake Ladoga in the summer of 1942, where he acted independently and not under orders from High Command), or seize the Murmansk railroad line (international pressure, particularly from USA, also strongly played into this), despite numerous German pleas to take an offensive role. The Finns never formally joined the Axis and did not send her armies to the tips of German advances, like the Romanians, Hungarians and Italians did.
In any case none of this dispels the fact that Stalin tried to conquer all of Finland, Russia's behaviour throughout 1939-44, as well as the orders of the Russian armies sent against Finland, more than support this. Even immediately after the Continuation War there was an order to send troops into Finland that got cancelled:
"The Finnish Headquarters' radio intelligence had between the beginning of the armistice and the signing of the truce intercepted an order from the Leningrad Military District to the commander of the Red Army forces in Karelia. Two [infantry?] divisions and one armoured division were to be moved near the Finnish border to Uhtua, from where a road led to Suomussalmi. Furthermore, Stalin told the leader of the Allied Control Commission in Finland, Andrei Zhdanov: "The Red Army has been given the order to cross the border 15.10. at 6:00am, and occupy Finland". The attack order was informed cancelled 15.10. at 4:00am. The former message probably related to pressure against Finland due to the concord between the Finns and Germans during the first phase of the Lapland War, which the Russians still suspected the Finns of conducting with the Germans. The latter message was apparently related to information that the Russians had received about the Weapons Cache Case".
In other words, even after the Continuation War Stalin still wanted to occupy Finland, but called it off at the last minute, in fear of a drawn-out and expensive Finnish guerrilla campaign. Actually this reminds me of a TV interview from the 1970s, where Molotov said something along the lines of: "It is good that we did not occupy Finland, for it would have become a bleeding wound".
After this Stalin reverted to the same kind of fifth column communist subterfuge that he had practiced in Finland before WW2 and in particular during the Interim Peace of 1940-41, when Finnish communists could operate quite openly (much more so than before WW2), even organising outright riots. See: e.g. the Kremlin-funded SNS, its members which got the epithet "stack burners" for lighting fire to huge stacks of firewood near downtown Helsinki during one of their protests in the summer of 1940. After the Continuation War the Finnish communists managed to obtain positions of influence, e.g. the state police (Valpo) was largely infiltrated and controlled by communists, and there was a real threat of a possible communist coup attempt. I'm less savvy in this era, that is 1944-48/49, the so called "Years of Danger" (Vaaran vuodet), but my understanding is that there's evidence that Stalin did try to orchestrate in Helsinki what he managed to do in Prague in 1948, but that Finnish communists weren't pro-Kremlin enough to bend to do this. By the late 1940s the communists were removed from positions of influence and the state police was shut down and recreated (Supo), free of communist infiltrators, ending the Years of Danger.
Wiki is not always right, and for example this has a lot of errors. Mauno Jokipii is a respected historian, but in 1987 he did not yet have access to all Soviet/Russian archives. They were opened after the collapse of the Soviet Union, during Yeltsin's presidency. Those previously secret archives showed that a lot of published Soviet history was more propaganda than research, and also that wiki contains Soviet claims that their own (internal) archives have already prooved to be falsified.
When the Soviets bombed Finnish airfields on June 25 and claimed they had destroyed German Luftwaffe aircraft in Finland, and that is totally false. According to Finnish Aces of WW 2 by Kari Stenman and Mark Styling (Osprey Publishing), there were no German planes stationed in Finland at that time. Also, the Soviet claims of high numbers of destroyed aircraft on those attacks are pure propaganda; real, lower numbers from Russian archives, acquired after the fall of the Soviet Union, are published in that book.
An amusing detail: according the the previously mentioned Osprey book, counting together the Soviet air unit losses from the Soviet Air Forces original wartime records in the archives in Moscow and Leningrad showed that the Soviet Air Forces, while fighting against Finland, in reality lost more planes than the Finnish pilots and antiaircraft gunners were credited.
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Asking me to throw books at people is a bad argument because few people who have a job in real life are going to spend time going back to books they've already read to convince a few internet tankies that they're wrong. Not to mention that many sources I've read may not even be easily available where I am.
Besides, anyone who has been on these forums for more than 10 minutes knows that no amount of sourcing will convince certain segments of people these forums. If I provide sources they will be dismissed as Western historians. Funny how a tradition of free expression and peer review gets your work dismissed, isn't it?
Edit: The fact that you've ignored the sourcing @Fulmen and others have provided, instead choosing only to reply to my specific post, speaks to this quite nicely.
Estonia. Latvia. Lithuania. They stopped because they had paid too high of a price, not because they wanted to. Ignoring the Soviet propensity to ignore treaties and grab lands through brute force is childish.
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I have also noticed this discrepancy from various sources. Usually it is said that air forces (and probably AA as well) exaggerated kill counts, but in the Finnish case it seems the opposite. I think this may be the result of a more strict style of kill recording, in that only kills that were actually witnessed and confirmed by another person were recorded, but otherwise even very probable kills were recorded merely as "damaged", if there was no witness to confirm them.
For example Ilmari Juutilainen, the top scoring Finnish fighter ace, is credited with 94 and 1/6th confirmed kills, but he always maintained he had downed around 126 aircraft.
I have also read that the VVS losses against Finland in just the Continuation War may be as high as over 4000 aircraft shot down, with the Finnish Air Force and AA confirmed kill count totaling at around 2700. Meanwhile the FAF lost a total of 207 aircraft during the Continuation War; 86 by enemy fighters, 66 by AA and 55 through other means (I think this includes accidents). Quite a low loss figure on the Finnish side, considering the mindbogglingly massive superiority in both numbers and materiel the Russians had. Meanwhile the Finns had mostly obsolete aircraft, with some of their own fighters being on relative parity with the quality of the enemy fighters on the Finnish front only in 1941 and 1943-44 when Finland acquired Bf 109s from Germany. An argument could also be made for the Fokker D.XXIs in 1939-40, though the Finnish license-built versions were equipped with the same engine as the license-built Bristol Blenheim bombers, making them painstakingly slow (e.g. catching a formation of Russian SB-2s took a long time with them), and especially the aircraft Finland managed to acquire later in the Winter War, though their impact on the conflict was smaller due to the little time they served in it for.
What really allowed the Finns their edge in the air war was their tactics and training that was far superior to those of the VVS. None of this is of course represented in HoI4. Try throwing a few dozen 1933-36 fighters against 2-4k Russian fighters and bombers, and see what happens. The completely opposite of what happened in real life, I'll tell you that much.
EDIT:
This very much. It is true I have not provided sources to everything I've said, or in this particular thread necessarily even to most of the things I have written, nor will I for the reasons @hkrommel pointed out; it's simply not worth the time and effort. Everything I say is based on 13-14 years of researching these things quite often as a hobby. I'm not a professional historian (I reckon it doesn't pay enough
), though I would say I am quite passionate about these things and spend an unreasonably large amount of time researching them. I make these history-related posts because I enjoy them, and hopefully I've educated someone a little bit of the not-so-well-known history of this little northern country. Sometimes I learn some things about history here too. Ideally, some of my posts would influence some of the thoughts of the developers on how to handle Finland in the eventual Finnish focus tree, though this might be a tall order from mere forum posts, but one can always hope.
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Finland lost two wars and were forced to switch sides, yet they like to pretend they won and are somehow important.
Depends on how you define victory. If you define it as, independant and not a puppet of the soviet union, sounds pretty good to me.
You said securing their borders but then described aggressive annexation of other sovereign nations, so which is it? Or are they "securing their borders" by redrawing them through other nations?
If the Soviet Union just wanted to be secure agaist Germany, they should have kept Poland as a buffer in between, not divided it with Germany. The Polish did not want Germans in their country, and if the SU had guaranteed Polish independence, and if needed, helped Poland to fight against Germany (in 1939 or later), Germans could not have invaded the SU, at least not without much greater difficulties than they historically had. East Prussia would have been too weak base for large invasion.
They couldn't keep Poland as a buffer. If you read Rise and Fall of the Third Reich this is abundantly clear. After Munich the Soviets realize they cant rely on the Western Allies. But they did try because they kept asking for specific plans about cooperation between them and the Allies. But the Allies kept insisting on principles of cooperation. Now Stalin knew Russua bore the brunt of enemy manpower against the Germans the last time a world war happened and he was keen on avoiding this by insisting on military cooperation with specific plans down to how many divisions will be committed and when in an as soon as possible period. Stalin was disappointed by what the Allies were giving him and if Poland is going to disappear, might as well get half of it as opposed to the whole thing going to the Germans and have half a buffer as opposed to none.
Also the poles wouldn't allow Soviets to "protect" them. Look at what they did to the Baltics. No different then the Nazis going in elsewhere to "protect" someone when what is really going on is an annexation. And both the Germans and Soviets wanted Poland dissolved and working with the Germans achieved these aims at mostly German expense relative to Soviet expense.
There is another explaination: there were other pilots and anti aircraft gun beside the Finnish ones!
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The Soviet was willing to let the Polish and their allies British-France-Romania fight as long as possible, but the moment Warsaw fall and the Polish defense collapsed, they need to go to western Poland otherwise the German will come there first and make a no man land there before give it to the Soviet. After seeing no action from British-France-Romania everyone can guess the outcome, but Soviet had waited until Warsaw falled.
There is also the Baltic question. Germany could annex the Baltic and get border with the Soviet. The Western didn't want to sign mutual defense with Soviet about the Baltics.
Poland will be the first to fight anyway, because they are too strong and too close to Berlin and German core.
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My own analysis on this:
Before the Winter War, the Soviet give the Finns a bargain offer that the Finn Parliament was splitted on the matter. (The Finn wanted to annex Karelina for a long time) See the term of the offer below.
At that time what the Soviet want is exactly to the paper.
When Winter War broke out, they wish regime change as a second goals, if things went easy.
When the first shot fired and there was no German help, the Finnish run for talk again but it was too late.
After the Fall of France and the appear of German troops on Finnland, the Soviet began to annex the Baltic and Bessarabia; there was a need to clear Finnland once again, but the German violated MR Pact and didn't allow that.
In 1944 the Soviet agreed with the British not to occupy Finnland, so they will not try hard. But the question is if the 1944 Soviet Offensive against Finnland could be avoided, if Finnland could changed side without it.
--------------from wiki below
The version of the agreement presented by the Soviet side was as follows:
- Finland moves the border 90 km from Leningrad.
- Finland agrees to lease the USSR for 30 years to the Hanko Peninsula for the construction of a naval base and the deployment of a four-thousand-strong military contingent there for its defense.
- Soviet navy available ports on the Hanko peninsula in Hanko and in Lappohya (Fin.) Russian.
- Finland transfers to the USSR the islands of Hogland , Laavansaari (now Powerful), Tütärsaari and Seiskari .
- The existing Soviet-Finnish non-aggression pact is supplemented by an article on mutual obligations not to join groups and coalitions of states hostile to one or another side.
- Both states disarm their fortifications on the Karelian Isthmus.
- The USSR transfers Finland the territory in Karelia with a total area twice as large as that received from the Finnish side (5 529 km²).
- The USSR undertakes not to object to the armament of the Aland Islands with Finland's own forces.
The USSR made public its demands before the third meeting in Moscow. Germany, which concluded a nonaggression pact with the USSR, advised the Finns to agree to them. Hermann Goering made it clear to Finnish Foreign Minister Erkko that the requirements for military bases should be accepted and Germany’s help should not be hoped for [25] .
The Council of State did not agree to fulfill all the requirements of the USSR, since public opinion and parliament were against it. Instead, a compromise was proposed - the Soviet Union was offered the islands of Suursaari (Gogland), Lavensari (Powerful), Bolshoy Tyuters and Maly Tyuters , Penisaari (Maly), Seskar and Koivisto (Birch) - a chain of islands that stretches along the main shipping channel to The Gulf of Finland [26] and the territories closest to Leningrad in Therioki and Kuokkala (now Zelenogorsk and Repino ), deepened into Soviet territory. Moscow negotiations ended on November 9, 1939 [27] [28] .
Earlier, a similar proposal was made to the Baltic countries, and they agreed to provide the USSR with military bases on their territory. Finland chose another: to defend the inviolability of its territory. On October 10, soldiers were called up from the reserve for unscheduled exercises, which meant full mobilization [29] [30] [31] .
Sweden made clear its position of neutrality, and other states did not receive serious assurances of help [14] .
The Finnish government refused to accept the Soviet conditions - since, in their opinion, these conditions went far beyond the issue of ensuring the security of Leningrad, while at the same time trying to achieve the conclusion of the Soviet-Finnish trade agreement and the consent of the USSR to the armament of the Aland Islands , whose demilitarized status was regulated Åland Convention of 1921 . In addition, the Finns did not want to give the USSR their only defense against a possible Soviet attack - the fortification strip on the Karelian Isthmus, known as the "Mannerheim Line" [32] .
The Finns insisted on their own, although on October 23-24, Stalin somewhat softened his position regarding the territory of the Karelian Isthmus and the size of the alleged garrison of the Hanko Peninsula. But these offers were rejected. “Do you want to provoke a conflict?” / V. Molotov. Mannerheim, with the support of Paasikivi, continued to insist before his parliament on the need to find a compromise, saying that the army would last no more than two weeks, but to no avail.
On October 31, speaking at a session of the Supreme Council, Molotov outlined the essence of Soviet proposals, while hinting that the harsh line occupied by the Finnish side was allegedly caused by interference from outside states. Finnish public, for the first time learning about the requirements of the Soviet side, categorically opposed any concessions[ source not specified 3291 day ] .
The negotiations resumed in Moscow on November 3 immediately came to a standstill. At them, Molotov told the Finnish delegation: “ We, civilians, have not made any progress. Now the floor will be given to the soldiers . ”
However, the next day, Stalin made concessions, offering instead of renting the Hanko Peninsula to buy it or even rent some coastal islands from Finland instead. Tanner, then the Minister of Finance and a member of the Finnish delegation, also believed that these proposals paved the way for reaching an agreement. But the Finnish government stood its ground
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Again, given Soviet propensity for, as @NormieCamo put it, "redrawing their borders through other countries," I don't blame the Finns at all. They had their territory via treaty, they had a right to it, they cannot be in the wrong for refusing to give up territory, no matter what they were offered.
It's like if I offer you some money for your house, you refuse to sell, so I kick the door down and drive you out with a gun, claiming it's your fault for refusing to sell your house to me.
Now, as to whether the Soviet intentions were truly "on the paper" I beg to differ, given Soviet actions before, during, and after the war that @Fulmen talked about. The Soviets wanted Finland as a puppet or a SSR.