Was there no way for the French or British to use their colonial manpower?

[Antediluvian Monster]

They were most certainly not few. The British Indian Army was the largest all volunteer army in history with over 2.5M volunteering in WW2 (and 1.75M in WW1).

The general answer was that colonial troops were not really needed in either case. Any additional troops would have come with a necessity to feed, cloth, equip and control them. Something that wouldn't have given better returns. What the allies needed more of in both world wars was landing craft and port/logistical facilities to support the troops they already had.

British did have front-line manpower shortages in the '44-'45 period. Some tank and (IIRC) artillery formations had to be disbanded to keep the infantry up the strength. Granted, this was in part because British were stringent on who they actually deployed overseas and there were untapped manpower reserves on the island had they chosen to use them.

 

[demanvanwezel]

British did have front-line manpower shortages in the '44-'45 period. Some tank and (IIRC) artillery formations had to be disbanded to keep the infantry up the strength. Granted, this was in part because British were stringent on who they actually deployed overseas and there were untapped manpower reserves on the island had they chosen to use them.

that had more to do with momentum rather then any real crisis, in 45 even the americans and the soviets got into a manpower shortage due to the speed of their advance while still contending with the full remains of the german army

this doesn't mean that there were no people left to fight, simply that the commanders didn't halt their advance to leave their armies time to regroup and reinforce

 

[Cavalry]

They were most certainly not few. The British Indian Army was the largest all volunteer army in history with over 2.5M volunteering in WW2 (and 1.75M in WW1).

The general answer was that colonial troops were not really needed in either case. Any additional troops would have come with a necessity to feed, cloth, equip and control them. Something that wouldn't have given better returns. What the allies needed more of in both world wars was landing craft and port/logistical facilities to support the troops they already had.

Few is a relative word. There were a chance that 25 million Indian soldiers and the British can save the world alone. But it didn't happen.

 

[Graf Zeppelin]

that had more to do with momentum rather then any real crisis, in 45 even the americans and the soviets got into a manpower shortage due to the speed of their advance while still contending with the full remains of the german army

this doesn't mean that there were no people left to fight, simply that the commanders didn't halt their advance to leave their armies time to regroup and reinforce

The British got low on manpower in 1943 and all their late war tactics and doctrines resolve around conserving manpower.

 

[Gil galad]

The British got low on manpower in 1943 and all their late war tactics and doctrines resolve around conserving manpower.

It's true that the British had manpower problems from 1943 on. With worldwide commitments a large and growing bomber command, a big navy and maintain industrial output to supply all of it, this was bound to happen. Though conserving manpower through overwhelming material superiority was already the British doctrine pre war sort of, it was only through lack of funds and political willpower that this doctrine could not be fully implemented on the eve of war.

Britain wasn't a fascist dictatorship after all.

 

[Gil galad]

Few is a relative word. There were a chance that 25 million Indian soldiers and the British can save the world alone. But it didn't happen.

Throwing bodies at a problem isn't going to solve them. Who would supply them? How many of those 25 million would be service troops, where would all the specialised manpower come from needed in an industrial war?

Just because you give a man a rifle it doesn't mean he's combat effective. He needs supply services, transport, artillery and tanks to back him up.

 

[JodelDiplom]

Throwing bodies at a problem isn't going to solve them. Who would supply them? How many of those 25 million would be service troops, where would all the specialised manpower come from needed in an industrial war?

Just because you give a man a rifle it doesn't mean he's combat effective. He needs supply services, transport, artillery and tanks to back him up.

Britain was allied to the United States, and the United States provided for more than enough logistic support and war material of all sorts. If there ever was one army in history that did not lack for food, materials, or logistics, it was the army of the western allies invading France in 1944!

I'm quite sure the British would really have liked to have another 5 to 10 combat worthy divisions on hand in 1943 or 1944, to be able to pursue more offensives against the Axis powers. But they would not really want those divisions to be from any part of the empire, they would have liked them to be from Britain or from a white dominion...

 

[Gil galad]

Britain was allied to the United States, and the United States provided for more than enough logistic support and war material of all sorts. If there ever was one army in history that did not lack for food, materials, or logistics, it was the army of the western allies invading France in 1944!

Even the US would have struggled to supply 25 million extra Indian soldiers @Cavalry mentioned. While the western allies had enough supplies in France in 1944, this was because they had time to build up those supplies and manpower in the previous years. It took a lot of effort, manpower and difficulties to get those supplies to France and even then there where supply difficulties.

I'm quite sure the British would really have liked to have another 5 to 10 combat worthy divisions on hand in 1943 or 1944, to be able to pursue more offensives against the Axis powers. But they would not really want those divisions to be from any part of the empire, they would have liked them to be from Britain or from a white dominion...

They could have had those divisions even without the white domininions, but that would have come at the cost of a smaller RAF and a drop in the production of war supplies and material.

 

[Holmes]

British did have front-line manpower shortages in the '44-'45 period. Some tank and (IIRC) artillery formations had to be disbanded to keep the infantry up the strength. Granted, this was in part because British were stringent on who they actually deployed overseas and there were untapped manpower reserves on the island had they chosen to use them.

Correct.

General Return of the British Army, 30th June 1944, there was a total of 57,590 Rifle Infantry in the UK on that date under Home Forces and War Office Control, just 14,975 were allowed for service overseas in 21st Army Group for NWE.

The total includes:
8,140 in 52nd ID (War Office Strategic Reserve), 0 draftable
347 in 9 Dorsets (War Office Control earmarked for other theater), 0 draftable
875 in 7 Inf Bde (Home Forces), 875 draftable
17,845 in 38, 45, 47, 55, 61 Lower Establishment Divisions (Home Forces Home Defense), 13,000 draftable
22,355 in 48, 76, 80 Reserve, 77 Holding Divisions, and 8 Sherwood Foresters (Training Establishment), 1,100 draftable
3,524 in five "Young Boys" Battalions, 0 draftable
2,892 in 15 Local defense Companys, 0 draftable
1,612 in "Other" (Lovat, 1/5 Leicsters, 4 Royal Berks), 844 draftable.

"Draftable" troops were those eligible by law for overseas duty, A1 medical condition and from 19 to 38 years of age.

 

[Holmes]

In 1939 the British Empire numbered 551,419,825. The French Colonial Empire numbered 114,386,572. Germany numbered 86,755,281, including 7,380,000 Czechs who wouldn't fight for them. Was there simply no way for the British or French to bring this manpower superiority to bear? The British and French did use Colonial troops, but in relatively limited numbers. Would it not have been possible to use far more of them in 1940?

Czech half of Czechoslovakia became the Protectorate of Bohemia and Moravia, all males became liable for mil service in the armed forces, in sudetenland half, 7ID and 5th Pzr had a high intake from there, rest of males of mil age went into Vládní vojsko (Goverment Army) and was used in manaul labour mostly in italy. https://www.ww2incolor.com/german/Martinhrustak#.html

 

[Henry IX]

Correct.

General Return of the British Army, 30th June 1944, there was a total of 57,590 Rifle Infantry in the UK on that date under Home Forces and War Office Control, just 14,975 were allowed for service overseas in 21st Army Group for NWE.

The total includes:
8,140 in 52nd ID (War Office Strategic Reserve), 0 draftable
347 in 9 Dorsets (War Office Control earmarked for other theater), 0 draftable
875 in 7 Inf Bde (Home Forces), 875 draftable
17,845 in 38, 45, 47, 55, 61 Lower Establishment Divisions (Home Forces Home Defense), 13,000 draftable
22,355 in 48, 76, 80 Reserve, 77 Holding Divisions, and 8 Sherwood Foresters (Training Establishment), 1,100 draftable
3,524 in five "Young Boys" Battalions, 0 draftable
2,892 in 15 Local defense Companys, 0 draftable
1,612 in "Other" (Lovat, 1/5 Leicsters, 4 Royal Berks), 844 draftable.

"Draftable" troops were those eligible by law for overseas duty, A1 medical condition and from 19 to 38 years of age.

To put these numbers in context, that amounts to slightly less than the total British killed and missing in the Normandy campaign. So enough to keep the current formations up to strength in normal operations, but insufficient for a high intensity campaign of more than a few weeks. Of course the British could have widened the draft, as the Soviet Union and Germany had already done, but this does come with extra issues (loss of productivity on the home front and poorer quality infantry).

 

[AjayAlcos]

Just my two cents here, but another major drain-on-manpower for the UK not yet touched upon here was the Royal Navy.

From what I can gather, the Royal Navy (RN) circa 1939 consisted of: "200,000 officers and men including the Royal Marines and Reserves". Now an infantry division of the British Army from 1939 theoretically had a strength nearing 14,000. So those 200k sailorboys would've been equivalent to having 14 fully-manned infantry divisions. By mid-1944 (or on the eve of D-Day to put in layman's terms), the RN had expanded to "800,000 officers and men and 73,000 WRNS in uniform". By that same year the organisational strength of a British infantry division had risen to just over 18,000 men, which would've been equivalent to roughly 44 fully-manned infantry divisions, plus another 4 fully-womanned (pardon the pun ) infantry divisions - theoretically speaking of course - especially assuming the Brits ever managed to get into as desperate a state as the Soviets in 1941. But I digress.

This of course doesn't include the 185,000 or so seamen & women who served in the British Merchant Navy over the course of the war.

When you add the colonial responsibilities for the UK in garrisoning the disparate parts of the British Empire, as well as the voracious resource requirements of what historically has been the primary branch of Britain's Armed Forces; it becomes understandable why the British Army was considerably smaller compared to both its continental counterparts (Germany, Soviet Union, France) and most importantly that of its most closest ally (the United States). Especially so when other wartime nations such as Germany & the Soviet Union placed a greater emphasis on their ground forces compared to the UK, for obvious geographical and strategic reasons.

 

[Holmes]

UK manpower allocation by service
https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarEcon/UK-Civil-WarEcon-15.html

Army in more detail
https://kclpure.kcl.ac.uk/portal/files/2931337/313385.pdf

 

[Gil galad]

Just my two cents here, but another major drain-on-manpower for the UK not yet touched upon here was the Royal Navy.

From what I can gather, the Royal Navy (RN) circa 1939 consisted of: "200,000 officers and men including the Royal Marines and Reserves". Now an infantry division of the British Army from 1939 theoretically had a strength nearing 14,000. So those 200k sailorboys would've been equivalent to having 14 fully-manned infantry divisions. By mid-1944 (or on the eve of D-Day to put in layman's terms), the RN had expanded to "800,000 officers and men and 73,000 WRNS in uniform". By that same year the organisational strength of a British infantry division had risen to just over 18,000 men, which would've been equivalent to roughly 44 fully-manned infantry divisions, plus another 4 fully-womanned (pardon the pun ) infantry divisions - theoretically speaking of course - especially assuming the Brits ever managed to get into as desperate a state as the Soviets in 1941. But I digress.

This of course doesn't include the 185,000 or so seamen & women who served in the British Merchant Navy over the course of the war.

When you add the colonial responsibilities for the UK in garrisoning the disparate parts of the British Empire, as well as the voracious resource requirements of what historically has been the primary branch of Britain's Armed Forces; it becomes understandable why the British Army was considerably smaller compared to both its continental counterparts (Germany, Soviet Union, France) and most importantly that of its most closest ally (the United States). Especially so when other wartime nations such as Germany & the Soviet Union placed a greater emphasis on their ground forces compared to the UK, for obvious geographical and strategic reasons.

The 18000 men you mention for a division would be the troops organic to a division alone. This does not tell the whole picture. Browsing through the hyperwar link in the previous post, it gives the manpower for a division slice of 42000.

"The doubts and obscurities about Army manpower arose not over the number of divisions but over the conception of divisional strength. The War Cabinet had not realised, when it approved a field Army of fifty-five divisions, that a division as contemplated by the War Office with its share of corps, army and G.H.Q. and line of communications formations would require 42,000 men, exclusive of all training establishments and of all garrisons, depots, or troops not included in the field Army."

It goes on to mention the support needed to field tactical formations:

Mr. Churchill's directive showed what this meant. In the home forces Army there were thirty-two divisions, some of them still in
or as training establishments, depots, etc., and as part of the rearward services of the forces overseas'. Here was the Army's capital fund of manpower. It would be replenished every year by the inflow of young men reaching call-up age; but it would not be further increased at the expense of the industrial labour force unless or until invasion or heavy casualties made new provision essential.

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarEcon/UK-Civil-WarEcon-11.html

This all goes to show the use and employement of manpower is a complicated issue and looking at numbers of divisions raised and used by different nations can be deceptive.

 

[Cavalry]

Of course soldiers in the field need support, but if the British can have Indidan soldiers then they can have support from Indian women.
And often as everything, more (free, willing) men will have more return on investment than invest on weapon industry. If you have more troops on the line, you will force Germany to have more to defend.

 

[Herbert West]

Of course soldiers in the field need support, but if the British can have Indidan soldiers then they can have support from Indian women.
And often as everything, more (free, willing) men will have more return on investment than invest on weapon industry. If you have more troops on the line, you will force Germany to have more to defend.

Support from Indian women? What the hell are you talking about?

Besides, disregarding the actual indian army of WWII, the best way to use colonial manpower in WWI is the same as in WWII: use them for the aforementioned long tail of the divisions, as laboureres, trench diggers, etc, not as frontline troops.

Still, this thread seems to ignore not only the Indian Army, but also the vast amounts of colonial manpower in the free french forces.

 

[Yakman]

that had more to do with momentum rather then any real crisis, in 45 even the americans and the soviets got into a manpower shortage due to the speed of their advance while still contending with the full remains of the german army

the soviets had a manpower shortage throughout the war.

yes, they had massive hosts, but all those guys had to come from somewhere else, where they were doing something else.

 

[AjayAlcos]

The 18000 men you mention for a division would be the troops organic to a division alone. This does not tell the whole picture. Browsing through the hyperwar link in the previous post, it gives the manpower for a division slice of 42000.

"The doubts and obscurities about Army manpower arose not over the number of divisions but over the conception of divisional strength. The War Cabinet had not realised, when it approved a field Army of fifty-five divisions, that a division as contemplated by the War Office with its share of corps, army and G.H.Q. and line of communications formations would require 42,000 men, exclusive of all training establishments and of all garrisons, depots, or troops not included in the field Army."

It goes on to mention the support needed to field tactical formations:

Mr. Churchill's directive showed what this meant. In the home forces Army there were thirty-two divisions, some of them still in
or as training establishments, depots, etc., and as part of the rearward services of the forces overseas'. Here was the Army's capital fund of manpower. It would be replenished every year by the inflow of young men reaching call-up age; but it would not be further increased at the expense of the industrial labour force unless or until invasion or heavy casualties made new provision essential.

https://www.ibiblio.org/hyperwar/UN/UK/UK-Civil-WarEcon/UK-Civil-WarEcon-11.html

This all goes to show the use and employement of manpower is a complicated issue and looking at numbers of divisions raised and used by different nations can be deceptive.

Indeed. Its actually shrewd you mentioned those aspects.

I remember reading how Hitler had ordered the Oberkommando des Heeres (OKH) to start demobilizing divisions whilst operations in France & the Low Countries was being wrapped up - as the German economy was already struggling due to a significant part of the labour force already being in uniform (as well as no truly serious attempts to mobilize the German Economy towards a wartime footing). When mentioning manpower, using tactical formations like divisions or army groups are a useful tool. Yet as you put it, it can lead to a rather myopic view and lead one to miss other fields in which manpower is employed during war. Whether it be the employment of manpower in industry, such as armaments, munitions and shipbuilding - as well as in other support & logistical branches of a nation's military.

And that's just scratching the surface

 

[Gil galad]

Support from Indian women? What the hell are you talking about?

Besides, disregarding the actual indian army of WWII, the best way to use colonial manpower in WWI is the same as in WWII: use them for the aforementioned long tail of the divisions, as laboureres, trench diggers, etc, not as frontline troops.

Still, this thread seems to ignore not only the Indian Army, but also the vast amounts of colonial manpower in the free french forces.

The Indian army and the amount of men they put into the field has been mentioned several times. That India raised 2,5 million volunteers to fight the Axis. Heck they formed the majority of the land forces in South East Asia Command and the forces in Iran and Iraq.

Could the Indian army have raised more divisions, possibly, but not with the existing allocation of resources for the theatres they operated in.

As for the French, I lack the expertise to discuss them properly.

 

[Easy-Kill]

British did have front-line manpower shortages in the '44-'45 period. Some tank and (IIRC) artillery formations had to be disbanded to keep the infantry up the strength. Granted, this was in part because British were stringent on who they actually deployed overseas and there were untapped manpower reserves on the island had they chosen to use them.

It's important to keep in mind that this was a shortage of trained line infantry soldiers and not necessarily a shortage of manpower. This was a combination of many factors which led to a 3 million man army (the approximate size of the British Army in 1945) fiedling only around 50 infantry divisions.

There were many factors. The first of which was the physical and intelligence standards which were stricter than most other European nations. Then there was the length of training and ability to mass train infantry soldiers. With the combination of basic training, infantry training and then small unit training, the process took nearly 40 weeks. This is approximately the time from D-Day through to the collapse of the Reich.

Further, it's all very well having lots of private soldiers, but you also needed to have trained officers and NCOs. In the 1944-45 period, it was easier to merge existing units than to replace soldiers across the depth of command posts. This is one of the reasons why the size of the British army peaked in 1945 - prior to Normandy, the forces were still being recruited to attend basic training. The 'Dick Winters' example of soldiers being promoted wildly in the field is relatively unknown - most Lts would be sent home for a junior officers tactics course, then staff college and finally advanced staff college before getting promoted to battlegroup commander.

Then of course there is the supply and equipping of such forces. The British had determined exactly the force they believe they needed to persecute the war in the necessary theatres and constructed it around that.

So yes - British infantry did have a shortage of manpower. However, this shortage was the cause of many different factors and wasn't necessarily due to not enough people. The same challenge is applied to the Indian manpower question.