World War 2 and Manpower

[Kurfürst]

That seems to be the dominant narrative about German wartime economy management nowadays. I'm a bit suspicious of it, but it may as well be the best angle to approach things in the general discussion of ww2 management.
Things look a bit different if you consider comparison between the German and Soviet wartime management, to which I was mostly referring in my previous posts. And in that context there is an obvious problem. The Soviet mismanagement, extensive use of forced labor, resource squandering and reliance on ideological fanaticism and 'triumph of will' approach were absolutely legendary.



This is the fascinating bit. That motif is frequently brought up in literature. And that is 1 of the main reasons for my astonishment that I expressed in previous posts. I mean, by the end of 1941 the illusion of quick victory in the East and the 'collapse of the rotten SU' theory was pretty much burried. There were still some hopes expressed here and there, that maybe the campaign of 1942 will deliver the final devastating blow. But for the most part the German leadership was already readjusted to the idea of a prolonged, attritional war. In such a war the economy management is decisive. The military, which heavily stressed the northern strategy in 1941 in hopes that taking Moscow will bring enemy's collapse, did not press for that anymore. There seems to be a consensus on the German side backing the Southern offensive, dictated by economical reasons. It was also clear to both the Germans and the Soviets that this war is the ultimate showdown that will decide the fate of the nations, that it's do or die, win or loose everything. When it comes to the economical managment of the war the Soviets responded accordingly. Yet the Germans held back a bit for quite a while. That's the bit that's puzzling to me. Why didn't Germany go all in total mobilization in 1942, since the stakes could not be higher.

(emphasis mine)

That question is quite thoroughly answered by the aforementioned Wages of Destruction. The simple answer is - the basically did, which made the spectacular growth and production fugures in 1943 and 1944 possible. Keep in mind that retooling production and bringing new plants online takes time and resources.

Simple timeline of Nazi German WWII industrial "strategy" (inadequate as it was) would be:
1933 to 1939 - rearmament with the war definitely on the horizon, but probably not sooner than in 1945. Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and Wehrmacht have comparable priorty, with ebbs and flows depending on cool projects and whim.
1939 - War starts way too soon. Longterm, Allies will win via attrition. Victory needs to come fast if it is to come at all. Full emphasis on ammunition, weapons and planes.
1940 to early 1941 - Spectacular victory over France, but Britain doesn't surrender. Long war with oceanic powers ahead, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine get priority, Wehrmacht is put on a kind-of backburner.
late 1941 to early 1942 - Ooops, easy war with the SU turns not so easy. Wehrmacht needs all the juice it can get. Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe expansion is sidelined, all the priority goes to Wehrmacht (Luftwaffe still gets like 40% of steel allocations, for example, while tanks get about 10% IIRC, so the priority changes are more about shifts than about absolute numbers, just FYI)
early 1942 to mid 1943 - new production comes online, numbers grow spectacularly. In mid 1943, the allied bombing campaign gets rolling, average growth of armaments production was 5,5% month on month and is 0% now
mid 1943 to end 1944 - slave labour and retooling of last civilian economy towards war enables modest growth, but the bombing,, destruction of transportation network, loss of rare resources and conscription of industrial workers lead to collapse.

So, the german economy pretty much went sustainably all in in early 1942 and unsustainably all in in early 1944. If they went unsustainably all in sooner, they might have collapsed sooner. If you stop making ALL the locomotives and clothes and cooking pans and structural beams, your tank factories eventually won't get shipments of resources, the workers will be sick and ineffective from insufficient nutrition and the new machine tools will rust outside for lack of building materials for extensions and for fixing of bomb damage.

 

[1 Star General]

(emphasis mine)

That question is quite thoroughly answered by the aforementioned Wages of Destruction. The simple answer is - the basically did, which made the spectacular growth and production fugures in 1943 and 1944 possible. Keep in mind that retooling production and bringing new plants online takes time and resources.

Simple timeline of Nazi German WWII industrial "strategy" (inadequate as it was) would be:
1933 to 1939 - rearmament with the war definitely on the horizon, but probably not sooner than in 1945. Luftwaffe, Kriegsmarine and Wehrmacht have comparable priorty, with ebbs and flows depending on cool projects and whim.
1939 - War starts way too soon. Longterm, Allies will win via attrition. Victory needs to come fast if it is to come at all. Full emphasis on ammunition, weapons and planes.
1940 to early 1941 - Spectacular victory over France, but Britain doesn't surrender. Long war with oceanic powers ahead, Luftwaffe and Kriegsmarine get priority, Wehrmacht is put on a kind-of backburner.
late 1941 to early 1942 - Ooops, easy war with the SU turns not so easy. Wehrmacht needs all the juice it can get. Kriegsmarine and Luftwaffe expansion is sidelined, all the priority goes to Wehrmacht (Luftwaffe still gets like 40% of steel allocations, for example, while tanks get about 10% IIRC, so the priority changes are more about shifts than about absolute numbers, just FYI)
early 1942 to mid 1943 - new production comes online, numbers grow spectacularly. In mid 1943, the allied bombing campaign gets rolling, average growth of armaments production was 5,5% month on month and is 0% now
mid 1943 to end 1944 - slave labour and retooling of last civilian economy towards war enables modest growth, but the bombing,, destruction of transportation network, loss of rare resources and conscription of industrial workers lead to collapse.

So, the german economy pretty much went sustainably all in in early 1942 and unsustainably all in in early 1944. If they went unsustainably all in sooner, they might have collapsed sooner. If you stop making ALL the locomotives and clothes and cooking pans and structural beams, your tank factories eventually won't get shipments of resources, the workers will be sick and ineffective from insufficient nutrition and the new machine tools will rust outside for lack of building materials for extensions and for fixing of bomb damage.

Thanks. Good points, I like the simplified timeline you shared. Following your advice I'm currently digging into Tooze. Just finished 'Nor room for miracles' and I really like how he deals with - 'Oh the Germans didn't plan for the long war anyway, cause it was all suppose to be Blitzkrieg' - kind of thinking, that so many people represent in this thread. He really does shred this mercilessly.
Coming back to the content of your post - it's coherent, very explanatory and convincing. Might be that that's all there is to it. However there are still some problems remaining, I feel. Anyway, I'll keep reading and might be I'll find the answers to all my questions there. Maybe...

 

[Kovax]

Now when it comes to the content on previous posts, that you're referring to, the problem defined there was of comparison of German and Soviet responses to economy management requirements of the total war for survival, with the stress being put on inadequacy of the measures taken by Germany. In this context, the question I posed is more about German approach to war, their planning and mental state if you will, rather than external factors. In that sense - No - the Allies had nothing to do with it.

As pointed out earlier, Germany had short-changed its transportation industry in order to build the guns, tanks, ships, and ammunition it figured that it needed to win against France. The battle for France didn't require any more extensive transportation resources than what was already built. Unfortunately for Germany, the Soviet front DID require those extensive assets. Until the transport problem was solved, there was no point in producing more military goods than could be delivered to the front, so there was no perceived need to expand production beyond what was required for France. Even more unfortunately for Germany, the raw materials which would be needed to solve the transportation problem were subject to blockade, and unavailable for anything but essential front-line equipment to replace losses. Expensive toys like the Tiger and Panther tanks chewed up much of what little there was to work with.

Yes, it was mismanaged, but the major mismanagement happened in 1933-1938, and could not be undone in 1939-1945 with the resources that Germany had available. By the time it became evident that there was a problem, there was no longer a viable solution, short of a complete collapse of the Soviet Union, which was increasingly becoming a fool's hope. Germany MIGHT have been able to build up its civilian transportation network, rail stock, commercial trucking, and other items in the early 1930's BEFORE turning the economy toward a military buildup, but that military buildup, once started, needed to take priority in order to beat France. The problem was not solved in the 1930's, and the ability to fight a long war of attrition at a distance was already out of reach by the opening of hostilities. The German high command was well aware of the problem, hence the need to destroy the Soviet Army practically on the border, but any time that you NEED the enemy to do something, you can pretty well assume that they're NOT going to be cooperative. France's army cooperated and was defeated, the Soviets' didn't cooperate after the initial shock.

 

[1 Star General]

As pointed out earlier, Germany had short-changed its transportation industry in order to build the guns, tanks, ships, and ammunition it figured that it needed to win against France. The battle for France didn't require any more extensive transportation resources than what was already built. Unfortunately for Germany, the Soviet front DID require those extensive assets. Until the transport problem was solved, there was no point in producing more military goods than could be delivered to the front, so there was no perceived need to expand production beyond what was required for France. Even more unfortunately for Germany, the raw materials which would be needed to solve the transportation problem were subject to blockade, and unavailable for anything but essential front-line equipment to replace losses. Expensive toys like the Tiger and Panther tanks chewed up much of what little there was to work with.

Yes, it was mismanaged, but the major mismanagement happened in 1933-1938, and could not be undone in 1939-1945 with the resources that Germany had available. By the time it became evident that there was a problem, there was no longer a viable solution, short of a complete collapse of the Soviet Union, which was increasingly becoming a fool's hope. Germany MIGHT have been able to build up its civilian transportation network, rail stock, commercial trucking, and other items in the early 1930's BEFORE turning the economy toward a military buildup, but that military buildup, once started, needed to take priority in order to beat France. The problem was not solved in the 1930's, and the ability to fight a long war of attrition at a distance was already out of reach by the opening of hostilities. The German high command was well aware of the problem, hence the need to destroy the Soviet Army practically on the border, but any time that you NEED the enemy to do something, you can pretty well assume that they're NOT going to be cooperative. France's army cooperated and was defeated, the Soviets' didn't cooperate after the initial shock.

These are excellent points. I'm not sure though, when it comes to impossibility of expanding the rail stock, which you're suggesting. Doing that would definitely be the logical step after failure of Barbarossa. Granted, it would probably be a long term project, impossible to bring meaningful results in a time frame that would really change things. But we know that with the benefit of hindsight. Actually, I don't know any source that would discuss this issue. They might as well have tried, I just don't know about it. After all, there were these projects of partial demotorization of Wehrmacht floated as early as 1941. That included both the armor spearheads and motorized logistics. So they must have had some ideas for replacing that part of supply chain.

France's army cooperated and was defeated, the Soviets' didn't cooperate after the initial shock.

The French and the Brits cooperated all too well in 1940 I'm not sure the Soviets differed that much in the first year or 2, they just had the depth and the reserves.

 

[Kupr]

Some numbers to compare:
USSR mobilized 32 mln. people.
Germany mobilized around 20 mln. people, plus allies.

USSR lost KIA around 8,5-11 mln. people.
Germany have problems with numbers of KIA, as I understand (may be I am wrong here now?).

 

[Dinglehoff]

@Dinglehoff - all sorts of planning can't conjure up armaments factories from nothing, or create workable budgets when you need a wheelbarrow of Marks to buy a bullet. Prominent German generals doubted they could win an invasion of Czechoslovakia, or win a war with France. I've never seen an account of a German army officer who predicted in 1933 that they'd be in Rostov and the Caucasus in 1942.

There were factories producing planes, tanks, and guns. You keep choosing 1933 for some reason when the european war starts in 1939, and it's spectre loomed earlier. The predictions and information needed are not about whether there would be war with France or the Soviets, but what they may have to fight with.

 

[Henry IX]

The Soviet mismanagement, extensive use of forced labor, resource squandering and reliance on ideological fanaticism and 'triumph of will' approach were absolutely legendary.

OK, to answer this will require going down a bit of a rabbit hole, into the philosophical underpinnings of Marxism vs Nazism.

Marxism is based on an idea called didactic materialism. In essence this theory is an economic model of human societies and how they change. It emphasises how material factors determine social structures and how those forces lead to progress. While the Soviet system always demanded absolute devotion to the state and loyalty to Stalin (after the 1920s) the idea of individual will and determinism was barely considered. Individuals simply didn't matter under this philosophy. Whilst this led to brutalisation and exploitation of the population, as individuals had no value beyond their economic value, it also led to a fairly rational economic system.

In the 21st century we see the failure of the Soviet state and tend to assume that the economic waste and inefficiency that typified it before its fall were a prominent feature of the system throughout its history, rather than a developing consequence of its inflexibility and inability to prevent corruption. In the mid-20th century there was a serious debate about whether state planning was actually superior to the free market in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. In these debates the USSR's huge economic growth during the '20s and '30s and extraordinary economic performance during the war were seen as demonstration of the power of a centrally controlled command economy.

The Soviets did not squander material resources to a particularly large extent, and, at least where industrial planning was concerned was actually very efficient. Agriculture was a different situation, where collectivisation was a real burden on the economy and never really reached a high level of efficiency (although it is worth noting it was far more effective than subsistence agriculture, which was the predominant model before collectivisation), with the cost to the economy coming from the disenfranchisement of the most efficient parts of the agricultural economy (the private farmers).

In other words the Soviets did not seriously mismanage the industrial economy during the '20s and '30s and did not rely on individual efforts or will to overcome problems. Soviet demands for ideological conformity are not really relevant to understanding the organization of the industrial economy, although they are important to understanding the sheer resilience of the Soviet state.

In contrast the Nazis embraced a twisted version of Nietzsche, seeing the goal of humanity to produce the 'ubermench' who is marked not so much by physical superiority (although the Nazis certainly embraced that aspect) but by his ability to overcome life's troubles and challenges through will. Failure to achieve one's goals is seen as due to a lack of will rather than through the nature of the problem confronted.

In super broad summary, the Soviets saw problems as having material causes and technocratic and material solutions whereas the Nazis saw problems as being caused by 'weakness' and lack of will and hance the solutions are to be found in the individual.

 

[Rubidium]

Exactly... there is absolutely no way to prevent infighting (top managers tend to be selfish psychopathic assholes, because those are the values preferred by in the selection process). Governing is always trying to maintain and/or slowly shift the balance between the different power centers... and while it is possible that the Nazi leadership did it somewhat worse than the Anglo-Saxon, at the end it was a droplet in the ocean.
The fact that it needed five years to defeat them indicates that mismanagement was not a very serious issue.

The Nazi bureaucracy actually was significantly more prone to in-fighting and duplication of effort than the Allied one, in large part because Hitler encouraged that approach in order to keep his various subordinates in check. FDR wasn't worried as to whether or not his Secretary of War was plotting to overthrow him, so he didn't worry about encouraging him and the Secretary of the Navy to work together. Hitler did have to worry about possibly being overthrown/assassinated (and indeed, there were frequent conspiracies against him, with the July 20 Plot only being the most famous), so he encouraged division and emphasized loyalty rather than competence as the most important virtue. Stalin had those threats as well, but he'd pretty much cowed everyone by that point.

A good contrast is the Allied and Nazi atomic weapons programs. The Allies determined "this program is potentially vital to our war effort" and so created a single, unified project and gave it all the resources it needed to succeed. As a result, the Allies created an atomic bomb and were able to deliver it by mid-1945. Various Nazis said "this program is potentially vital to our war effort" and so created a plethora of uncoordinated, undersourced programs to make sure that their department was the one who would get credit (famously, even the Post Office had its own atomic weapons project). As a result, the Germans never came close to creating an atomic weapon, and had barely managed to get a more-or-less functional reactor going by 1945 (something the Americans had done within a year of Pearl Harbor).

In addition to the other books that have been recommended on this thread, I'd strongly recommend Alsos by Sam Goudsmit. He was the scientific head of the Anglo-American team sent in after D-Day to assess Nazi progress in nuclear weapons (originally to determine whether or not the Nazis were likely to be able to deploy a bomb against the Allies as they invaded Germany, later to secure as much of their personnel and materials as possible before the Soviets or French got a hand on it), and that is his memoir of the mission. A big theme of his work is the role that the Nazi approach to science and planning had in undermining their scientific success.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

The converse to their inability to generate an atomic weapon is their ability to develop new generation jet engines and rocket technology far ahead of anything the Allies came close to developing. The fact these weapons were completely misused by Hitler is secondary to the shock and awe they inspired in the minds of their enemies.

Oh, btw, you're three pages in to a rather intellectual and detailed discussion of manpower shortages in Germany and you keep walking around one, minor, little manpower 'Solution' employed by Nazi Germany that has more than a passing effect on this conversation. As a favor to many, I'll leave it at that.

 

[1 Star General]

OK, to answer this will require going down a bit of a rabbit hole, into the philosophical underpinnings of Marxism vs Nazism.

Marxism is based on an idea called didactic materialism. In essence this theory is an economic model of human societies and how they change. It emphasises how material factors determine social structures and how those forces lead to progress. While the Soviet system always demanded absolute devotion to the state and loyalty to Stalin (after the 1920s) the idea of individual will and determinism was barely considered. Individuals simply didn't matter under this philosophy. Whilst this led to brutalisation and exploitation of the population, as individuals had no value beyond their economic value, it also led to a fairly rational economic system.

In the 21st century we see the failure of the Soviet state and tend to assume that the economic waste and inefficiency that typified it before its fall were a prominent feature of the system throughout its history, rather than a developing consequence of its inflexibility and inability to prevent corruption. In the mid-20th century there was a serious debate about whether state planning was actually superior to the free market in terms of efficiency and effectiveness. In these debates the USSR's huge economic growth during the '20s and '30s and extraordinary economic performance during the war were seen as demonstration of the power of a centrally controlled command economy.

The Soviets did not squander material resources to a particularly large extent, and, at least where industrial planning was concerned was actually very efficient. Agriculture was a different situation, where collectivisation was a real burden on the economy and never really reached a high level of efficiency (although it is worth noting it was far more effective than subsistence agriculture, which was the predominant model before collectivisation), with the cost to the economy coming from the disenfranchisement of the most efficient parts of the agricultural economy (the private farmers).

In other words the Soviets did not seriously mismanage the industrial economy during the '20s and '30s and did not rely on individual efforts or will to overcome problems. Soviet demands for ideological conformity are not really relevant to understanding the organization of the industrial economy, although they are important to understanding the sheer resilience of the Soviet state.

In contrast the Nazis embraced a twisted version of Nietzsche, seeing the goal of humanity to produce the 'ubermench' who is marked not so much by physical superiority (although the Nazis certainly embraced that aspect) but by his ability to overcome life's troubles and challenges through will. Failure to achieve one's goals is seen as due to a lack of will rather than through the nature of the problem confronted.

In super broad summary, the Soviets saw problems as having material causes and technocratic and material solutions whereas the Nazis saw problems as being caused by 'weakness' and lack of will and hance the solutions are to be found in the individual.

You truly went down the rabbit hole and - forgive me a cheap pun - came out by the way of horse ass (don't take it personally, I just couldn't resist). But seriously, there's gonna be no agreement between us on this one. Let's leave aside the dialectical materialism as a philosophical underpinning of Soviet statehood, not it's economical modus operandi, and consider fundamentals instead. Permanent mismanagement and colossal waste of resources were the constant feature of that system, not the result of decadence and corruption of its late years, as you're suggesting. The decisive factor creating that constant was lack of real prices making it impossible to allocate resources efficiently. This is particularily stark when it comes to squandering resources, as in absence of real price and market pressure there were no checks preventing it. Another strongly contributing factor was entirely political nature of the resource allocation process. The Soviets did build a massive technocratic planning structure that was supposed to operate as a meritocratic apparatus. But in the monoparty dictatorial police state that the SU was, especially during Stalin's tenure, the real driving force was always the Politbureau and the state apparatchiks vied for control of resources through various formal and informal channels of influence, relegating the 'Gosplan' to the role of balancer between different political interests and power factions and coteries. And there wasn't any particular difference whether we consider the industry or agriculture.
It's true that the Soviet economy experienced a massive growth during first decades of the planning system, but it did so despite the waste and inefficiency, not as a result of lack of it. The real reason for it was not the efficient nature or other virtues of 'planned command economy', but the extreme (beyond sustainable and ruining to the population) rate of investment in industrialization. That did in fact result in transforming the backward, agrarian Russian economy and obviously multiplied its output. But it did so at the cost of hunger, poverty and misery of civilian population (starving people could also be considered a wasted resource). Most importantly, that growth was completely unbalanced and led to structural problems that doomed the soviet economy in the long run, as it was based entirely on development of heavy and armaments industries. What was missing was any consideration of value added to the economy, but for that, one would need a measure, so a real price, so the market.. and here we go down the rabbit hole again... Let me just say this: the practical absurdities of underpinnings of the Soviet economy and the gargantuan waste as its permanent fixture are so widely described in literature, that it's really hard to miss it if one reads pretty much anything touching on the subject.

 

[Henry IX]

The converse to their inability to generate an atomic weapon is their ability to develop new generation jet engines and rocket technology far ahead of anything the Allies came close to developing. The fact these weapons were completely misused by Hitler is secondary to the shock and awe they inspired in the minds of their enemies.

Oh, btw, you're three pages in to a rather intellectual and detailed discussion of manpower shortages in Germany and you keep walking around one, minor, little manpower 'Solution' employed by Nazi Germany that has more than a passing effect on this conversation. As a favor to many, I'll leave it at that.

Only in rocket technology were they significantly further ahead than the Allies. The Me-262 only entered service a few months earlier than the Meteor, and although it was in many ways a better design, it was not significantly more technologically advanced. Indeed, the political interference in the design of the Me-262, which delayed its production significantly, is a golden example of the general administrative incompetence of Nazi administration.

The solution you are referring to is not a solution to manpower issues, but rather a grotesque example of Nazi wastage driven by ideological issues. Again an example of Nazi ideology over reality.

 

[Henry IX]

You truly went down the rabbit hole and - forgive me a cheap pun - came out by the way of horse ass

Permanent mismanagement and colossal waste of resources were the constant feature of that system, not the result of decadence and corruption of its late years, as you're suggesting. The decisive factor creating that constant was lack of real prices making it impossible to allocate resources efficiently. This is particularily stark when it comes to squandering resources, as in absence of real price and market pressure there were no checks preventing it. Another strongly contributing factor was entirely political nature of the resource allocation process. The Soviets did build a massive technocratic planning structure that was supposed to operate as a meritocratic apparatus. But in the monoparty dictatorial police state that the SU was, especially during Stalin's tenure, the real driving force was always the Politbureau and the state apparatchiks vied for control of resources through various formal and informal channels of influence, relegating the 'Gosplan' to the role of balancer between different political interests and power factions and coteries. And there wasn't any particular difference whether we consider the industry or agriculture.
It's true that the Soviet economy experienced a massive growth during first decades of the planning system, but it did so despite the waste and inefficiency, not as a result of lack of it. The real reason for it was not the efficient nature or other virtues of 'planned command economy', but the extreme (beyond sustainable and ruining to the population) rate of investment in industrialization. That did in fact result in transforming the backward, agrarian Russian economy and obviously multiplied its output. But it did so at the cost of hunger, poverty and misery of civilian population. Most importantly, that growth was completely unbalanced and led to structural problems that doomed the soviet economy in the long run, as it was based entirely on development of heavy and armaments industries. What was missing was any consideration of value added to the economy, but for that one would need a measure, so a real price, so the market.. and here we go down the rabbit hole again... Let me just say this: the practical absurdities of underpinnings of the Soviet economy and the gargantuan waste as its permanent fixture are so widely described in literature, that it's really hard to miss it if one reads pretty much anything touching on the subject.

You have actually contradicted yourself here. The reason for the astonishing rate of investment is because no price structure was used in its allocation. No system that has a price structure is capable of that level of investment. That level of growth is only possible because the Soviets were able to cannibalise their civilian economy to hyper industrialise.

In addition, you have frequently referred to Soviet wastage and stated how it 'so widely described in literature'. However, I have not read any indication that Soviet manpower or resources were poorly allocated in the establishment or running of heavy industry. The primary factors identified by most economists in the collapse of the Soviet economy is due to a combination of slow technological penetration, a measuring system that emphasised static allocative efficiency vs dynamic efficiency (which is why the Soviet Union is actually MORE efficient than the capitalist west by some measures) and lower long term marginal returns to capital. This is not to argue that the Soviet planned economy was efficient or effective as a complete entity or was sustainable in the long term. All of your criticisms are valid for the Soviet economy broadly, but viewed from the narrow perspective of the Soviet war effort it was highly efficient, with only the American economy outcompeting the Soviets in terms of productivity per unit manpower in heavy industry and general war production (aircraft engines being a notable exception) as well as productivity per unit of input.

Be careful that you are not caught in a trap of your assumptions about the Soviet economy. Just because if failed in the long term does not mean it did not perform very well by some specific measures and in some circumstances. To illustrate with a metaphor, just because Rolls-Royce failed as an automobile company in the long run does not mean they made bad cars. The Soviet economy was very efficient at allocating resources (material and human) to maximise production, but proved to be poor at allocating resources to maximise efficiency growth. Only the first factor was critical to the short period of 1941-1945.

 

[1 Star General]

You have actually contradicted yourself here. The reason for the astonishing rate of investment is because no price structure was used in its allocation. No system that has a price structure is capable of that level of investment. That level of growth is only possible because the Soviets were able to cannibalise their civilian economy to hyper industrialise.

Hmmm... I don't see any contradiction here....? I wrote precisely, that lack of real prices led to misallocation of resources and waste. Redirecting the investment beyond sustainable limits in which resources could be rationally used, or to put it another way, efficiently absorbed, and on top of that by means of 'cannibalizing' civilian economy (as you aptly described it) has to be considered as waste and is the testament of inherent inefficiency and wasteful nature of the Soviet economy. They were able to hyperindustrialize, but in a highly inefficient and unsustainable manner. To bring it to grassroots level of understanding - taking a serf out of his field and putting him in front of a machine, will no doubt multiply his productive output - on paper that leads to growth. But if he and millions like him manufacture t26 tanks in peacetime (in this part I think we mainly talk 20's and 30's) that are of no use to anybody, while the the population starves and walks around with no shoes on their feet , it is highly dubious that you could call what he generates a 'real growth'.

In addition, you have frequently referred to Soviet wastage and stated how it 'so widely described in literature'. However, I have not read any indication that Soviet manpower or resources were poorly allocated in the establishment or running of heavy industry. The primary factors identified by most economists in the collapse of the Soviet economy is due to a combination of slow technological penetration, a measuring system that emphasised static allocative efficiency vs dynamic efficiency (which is why the Soviet Union is actually MORE efficient than the capitalist west by some measures) and lower long term marginal returns to capital.

The colossal waste and misallocation was endemic. The best source to apprehend the scale of it is the literature published after 1989 by historians and economists in post-communist states, based on archival data (only available after communism collapse). There would be a lot of good references I could give you, but in Russian and Polish, which I doubt you read (I'm only familiar with it because I did a Political Economy of Communist States course as part of my postgrad curriculum in Poland). The results of this archival based research is also rather slowly filtering to English language literature, since interest in USSR economy really bottomed soon after it's collapse. I guess a good source in English for the general picture would be Stepen Kotkin's books. But, since I don't want to leave it at - trust my word - I'll recommend you few free access sources in English that deal with the topic with 'case study' approach, but who's conclusions are applicable to the scale of the whole economy:

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.599.7534&rep=rep1&type=pdf

https://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/WP0130.pdf

When it comes to misunderstandings regarding comparisons between Western and Soviet economical efficiency, you might wanna take a look at:

https://jdeanicite.typepad.com/files/why-does-the-soviet-economy-appear.pdf

Be careful that you are not caught in a trap of your assumptions about the Soviet economy. Just because if failed in the long term does not mean it did not perform very well by some specific measures and in some circumstances. To illustrate with a metaphor, just because Rolls-Royce failed as an automobile company in the long run does not mean they made bad cars. The Soviet economy was very efficient at allocating resources (material and human) to maximise production, but proved to be poor at allocating resources to maximise efficiency growth. Only the first factor was critical to the short period of 1941-1945.

Focusing on 1941-45 period, there is no reason to believe that already wasteful and inefficient Soviet economy got suddenly better at allocating resources in the time of war induced crisis. If anything, it got way worse because of chaos of industry relocation (inevitable chaos, I might add, I won't blame that on Soviet regime). Somebody rightfully pointed out in this thread that Soviet economical performance in wartime can't be judged in isolation, as Lend Lease was a major factor, and I think that explains a lot. I think the Soviet survival was hanging on a thread and the totalitarian command over the economy enjoyed by Stalin helped in this particular instance, but it was rather through ability of cental power to overcome the naturally ensuing chaos, than through inherent advantages in maximizing output - as you seem to suggest.

 

[Victor1234]

The Nazi bureaucracy actually was significantly more prone to in-fighting and duplication of effort than the Allied one, in large part because Hitler encouraged that approach in order to keep his various subordinates in check. FDR wasn't worried as to whether or not his Secretary of War was plotting to overthrow him, so he didn't worry about encouraging him and the Secretary of the Navy to work together. Hitler did have to worry about possibly being overthrown/assassinated (and indeed, there were frequent conspiracies against him, with the July 20 Plot only being the most famous), so he encouraged division and emphasized loyalty rather than competence as the most important virtue. Stalin had those threats as well, but he'd pretty much cowed everyone by that point.

A good contrast is the Allied and Nazi atomic weapons programs. The Allies determined "this program is potentially vital to our war effort" and so created a single, unified project and gave it all the resources it needed to succeed. As a result, the Allies created an atomic bomb and were able to deliver it by mid-1945. Various Nazis said "this program is potentially vital to our war effort" and so created a plethora of uncoordinated, undersourced programs to make sure that their department was the one who would get credit (famously, even the Post Office had its own atomic weapons project). As a result, the Germans never came close to creating an atomic weapon, and had barely managed to get a more-or-less functional reactor going by 1945 (something the Americans had done within a year of Pearl Harbor).

In addition to the other books that have been recommended on this thread, I'd strongly recommend Alsos by Sam Goudsmit. He was the scientific head of the Anglo-American team sent in after D-Day to assess Nazi progress in nuclear weapons (originally to determine whether or not the Nazis were likely to be able to deploy a bomb against the Allies as they invaded Germany, later to secure as much of their personnel and materials as possible before the Soviets or French got a hand on it), and that is his memoir of the mission. A big theme of his work is the role that the Nazi approach to science and planning had in undermining their scientific success.

Thank you for the interesting book recomendation! This has been the most interesting book I've read in a long time. Do you have any other sources?

Goudsmit's writing style conveys very clearly a smug, superior attitude, which is the exact thing he cites as the primary cause of the Nazi scientists' failures (whether personal or professional).....in fact, aside from mentioning that a particularly manipulative Nazi scientist fooled him completely and derailed his investigation for some months, he's very hesitant to admit any mistakes, although he doesn't hold back criticism of the unit's offices in Paris, Washington or even the Colonel. I'd be interested in a second opinion.

Not to derail the interesting conversation around the efficiency of Soviet central planning, but shouldn't duplication of effort and in-fighting stimulate technological advancement rather than hinder it?

Realizing it's different time periods and scales of course, but how can duplicative and in-fighting European states surpass single, unified China technologically and the same principle doesn't apply in this case?

Edit: I'd be very interested in seeing someone *cough* @Semper Victor *cough* add observations around Soviet technological research as a kind of comparison. Clearly all three powers had differences and similarities in organization and externalities of research, but I'd be curious to see how Goudsmit's claim that scientists can only work effectively in a democracy, measures up against what came out of Soviet sharashkas.

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

Only in rocket technology were they significantly further ahead than the Allies. The Me-262 only entered service a few months earlier than the Meteor, and although it was in many ways a better design, it was not significantly more technologically advanced. Indeed, the political interference in the design of the Me-262, which delayed its production significantly, is a golden example of the general administrative incompetence of Nazi administration.

The solution you are referring to is not a solution to manpower issues, but rather a grotesque example of Nazi wastage driven by ideological issues. Again an example of Nazi ideology over reality.

As I said the misuse of the weapon by trying to make a jet bomber rather than a jet fighter which might have had a dramatic effect upon Allied bombers, or using the V weapons on London rather than the invasion embarkation port, is secondary to their development. And in that the Fuhrer's direct involvement is the downgrading factor, we agree.

Regarding the other: no one said it is a solution to the manpower issue, but a compounding of the problem by creating a massive drain of trained industrial workers Emigrated to the East and Evacuated in a project requiring men and material that was given higher priority than the war effort itself. Are you sure it should just be another line item under 'ideological waste'? You don't see this as a massive oversimplification that does nothing to explain that, perhaps, the Germans are fighting one war while the Nazis are fighting another?

 

[Rubidium]

Thank you for the interesting book recomendation! This has been the most interesting book I've read in a long time. Do you have any other sources?

Goudsmit's writing style conveys very clearly a smug, superior attitude, which is the exact thing he cites as the primary cause of the Nazi scientists' failures (whether personal or professional).....in fact, aside from mentioning that a particularly manipulative Nazi scientist fooled him completely and derailed his investigation for some months, he's very hesitant to admit any mistakes, although he doesn't hold back criticism of the unit's offices in Paris, Washington or even the Colonel. I'd be interested in a second opinion.

Not to derail the interesting conversation around the efficiency of Soviet central planning, but shouldn't duplication of effort and in-fighting stimulate technological advancement rather than hinder it?

Realizing it's different time periods and scales of course, but how can duplicative and in-fighting European states surpass single, unified China technologically and the same principle doesn't apply in this case?

Edit: I'd be very interested in seeing someone *cough* @Semper Victor *cough* add observations around Soviet technological research as a kind of comparison. Clearly all three powers had differences and similarities in organization and externalities of research, but I'd be curious to see how Goudsmit's claim that scientists can only work effectively in a democracy, measures up against what came out of Soviet sharashkas.

Yeah, Goudsmit is very much coming from a particular ideological slant. He's also, while ostensibly writing about the Nazi program, intentionally writing to influence the then-ongoing American political debates about nuclear policy in the immediate aftermath of the war, and should be read with that in mind. Still, I think he provides an interesting and thought-provoking take (and a very readable one), which is why I recommended him.

For other sources on the topic, Richard Rhodes' The Making of the Atomic Bomb remains the most readable introduction to the subject; it focuses on the Manhattan Project, but touches on other wartime atomic projects as well. Be aware though, it is dated in some respects: in particular it came out before both the fall of the Soviet Union (and the resulting brief opening of the Soviet archives), as well as before the release of the Farm Hall transcripts (which Goudsmit did have access to as part of his role in the Alsos mission).

The Farm Hall transcripts themselves were published in the mid-1990s, and are also available in book form. Basically, after the Alsos mission captured the various German nuclear scientists, they shut them up in Farm Hall in the UK, isolated from most outside contact, and then bugged their quarters to record what they talked about. Goudsmit makes some reference to these conversations (and uses them explicitly when he talks about the German scientists' reaction to the bombings of Hiroshima and Nagasaki), but they were only declassified and published in the early 1990s in a couple of different editions (one called Operation Epsilon in 1993, one with more commentary called Hitler's Uranium Club: The Secret Recordings at Farm Hall in 1996; there have probably been other releases since).

In addition, Colonel Pash (the military commander) published his own account of the Alsos mission in 1980 (called simply The Alsos Mission), which I confess I have not read, although I've been meaning to track down a copy for a while.

I'm not remotely versed enough in the Soviet nuclear program to comment on how their system differed.

 

[Yakman]

Hmmm... I don't see any contradiction here....? I wrote precisely, that lack of real prices led to misallocation of resources and waste. Redirecting the investment beyond sustainable limits in which resources could be rationally used, or to put it another way, efficiently absorbed, and on top of that by means of 'cannibalizing' civilian economy (as you aptly described it) has to be considered as waste and is the testament of inherent inefficiency and wasteful nature of the Soviet economy. They were able to hyperindustrialize, but in a highly inefficient and unsustainable manner. To bring it to grassroots level of understanding - taking a serf out of his field and putting him in front of a machine, will no doubt multiply his productive output - on paper that leads to growth. But if he and millions like him manufacture t26 tanks in peacetime (in this part I think we mainly talk 20's and 30's) that are of no use to anybody, while the the population starves and walks around with no shoes on their feet , it is highly dubious that you could call what he generates a 'real growth'.




The colossal waste and misallocation was endemic. The best source to apprehend the scale of it is the literature published after 1989 by historians and economists in post-communist states, based on archival data (only available after communism collapse). There would be a lot of good references I could give you, but in Russian and Polish, which I doubt you read (I'm only familiar with it because I did a Political Economy of Communist States course as part of my postgrad curriculum in Poland). The results of this archival based research is also rather slowly filtering to English language literature, since interest in USSR economy really bottomed soon after it's collapse. I guess a good source in English for the general picture would be Stepen Kotkin's books. But, since I don't want to leave it at - trust my word - I'll recommend you few free access sources in English that deal with the topic with 'case study' approach, but who's conclusions are applicable to the scale of the whole economy:

http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.599.7534&rep=rep1&type=pdf

https://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/WP0130.pdf

When it comes to misunderstandings regarding comparisons between Western and Soviet economical efficiency, you might wanna take a look at:

https://jdeanicite.typepad.com/files/why-does-the-soviet-economy-appear.pdf

Focusing on 1941-45 period, there is no reason to believe that already wasteful and inefficient Soviet economy got suddenly better at allocating resources in the time of war induced crisis. If anything, it got way worse because of chaos of industry relocation (inevitable chaos, I might add, I won't blame that on Soviet regime). Somebody rightfully pointed out in this thread that Soviet economical performance in wartime can't be judged in isolation, as Lend Lease was a major factor, and I think that explains a lot. I think the Soviet survival was hanging on a thread and the totalitarian command over the economy enjoyed by Stalin helped in this particular instance, but it was rather through ability of cental power to overcome the naturally ensuing chaos, than through inherent advantages in maximizing output - as you seem to suggest.

honestly we should get behind the idea that the Soviet economy before the war was wasteful and inefficient.

When the apocalypse happened, when the armies of Gog and Magog literally arrived at the end times, the Soviet economy was there to defeat them.

However many arguments can be made about the evils of Stalin- and they are many and they are legitimate- the claim that the Stalinist economy was a failure is demonstrably false

 

[Andre Bolkonsky]

When the apocalypse happened, when the armies of Gog and Magog literally arrived at the end times, the Soviet economy was there to defeat them.

Uhm, what?

 

[Henry IX]

. Are you sure it should just be another line item under 'ideological waste'?

Ideologically driven human resource spoilage? Sounds wonderfully Orwellian...

I take and agree with the point you are making. I was just confirming that when trying to understand the war in Europe and the reasons the Germans fought, and when and how they did it, is impossible to understand without accounting for ideology.

I'll recommend you few free access sources in English that deal with the topic with 'case study' approach, but who's conclusions are applicable to the scale of the whole economy:
http://citeseerx.ist.psu.edu/viewdoc/download?doi=10.1.1.599.7534&rep=rep1&type=pdf https://www.ebrd.com/downloads/research/economics/workingpapers/WP0130.pdf When it comes to misunderstandings regarding comparisons between Western and Soviet economical efficiency, you might wanna take a look at:
https://jdeanicite.typepad.com/files/why-does-the-soviet-economy-appear.pdf

Thank you for those references - the first one on automobile allocation was really interesting. However, they very much reinforce my point. None of them describe a state of massive waste within the pre-war Soviet economy. The only one that demonstrates actual comparative inefficiency, Employment concentration and resource allocation: one-company towns in Russia, describes the Russian economy in the 21st century. The 3rd paper, Why does the Soviet economy appear to be allocatively efficient? is one of the papers I looked at when describing the Soviet economy as efficient at static allocative measures. The economic weakness of the Soviet planned economy arises from poor marginal returns and slow technological adaptation rather than allocative inefficiency - leading to a progressive loss of comparative efficiency when compared with the West. This is not a problem in the early period of the Soviet economy due to the newness of the soviet infrastructure.

The first paper, The Wheels of A Command Economy: Allocating Soviet Vehicles actually shows how the Soviet economy managed a severe resource shortage during the critical period of the 1920s and 30s. Whilst the chaos of the allocation systems was not ideal, it likely worked better for the needs of the Soviet state than a price allocation model would have, as it allowed both rapid redeployment of resources during crisis and prevented extremely limited production from being to syphoned off to private display consumption. Again, long term this is not a good thing, but for the pre-war period it is critical in allowing the Soviet economy to produce the nearly miraculous production figures of the war.

To reiterate my point, I am not arguing that Soviet economy was stable and sustainable in the long term or that I was an effective way to run a country, but rather that it allowed the construction of an economy that was remarkably resilient and extraordinarily productive during the war. If you insist on viewing the Soviet economy as inefficient and broken from the beginning then the Soviet performance during the war is indeed inexplicable.

 

[Yakman]

Uhm, what?

The German Army was coming to the Soviet Union to kill everyone.

I can’t imagine a more chiliastic scenario than that.

Stalin doesn’t restore the Patriarch in 1943 for lack of understanding biblical reference.