I saw a graphical depiction today of the rate of attrition that the grande Armée endured over the Russian campaign in 1810-12. I guess some will have seen it before:
What kinda strikes me in this graph is the amount of casualty's already taken by the time Vitebesk seems reached. Now i presume that the Battle of Borodino in this graph is the point where troop strenght reduces from 127k to 100k, roughly consistent with the lower estimates for French casualties in that battle. By the time of Borodino, Napoleon would apparently already have lost about 70% of his force, one could wonder what the hell he is thinking he's doing but then history has it that at this point he can win the war by occupying Moskou, which proved a big mistake on his part.
Eitherway, it would appear that at many points in this opperation Napoleon should have counted his army strenght and reconsidered. I look at the point for example that he passed Witebesk, down to 175k from 420K and he's only halfway. (edit, though he left some troops behind too) One would think that France cannot afford these sort of casualty's eitherhow. Granted, Russia seemed the last continental power to beat.
I think atleast the argument can be made that France simply lost it's army in Russia mostly to attrition, leading squarly to the defeat of France because this is not the kind of losses that it can afford.
Had Napoleon ever encountered these sorts of horendous losses before in a campaign?

What kinda strikes me in this graph is the amount of casualty's already taken by the time Vitebesk seems reached. Now i presume that the Battle of Borodino in this graph is the point where troop strenght reduces from 127k to 100k, roughly consistent with the lower estimates for French casualties in that battle. By the time of Borodino, Napoleon would apparently already have lost about 70% of his force, one could wonder what the hell he is thinking he's doing but then history has it that at this point he can win the war by occupying Moskou, which proved a big mistake on his part.
Eitherway, it would appear that at many points in this opperation Napoleon should have counted his army strenght and reconsidered. I look at the point for example that he passed Witebesk, down to 175k from 420K and he's only halfway. (edit, though he left some troops behind too) One would think that France cannot afford these sort of casualty's eitherhow. Granted, Russia seemed the last continental power to beat.
I think atleast the argument can be made that France simply lost it's army in Russia mostly to attrition, leading squarly to the defeat of France because this is not the kind of losses that it can afford.
Had Napoleon ever encountered these sorts of horendous losses before in a campaign?