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TheFlemishDuck

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I saw a graphical depiction today of the rate of attrition that the grande Armée endured over the Russian campaign in 1810-12. I guess some will have seen it before:

1500px-Minard.png


What kinda strikes me in this graph is the amount of casualty's already taken by the time Vitebesk seems reached. Now i presume that the Battle of Borodino in this graph is the point where troop strenght reduces from 127k to 100k, roughly consistent with the lower estimates for French casualties in that battle. By the time of Borodino, Napoleon would apparently already have lost about 70% of his force, one could wonder what the hell he is thinking he's doing but then history has it that at this point he can win the war by occupying Moskou, which proved a big mistake on his part.

Eitherway, it would appear that at many points in this opperation Napoleon should have counted his army strenght and reconsidered. I look at the point for example that he passed Witebesk, down to 175k from 420K and he's only halfway. (edit, though he left some troops behind too) One would think that France cannot afford these sort of casualty's eitherhow. Granted, Russia seemed the last continental power to beat.

I think atleast the argument can be made that France simply lost it's army in Russia mostly to attrition, leading squarly to the defeat of France because this is not the kind of losses that it can afford.

Had Napoleon ever encountered these sorts of horendous losses before in a campaign?
 
One would think that France cannot afford these sort of casualty's eitherhow. Granted, Russia seemed the last continental power to beat.

Well in hindsight, France couldn't afford them.
It should be noted though that only half of the original force was French, the rest coming from client countries across Europe.
 
Here's a criticism piece on the Minard map. https://www.masswerk.at/nowgobang/2018/observing-minard
I think it's a ridiculous infographic. Doesn't present the order of battle from which he derives his numbers. Doesn't stipulate garrisoning forces left behind the central force under Napoleon which was only ~220k men at the Niemen. Realistically a force which is taking over 10% attrition losses can't advance because it's losses would snow ball out of control. The central army left battalions at every town and actual attrition wouldn't have been over 5%. 1/3rd of the Grand Army probably died in Russia but, the rest melted away to the west. This infograph probably best represents French morale at an artistic level. It's a miracle Napoleon could rebuild the army for the 1813 campaign at all.
My question is why Moscow? St. Petersburg would have been the better main effort offering a chance to control the Baltic sea routes and threatening Sweden/Bernadotte into alignment. Napoleon never moved this far with nearly this many men over enemy territory. 1806 invasion of Prussia would have been his best comparison but, then the grand army was just mopping up after Jena-Auerstadt.
 
My question is why Moscow? St. Petersburg would have been the better main effort offering a chance to control the Baltic sea routes and threatening Sweden/Bernadotte into alignment. Napoleon never moved this far with nearly this many men over enemy territory. 1806 invasion of Prussia would have been his best comparison but, then the grand army was just mopping up after Jena-Auerstadt.

Napoleon planned on invading India by land from Egypt. He was a tactical genius but large scale strategic planning was perhaps not in his skill-set.
 
Here's a criticism piece on the Minard map. https://www.masswerk.at/nowgobang/2018/observing-minard
I think it's a ridiculous infographic. Doesn't present the order of battle from which he derives his numbers. Doesn't stipulate garrisoning forces left behind the central force under Napoleon which was only ~220k men at the Niemen. Realistically a force which is taking over 10% attrition losses can't advance because it's losses would snow ball out of control. The central army left battalions at every town and actual attrition wouldn't have been over 5%. 1/3rd of the Grand Army probably died in Russia but, the rest melted away to the west. This infograph probably best represents French morale at an artistic level. It's a miracle Napoleon could rebuild the army for the 1813 campaign at all.

Interresting piece, if not nessecarily easy to understand. So there was a political/cultural message to tell with this graph, i must agree with the piece that for what regards the leg between Wilna and Witebesk that it leaves a lot of questions as to how that army was reduced to half it's strenght over part of the voyage.

My question is why Moscow? St. Petersburg would have been the better main effort offering a chance to control the Baltic sea routes and threatening Sweden/Bernadotte into alignment.

Fair question too. Moscow was neither the capital at the time.

Napoleon planned on invading India by land from Egypt. He was a tactical genius but large scale strategic planning was perhaps not in his skill-set.

Yeah, on my question if Napoleon ever faced such horendous losses, this reminds me that afaik napoleon pretty much lost all the forces he took to Egypt, though that force was less than 40.000 strong it seems.
 
Yeah, it's written in autistic German fashion but, the final bit is probably the most telling. That Minard late in his life on the centenary of Napoleon I's birthday wanted to make an anti-war statement despite his friendship with Napoleon III during tensions between France and Prussia.
The Russian invasion was a defeat because the Russian army was never fully engaged and destroyed. The Grand Army wasn't destroyed either and conclusions that 'Napoleon entered Russia with 680k and left with under 200k' are just wrong. Soldier's have legs and they use them when the operation is obviously going to ruin due to weather and constant enemy harassment. The French and allies horse stock was ruined though which led that elite arm to being used as cannon fodder at Leipzig.
 
My question is why Moscow?
Complex question, short version.

First he did not wanted to march that far, he would have prefered a huge battle (or a series of battles) at the border and be done with this. The Russians did not play along. When he was siting in Smolensk he started peace talks but no avail.
Then he marched toward Moscow in the assumption the Russians would fight for it (he was right) but the battle wasnt deceisive. He then wanted it as winter quarter and another peace talk token and the rest did not work out for him as planed.

Also St Petersburg was quite fortified and could be supported by the sea. It was also compared to Moscow rather far away from important Russian assets.

Last but not least a 100 000 men strong French (+Allies) army was marching towards it.
 
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ironicly the russian commanders did want to fight initially but the size of the french army persuaded them to not do so
if napoleon had gone in with his usual army size instead of grandstanding with that lumbering behemoth then he could have won
 
ironicly the russian commanders did want to fight initially but the size of the french army persuaded them to not do so
if napoleon had gone in with his usual army size instead of grandstanding with that lumbering behemoth then he could have won

On the other hand it was not anymore the time of Austerlitz with clear French superiority and it degenerated into a grinding contest. The previous match against Austria while a French victory what has won it is the ability to absorb casualties. Take a few divisions from Aspern or Wagram and the whole war might end up differently.
 
Napoleon planned on invading India by land from Egypt. He was a tactical genius but large scale strategic planning was perhaps not in his skill-set.
Geopoliticking too I should add.

He was a bit too full-of-himself in that regard o_O
 
Related video (and to jump over spam threads)

here are the 2 previous videos as well:

On the other hand it was not anymore the time of Austerlitz with clear French superiority and it degenerated into a grinding contest. The previous match against Austria while a French victory what has won it is the ability to absorb casualties. Take a few divisions from Aspern or Wagram and the whole war might end up differently.

true but in the run-up to borodino napoleon twice failed in the sort of divide-and-conquer by manoever warfare that was his bread and butter to pin either the russian first army and second army and fight them seperatly (which perhaps could have happened with a smaller, more mobile force) and borodino was simply a head-on collision with the french then slightly outnumbering the russian first and second army (as opposed to double their strenth at the start of the campaign)

napoleon sought to defeat russia in 4 weeks, most of the first week was spend simply marching his troops over the river into russia, somewhere inbetween those 2 phrases is the divide between planning and reality
 
Napoleon planned on invading India by land from Egypt. He was a tactical genius but large scale strategic planning was perhaps not in his skill-set.
When he was in Egypt, Napoleon was not Emperor. He was not even the most powerful man in the Directory.

His blustery about invading India was just that. When Napoleon was in Egypt, political opportunities in France presented themselves, and that is why he abandoned his army.

Napoleon was a smart guy. He may have dreamed about invading India, but he always really wanted the real prize, which he briefly achieved, which was Europe.
 
Putting an end for the British possessions and the British economy in India might have been a death-blow for the East-India Company and would had set the British Empire definitely at a disadvantage. Furthermore, finding allies in India against the British Imperium would had been rather easy.

It's still completely different thing did France and Napoleon have any basis to knock-out the British trade in India.
 
East-India Company didn't really do anything for the Empires finances, other than enriching some people in it.

So, no effect for the British Empire when the British East-India Company ceases to exist after Napoleon and the French East-India Company takes the control of trade and economy in the Colonial India?
 
india wasn't really an economic powerhouse at this point, later on the EIC would grow opium there to trade with china but overall india wasn't yet a huge a part of british trade or economy

also the idea that you can invade india by invading the middle east is more farfetched then the idea that you can invade the caucasus by invading the middle east, the ottomans in 1914 didn't even have the capability to disrupt indian shipping and they didn't even have to invade the middle east

napoleon had about as much chance to take over india as I do in taking over brittain
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Anglo-Mysore_War
Napoleon wasn't a delusional nutcase. A small army of French in southern India would certainly have tipped the scales against British/Hyderabad dominance. Problem being the loss of the French fleet at the Nile battle. By 1812 the Empire had launched a couple dozen new ships of the line but, they had no admiral worth a damn to lead them to the Baltic by then. Most of the navy being dry docked, having their guns used for garrisons, and sailors as elite line infantry in 1813.
 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Fourth_Anglo-Mysore_War
Napoleon wasn't a delusional nutcase. A small army of French in southern India would certainly have tipped the scales against British/Hyderabad dominance. Problem being the loss of the French fleet at the Nile battle. By 1812 the Empire had launched a couple dozen new ships of the line but, they had no admiral worth a damn to lead them to the Baltic by then. Most of the navy being dry docked, having their guns used for garrisons, and sailors as elite line infantry in 1813.

But how was the fleet lost in the Battle of the Nile supposed to get Napoleon to India? This was before the Suez Canal so was the plan to have them redeploy around Africa once Napoleon got a Red Sea port?
 
It's not only the Napoleon's French campaign in Egypt and Syria when thinking of an expedition against the British dominions in India. Indian March of Paul was a secretly planned Russo-French coalition and an expedition to attack the British possessions in the Colonial India.

The Indian March was designed to look like the Egyptian Expedition with presence of French scientist, painters, artists and engineers. The schedule of French advance was via Danube to Black Sea - through the southern Russia via Taganrog, Tsaritsyn and Astrakhan. At the Volga Delta the French would join the Russian forces and the joint Russo-French corps would then cross the Caspian Sea and land at the Iranian port of Astrabad. From there the expedition would advance to Herat and Kandahar in Afghanistan before reaching the main areas of the Colonial India of the British Empire.

The Indian March was abandoned after the assassination of Emperor Paul I of Russia in 1801, but Napoleon didn't stand down regarding his obsession to put an end for the British rule in India. After the supposed profit and victory in the Russian campaign of 1812 Napoleon planned to proceed in another Indian campaign, turn the French Army towards south and finish the Indian March abandoned in 1801.